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This anthology collects previously published seminal writings alongside 
new essays written especially for the present volume. The work on the pub-
lication began when we initiated a series of public symposia on extraterrito-
riality in various global locations in the framework of the ongoing artistic 
platform Exterritory Project. These events opened an indispensable discursive 
platform for us on the concept of extraterritoriality and instigated some of 
the contributions now included in the book. The first symposium, held in 
Paris in May 2012, was organized in collaboration with the Kadist Art Foun-
dation and the Evans Foundation. The second symposium took place in Jaffa 
in May 2012. The third event was hosted by Beit HaGefen Culture Center in 
Haifa in December 2013, while the fourth was organized in collaboration 
with the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam, which also hosted the event in 
March 2015.  We would like to express our deep gratitude to the writers 
whose inspiring essays are republished here as well as to those who gener-
ously agreed to engage in this effort.  It is with the great help of the contribu-
tors, the hosting institutions, and the project’s various supporters that this 
volume was made possible; we are grateful for their encouraging willingness 
to take part and aid. Our special thanks go to Sandra Terdjman, then-Director 
of the Kadist Art Foundation and currently Co-Founder and Director of Coun-
cil, for her keen involvement in organizing the first and third symposia and 
for her valuable and enduring faith in the project. We are also thankful for 
the dedicated help of Émilie Villez, current Kadist Director and Curator Léna 
Monnier of the Kadist Art Foundation as well as to Anne Davidian, Head of 
the Paris Office of the Evens Foundation. In addition, we thank Curator Jelle 
Bouwhuis and Assistant Curator Joram Kraaijeveld at the Stedelijk Museum; 
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Director and Curator Yeala Hazut and artist and Curator Farid Abu Shakra at 
Beit-HaGefen; Goethe-Institut Tel-Aviv, in particular Dr. Georg Blochmann; 
and Institut français de Tel-Aviv, in particular Olivier Tournaud. We owe a 
special debt of gratitude and appreciation to Tal Yahas, Dr. Anat Ben-David, 
Maya Feldman, Carolina Ben Shemesh, Dganit Turjeman, Renrad Gluzman, 
Shony Rivnay, Shlomo Gross and Alon Agmon, and to all those who sup-
ported the project over the years. In particular, we are forever indebted to 
the generosity of Vivian Ostrovsky and the Ostrovsky Family Fund. Finally, 





ity designates certain 
relationships between 
space, law, and representa-
tion. This collection of essays 
explores contemporary manifesta-
tions of extraterritoriality and the ways 
in which the concept has been put to use in 
various disciplines. Some of the essays were writ-
ten especially for this volume, while others are brought 
together here for the first time. The inquiry into extraterri-
toriality found in these essays is not confined to the established 
boundaries of political, conceptual, and representational territories 
or fields of knowledge; rather, it is an invitation to navigate the margins 
of the legal–juridical and the political, but also the edges of forms of repre-
sentation and poetics. 
Within its accepted legal and political contexts, the concept of extrater-
ritoriality has traditionally been applied to people and to spaces. In the first 
case, extraterritorial arrangements could either exclude or exempt an individ-
ual or a group of people from the territorial jurisdiction in which they were 
physically located; in the second, such arrangements could exempt or exclude 
a space from the territorial jurisdiction by which it was surrounded. The spe-
cial status accorded to people and spaces had political, economic, and juridi-
cal implications, ranging from immunity and various privileges to extreme 
disadvantages. In both cases a person or a space physically included within a 
certain territory was removed from the usual system of laws and subjected to 
another. In other words, the extraterritorial person or space was held at what 
could be described as a legal distance. (In this respect, the concept of extra-
territoriality presupposes the existence of several competing or overlapping 
legal systems, whether officially recognized or not.) It is this notion of being 






extraterritorialities in occupied worlds
This publication is a part of Exterritory Project, an ongoing art project that 
wishes to encourage both the theoretical and practical exploration of ideas 
concerning extraterritoriality in an interdisciplinary context. The project 
aims not only to draw on existing definitions of extraterritoriality but seeks 
to reload it with new meanings, searching for ways in which the notion of ex-
traterritoriality could produce a critique of discriminating power structures 
and re-articulate new practical, conceptual and poetical possibilities. 
The project was initiated in 2009 when we decided to screen a video com-
pilation of works by Middle-Eastern artists onto the sails of boats sailing in 
the extraterritorial waters of the Mediterranean as a response to the enduring 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict. We wished to create a neutral space to exhibit art 
that would be unrestricted by any single set of national constraints. Extrater-
ritorial waters seemed to us a space that could offer the suspension of the 
neighboring states’ regimes. 
The naval limits of sovereign territories were originally demarcated 
in order to establish trade relations between nations. In the Western legal 
tradition as articulated in the early seventeenth century, the high seas were 
perceived as a space of “experiential unruliness.”1 The extent of a state’s ter-
ritorial waters was originally defined by the range covered by a cannon shot 
fired from the state’s land territory out to sea. In ensuing centuries, the range 
of territorial waters became increasingly determined by the technological 
limits of a nation’s ability to wage war and exercise its control.2 For these rea-
sons, we wanted to launch the project in extraterritorial waters at the point at 
which the sovereignty of the state is no longer effective, if only symbolically. 
We commenced the project wishing to bring together artists and think-
ers from conflict areas where such meetings are normally forbidden. We de-
cided to initiate a meeting in the extraterritorial waters of the Mediterranean, 
openly inviting people from diverse disciplines to offer their interpretation of 
the concept of extraterritoriality and to project their artworks onto the sails 
of the participating boats. By using this unoccupied space and exploring dif-
ferent ideas of extraterritoriality, we wished to emphasize the need to create 
unstable sites that could depart from familiar ways of experiencing political 
1 Mireille Hildebrandt, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Enforce in Cyberspace?: Bodin, Schmitt, Gro-
tius in Cyberspace,” this volume, 188.
2 Cornelius van Bynkershoek, A Treatise on The Law of War (Clark, nj: The Law Book Exchange, 
2008). The establishment of cannon shot as a rule may be traced to the writings of several French 
and Dutch jurists from as early as the eighteenth century: see W.L. Walker, “Territorial Waters: The 
Cannon Shot Rule,” British Year Book of International Law, no. 22 (1945): 210.
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concepts. We sought to produce an image that would transgress the usual ter-
ritorial conventions of art exhibitions, where national politics and market in-
terests intersect. Under such conditions, works of art are exploited to promote 
national agendas and profits, and are, as such, often seemingly de-politicized. 
By exhibiting works of art in an extraterritorial space, we sought to challenge 
and recontextualize these conventions. During 2010, the project expanded 
into an ongoing collaborative art initiative that strove to provide a platform 
for producing and sharing knowledge, critical thinking, and various forms of 
artistic and cultural production. In particular, our goal was to explore the re-
lationships between various forms of what may be termed extraterritoriality. 
The idea that informs our exploration is that rather than being a single 
static form, extraterritoriality always involves a practice with its own logic 
of representation. Understanding extraterritoriality in such terms helps to 
explain its applicability in multiple and diverse types of discourse ranging 
from legal theory — where the concept designates both a legal status and a 
geographical jurisdiction — to sociology, political philosophy, literature, 
economy, architecture, and many others fields. Viewing extraterritoriality in 
this manner also helps explain why the concept has been applied to widely 
different, even conflicting phenomena. For these reasons, rather than trying 
to redefine what extraterritoriality is, we propose to adopt it as a vital prism 
from which to reflect on and decipher certain aspects and possibilities of con-
temporary political life. 
This book is an attempt to bring together for the first time seminal theo-
retical writings pertaining to the notion of extraterritoriality. In doing so, we 
hope to promote the production of new knowledge by exploring these and 
related notions. This endeavor is part of the Exterritory Project ’s effort to iden-
tify and rethink the unique features of extraterritoriality as a logic of repre-
sentation and to contribute to its broader understanding. 
Based as it is in the arts, this project builds on a view that extraterritori-
ality — the quality of being held at a legal distance — may characterize not 
only people and spaces, but any entity or thing that follows the same logic of 
representation, where “entities,” or “things,” may be physical objects, but also 
intangible entities such as visual images. Extraterritoriality regulates the 
function and circulation of people and things within space and across bor-
ders, sometimes by exclusion, sometimes by exemption. Under conditions of 
extraterritoriality, people and things are placed in a space that is beyond the 
reach of particular legal or political systems that would otherwise apply to 
16
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them. This book presents several attempts to expand this understanding of 
extraterritoriality to a wider range of objects and spheres of activity. 
As with all legal and political concepts, the concept of extraterritoriality 
has acquired different meanings in different historical contexts based on the 
myriad ways in which it has been put to use. Etymologically, the term “extra-
territoriality” is derivative of the Latin extra territorium — “outside the terri-
tory.” An examination of the different definitions of extraterritoriality, both 
historical and contemporary, not only reveals a complex dynamics between 
the term’s various early meanings (“being outside of one’s territory,” “hav-
ing no territory,” etc.), but also shows how new extraterritorial phenomena 
helped redefine these terms over time, imbuing them with new meanings. 
Since the establishment of the state system from the sixteenth century 
onward, the notion of extraterritoriality has emerged in various fields of 
knowledge, where it has been applied in different ways. Extraterritoriality is 
often dialectically defined in relation to and as a result of territoriality. That is, 
extraterritoriality is understood as a corollary of the post-Westphalian divi-
sion of the globe into distinct sovereign territories. However, the relationship 
between the concept of extraterritoriality and that of sovereign territoriality 
is much more complex. A more careful look at the history of extraterritorial-
ity shows that its origins were not simply derivative of territorial definitions; 
on the contrary, the notion of extraterritoriality and its applications have of-
ten been the product of attempts to evade territorially based laws (including 
those regulating the circulation of images). To understand the notion of ex-
traterritoriality as it is currently deployed, we must therefore conceptualize 
it within a larger context. As the essays in this volume suggest, such a context 
must also include literature and the arts. 
×
This anthology is divided into five parts. In doing so, we do not mean to erect 
closed borders within the book or limit the reader’s movement. Rather, we 
suggest this arrangement and the order of the essays within each section as a 
possible sequence, a recommended path for the reader to take. Moreover, to 
signify the fluidity and permeability of the book’s division into sections, the 
essay that concludes each section of the book presages some of the themes of 
the following one. The present selection of essays also suggests various links 
to writings from similar intellectual genealogies. Focusing on perceptions of 
17
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extraterritoriality presented in them, however, unravels the different read-
ings of these genealogies and sometimes even reveals essential distinctions 
in their applications.   
The book’s first part, “Extraterritorial Ethics,” comprises four interre-
lated essays, each offering a different interpretation of extraterritoriality. In 
the essay, “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other,” philosopher Em-
manuel Levinas develops a reinterpretation of the concept of the “rights of 
man.” Departing from the term’s original eighteenth-century meaning and 
surveying its subsequent development in Western thought, Levinas points 
to the risks and limitations of defending such rights within existing social, 
political, conceptual, and ideological frameworks. Stressing the need to de-
fend these rights beyond rational calculation and the law in general, Levinas 
resorts to extraterritoriality as a vital space from which forms of dictatorship 
and totalitarianism, but also the inequalities found in the liberal state, can be 
fought. According to Levinas, any effort to protect human rights must rely on 
the understanding that these rights are located outside the state; “defense of 
the rights of man,” he writes, “corresponds to a vocation outside the state […] 
a kind of extraterritoriality, like that of prophecy in the face of the political 
power of the Old Testament.”3 Furthermore, extraterritoriality is an essential 
site from which “the I frees itself from its ‘return to self,’ from its auto-affir-
mation, from its egotism of a being persevering in its being, to answer for the 
other, precisely to defend the rights of the other man.”4 In this sense, accord-
ing to Levinas, the rights of man and the rights of the other are inseparable. 
In “Extraterritoriality: Outside the State, Outside the Subject” philoso-
pher Robert Bernasconi explores Levinas’s conception of extraterritoriality 
in the larger context of his oeuvre. According to Bernasconi, Levinas’s aim 
was to account for the ethical threats to the “rights of man” posed by totalitar-
ianism but also by liberalism. To this end, he addressed certain dilemmas and 
antinomies in political philosophy such as the tensions between solidarity 
and the liberal articulation of individual freedom, between individualism or 
communitarianism, between multiple types of freedoms, between the pub-
lic and the private spheres as conceived in liberal and other ideologies, and 
so forth. Drawing on multiple sources, from Biblical prophetic and eschato-
logical traditions to Moses Mendelssohn and Karl Marx, Levinas eventually 
3 Emmanuel Levinas, “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other,” this volume, 37.
4 Ibid.
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turned to extraterritoriality as a dimension essential to the protection of the 
oppressed and for human freedom. According to Bernasconi, Levinas postu-
lates a conception of moral freedom that transcends phenomenology as an 
ethics of asymmetry, at the center of which is one’s self-imposed commit-
ment to defend the Other. In this manner, the “rights of man” are located both 
outside of the state and outside the subject, neither in the realm of politics 
nor in that of ethics, but in the extraterritorial conjunction between the two. 
In the next essay “The World Inhospitable to Levinas,” sociologist Zyg-
munt Bauman criticizes Levinas’s conception of morality in terms of a face-
to-face encounter with the Other, arguing that Levinas’s Other is no more 
than a mirror image of one’s responsibility. Unlike Bernasconi, then, Bauman 
locates Levinasian ethics within phenomenology. In place of the Levinasian 
approach, he emphasizes the importance of morals established on reason. 
Instead of basing ethics solely on acquaintance with the “other as a face,” he 
contends, we must also base it to some inevitable extent on the various so-
cial “masks” worn by “faceless” others.5 In addition, Bauman warns against 
the hazards of categorical stereotyping when adopting a model of the Other, 
highlighting the dialectical constraints of any ethics based on the “moral 
party of two.”6 He argues that in contemporary times, when economy has 
gained independence from the state, it is not ethics but rather “the real pow-
ers which decide the shape of things [which] have acquired a genuine ex-
territoriality.”7 The extraterritorial nature of power serves an extraterritorial 
elite whose “liquid” resources are extraterritorial as well. This state of affairs 
exempts the elite from the obligation or the need to “engage with [the] conse-
quences” affecting those who remain confined to locality and territoriality.8 
This process, Bauman argues, has made it more difficult to maintain a dis-
tinction “between the internal and global market, or more generally between 
the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of the state […] in any but the most narrow, ‘terri-
tory and population’ policing sense.”9 
In “Authentic Thinking and Phenomenological Method,” philosopher 
Steven Galt Crowell discusses the notion of authentic thinking as introduced 
by the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, in his Logical Investiga-
tions. In particular, Crowell examines the claim that Husserl’s concept of au-







thentic thinking enabled the move to a philosophy of speculation, that is, to 
speculative and constructive phenomenological approaches which argue for 
a givenness beyond human intuition. Revisiting Husserl’s claim that think-
ing itself is a form of intuition, Crowell suggests that the crucial distinction 
for Husserl is not between thought and intuition, but rather between intu-
ition and signification. While for Husserl “every expression has signification, 
whether or not it has an intuitive fulfillment,” some categorical formation of 
intuition might nevertheless remain merely “empty” or “symbolic.”10 Intu-
ition, Crowell stresses, “continues to play its cognitively critical or normative 
role with respect to signification, but it does so precisely as thinking, thus not 
as something foreign to the space of reasons.”11 In later readings of Husserl, 
this understanding of perception presents a break in Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy, allowing symbols to “have a life of their own.”12 According to Jean-Luc 
Marion, for example, this makes signification “a kind of givenness without 
intuition”:13 signification comes before intuition, of which it is the Other. 
Against this reading, Crowell claims that according to Husserl, “to say that 
signification can be ‘valid’ without a confirming intuition — that is, can be 
empty — is not yet to say that it is ‘extraterritorial’ with respect to intuition,”14 
for according to Husserl, signification is itself given intuitively. Crowell’s 
essay thus presents yet another entry point into rethinking Levinasian ex-
traterritorial ethics. By following the above logic of “authentic thinking,” 
Crowell reaches a somewhat similar conclusion to Bauman’s, claiming that 
Levinas’s view of the Other as transcending intuition can be traced back to 
our experience. 
Part two of the book consists of five essays exploring “Extraterritorial Ge-
ographies.” The first essay, Giorgio Agamben’s “Beyond Human Rights,” pro-
ceeds from similar ethical concerns invoked by Levinas. But whereas Levinas 
uses extraterritoriality as a spatial metaphor in order to resolve the abstract 
philosophical problem of the Other, Agamben turns to extraterritoriality in 
order to grapple with the very concrete spatial problem of stateless refugees; 
even more concretely, he proposes that adopting notions of extraterritorial-
ity may help resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem. Accord-
ing to Agamben, the figure of the refugee marks the need to abandon cur-
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rent political concepts. The existing state of affairs, he claims, is a product of 
the nation-state system, which is based on the triad state–nation–territory. 
To solve the refugee problem, we must first re-examine and re-articulate 
the very concepts by which political subjects are represented. In his view, 
extraterritoriality (or “better yet, aterritoriality”) could serve as a general-
ized “model of new international relations.”15 Accordingly, Jerusalem could 
be governed by a mutual condition of extraterritoriality, creating a multifac-
eted collective political space: “Instead of two national states separated by 
uncertain and threatening boundaries, it might be possible to imagine two 
political communities insisting on the same region and in a condition of exo-
dus from each other — communities that would articulate each other via a 
series of reciprocal extraterritorialities in which the guiding concept would 
no longer be the ius (right) of the citizen but rather the refugium (refuge) of 
the singular.”16 
In “Islands: The Geography of Extraterritoriality,” Anselm Franke, to-
gether with Eyal and Ines Weizman, maps diverse extraterritorial phenom-
ena that often inhabit concrete spaces of legal and political voids. These in 
turn shape landscapes of islands of exclusions, topographies of free-floating 
legal lacunae, enclaves of “abused geographies,” but also forms of utopia and 
the contours of attempts to create a better place.17 Focusing on such “extra-
territorial islands” as churches, tax-free ports, and city-states offering refuge 
from prosecution, they trace their architecture to pre-Westphalian Europe, 
before the advent of territorial sovereignty. Extraterritoriality, they write, “is 
rooted in the concept of sovereignty, although it is usually considered as its 
violation.”18 Surveying the ways in which extraterritorial islands served for 
colonial territorial expansion, they contend that “figures of extraterritorial-
ity returned to haunt current political order”19 and can be identified in con-
temporary extraterritorial military camps, in special enterprise zones, but 
also in zones of humanitarian intervention and refugee camps, to give just 
a few examples. Often operated by deterritorialized powers as a way to en-
hance the flow of people beyond the borders of the state, such extraterritorial 
islands mark the limits of the current spatio-political regime. 
15 Giorgio Agamben, “Beyond Human Rights,” this volume, 115.
16 Ibid.
17 See, e.g., Anselm Franke, Eyal Weizman, and Ines Weizman, “‘Islands’: The Geography of Extrater-





The question of what exists beyond the limits of political spaces is the 
point of departure for geographer Stuart Elden’s “Outside Territory.” Ter-
ritory, Elden writes, is often defined in terms of what it encompasses, as a 
“bounded space” or “a bordered power container.”20 The concept requires a 
more complex definition, however, to account for the varied practices that 
shape its meanings across time and space, but also to capture its relationship 
with other geographical concepts and spatio-political orderings. Noting that 
in Latin territorium originally referred to the area surrounding a place and 
marking its outside, Elden proposes that we look at conceptions of “outside 
territory” in the Western literary canon, especially in the plays of William 
Shakespeare, written in the seventeenth century around the time modern 
sovereign territories were conceived. We can think of the Homeric story of 
Odysseus’s adventures on his journey home, the “outside” as the domain of 
King Lear’s madness, or as a lawless zone of rape and murder in Titus Androni-
cus; the idea of exile as punishment; the tension between common and pri-
vate landownership — all these instances of being outside a political space 
echo the imaginary ways in which extraterritoriality has been represented. 
Angus Cameron’s “Where Has All the (Xeno)money Gone?” is an attempt 
to understand two recent financial crises in which trillions of dollars evap-
orated: the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis and the so-called Flash Crash of 
2010. The answer Cameron proposes to his titular question is that we must 
rearticulate the question itself by historically and conceptually exploring the 
spatiality of money and its intrinsically extraterritorial nature. Money, he 
claims, is a legal rather than a material entity — the product of a vast system 
of laws. But whereas many view money as created purely on a national level 
by state apparatuses, it is in fact the product not only of national but also of 
international laws. By combining historical and sociological perspectives 
with insights drawn from literature and the arts, Cameron discusses the ways 
money has been used as an extraterritorial tool, both to consolidate territo-
ries and to circumvent the state’s legal space. According to Cameron, we must 
reject misleading perceptions of money as territorially “fixed,” as “connected 
unambiguously to a territory or territories.”21 Instead, he claims, we must 
understand money as transcending the territorial borders of sovereign states.
20 Stuart Elden, “Outside Territory,” this volume, 123.
21 Ibid., 139.
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Cameron’s critique of the territorial view of money finds certain parallels 
in anthropologist Victoria Bernal’s discussion of cyberspace in her essay “Ex-
traterritoriality, Diaspora, and the Space of Cyberspace.” Just as Cameron ar-
gues that money is not to be construed as primarily territorial, Bernal claims 
that cyberspace should not be cast in purely territorial terms. However, 
should it be conceived in purely extraterritorial terms, either: neither territo-
riality nor extraterritoriality, she contends, enable us to understand the full 
complexity of cyberspace. In her essay, Bernal examines the extraterritorial 
online participation in national politics by Eritrean diaspora against the op-
pressive Isaias Afewerki regime. Through an analysis of the complex spatial-
ity of cyberspace, she explores how the diverse ways in which cyberspace 
is utilized reshapes the borders of citizenship and extraterritorial belonging. 
Resistance and criticism, Bernal claims, can be practiced from varied territo-
rial locations through an extraterritorial network of diasporic communities. 
In this respect, cyberspace transcends the territorial–extraterritorial dichot-
omy, serving instead as a kind of “extra territory,” a “national space that is 
outside the nation and free of government control.”22 
The spatiality of the Internet is elaborated from another point of view in 
the opening essay of the next section, “Extraterritorial Crimes,” whose four 
essays present a juridical and conceptual discussion of the borders of law en-
forcement. In “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Enforce in Cyberspace?: Bodin, 
Schmitt, Grotius in Cyberspace,” Mireille Hildebrandt confronts the legal 
challenges posed by cross-border cybercrimes vis-à-vis the borders of state 
jurisdictions and the current limits of territorial criminal law. In an “age of 
interconnected digital infrastructures,” she claims, certain questions emerge 
regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction.23 In this context, Hildebrandt explores 
the meanings of jurisdiction and territory in modern Western legal-philo-
sophical thought. Pointing to the possibility of unbounded territorial juris-
diction, she explores the potentialities opened up by conceiving cyberspace 
in comparison with extraterritorial maritime space. In particular, she probes 
the affinities between cyberspace and maritime law, especially in relation to 
the law of war and global free trade. Among other questions, Hildebrandt ex-
amines whether the territorial understanding of cyberspace is productive or 
even possible given the inability of cartographic technology to encompass 
22 Victoria Bernal, “Extraterritory, Diaspora, and the Space of Cyberspace,” this volume, 161.
23 Hildebrandt, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Enforce in Cyberspace?,” 177.
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the unique spatiality of extraterritoriality. Stressing the need to redefine the 
relations between spatiality and jurisdiction, Hildebrandt concludes that cy-
berspace must remain a res communis which “may not come under exclusive 
sovereign control” — a space accessible to the public, yet conducive to the 
enforcement of human rights.24 
In “The Rise of Legal Cosmopolitism: Denationalization and Territorial-
ization of Law,” Julien Seroussi, member of the French International Crime 
Unit and former analyst at the International Criminal Court (icc) at The 
Hague, underscores the challenges of prescribing and enforcing internation-
al criminal justice by exploring the tension between the universalization of 
criminal jurisdiction and the primacy of national sovereignty. Through this 
lens Seroussi reviews the historical development of international criminal 
law, locating its origins in both national criminal law and public interna-
tional law. Particular attention is given to the ways in which the cataclys-
mic events of the twentieth century — the two World Wars and the Cold 
War — shaped the expanding application of international law, from transna-
tional criminality to human rights violations. 
More than just a historical survey, Seroussi’s essay examines actual cas-
es of conflict between territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction handled 
by the International Criminal Court. The conflict between icc rulings and 
diplomatic immunity is represented by the failure to arrest former Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet and Sudanese president Omar El-Beshir despite is-
sued warrants, while the limits of the icc as an international investigative 
institution are discussed in reference to the trial of former Congolese militia 
leader Germain Katanga. Though Seroussi stresses the importance of dena-
tionalizing criminal law, he also argues that encouraging individual states to 
enforce international law on a local territorial basis is in many cases crucial 
to investigative reliability. 
The failure of international institutions to “adequately tackle collective 
action problems”25 motivates the following essay, “Extraterritorial State Ac-
tion in the Global Interest: The Promise of Unilateralism,” by international 
law scholar Cedric Ryngaert. Since international institutions often prove un-
able to cope with global challenges, the latter, Ryngaert suggests, may best 
be met by expanding state law extraterritorially, that is, by allowing states to 
24 Ibid., 201.
25 Cedric Ryngaert, “Extraterritorial State Action in the Global Interest: The Promise of Unilateral-
ism,” this volume, 215.
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apply and enforce certain laws beyond their own borders. Though Ryngaert 
acknowledges the risks involved in states abusing extraterritorial power to 
promote their interests and imperialist ambitions, he challenges the passive 
role of states as bystanders in favor of cosmopolitan responsibility. The es-
say critically probes the principle of sovereignty in modern international 
law and the decline of its discursive force in favor of a rhetoric of human-
ity. To establish his claims, Ryngaert revisits the concept of hegemony and 
examines the relationship between conceptions of territoriality and policies 
of non-intervention. 
The last essay in this section, Ed Morgan’s “Franz Kafka: Extraterrito-
rial Criminal Law,” discusses the hazards posed by various states’ efforts 
to invoke extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to expand their power, with 
particular focus on the complex legal rhetoric involved in such efforts. Re-
flecting on the relationship between constitutionalism and international-
ism, Morgan looks at criminal cases that involve Supreme Court decisions 
concerning the boundaries of a state’s extraterritorial power. His focus is on 
Canada, which like other former British colonies was permitted to expand its 
sovereignty extraterritorially only when its constitution was severed from 
that of the United Kingdom in 1982. Morgan’s analysis is combined with a 
legal examination of Franz Kafka’s short story “In the Penal Colony.” Compar-
ing Kafka’s surprising reversals of “law and crime, reason and violence” with 
the way Canada’s Supreme Court justices deployed international arguments 
to promote constitutional goals, he concludes that “internationalism has 
become, in the Supreme Court’s hand, a medium of inflicting punishment, 
while constitutionalism has become a medium of enduring it.”26
The five essays of the book’s next section, “Extraterritorial Poetics,” ex-
plore the possibility of extraterritoriality as both an aesthetic and an ideo-
logical medium. In Martin Jay’s seminal essay “The Extraterritorial Life of 
Siegfried Kracauer,” the pioneering works of the Frankfurt School film theo-
rist are reviewed within the broad context of his personal and intellectual bi-
ography. Having fled Germany with the rise of the Nazi Party, Kracauer spent 
the rest of his life in exile, writing in a non-native language. Focusing on Kra-
cauer’s anti-psychological and anti-subjectivist analyses of Weimar cinema, 
Jay portrays him as leading an extraterritorial existence, not only geographi-
cally but also intellectually. Through the spatial metaphor of extraterritorial-
26 Ed Morgan, “Franz Kafka: Extraterritorial Criminal Law,” this volume, 272.
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ity, Jay also probes the temporal obscurities of Kracauer’s life and thought: 
adamant not to disclose his age, Kracauer viewed “chronology […] itself [as] 
an arbitrary code imposed by men.”27 In his view, thinkers must occupy an 
extraterritorial position in order to achieve self-transcendence — to bracket 
the self in order to achieve “openness to the material.” Extraterritoriality, for 
Jay, is thus a prism through which to understand Kracauer’s conception of 
time as the simultaneous co-existence of diverse temporalities. 
In their exploration of literary works by W.G. Sebald, Matthew Hart, and 
Tania Lown-Hecht build on some of Jay’s ideas to establish a unique percep-
tion of extraterritoriality as a form of poetics. Contesting the reductive appli-
cation of the term as interchangeable with a “state of multilingual plenitude 
and postnational migrancy,”28 the two identify extraterritoriality both as a 
recurring theme in Sebald’s works and as a distinct mode of narration char-
acterized by certain formal patterns. In the authors’ view, it is Sebald’s extra-
territorial prism that makes possible his abrupt shifts in perspective — from 
long shots to extreme close-ups, from vivid memories to an evasive present 
and from individual experiences to collective engagement. Sebald’s literary 
tactics are also informed, they claim, by the extraterritorial practice of excep-
tion — the creation of spaces in which law is suspended — making his extra-
territorial poetics an effort to understand the paradoxes of state violence. 
In the next essay, “The World and the Home,” Homi K. Bhabha propos-
es the notion of the unhomely to capture the post-colonial experience and 
rearticulate the distinction between the public and the private spheres. In his 
view of the relationship of the world and the home, “the intimate recesses of 
the domestic space become sites for history’s most intricate invasion.”29 “The 
unhomely,” he states, “is the shock of recognition of the world-in-the-home, 
the home-in-the-world.”30 This insight also applies in his view to the evasive 
borders between the historical and the fictional. Reflecting on expressions 
of the “unhomely” in works by Henry James, Toni Morrison, Rabindranath 
Tagore, Nadine Gordimer, and others, Bhabha argues that the aesthetic pro-
cess “introduces into our reading of social reality not another reified form of 
mediation — the art object — but another temporality in which to signify the 
‘event’ of history.”31 According to him, the “unhomely” is “inherent in [the] 
27 Martin Jay, “The Extraterritorial Life of Siegfried Kracauer,” this volume, 325.
28 Matthew Hart & Tania Lown-Hecht, “The Extraterritorial Poetics of W.G. Sebald,” this volume, 335.




extraterritorialities in occupied worlds
rite of ‘extraterritorial’ initiation” and connected to inhabiting the world, 
while at the same time representing its outside.32 
The connection between homelessness, extraterritoriality, and forms of 
representation is also among the themes of “Homeless Images: Kracauer’s Ex-
traterritoriality, Derrida’s Monolingualism of the Other” by Gerhard Richter. 
For Richter, philosophical thought and images are “means of dwelling within 
homelessness.”33 The image, he claims, turns “historical when it tells us of its 
own departure from history, capturing time most fully when it removes itself 
from time.”34 Precisely for this reason, however, images are incapable of fully 
representing the events they purportedly depict. In the book from which the 
essay is taken, Thought-Images: Frankfurt School Writers’ Reflections from Dam-
aged Life, Richter interprets the work of such theorists as Theodor W. Adorno, 
Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, and Siegfried Kracauer in order to explore the 
literary genre of the Denkbild, defined as an “image of reflection […] insepa-
rable from the aesthetic dimension of conceptual thought” and existing in a 
form of “perpetual displacement.”35 In the essay included here, he compares 
Kracauer’s concept of the “homeless image,” especially in relation to extrater-
ritoriality, with Derrida’s notion of exteriority in relation to language and the 
Other. These themes are discussed in the context of linguistic exiles and the 
ties between language and cultural identity. Instead of aspiring to the essen-
tialist “promised land of cultural identity,” Richter concludes, we must seek 
“the realm of extraterritoriality […] where selves can be recognized as the ones 
gathered and dispersed in language.”36 By doing so, he adds, we will also avoid 
the alienation inscribed in monolingualism. 
The relationship between extraterritoriality and language or speech 
is further elaborated in Caryl Emerson’s “Outer Word and Inner Speech: 
Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and the Internalization of Language.” Emerson looks at 
the attempts of Russian philosopher and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin and 
other members of the so-called Bakhtin Circle to synthesize two competing 
theories: Saussurean linguistic and semiotic theory on the one hand, Marxist 
theory of ideology on the other. For Marxists, the Saussurean approach was 
32 Ibid.
33 Gerhard Richter, “Homeless Images: Kracauer’s Extraterritoriality, Derrida’s Monolingualism of 
the Other,” this volume, 378.
34 Ibid., 377.
35 Gerhard Richter,Thought-Images: Frankfurt School Writers Reflections from Damaged Life (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), 1, 18, 36.
36 Gerhard Richter, “Homeless Images,” 421.
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suspect for its opposition between the social and the individual. Saussurean 
linguistic investigation was completely absorbed in an “inner logic of the sys-
tem of signs itself,” excluding “the ideological meanings that give the signs 
their content.”37 To reconcile the two theories, the members of the Bakhtin 
Circle rearticulated the interplay between language and consciousness. Rath-
er than viewing the sign and its effect as mental constructs, they relocated 
them in outer experience. This called for a reorientation of linguistic study, 
replacing individual psychology with the social phenomena of interrelation 
and interaction. In Bakhtin’s view, Emerson argues, the psyche is constituted 
by a spatial model comprising the individual’s communication with others, 
as well as by a parallel “inner speech” or internal relationship between the 
psyche and the outer world. According to Emerson, the crucial role ascribed 
by the Bakhtinian model to extraterritoriality is at the heart of the process 
that constitutes the psyche. For Bakhtin, the psyche, rather than an internal 
phenomenon, is a “boundary phenomenon,” “a space to be filled with ideo-
logical signs.”38 Extraterritoriality is a special status that the psyche enjoys 
which enables it to move between an external horizontal relationship with 
other individuals and an internal vertical relationship with the outer world. 
“The psyche,” Bakhtin thus argues, “enjoys extraterritorial status […] [as] a so-
cial entity that penetrates inside the organism of the individual person,” from 
social intercourse to outer speech, and from outer speech to inner speech.39
An understanding of extraterritoriality as the ability to move between 
spheres of representation, especially in relation to artworks, informs the 
opening essay of the book’s final section, “Extraterritorial Objects.” In “Valéry 
Proust Museum,” Theodor W. Adorno begins his discussion with the nexus 
between the museum and the mausoleum: both, he writes, are home to 
“objects to which the observer no longer has a vital relationship and which 
are in the process of dying.”40 By juxtaposing poet Paul Valéry and novelist 
Marcel Proust’s contrasting approaches to the museum, Adorno illustrates 
their different attitudes to art’s role and articulates his own. Valéry describes 
the museum as the place in which “Dead visions are entombed.”41 For him, 
Adorno writes, “art is lost when it has relinquished its place in the imme-
37 Caryl Emerson, “The Outer World and Inner Speech: Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and the Internalization of 
Language,” this volume, 425.
38 Ibid., 428.
39 Ibid.
40 Theodor W. Adorno, “Valéry Proust Museum,” this volume, 447.
41 Ibid., 449.
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diacy of life.”42 His “ultimate question” is “that of the possible use of the work 
of art.”43 For Proust, by contrast, “it is only the death of the work of art in 
the museum which brings it to life.”44 The work’s afterlife, or second life, is 
therefore located in the spectator of consciousness. For Adorno, Proust’s atti-
tude is somewhat extraterritorial. Criticizing Proust for overestimating “the 
act of freedom in art,” Adorno himself locates the artwork in the “force field” 
between the subject and the object.45 The notion of extraterritoriality is again 
implicit in his approach when he concludes that “[t]he natural-history collec-
tions of the spirit have actually transformed works of art into hieroglyphics 
of history and brought them a new content while the old one shriveled up.”46 
In the book’s final essay, “Subspatial and Subtemporal,” philosopher Graham 
Harman interprets the concept of extraterritoriality from the perspective of 
an object-oriented philosophy that conceptualizes the relationship between 
time, space and objects. Harman develops a fourfold model of objects based 
on the distinction between sensual and real objects and qualities (whereby 
real objects can have sensual qualities, and so forth). Spatial and temporal 
qualities are in his view sensual qualities; they are “the accidental chaff that 
shift atop the surface of any object, whirling like a kaleidoscope without 
changing the underlying object.”47 At the same time, space and time (like 
other sensual qualities) are the vehicles through which real objects can 
“announce their presence” to us; they are therefore “the sole emissaries of 
change in the world.”48 Real objects, in themselves, “are not localizable in any 
given place because they punch holes in every place they touch.”49 To have 
a sense of space, we must therefore find ways to mark the absence of real ob-
jects within it. According to this model, the extraterritorial qualities of space 
and time are crucial to understanding the reality of objects; extraterritorial-
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The rights claimed 
under the title rights of 
man, in the rigorous and almost 
technical sense which that expres-
sion has taken on since the eighteenth 
century — the right to respect for the human 
dignity of the individual, the rights to life, liberty, 
and equality before the law for all men — are based 
on an original sense of the right, or the sense of an original 
right. And this is the case, independently of the chronology of 
the causes, the psychological and social processes and the contingent 
variations of the rise of these rights to the light of thought. For today’s 
way of thinking, these rights are more legitimate than any legislation, more
than just any justification. They are probably, however complex their appli-
cation to legal phenomena may be, the measure of all law and, no doubt, of 
its ethics. The rights of man are, in any case, one of the law’s latent principles, 
whose voice — sometimes loud, sometimes muffled by reality’s necessities, 
sometimes interrupting and shattering them — can be heard throughout his-
tory, ever since the first stirrings of consciousness, ever since Mankind.
These rights are, in a sense, a priori: independent of any power that 
would be the original share of each human being in the blind distribution 
of nature’s energy and society’s influence, but also independent of the merits 
the human individual may have acquired by his or her efforts and even vir-
tues. Prior to all entitlement: to all tradition, all jurisprudence, all granting 
of privileges, awards or titles, all consecration by a will abusively claiming 
the name of reason. Or is it perhaps the case that its a priori may signify an 
ineluctable authority, older and higher than the one already split into will 
and reason and that imposes itself by an alternance of violence and truth; the 
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authority that is, perhaps — but before all theology — in the respect for the 
rights of man itself, God’s original coming to the mind of man.
These rights of man, that do not need to be conferred, are thus irrevoca-
ble and inalienable. Rights that, independently of any conferral, express the 
alterity or absolute of every person, the suspension of all reference : a violent 
tearing loose from the determining order of nature and the social structure 
in which each of us is obviously involved; an alterity of the unique and the 
incomparable, due to belonging of each one to mankind, which, ipso facto and 
paradoxically, is annulled, precisely to leave each man the only one of his kind. 
A tearing loose and a suspension — or freedom — which is no mere abstrac-
tion. It marks the absolute identity of the person, that is, of the non-inter-
changeable, incomparable and unique. A uniqueness beyond the individuali-
ty of multiple individuals within their kind. A uniqueness not because of any 
distinctive sign that would serve as a specific or individuating difference. A 
unity prior to any distinctive sign, a uniqueness logically indiscernible from 
the first person. A uniqueness that is not forgotten, beneath all constraints 
of Being, History, and the logical forms that hold it in their grip. It remains 
concrete, precisely in the form of the various rights of man, claimed uncon-
ditionally, under the various necessities of the real, as various modes of free-
dom. Later, I shall discuss the phenomenology of these claims, the structure 
of the consciousness in which they take shape concretely.
The rights of man manifest the uniqueness or the absolute of the person, 
despite his or her subsumption under the category of the human species, or 
because of that subsumption. This is the paradox, or mystery, or novelty of 
the human in being, which I have just stressed. It seems to me to be suggested 
by a remarkable talmudic apologue, which I quote:
Grandeur of the Holy-Blessed-Be-He: Behold man, who strikes coins with 
the same die and gets coins all alike: but behold the King of kings, the 
Holy-Blessed-Be-He, who strikes all men with the die of Adam and not 
one is the same as another. That is why each is obliged to say: The world 
was created for me!1
The fact that the identity of species can include the absolutely dissimilar, a 
multiplicity of non-additive, unique beings — that the unity of Adam marks 
1 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin, 37a.
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the individuals of incomparable unique ness in which the common species 
disappears and in which the individuals cease being interchangeable like 
coins — that they affirm themselves to be, each one, the sole purpose of the 
world (or the sole one responsible for the real): surely this is the trace of God 
in man, or, more precisely, the point in reality at which the idea of God comes 
only to man. This is a possible meaning of that apologue, which is not the 
equivalent of some deduction of the rights of man on the basis of a prior Rev-
elation, but means, on the contrary, the coming of the idea of God on the basis 
of the patency of the rights of man.
That the rights of man or respect for those rights does not proceed from the 
sternness or the grace of God, as the latter are expressed in theologies appeal-
ing to Revelation, that is, to “truths about God” already acquired elsewhere 
(an appeal that would still bear witness to the extra-ordinary aspect of those 
rights, recognized as super-natural, but also already to the jurisprudence 
and mediation of the religious authorities) — that has been, since the Renais-
sance, the trait that has characterized the consciousness of the rights of man.
2. the broad notion of the rights of man
The possibility of ensuring the actual enjoyment of these rights — of making 
the facts respond to the unconditional claim to human freedom and all the 
rights therein implied, despite the weight of physical and political necessity, 
and even despite the violence in which the person may experience the pure 
undergoing of the things of the world — this possibility is not immediately 
given. The conditions for the respect of these rights are only apparent once 
man has already assumed his first right, in becoming aware of the natural 
and social determinism that hampers the person, and once, consequently, he 
catches sight of the practical procedures, issuing from that knowledge, capa-
ble of freeing the person from these pressures and of subordinating them to 
the exercise of his rights.
The taking up of one’s freedom from within knowledge is not an inevi-
table fact for the humanity of all eras and all lands. A taking up of freedom 
which is itself free! That is a revolutionary act in the most radical sense of 
the term. It is the mark of an era and a civilization, an event of the Western 
world! Science and the possibilities of technology are the first conditions for 
the factual implementation of the respect of rights of man. Technical develop-
ment thanks to the flourishing of theoretical knowledge [savoir] through which Eu-
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ropean humanity passed on its way toward its modernity is probably, in itself, the 
essential modality in which the idea of the rights of man, placed at the center of self-
awareness, broadened in its conception and was inscribed or required as the basis of 
all human legislation; which legislation at least thought of itself as being the rights 
of man in their indispensable or hoped-for entirety. A rational discipline, born in 
Europe, could broaden out and be available to all humanity. Into a world that 
until then was felt to be doomed to an arbitrary play of forces that (natural 
or supposedly supernatural, individual and social) only counted in propor-
tion to their power, in the obstinacy that Beings and institutions invest in 
persevering in their being and their traditions — there came the a priori of 
the rights of man understood as intellectual a priori, and becoming in fact the 
measure of all law. Since the Renaissance, the actual laws regulating society 
began to be judged in reference to so-called “natural” law, which, as we know, 
means the latter’s belonging to the order of truths bearing intelligibility and 
evidence and deriving, one way or another, from a consciousness of the rights 
of man. Need I recall the works of such men as Hugo Grotius and Puffendorf, 
in the seventeenth century, who developed the idea of law based on consid-
erations similar to those of mathematics? The mind was thought capable of 
working from its own foundation, from its “innate” ideas, to undertake and 
carry out the construction of the Realm of Law. A law that would be valid in-
dependently of all tradition, indifferent to the empirical data of accepted laws. 
To other thinkers, the legal givens themselves seemed to make possible the 
formulation of these fundamental rights by induction, after a fashion. Mon-
tesquieu reduced the diversity of positive laws to determined principles, and 
brought out the spirit of those laws and their systematic interdependence.
Henceforth there would be attached to the notion of the rights of 
man — inseparably, and in ever-increasing numbers — all the legal rules that 
are the necessary conditions for the actual exercise of those rights. Behind 
the rights to life and security, to the free disposal of one’s goods and the equal-
ity of all men before the law, to freedom of thought and its expression, to edu-
cation and participation in political power — there are all the other rights 
that extend these, or make them concretely possible: the right to health, 
happiness, work, rest, a place to live, freedom of movement, and so on. But 
also, beyond all that, the right to oppose exploitation by capital (the right 
to unionize) and even the right to social advancement; the right (utopian or 
Messianic) to the refinement of the human condition, the right to ideology 
as well as the right to fight for the full rights of man, and the right to ensure 
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the necessary political conditions for that struggle. The modern conception 
of the rights of man surely extends that far! True, it is also necessary to ascer-
tain the urgency, order and hierarchy of these various rights, and to enquire 
as to whether they may not compromise the fundamen tal rights, when all 
is required unreflectively. But that is not to recognize any limitation to the 
defense of these rights; it is not to oppose them, but to pose a new problem in 
connection with an unquestionable right, and, without pessimism to devote 
necessary reflection to it.
Thus the dynamic and ever-growing fullness of the rights of man appears 
inseparable from the very recognition of what are called the fundamental 
rights of man, from their requirement of transcendence, in a sense, of the in-
human that may be contained in pure nature, and of blind necessity in the so-
cial body. The uniqueness and irreducibility of human persons are respected 
and concretely affirmed by the diminishing of the violence to which they are 
exposed in the order, or disorder, of the determinism of the real.
But the development of science and technology which are supposed to 
make possible the actual respect for the enlarged rights of man may, in turn, 
bring with it inhuman requirements that make up a new determinism, threat-
ening the free movements that it was to make possible. For example, in a to-
tally industrialized society or in a totalitarian society — which are precisely 
the results of supposedly perfected social techniques — the rights of man are 
compromised by the very practices for which they supplied the motivation. 
Mechanization and enslavement! And this is the case even before adducing 
the banal theme of the necessary connection between technical advances, 
the development of destructive armaments, and the abusive manipulation of 
societies and souls. Whence a dialectic that could be too easily led toward the 
challenging or the condemning of technology, without any hope of a possibil-
ity of equilibrium, an eventual turning back of science and technology upon 
themselves. These are problems that cannot go undiscussed, for it is not only 
a new development of the rights of man in “civilized” countries that depends 
upon technical progress, but also respect for the elementary rights of man in 
the “third” and “fourth” worlds, threatened by disease and hunger. 
3. the rights of the other man
But do not the rights of man (that is, individual freedom, the uniqueness of 
the person) also run the risk of being belied or infringed upon by the rights 
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of the other man? What Kant calls “a kingdom of ends” is a plurality of free 
wills united by reason. But is the freedom of one not, for another’s will, the 
latter’s possible negation, and thus at least a limitation? Is it not a principle 
of possible war between multiple freedoms, or a conflict between reasonable 
wills that must be resolved by justice? A just legality, in agreement with uni-
versal laws, would in Kant’s view be obtainable through the resolution of a 
plurality of opposing wills. And, indeed, through or with the rigor of justice 
being imposed upon the “incomparable uniqueness” of free persons, we wit-
ness the miraculous birth, a birth “out of suffering,” of the objective spirit of 
truth. But that justice represents nonetheless a certain limitation of rights 
and free will.
Is it so certain that the entire will is practical reason in the Kantian sense? 
Does the will not contain an incoercible part that cannot be obligated by 
the formalism of universality? And we might even wonder whether, Kant 
notwithstanding, that incoercible spontaneity, which bears witness both 
to the multiplicity of humans and the uniqueness of persons, is not already 
pathology and sensibility and “ill will.” There also remains the question of 
determining whether the limitation of rights by justice is not already a way 
of treating the person as an object by submitting him or her (the unique, the 
incomparable) to comparison, to thought, to being placed on the famous 
scales of justice, and thus to calculation. Whence the essential harshness of 
a law that offends, within the will, a dignity other than that which attaches 
to respect for universal laws. The dignity of goodness itself! The universality 
of the maxim of action according to which the will is assimilated to practical 
reason may not correspond to the totality of good will. 
Thus limited by justice, does not the fundamental principle of the rights 
of man remain repressed, and does not the peace it inaugurates among men 
remain uncertain and ever precarious? A bad peace. Better, indeed, than a 
good war! But yet an abstract peace, seeking stability in the powers of the 
state, in politics, which ensures obedience to the law by force. Hence recourse 
of justice to politics, to its strategies and clever dealings: the rational order 
being attained at the price of necessities peculiar to the state, caught up in it. 
Necessities constituting a determinism as rigorous as that of nature indiffer-
ent to man, even though justice — the right of man’s free will and its agree-
ment with the free will of the other — may have, at the start, served as an 
end or pretext for the political necessities. An end soon unrecognized in the 
deviations imposed by the practicalities of the state, soon lost in the deploy-
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ment of means brought to bear. And in the eventuality of a totalitarian state, 
man is repressed and a mockery made of the rights of man, and the promise 
of an ultimate return to the rights of man is postponed indefinitely.
This also means (and it is important that this be emphasized) that defense 
of the rights of man corresponds to a vocation outside the state, disposing, in 
a political society, of a kind of extraterritoriality, like that of prophecy in the 
face of the political powers of the Old Testament, a vigilance totally differ-
ent from political intelligence, a lucidity not limited to yielding before the 
formalism of universality, but upholding justice itself in its limitations. The 
capacity to guarantee that extraterritoriality and that independence defines 
the liberal state and describes the modality according to which the conjunc-
tion of politics and ethics is intrinsically possible.
But, given these considerations, in defending the rights of man, the lat-
ter should no longer be considered exclusively from the point of view of a 
conception of freedom that would already be the potential negation of every 
other freedom and in which, among freedoms, the just arrangement could 
only come from reciprocal limitation. Concession and compromise! The 
justice that is not to be circumvented requires a different “authority” than 
that of the harmonious relations established between wills that are initially 
opposed and opposable. These harmonious relations must be agreed upon 
by free wills on the basis of a prior peace that is not purely and simply non-
aggression, but has, so to speak, its own positivity. Its dis-interestment is 
suggested by the idea of goodness, a dis-interestment emerging from love, 
for which the unique and absolutely other can only mean their meaning in 
the loved one and in oneself. To limit oneself in the matter of justice, to the 
norm of pure measure, or moderation, between mutually exclusive terms, 
would be to revert to assimilating the relations between members of the hu-
man race to the relation between individuals of logical extension, signifying 
between one another nothing but negation, additions or indifference. In hu-
manity, from one individual to another, there is established a proximity that 
does not take its meaning from the spatial metaphor of the extension of a 
concept. Immediately, one and the other is one facing the other. It is myself 
for the other. The essence of the reasonable being in man designates not only 
the advent in things of a psychism in the form of knowledge, in the form of 
consciousness rejecting contradiction, that would encompass the other things 
under concepts, disalienating them within the identity of the universal: it 
also designates the ability of the individual, who initially appears to exist 
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relatively to the extension of a concept — the species man, to posit himself 
as the only one of his kind, and thus as absolutely different from all the others, 
but, in that difference, and without reconstituting the logical concept from 
which the I disengaged myself, to be non-in-different to the other. Non-in- 
difference, or original sociality — goodness; peace, or the wish for peace, ben-
ediction; “shalom”2 — the initial event of the meeting. Difference — a non-in-
difference in which the other — though absolutely other, “more other,” so to 
speak, than are the individuals with respect to one another within the “same 
species” from which the I has freed itself — in which the other “regards” me, 
not in order to “perceive” me, but in “concerning me,” in “mattering to me as 
someone for whom I am answerable.” The other, who — in this sense — “re-
gards” me, is the face.3
This is a goodness in peace, which is also the exercise of a freedom, and 
in which the I frees itself from its “return to self,” from its auto-affirmation, 
from its egotism of a being persevering in its being, to answer for the other, pre-
cisely to defend the rights of the other man. Non-indifference and goodness 
of responsibil ity: these are not neutral, midway between love and hostility. 
They must be conceived on the basis of the meeting, in which the wish for 
peace — or goodness — is the first language.
Should not the fraternity that is in the motto of the republic be discerned 
in the prior non-indifference of one for the other, in that the original good-
ness in which freedom is embedded, and in which the justice of the rights of 
man takes on an immutable significance and stability, better than those guar-
anteed by the state? A freedom in fraternity, in which the responsibility of 
one-for-the-other is affirmed, and through which the rights of man manifest 
themselves concretely to consciousness as the rights of the other, for which 
I am answerable. Their original manifestation as rights of the other person 
and as duty for an I, as my fraternal duty — that is the phenomenology of the 
rights of man. But in their original mise-en-scène, there is also the affirmation, 
as a manifestation of freedom, of the rights of the obligated person, not only 
as the result of a simple transference and thanks to a generalization of the 
rights of man as they appear in others to the obligated person. One’s duty 
2 Shalom — peace and benediction — in Hebrew, which resonates, in Psalm 120:7, as a way for a man 
to refer to himself: “I peace …”
3 [Translator’s note: In French, “l’autre me regarde” means both “the other looks at me” and “the 
other concerns me.” While both senses are “intended” in the passage, it is in the letter sense that 
the other is, for me, “visage” or face: and in this latter sense, normally considered the more “figura-
tive,” that Levinas makes primary.]
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regarding the other who makes appeal to one’s responsibility, is an invest-
ing of one’s own freedom. In responsibility, which is, as such, irrecusable 
and non-transferable, I am instituted as non-interchangeable: I am chosen 
as unique and incomparable. My freedom and my rights, before manifesting 
themselves in my opposition to the freedom and rights of the other person, 
will manifest themselves precisely in the form of responsibility, in human 






Beyond the Verse, 
written in 1981, 
Emmanuel Levinas poses 
the following provocative 
question: “Can democracy and 
the ‘rights of man’ divorce themselves 
without danger from their prophetic and 
ethical depth?”1 The question is clearly in-
tended to threaten the comfortable consensus that 
has gathered around these icons of our time and, more 
specifically, to displace what have come to be known under 
the title the “rights of man” from the context of the European 
Enlightenment with which they are so often identified. Levinas per-
forms this act of displacement in the first instance by relocating them 
within the tradition of the Jewish prophets. However, this effort ultimately 
leads him to a more radical displacement, one that amounts to a certain re-
placing of them, a relocating of them elsewhere altogether. What does that 
mean? What are its implications for the doctrine of the “rights of man”? 
In “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other,” an essay written 
about the same time as the preface to Beyond the Verse, Levinas answers the 
questions he poses there. He explains that the “rights of man” find their jus-
tification not within the political sphere alone, but outside the state from 
what he calls somewhat enigmatically “extraterritoriality.” More specifically, 
he refers to “a kind of extraterritoriality, like that of prophecy in the face of 
the political powers of the Old Testament.”2 My aim in this essay is to throw 
 An earlier version of this essay was delivered as a lecture at the Hangzhou International Confer-
ence on Levinas at Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China on September 11, 2006. I am grateful 
to the participants for their comments and to the organizers for their invitation. Originally pub-
lished as Robert Bernasconi: “Extraterritoriality: Outside the Subject, Outside the State,” in Levinas 
Studies: An Annual Review, vol. 3, ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2008), 
61–77. Reprinted with permission of Duquesne University Press. 
1 Emmanuel Levinas, Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, trans. Gary D. Mole (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1994), xv. Originally published as L’au-delà du verset (Paris: Minu-
it, 1982), 12–13.
2 Id., “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other,” this volume, 29–40. Originally published as 
Hors sujet (Cognac: Fata Morgana, 1987), 185.
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some light on these enigmatic notions of an extraterritoriality and an outside 
the state, and in particular to pursue the question of what they reveal about 
Levinas’s relation to liberalism. Within Western political thought, since the 
seventeenth century, to be outside the state is to be in the state of nature. 
Does Levinas’s use of the phrases “outside the state” and “extraterritoriality” 
amount to an underwriting of the state of nature? Does he join with liberal-
ism in locating the basis of the “rights of man” in the state of nature? Indeed, 
does Levinas’s appeal to the “rights of man” align him with liberalism? 
In the sentence that follows the reference to the defense of the “rights 
of man” to extraterritoriality, Levinas explicitly evokes liberalism and its 
contribution to the attempt to bring ethics and politics into relation: “The 
capacity to guarantee that extraterritoriality and that independence defines 
the liberal state and describes the modality according to which the conjunc-
tion of politics and ethics is intrinsically possible.”3 This is not Levinas’s only 
endorsement of liberalism. In an interview from 1988, he suggests that de-
mocracy and liberalism provide the possibility for an ethical corrective of 
politics. The work of justice involves comparing what is incomparable, but 
this cannot be done with a good conscience. That is why one must always be 
trying to correct the severity of justice, not least by enacting new legislation. 
Levinas privileges liberalism in this regard. He writes: “That is perhaps the 
very excellence of democracy, whose fundamental liberalism corresponds to 
the ceaseless deep remorse of justice: legislation, always unfinished, always 
resumed, a legislation open to the better.”4 Levinas in this place seems to be 
inviting his readers to think of him as an adherent of liberalism and some 
scholars read him this way uncritically.5
However, what makes this apparent celebration of liberalism somewhat 
surprising and ultimately misleading is the fact that Levinas was, from the 
time of his earliest essays, and most notably in “Reflections on the Philoso-
phy of Hitlerism” from 1934, outspoken in his critique of liberalism. He there 
acknowledges a certain debt of liberalism to the Judeo-Christian conception 
of freedom, but his focus is on the way that liberation by grace came in the 
3 Ibid.
4 Emmanuel Levinas, Entre nous: Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. M. Smith and B. Harshov (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998), 229–30. Originally published as Entre nous: Essais sur le penser-
à-l’autre (Paris: Grasset, 1991), 260. See also Francois Poirié, Emmanuel Levinas. Qui êtes-vous? (Lyon: 
La Manufacture, 1987), 98. Translated by Jill Robbins as Is it Righteous to Be? (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), 52.
5 See, for example, Thaddée Ncayizigiye, Réexamen éthique des droits de l’homme sous l’éclairage de la 
pensée d’Emmanuel Levinas (Boston: Peter Lang, 1997), 485.
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course of the Western tradition to be replaced in liberalism by autonomy.6 
This leads him to offer the following critique: 
Man in the liberal world does not choose his destiny under the weight 
of history. He does not know his possibilities as troubled forces churn-
ing within, that already orient him on a determined track. He sees them 
simply as logical possibilities offered to serene reason that chooses while 
eternally keeping its distance.7 
Levinas here is not simply drawing a distinction between positive and nega-
tive freedom: it is not a matter of a freedom for giving way to freedom from. 
He believes that, prior to modernity and at least in the West, freedom meant, 
paradoxically to us, being committed to the point of being captivated, and it 
was only subsequently confined to the now more familiar idea of a capacity to 
make arbitrary choices. Freedom, hitherto located in the whole human being, 
was in liberalism concentrated in the realm of thought. Furthermore, Levinas 
judges that a high price was paid for that shift in focus. It was, on his analysis, 
this degenerate conception of freedom, which included liberation from one’s 
body, that deprived Europe of the adequate intellectual resources to combat 
Hitlerism.8 By denying the evident significance of the body, liberalism left 
biological determinism without a credible alternative. In this way, Levinas 
already in 1934 sets out to find a way beyond both Hitlerism and liberalism.
Immediately after the end of the Second World War, in a brief essay wel-
coming Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, Levinas renews his attack on liberalism. 
This text is significant here because in it we see Levinas putting in question 
the ideas of the “rights of man.” Levinas complains that the Enlightenment 
was one-sided in its tendency to subordinate the world of concrete economic 
and social conditions to the inner realm in which thought is free. He employs 
an anecdote to illustrate the problem: 
In a memorandum that unesco recently circulated among philosophers, 
while preparing a report for the Unite Nations on the “rights of man,” the 
emphasis is on the antinomy facing reason when it tries to specify hu-
6 Emmanuel Levinas, Unforeseen History, trans. Nidra Poller (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2004), 15. Originally published as Les imprévus de l’histoire (Cognac: Fata Morgana, 1987), 32.
7 Levinas, Unforeseen History, 16 [32].
8 Ibid., 19 [38–39].
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man rights: personal freedom is inconceivable without economic libera-
tion, while the organization of economic freedom isn’t possible without 
an enslavement of the moral person — temporary but for an indetermi-
nate duration.9 
This antinomy has not only been the classic dilemma that all developing 
countries have faced in modernity when they are determining their order 
of priorities, it has also been the choice that since the late 1940s the two 
dominant ideologies imposed on those countries. But that is perhaps only 
another version of the problem that Levinas already identifies in “Reflec-
tions on the Philosophy of Hitlerism”: Either one allows human thought to 
be overwhelmed by historical, social, and economic phenomena, or the con-
crete situation in which we find ourselves is reduced to mere thought and 
structures of knowledge.10
Levinas continues the same train of thought in “The I and the Totality.” 
He explains that “The impasse of liberalism resides in the exteriority of my 
consciousness to myself,” an exteriority that exhibits one’s lack of identity 
with oneself.11 One finds the law of one’s actions, the meaning of one’s exist-
ence, even one’s own self-consciousness, not in the depths of one’s heart or in 
introspection, but outside oneself.12 It is outside oneself that one is asked to 
give an account of oneself.13 This is the crucial first step in Levinas’s attempt 
to overcome the opposition between individualism and communitarianism, 
the alternatives that, in one form or another, have shaped political philos-
ophy since the advent of modernity. It starts from the insight in 1934 that 
there is no isolated self-identical individual and culminates in 1968 in the 
insight that the self as self is for the other to the point of substitution, but 
nevertheless still separate from the other.14
Levinas was not the only philosopher who was convinced of the ultimate 
inability of liberalism to combat the threat posed by totalitarianism. Han-
nah Arendt’s questioning of the capacity of the “rights of man” to serve as 
9 Emmanuel Levinas, “Existentialism and Anti-Semitism,” October 87 (Winter 1999): 28. Levinas is 
referring to the “Memorandum and Questionnaire Circulated by unesco on the Theoretical Basis 
of the Rights of Man,” reprinted in Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations, ed. unesco (Lon-
don: Allan Wingate, 1969), 251–7.
10 Levinas, Les imprévus de l’histoire, 27–41.
11 Levinas, Entre nous: Thinking-of-the-Other, 23 [36].
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 30 [44].
14 I have chartered this itinerary in “No Exit: Levinas’s Aporetic Account of Transcendence,” Research 
in Phenomenology 35 (2005): 101–17.
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a resource with which to combat the persecution of stateless refugees par-
alleled Levinas’s own sense that liberalism and the much-vaunted values of 
the European Enlightenment were ill equipped to combat Hitlerism at its 
core. Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism in 1951 complained that the ex-
istence of stateless refugees had shown that the idea of the “rights of man” 
was worthless: the refugee was by definition stateless and as such without 
protection. Civil rights, the rights that belonged to citizens, proved to be the 
only rights worth having. Those who lacked citizenship were reduced to the 
status of mere human beings without anybody on whom they could rely.15 
In 1973, Levinas echoed Arendt’s observation and associated it with his ear-
lier suspicion of liberalism when, in “Antihumanism and Education,” after 
recalling the inhumanity of men towards their fellow men in the twentieth 
century, he asked himself: “Is this the fragility of humanism in Western liber-
alism? Is it a basic inability to guarantee the privileges of humanity of which 
humanism had considered itself the repository?” Levinas answered his own 
question this way: “We, as Jews, were the first to feel it.”16 
So what led Levinas to be apparently more open to liberalism by the time 
of “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other”? One cannot be sure, but 
the historical record points to Levinas’s study of the eighteenth century Jew-
ish thinker, Moses Mendelssohn. This took place when Levinas responded 
to an invitation to write a preface to a French translation of Mendelssohn’s 
masterpiece, Jerusalem. There are very few other references to Mendelssohn 
elsewhere in Levinas’s writings, but this preface offers one of his few major 
discussions of an Enlightenment thinker. It is also his only prolonged discus-
sion of any political thinker as such.17 In his essay on Mendelssohn, Levinas 
does not step back from his critique of “the fragility of Europe’s democratic 
institutions, which were unable to prevent two world wars, fascism and 
15 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1973), 293. Arendt’s ideas 
on this issue were given a renewed currency when they were recalled in the late 1980s and 1990s 
both by Julia Kristeva in Etrangers à nous-mêmes (Paris: Fayard, 1988), 220–29, translated by Leon 
S. Roudiez as Strangers to Ourselves (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 148–54; and by 
Giorgio Agamben in Homo Sacer, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998), 126–35.
16 Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Seàn Hand (Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1990), 152. Originally published as Difficile liberté: Essais sur le judaïsme, 2nd 
ed. (Paris: A. Michel, 1976), 360–1.
17 It is surprising that more attention has not been paid to this essay. For an exception, see Ephraim 
Meir, In Proximity: Emmanuel Levinas and the Eighteenth Century, eds. Melvyn New, Robert Bernasco-
ni, and Richard Cohen (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2001), 243–59. There are, of course, 
a few references to Thomas Hobbes, but no real engagement at any level of detail. See Cheryl L. 




Auschwitz,”18 but he also acknowledges the historical impact of the idea of 
natural rights, particularly for Jews, whose emancipation preceded and sur-
vived the holocaust. This text is of more than marginal interest here because 
Levinas identifies Mendelssohn as a representative of liberalism.19 Neverthe-
less, it is important to understand that Levinas recognizes this as a different 
kind of liberalism because of its radically different conceptions of freedom 
and of the relation between religion and the state. 
Levinas makes clear that the holocaust and the advent of the new philo-
sophical framework introduced by phenomenology have made much of Men-
delssohn’s philosophy unsustainable today. He celebrates the continuing rele-
vance of Mendelssohn’s “liberalist scruples,”20 but at the same time insists that 
the conception of freedom Mendelssohn introduced requires “a philosophical 
elaboration more complex” than that which Mendelssohn could provide in 
the context of the Enlightenment. I shall show here that “The Rights of Man 
and the Rights of the Other” is an attempt to supply this “more complex” elab-
oration in the form of an implicit critique of the original framework on which 
Mendelssohn relied. What is at stake is indicated by Levinas when he explains 
that Mendelssohn’s idea of freedom needs “a less abstract theology and an es-
chatology less unproblematically optimistic.”21 Levinas thereby announces 
that he plans to develop an idea of concrete freedom within the context of 
an eschatology divorced from teleology.22 Such an eschatology owes little or 
nothing to the philosophy of history introduced by Kant and Hegel, but in-
stead draws on Judaism. According to Levinas, the Jews of the nineteenth cen-
tury already recognized in Mendelssohn’s ideas of freedom and of the “rights 
of man” “something close to their own prophetic traditions.”23 However, it 
should be emphasized that Levinas, so far as I am aware, nowhere identifies 
a prophetic dimension in liberalism, except in relation to Mendelssohn. By 
contrast, he goes out of his way to emphasize a prophetic dimension to Marx-
ism, which he characterizes as having the interrupting force of ethics.24 This 
18 Emmanuel Levinas, In the Time of Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1994), 138. Originally published as A l’heure des nations (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1988), 
161.
19 Ibid., 139 [162].
20 Ibid., 138 [161].
21 Ibid., 144 [167–8].
22 See further Robert Bernasconi, “Different Styles of Eschatology,” Research in Phenomenology 28 
(1998): 3–19.
23 Levinas, In the Time of Nations, 138 [161].
24 Emmanuel Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans. Bettina Bergo (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 4. Originally published as De Dieu qui vient à l’ideé (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982), 19. See also 
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is, at least in part, because he appreciated its strong commitment to address 
the impact of the material dimension of poverty.
In order to emphasize the Judaic heritage he shares with Mendelssohn, 
Levinas, when introducing Mendelssohn’s radical idea of freedom, recalls the 
title of his first collection of confessional writings, Difficult Freedom.25 To be 
sure, in this book, Levinas is clearer about the philosophical problem posed 
by freedom than he is about the solution. When, in “A Religion for Adults,” 
he asks how Judaism integrated the need for a virtually vertiginous free-
dom into a desire for transcendence, he is in fact identifying a dilemma that 
haunts his own thinking from beginning to end.26 Nevertheless, elsewhere 
in the book, he brilliantly encapsulates his conception of freedom: “man’s 
freedom is that of an emancipated man remembering his servitude and feel-
ing solidarity for all enslaved peoples.”27 This sentence goes to the heart of 
Levinas’s philosophy, a philosophy born not from the individual’s experi-
ence of an arbitrary free choice,28 but from the solidarity of the oppressed 
that emerges from suffering at the hands of others. In that context freedom 
emerges as moral freedom.29
Surprisingly, given the idiosyncrasies of most of Levinas’s readings in 
the history of philosophy, his exposition of Mendelssohn relies on the best 
scholarship available to him. More specifically, he draws heavily on Alexan-
der Altmann’s essay, “The Quest for Liberty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Political 
Philosophy.”30 What Altmann supplies, and what Levinas certainly would 
ibid., 77 [126].
25 Id., In the Time of Nations, 144 [167].
26 Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 16 [32]
27 Ibid., 152 [201].
28 Ibid., 10 [24].
29 Ibid., 71 [98]. I have recently elaborated this idea, with its clear biblical resonances, in “Strangers 
and Slaves in the Land of Egypt: Levinas and the Politics of Otherness,” in Difficult Justice, ed. Asher 
Horowitz and Gadd Horowitz (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 246–61. To be sure, the 
question immediately arises as to the whether all share equally in this “memory of the totalitari-
anisms that still haunt today’s humanity” (Levinas, In the Time of Nations, 138 [161]). The privilege 
Levinas accords to Judaism in his philosophical works arises from its memory of suffering. His 
thereby comes to rely on a memory philosophy that seems to be available only to those who share 
in the cultivation of this memory. This raises serious questions about his attempt to translate He-
braic wisdom into a Jewish philosophy to one that is truly universal. I have explored these ques-
tions elsewhere, but by no means exhausted them.
30 Levinas cites the essay in the Hebrew version which appeared in Daat 5 (1980), with an English 
summary (23–4). The full English text appeared in a supplement to the Lessing Yearbook: Human-
ität und Dialog, ed. E. Bahr, E.P. Harris, and L.G. Lyon (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1982), 
37–65. On this topic, see also “Moses Mendelssohn über Naturrecht und Naturzustand,” in Ich han-
dle mit Vernunft…, ed. N. Hinske (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1981), 45–82. Altmann is the author of a 




not have been able to provide on his own, is an account of what is original in 
Mendelssohn’s contribution to social contract theory. Mendelssohn radical-
izes the sense in which the freedom of natural law cannot be limited by the 
social contract: the social contract is not a way to guarantee security, but a 
necessary step in the pursuit of freedom. There is not, as in Hobbes, an ex-
change where one sacrifices a measure of one’s freedom the better to enjoy 
what freedom is left to one. Freedom is moral freedom, in the sense of the 
exercising of beneficence, which one can only do effectively as a citizen.31 
According to Mendelssohn, in the state of nature one is already looking for 
fulfillment in beneficence. That is why he can say that it is for the sake of 
promoting beneficence that one takes on citizenship through the social con-
tract.32 One enters society not to avoid a state war but to fulfill a preexisting 
obligation, an obligation from which no agreement, tacit or explicit, could 
release one. It is in that sense that Altmann attributes to Mendelssohn “a 
moral, even a metaphysical” quality to freedom in its inalienability, a point 
Levinas makes his own by referring to a “quasi-ontological impossibility of 
relinquishing one’s freedom.”33 
Levinas repeatedly complains that the fact that the traditional concep-
tion of the “rights of man” is based on the right to a free will leads social 
contract theory to be faced with the problem of competing freedoms.34 In 
other words, because social contract theory takes its starting point in the in-
dividual within the state of nature, the advent of society is understood as a 
necessary attempt to address the problem of constraining and limiting those 
competing freedoms in such a way that we are persuaded to believe that we 
have imposed these limitations on ourselves. This complaint mirrors Men-
delssohn’s critique of his predecessors in social contract theory, and, follow-
ing Altmann, Levinas judges that when Mendelssohn presents freedom as a 
right and a duty at the same time it is in order to negotiate this problem.35 To 
31 One should not be misled by the fact that Mendelssohn insists that the social contract is not for 
the sake of peace, to establish a difference on that issue between him and Levinas who is con-
stantly invoking peace. Both are arguing against a broadly Hobbesian approach. Levinas’s way of 
saying this is to set out not from a state of war, but “on the basis of a prior peace” (Levinas, Outside 
the Subject, 123 [185]). Levinas was always clear that what he meant by peace was not security and 
the cessation of war. Peace for Levinas is eschatological in his sense of an interruption of history.
32 Levinas, In the Time of Nations, 138 [160–62]; Humanität und Dialog, 48.
33 Id., In the Time of Nations, 137 [160]; Humanität und Dialog, 44.
34 See also id., Outside the Subject, 121–2 [183]; Lionel Ponton, Philosophie et droits de l’homme de Kant à 
Levinas (Paris: J. Vrin, 1990), 194–5; and Emmanuel Levinas, Alterity and Transcendence, trans. Mi-
chael B. Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 145–9, originally published as Altérité 
et transcendence (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1995), 151–5.
35 Levinas, In the Time of Nations, 137 [160]; Humanität und Dialog, 44.
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be sure, it suggests another approach to the problem only to the extent that 
the obligations do not proceed from the rights, but the other way around. 
Indeed, according to Altmann, Mendelssohn believes that rights flow from 
obligations.36 This idea reemerges transformed in Levinas’s “The Rights of 
Man and the Rights of the Other” as the claim that the original manifesta-
tion of the “rights of man” is in the form of rights for the other and duty for 
an I.37 Nevertheless, there is surely something spurious about the suggestion 
in Levinas and Altmann that appeals to obligations somehow resolves the 
problem when it simply relocates it. With Levinas one never leaves behind 
competing obligations. It is the source of bad conscience.
Levinas expresses a similar idea in another essay from 1981, “The Prohibi-
tion against Representation and ‘the Rights of Man.’” He again summarizes 
his thoughts on rights in a way that suggests his proximity to Mendelssohn: 
“You shall not kill” is not simply a prohibition but means “You shall cause 
your neighbour to live.” He adds: “Event of sociality prior to all association in 
the name of an abstract and common ‘humanity.’ The right of man, absolutely 
and originally, takes on meaning only in the other, as the right of the other 
man. A right with respect to which I am never released!”38 This last phrase 
echoes Mendelssohn’s recognition that leaving the state of nature by way of 
the social contract cannot release one from the obligations existing there. 
Unlike the traditional perspective on the “rights of man,” which highlights 
the struggle between my rights and those of others, such that it seems that 
my rights can always be compromised by the rights of the other, Levinas 
highlights the fact that the other’s rights represent obligations for me. 
This is not just a typical Levinasian assertion of the asymmetry of ethics. 
It is a phenomenological point about how rights appear, as Levinas is care-
ful to specify.39 Rights do not become manifest when I make demands for 
myself. This is indistinguishable from egoism. As he said many years earlier, 
“My consciousness of my I reveals no right to me. My freedom shows itself to 
be arbitrary.”40 Rights appear as such only when one comes to the defense of 
others.41 In other words, Levinas takes from the traditional idea of the “rights 
of man” its formal structure as a priori, but locates the concretization of such 
36 Humanität und Dialog, 41.
37 Levinas, “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other,” 38 [187].
38 Id., Alterity and Transcendence, 127 [127].
39 Id., “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other,” 32 [177].
40 Id., Difficult Freedom, 17 [33].
41 Id., “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other,” 32, 38 [177, 187].
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rights elsewhere than where the tradition finds it. They are no longer to be 
understood as concretized originally in the right of a free will, but in the 
rights of the other.42 Hence Levinas describes the transcendent dimension of 
the exercise of freedom in these terms: “the I frees itself from its ‘return to 
self,’ from its auto-affirmation, from its egotism of a being persevering in its 
being, to answer for the other, precisely to defend the rights of the other man.”43 
However, Levinas’s theory passes beyond phenomenology. In locating 
originary right in the rights of others, he thereby locates it not only apart 
from the state but also beyond the subject. Rights are located “outside the 
subject,” to employ the phrase he used as the title of the book in which he 
published “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other.” It needs to be un-
derstood that when Levinas refers to an extraterritoriality beyond political 
society, he is not invoking anything like a state of nature, but distancing him-
self from any such framework. To be sure, he initially used the term “extrater-
ritoriality” in Totality and Infinity in his discussion of the home or domicile: 
“Man has overcome the elements only by surmounting this interiority with-
out issue by the domicile, which confers upon him an extraterritoriality.”44 
This extraterritorality is “produced in the gentleness or the warmth of inti-
macy” in a welcome that is itself “produced primordially in the gentleness 
of the feminine face.”45 In this way Levinas seeks to combat totalitarianism, 
which is defined in part by its denial of any outside the state. But as a num-
ber of critics have noticed, this account of extraterritoriality seems to be in 
danger of confining the feminine to the home, which would reproduce for 
women the same exclusion from which Mendelssohn suffered as a Jew. That 
is why it is so important when we read the paragraph on extraterritoriality 
from “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other” to understand that the 
term “extraterritoriality” is being used in a very different way. It can no long-
er be construed as simply referring to a private realm outside the state such 
as we find it in classical liberalism. Levinas’s discussion of Mendelssohn is 
indispensable in this context because it offers some guidance as to how to dif-
ferentiate his somewhat enigmatic language from that of the social contract 
tradition in all its variations.
42 Ibid., 38 [187].
43 Ibid., 38 [186].
44 Id., Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 131. 
Originally published as Totalité et infini: Essai sur l’extériorité (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 
104.
45 Ibid., 150 [124].
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Although many adherents of the social contract tradition see them-
selves as promoting freedom, it seems likely that when Levinas presents 
Mendelssohn as a philosopher who, writing from the experience of oppres-
sion, promotes natural law as “mankind’s protection against oppression,”46 
he means to distinguish him from the others. Altmann provides the basis 
for this interpretation by relating Mendelssohn’s account of freedom to his 
experience of being excluded from citizenship as a Jew. The question facing 
Mendelssohn as a Jew was whether a Christian society could legitimately 
constrain dissidents.47 Mendelssohn was dissatisfied with the standard lib-
eral solution whereby one submits to the state in the public realm but ex-
ercises freedom of conscience privately.48 He rejected the radical separation 
of private and public that was reflected in conventional liberalism’s sharp 
division between religion and the state. By emphasizing the function of 
religion, its right to admonish, instruct, fortify, and comfort, Mendelssohn 
brought church and state into contact.49 However, neither church, nor state, 
had a right to subject one’s principles and convictions to coercion.50 Altmann 
claims that Mendelssohn was particularly concerned with the danger that 
some people might focus on exclusively cultivating religion in private at the 
expense of the affairs of this world, a concern which was also Levinas’s, as 
is apparent from his refusal to find in mysticism the concretization of tran-
scendence, insisting instead that transcendence is produced as ethics and 
fecundity. But Levinas also knew the danger in granting autonomy to the 
political. He thus attempted to locate the “rights of man” not as what politics 
must secure, or even as the very foundation of the political, but at the point 
of intersection of ethics and politics.51 
What is of lasting significance in Levinas’s question about whether the 
“rights of man” can be divorced from their prophetic and ethical depths is 
the way that it highlights the dangers that ensue once politics — however 
well-intentioned in terms of its goal — is separated from ethics, as, for exam-
46 Id., In the Time of Nations, 138 [161].
47 Humanität und Dialog, 47.
48 Altmann explores this further in another essay: “The Philosophical Roots of Moses Mendelssohn’s 
Plea for Emancipation,” Essays in Intellectual Jewish History (Hanover, nh: University Press of New 
England, 1981), 154–69.
49 Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum (Berlin: Friedrich Maurer, 
1783), 62. Translated by Allan Arkush as Jerusalem or on Religious Power and Judaism (Hanover, nh: 
University Press of New England, 1983), 59.
50 Ibid. 70 [85].
51 For the essential background, see Robert Bernasconi, “The Third Party,” Journal of the British Society 
for Phenomenology 30 (1999): 76–87.
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ple, when the expectation of some desired result distracts attention from the 
atrocities that occur along the way, allowing them to be dismissed as so much 
“collateral damage.” Even though the relation of ethics to politics dominates 
the preface to Totality and Infinity from the opening sentences about war and 
morality, there is no final resolution of this problem within the confines of 
the book because Levinas never fully follows through on the reconception 
of ethics as an eschatology, understood as “a relation with being beyond the 
totality or beyond history.”52 This is perhaps because Totality and Infinity is 
directed primarily against totalitarianism, and so Levinas is content to look 
to the family as the concretization of that outside the state which neverthe-
less reserves a place for the state, even as it resists totalitarianism’s claims 
to dominate everything. Hegelianism, which regards the family as merely “a 
step toward the anonymous universality of the State,”53 is thereby resisted. 
But when, at the beginning of the 1980s, Levinas interrogates democracy and 
the “rights of man” a more nuanced approach is called for, one that trans-
forms the meaning of “extraterritoriality.” To be sure, as I shall now show, 
Levinas had already prepared for this transformation, but until then he had 
not seen the need to address directly how his own still embryonic account of 
the relation of ethics and politics necessitates a refiguring of the relation of 
the private and the public. 
Levinas introduces the central paragraph of “The Rights of Man and the 
Rights of the Other” by recalling that the quest for justice submits the in-
comparable singular individual to comparison and calculation, so that the 
limitation of one person’s rights to satisfy another’s rights seems inevitable.54 
In this context Levinas immediately reiterates what had been for him, as it 
was for Arendt, one of the lessons of Auschwitz: one cannot rely on the state 
to secure one’s rights. But that is not the last word. Just as justice needs to be 
always put in question from elsewhere so that conformity to its abstract rule 
does not become a new tyranny, so one cannot rely on the politicians for pro-
tection and implementation of the “rights of man.” Hence the need for voices 
from outside, like those of the Old Testament prophets. 
This also means (and it is important that this be emphasized) that the 
defense of the rights of man corresponds to a vocation outside the state, 
52 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 22 [xii].
53 Ibid., 306 [283].
54 Id., “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other,” 36 [184].
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disposing, in a political society, of a kind of extraterritoriality, like that of 
prophecy in the face of the political powers of the Old Testament, a vigi-
lance totally different from political intelligence, a lucidity not limited to 
yielding before the formalism of universality, but upholding justice itself 
in its limitations.”55 
Elsewhere Levinas offered an illustration of such a vigilance when he cel-
ebrated the visit of President Sadat of Egypt to Jerusalem.56 This was a break 
from political prudence. Levinas continues in “The Rights of Man and the 
Rights of the Other”:
The capacity to guarantee that extraterritoriality and their independence 
defines the liberal state and describes the modality according to which 
the conjunction of politics and ethics is intrinsically possible.57 
The reference to the prophets in the previous sentence is decisive because 
it interrupts any expectation that reliance on the time-honored distinction 
between public and private, so beloved of classical liberalism, will be suffi-
cient. Hence the focus is not on the separation of politics and ethics, but on 
their conjunction. 
Classical liberalism, through its insistence on separating the public and 
the private, reduces ethics to a private morality. It is ethics in an entirely dif-
ferent sense that, according to Levinas, conjoins with politics in the form 
of an eschatological interruption of it, as when supplying justice with the 
bad conscience that arises from an awareness of the tears that the bureau-
crat cannot see.58 And yet Levinas seems to allow, and we saw it reiterated 
in the 1988 interview, that this conjunction of an eschatological ethics and 
a politics respectful of rights is most likely in liberalism, because liberalism 
does not allow politics to be everything. I propose that Levinas has in mind 
here a Mendelssohnian, prophetic liberalism, not the classical version. The 
shift in the meaning of “extraterritoriality” is an indication of this. In 1964 
55 Ibid., 37 [185].
56 Id., Beyond the Verse, 188–95 [221–28].
57 Id., “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other,” 37 [185].
58 Id., “Transcendence et Hauteur,” in Liberté et commandement (Cognac: Fata Morgana, 1994), 80–1. 
Translated by Tina Chanter and Simon Critchley as “Transcendence and Height,” in Basic Philo-
sophical Writings, ed. Adriaan Pepercak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1996), 23.
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“extraterritoriality” still suggests to Levinas a kind of irresponsibility, as “The 
Temptation of Temptation,” a talmudic lecture, makes clear.59 It is only in 
the 1980s that Levinas reserves the word to point to an intersection of ethics 
and politics that traditional liberalism cannot readily accommodate, but that 
Mendelssohnian liberalism makes possible. 
This more profound meaning of “extraterritoriality” can perhaps best be 
approached through the idea of the trace and in a way that confirms how, 
notwithstanding the changes I have just documented in the use of that word, 
Levinas remains faithful to the fundamental trajectory of his thought. Al-
ready in 1953, in “Freedom and Command,” and apparently quite indepen-
dently of any impact of Mendelssohn, Levinas presents the command issued 
to me by the defenseless face as presenting a model of freedom that not only 
challenges the tyranny of the state, but predates it. Leaning heavily on the 
phenomenological idea that reflection draws on an unreflective fund of ex-
perience which forms a kind of “past that has never been present,” Levinas lo-
cates the command of the face in such a past, thereby anticipating his notion 
of the trace.60 The notion of extraterritoriality is, as it were, the equivalent of 
the trace, albeit in another idiom. Freedom in Levinas is not the experience 
of free choice but the “experience” of an exit from oneself.61 However, this 
exit is not from the private realm into the public arena of the world, as in 
existentialism, but an exit that passes beyond being, albeit not in such a way 
that the material dimension of life can be ignored. Substitution, the one-for-
the-other, is to pass outside the subject, while retaining a responsibility that 
is mine alone. This is the concrete meaning of transcendence for Levinas and 
he evokes it in the essay, “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other,” 
when he writes of an exercise of freedom in which “the I frees itself from its 
‘return to self,’ from its auto-affirmation, from its egotism of a being perse-
vering in its being, to answer for the other, precisely to defend the rights of the 
other man.”62 
59 Id., Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994), 36. Originally published as Quatre lectures talmudiques (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1982), 78.
60 Id., Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 
1998), 22; Liberté et commandement (Cognac: Fata Morgana, 1994), 46. On the trace, see Robert Ber-
nasconi, “The Trace of Levinas in Derrida,” Derrida and Différance (Evanston: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1988), 13–29. Already in Totality and Infinity there is some suggestion of a connection 
between Levinas’s first conception of extraterritoriality and his idea of the anterior posteriori, 
which is a forerunner of the trace (see Totality and Infinity, 170 [144]).
61 Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 10 [24].
62 Id., “The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other,” 38 [186].
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What this all amounts to still remains highly abstract, so I will close by 
offering an account of an ancient right, the so-called right of necessity, which 
determined that if the poor in case of necessity took what they needed to 
survive from someone else’s surplus, they were not committing theft but 
reasserting a common ownership that was ultimately inalienable. This idea 
was of long standing, widely articulated in twelfth-century Europe, and it 
survived intact in modern rights theory with Hugo Grotius.63 I have argued 
elsewhere that it was in the chapter on property in John Locke’s Second Trea-
tise of Government that this right of necessity for the poor was supplanted by 
the right to amass private property without limit.64 Whereas for Grotius the 
rights of the poor were inalienable, Locke tells us, albeit only in passing, that 
those rights were abandoned when we allegedly gave tacit agreement to the 
invention of money: That is to say, the poor were sacrificed to the interests 
of the unlimited accumulation of private property. In other words, the poor 
were sacrificed to the interests of the unlimited accumulation of private 
property. In other words, classical liberal social contract theory highlights 
the rights of property, thereby securing the home or domicile which guar-
antees the independence of the private realm, but at the same time ignores 
those who do not have a home: the homeless and, of course, refugees. 
Even if mainstream political philosophy, with the striking exception of 
Hegel, largely forgot the rights of the poor and only a relatively few schol-
ars have kept the memory of it alive, it resurfaces in Levinas. In “A Religion 
for Adults” from 1977,65 he reports the conviction of the eleventh-century 
commentator Rachi that one must know that God created the earth in or-
der to possess the Promised Land, because without that knowledge posses-
sion would be mere usurpation. Levinas adds: “No rights can therefore ensue 
from the simple fact that a person needs espace vital.”66 The consciousness of 
my ego (moi) reveals no right to me. This might sound like a reassertion of 
the Lockean theory in all its harshness: the spoils go to the industrious and 
rational, and not to all by virtue of their existence. However, it is, on the con-
63 On the background, see Scott G. Swanson, “The Medieval Foundations of John Locke’s Theory of 
Natural Rights,” History of Political Thought 18 (1997): 399–459. However, it should be clear that I am 
on the opposite side of the debate when it comes to the interpretation of Locke.
64 See Robert Bernasconi, “Locke and the Politics of Desire,” Acta Institutionis Philosophiae et Aestheticae 
7 (1989): 97–110; and, “On Giving What is Not Mine to Give: A Critique of John Locke’s Displace-
ment of the Rights of the Poor to Charity” in Le don et la dette, ed. Marco Olivetti (Milan: Cedam, 
2004), 419–29.




trary, in conformity with the phenomenological approach elaborated in “The 
Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other” where the focus falls on my expe-
rience of an obligation imposed on me by virtue of the rights of the other. I 
am confronted not by a specific set of obligations or duties that I might fulfill 
to establish my good con- science, but by an infinite responsibility. One hears 
a similar suspicion of the rights of property in Entre nous: “My ‘being in the 
world’ or my ‘place in the sun,’ my home — are they not a usurpation of plac-
es that belong to the other man who has already been oppressed or starved by 
me?”67 In one of his Talmudic lectures Lévinas poses the problem even more 
dramatically. He writes: “The problem of a hungry world can be resolved only 
if the food of the owners and those who are provided for ceases to appear 
to them as their inalienable property, but is recognized as a gift they have 
received for which thanks must be given and to which others have a right.”68
Levinas does not associate the privileging of property rights over the 
rights of the poor with a specific strand of individualism within the social 
contract tradition. Nor does Levinas draw attention to Mendelssohn’s rec-
ognition that the notion of beneficence (Wohltum) calls for the benevolence 
(Wohlwollen) that was expressed in the right of necessity: 
If, therefore, a man possesses goods or owns certain means of attaining 
felicity, which he can spare, that is, which are not necessarily required for 
maintaining his existence but serve the improvement of his existence, he is 
obligated to employ a part of them for the benefit of his fellow man, that 
is, for benevolence. For the improvement of one’s existence is inseparable from 
benevolence.69 
This was in marked contrast with mainstream political philosophy, with the 
striking exception of Hegel, that used the right to private property as a way of 
denying the rights of the poor. Nevertheless, the rights of the poor resurface 
in Levinas. 
Levinas was not a great political thinker in the way that Jean-Paul Sar-
tre was, for example, but he pinpointed the deep-seated deficiencies in clas-
sical liberalism and saw the direction from which a new thinking of the 
67 Id., Entre nous, 130 [149].
68 Id., Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994), 133. Originally published as Du sacré au saint (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1977), 77.
69 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem or on Religious Power and Judaism, 47 [33–34].
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conjunction between ethics and politics might arise: from outside the state 
and outside the subject. Central to that new direction was the notion of ex-
traterritoriality which points beyond the division of private and public, and 
thus threatens the classical version of the state of nature, which takes as its 
starting-point the isolated individual for whom others are a threat. “Extrater-
ritoriality” is not the “outside all places” of more pious thoughts,70 any more 
than it is the state of nature of liberal thought. It names the site of the con-
junction of ethics and politics, where politics is called to go beyond its own 
procedure of comparing the incomparable in order to meet ethical obliga-
tions that come from elsewhere and face the complexity of difficult choices. 
In the works published after Totality and Infinity Levinas accomplished a 
departure from possessive individualism without embracing the totalizing 
tendencies of communitarianism. This was achieved, not only by introduc-
ing an eschatological conception of peace in place of the Hobbesian state of 
war, but, more particularly, by construing the event of identity in a being for 
the other that undoes the conception of personal identity on which liberal-
ism relies. In consequence, the “rights of man” could no longer be understood 
as a function of classical liberalism, even if it was in the context of liberalism 
that they were first articulated. To the extent that Levinas in the early 1980s 
is more open to liberalism, it is only a certain kind of Mendelssohnian liber-
alism in which he finds a rough anticipation of some ideas at which he had 
already arrived, particularly that of primordial duties that belong, according 
to Levinas, to an ethical subject, a subject not identical with itself, but respon-
sible for the other. Mendelssohn’s contribution to Levinas’s philosophy, by 
contrast, helps him to locate himself in this the history of political thought 
attempting to pass beyond the opposition of liberalism and totalitarianism. 
It is my conviction that although Levinas’s ideas of the “rights of man” are 
only presented by him in broad outline so that, particularly in the English-
language discussion, they have not been given much prominence, they are a 
valuable resource for anyone committed to the struggle for social justice and 
particularly the struggle to transform a world that persistently turns its back 
on the victims of famine.






cepts and /or images 
of their own but as a rule 
design them together with 
a complete universe to accom-
modate them and infuse them with 
sense. For Emmanuel Levinas, the world 
he constructed was “the moral party of two,” 
which was self-consciously a utopia in both of its 
inseparable senses (i.e., of no place and good place). The 
moral party of two was the primal scene of morality, the 
test-tube in which moral selves germinate and sprout. It was 
also the only stage on which such selves could play themselves, i.e., 
as moral beings, instead of playing scripted roles and reciting someone 
else’s lines. The primal scene of morality is the realm of the face-to-face, of 
the tremendous encounter with the Other as a Face.
Morality, which in Levinas’s terms referred to being for the Other, has 
a notoriously awesome potential for love and hatred, for self-sacrifice and 
domination, care and cruelty. Ambivalence is its prime mover. And yet the 
moral party of two is capable of sustaining the universe on its own. In this 
party, morality does not need codes or rules, reason or knowledge, argument 
or conviction. It would not understand them anyway; morality is “before” 
all that (one cannot even say that the moral impulse is “ineffable” or “mute” 
since ineffability and dumbness come after language). The moral impulse 
triggered by the Face precedes speech. It sets its standards as it goes. It does 
not know guilt or innocence. It is pure in the only true sense of purity, the 
purity of naivety. As Vladimir Jankélévitch has pointed out, one cannot be 
pure except under the condition of not having purity, that is to say of not 
possessing it knowingly.1
 Originally published as Zygmunt Bauman: “The World Inhospitable to Levinas,” Philosophy Today 
43, no. 2 (1999): 151–67. Reprinted with the permission of the author. 
1 Vladimir Jankélévitch, Traité des vertus (Paris: Mouton, 1968), 1024–7.






The “moral party of two,” postulated by Levinas as the birth-home and 
the homeland of morality, is naive; it does not know (has not been told) that 
it is a party, let alone a moral one. Only when gazed upon from outside, does 
the moral party congeal into a “couple,” a “pair,” a “they out there.” It is the 
outside gaze that “objectifies” the moral party and thus makes it into a unit, 
a thing that can be described as it is, “handled,” compared with others “like 
it,” assessed, evaluated, and ruled on. But from the point of view of me as a 
moral self there is no “we,” no “couple,” no supraindividual entity with its 
“needs” and “rights.”
“Inside” the moral party there is just me, with my responsibility, with my 
care, with the command that commands me and me alone, and there is the 
Face, the catalyst and the midwife. My togetherness with the Other won’t sur-
vive the disappearance or the opting out of myself or the Other. There would 
be nothing left to “survive” that disappearance.
“Togetherness” in the “moral party” is vulnerable, weak, fragile, and lives 
precariously with a shadow of death never far away and all this because nei-
ther I nor the Other is replaceable. It is precisely this non-replaceability that 
makes our togetherness moral. Because each of us is irreplaceable, it makes 
no sense to think of actions in terms of “interests.” There is no way in which 
the actions of either of us could be classified as “egoistic” or “altruistic.” Good 
can be seen only in its opposition to evil. How can one say inside a “society” 
in which no one is replaceable, that what is good for one partner may be bad 
for another? It is inside such a “moral society,” the “moral party of two,” that 
my responsibility cannot be fathomed and “fulfilled”; it feels unlimited and 
becomes a whole life responsibility. It is under this condition that the com-
mand needs no argument to gain authority, nor the support of a threat of 
sanctions. It feels like a command, and an unconditional command at that.
But all this changes with the appearance of the Third. Now, true society 
appears, and the naive, unruled, and unruly moral impulse, simultaneously 
the necessary and the sufficient condition of the “moral party,” does not suf-
fice anymore.
the moral party broken into
In society, unlike in the universe of two, Levinas’s postulate of putting eth-
ics “before ontology” sounds odd. In the party of two, priority means “being 
before,” not “being better.” The pristine, naive togetherness of I and the Other 
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is neither pristine nor naive. There are now a lot of questions that can be, and 
are asked about that togetherness. Love now has self-love to reckon with: Für-
sein has the Mitsein as its sometime competitor and always as its judge. Re-
sponsibility desperately seeks it limits; it is flatly denied that the “command” 
is “unconditional.” Baffled, the moral impulse pauses and awaits instructions.
Now I live in a world populated, as Agnes Heller wittily put it, by “All, 
Some, Many and their companions. Now there is Difference, Number, Knowl-
edge, Now, Limit, Time, Space, Freedom, Justice and Injustice, and, certainly, 
Truth and Falsity.”2 These are the main characters in the play called Society, 
and all of them stay far beyond the reach of my moral (now, merely intuitive) 
wisdom, apparently immune to whatever I may do, powerful against my 
powerlessness, immortal against my morality. They are secure against my 
blunders, so that my blunders harm me only, not Them. They are the char-
acters who act now: as Heller puts it, “Reason reasons, Imagination imagines, 
Will wills, and Language speaks (die Sprache spricht). This is how characters 
became actors in their own right. They come into existence and live indepen-
dently of their creators.”3 And all this had been made possible, nay inescap-
able, by the entry of the Third, that is, due to the “moral party” outgrowing its 
“natural” size and turning into society.
The Third is also an Other, but not the Other we encountered at the “pri-
mal scene” staged by Levinas in which the moral play, not knowing itself to 
be a moral play, was scripted and directed by my responsibility alone. The 
“otherness” of the Third is of an entirely different order. The two “others” re-
side in different worlds. They are two planets each with its own orbit that 
does not cross with the orbit of the other, Other. Neither would survive the 
swapping of orbits. They do not converse with each other; when one speaks, 
the other one does not listen. If the other one did listen, she would not un-
derstand what she heard. Each one can feel at home only if the other one 
steps aside, or better still stays outside. The Other who is a Third can be met 
with only if we have already left the realm of Levinas’s morality, and entered 
another world, the realm of Social Order, which is ruled by Justice. As Levinas 
put it, “this is the domain of the State, of justice, of politics. Justice differs 
from charity in that it allows the intervention of some form of equality and 
measure, a set of social rules established according to the judgment of the 




State, and thus also of politics. In the domain of justice, the relationship be-
tween me and the other must leave room for the third, i.e., a sovereign judge 
who decides between two equals.”4
What makes the Third so unlike the Other that we met in the pristine 
moral encounter? In his assessment of the sociological meaning for the role 
of the third element, Georg Simmel brought the unique and seminal role of 
the Third down to the fact that in any triad, “the third element is at such a 
distance from the other two that there exist no properly sociological inter-
actions which concern all three elements alike.”5 Mutual distance, when 
void of encounters, congeals into “objectivity” (disinterestedness or non-
commitment). From the vantage point of the Third, what was a “moral party” 
becomes a group, an entity endowed with a life of its own, a totality which is 
“greater than the sum of its parts.”6 Thus the selves can be set and seen against 
the “totality” and their motives against the “interest of the whole.” The selves 
turn into individuals who are comparable, measurable and can be judged by 
extra-personal, “statistically average” or “normative” standards. Under this 
condition, the Third is firmly placed in the position of the potential jury or 
umpire. Against the moral selves’ hopelessly subjective and thus non-ration-
al propulsions, the Third may now set the objective criteria of rational in-
terests. The asymmetry of the moral relationship is all but gone. The social 
partners are now equal, and exchangeable, and replaceable. Actors have now 
to explain what they do, lay down and stand up to arguments that are made, 
justify themselves by reference to standards that are not of their own making. 
The site is cleared for norms, laws, ethical rules, and courts of justice.
And that site must be build upon, and urgently. Objectivity, that Trojan 
Horse of the Third, has delivered a mortal, or at least potentially terminal 
blow to the affection that moved the moral partners. “A third mediating ele-
ment deprives conflicting claims of their affective qualities,” says Simmel; 
but it also deprives affection of its authority as the life-guide. Reason, un-
derstood as the enemy of passion, must step in lest disorientation and chaos 
should rule. Reason is what we name the ex post-facto accounts of actions 
from which passion of the naive past has been drained. Reason is what we 
hope will tell us what to do when passions have been tamed or extinguished. 
We cannot live without reason once the survival of the “group” is something 
4 Roger-Pol Droit, “Un entretien avec Emmanuel Levinas,” Le Monde (June 2, 1992).
5 Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel (Glencoe: Free Press, 1950), 145.
6 Ibid.
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else than the life of the Other that is sustained by my responsibility: once 
the unique Other has dissolved in the otherness of the Many. It is now a mat-
ter between my life and life of the many. Survival of the many and my own 
survival being two different Survivals, I might have become an “individual,” 
but the Other has most certainly forfeited her individuality and is dissolved 
in a categorical stereotype. My being-for has been split into the potentially 
conflicting tasks of self-preservation and the preservation of the group.
When the Other dissolves in the many, the first thing to be washed out is 
the Face. The Other(s) is/are now faceless. They are persons (persona refers to 
mask, and masks, e.g., classes, stereotypes, that hide rather than reveal faces). 
It is the mask that determines who I am dealing with and what my responses 
ought to be. I have to learn the meaning of each kind of mask and memo-
rize the responses each one calls for. But even then I cannot be totally secure. 
Masks may be taken on and off, they hide more than they disclose. The in-
nocent confidence of moral drive has been replaced by the unquenchable 
anxiety of uncertainty. With the advent of the Third, fraud crawls in, more 
horrifying in its premonition than in its confirmed presence, more paralyz-
ing still for being a non exorcizable specter. In society, one has to live with 
this anxiety. Whether I like it or not, I must trust the masks, not that I can 
trust them. Trust is the way of living with uncertainty, not a way to dispose 
of anxiety.
The “moral party of two” is a vast space for morality. It is large enough 
to accommodate the ethical self in its full flight. It scales the highest peaks 
of saintliness and reaches down to the underwater reefs of moral life, the 
traps that must be avoided by the self before (as much as and after) it takes 
responsibility for its responsibility. But that party is too cramped a space for 
the human-being-in-the-world. It has room for no more than two actors. It 
leaves out most of the things that fill the daily bustle of every human being: 
pursuit of survival and self-aggrandizement, rational consideration of ends 
and means, calculation of gains and losses, pleasure, or power in politics and 
economics. To be in the moral space, one needs to re-enter it. Re-entry can 
be accomplished only by taking time-off from daily business, by bracketing 
off time in order to come back to the moral party of two. But can we make a 
comeback? The party is so starkly different from the one described by Levi-
nas “before ontology.” I and the Other must derobe or be derobed of all so-
cial trappings, stripped of status, social distinctions, handicaps, positions, or 
roles. We must once more be neither rich nor poor, high or lowly, mighty or 
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disempowered. We must be reduced to the bare essentiality of common hu-
manity which, in Levinas’s moral universe, was given to us at birth.7
morality’s fight for survival
The moral self, as it is constituted inside Levinas’s moral universe, cannot 
but feel uncomfortable the moment the moral party of two is gate-crashed 
by the Third. But it is not just the moral self that feels uncomfortable, so 
does its producer and director, Levinas himself. There is no better proof of 
his discomfort than the obsessive urgency, in later writings and interviews, 
to return to the “problem of the Third” and to the possibility of salvaging his 
description of the ethical relationship in the “presence of the Third party.” 
There is a remarkable similarity between his attempts as he grew older to 
bring back into the picture (with zeal and success) what he struggled to ex-
clude all his life, and Husserl’s attempts to accommodate inter-subjectivity 
in the transcendental subjectivity that, all his life, he had tried to purify of 
all “intercontaminations” (never to anybody’s, and least of all to his own, full 
satisfaction). The question was: is it necessary to cut the Gordian knot also in 
the case of Levinasian ethics? Can an ethic, which is born and grows old in 
the safe seclusion of a greenhouse-for-two, withstand the assault by a Third 
party? And more to the point, can the moral capacity, made to the measure 
of the responsibility for the Other as Face, be vigorous enough to carry an en-
tirely different burden of responsibility for the “Other as such,” i.e., the Other 
without a Face?
Already in 1954, in “Le Moi et la Totalité,” Levinas signaled an essential 
discontinuity between the self’s relation to the Other, out of respect for the 
Other’s freedom and integrity, and the relation towards the concept of the hu-
man being. In that second domain, the domain of totality, the other is “a free 
being to whom I may do harm by violating his liberty.”8 “Totality,” sadly con-
cluded Levinas, “cannot constitute itself without injustice.”9 What is more, 
by itself the “totality” would not set me on the road to justice. Very much in 
the Husserlian spirit, Levinas suggested that “justice does not result from the 
normal play of injustices. It comes from the outside, ‘through the door,’ from 
7 Ibid.
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beyond the melee and appears as a principle external to history.”10 Justice 
comes in defiance of the “theories of justice which are forged in the course of 
social struggles, in which moral ideas express the needs of one society or one 
class”; it appeals to the “ideal of justice,” which requires that all needs-all of 
them after all are but relative-be abandoned on “approaching the absolute.”11 
Justice comes, therefore, not out of history, but as a judgment made on his-
tory: “Human is the world in which it is possible to judge history.”12
Almost thirty years passed, and in “La souffrance inutile” (1982), old wor-
ries were restated more bluntly: “Interhumanity in the proper sense lies in 
one’s non-indifference towards the others, one’s responsibility for the oth-
ers, but before the reciprocity of such responsibility is inscribed into the im-
personal law.”13 For this reason, “the interhuman perspective may survive, 
but may be also lost in the political order of the City or in the Law which 
establishes mutual obligations of the citizens.”14 There are — so it now 
seems — two mutually independent, perhaps even unconnected orders: po-
litical and ethical. 
Political order — whether pre- or post-ethical — which inaugurates the 
social contract is neither the sufficient condition nor the necessary out-
come of ethics. In the ethical position “I” is distinct from the citizen and 
from that individual who, in his natural selfishness, precedes all order yet 
from whom political philosophy, from Hobbes onward, tried to derive or 
derived the social and political order of the City.15 
It is that time-honored philosophical strategy Levinas declared mistaken and 
therefore vain, but what is there to replace it, given the separation and, in-
deed, virtual absence of communication between the two orders?
In the same year an interview with Levinas appeared under the title “Phi-
losophie, Justice et Amour.”16 Pressed by the questions put to him by R. Fornet 
and A. Gomez, Levinas seemed to moderate his position, allowing for certain 




13 Id., “La souffrance inutile,” in Entre nous, p. 111.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.,
16 Id., “Philosophie, Justice et Amour” in Entre nous, 113–32.
66
extraterritorial ethics
der of justice,” he consented, “there would be no limit to my responsibility,” 
and thus cohabitation with Others as generalized citizens would not be pos-
sible.17 “But,” he hastened to qualify, “only departing from my relation to the 
Face, from me in front of the Other, may one speak of the State’s legitimacy 
or illegitimacy.”18 Ethics born of the moral party of two shall sit in judgment 
when it comes to decide the State’s legitimacy. And then, in response to the 
straightforward question “do you think that such a (just) state is possible,” 
came the equally straightforward answer: “Yes, an agreement between the 
ethics and the State is possible. The just State will be the work of just people 
and the saints, rather than of propaganda and preaching…”19
“De l’Unicité” appeared two years later.20 Here, an attempt is made to 
treat the difference between the ethical and the formal or legal in a system-
atic way. The difference is traced to the loss of the uniqueness of the ethi-
cal Other, the Other’s dissolution in the similarity of the Individual as citi-
zen. Such dissolution is a foregone conclusion since the appearance of “the 
Third” — someone different from the one close to me (mon prochain), but at 
the same time close to the one close to me and moreover close to me in his 
own right, is an “also close.” Now there are “they.” They, those various others, 
do things to each other, may harm each other and make each other suffer. 
This is the hour of justice. The uniqueness of the Other won’t help much now. 
One needs to appeal to a force one could do without before, i.e., to reason, 
that allows us first, to “compare the incomparable,” and second, to “impose 
a measure upon the extravagance of the infinite generosity of the ‘for the 
Other.’’’21 But note, this recourse to Reason feels necessary thanks precisely to 
the memory of that “uniqueness” of the Other which was experienced in the 
moral relationship; it is because each of the multiple others is unique in her 
challenge to my responsibility, in her claim on my “being for,” that the new 
situation “postulates judgement and thus objectivity, objectivation, thema-
tization, and synthesis. One needs arbitrating institutions and the political 
power that sustains them. Justice requires the foundation of the State. In this 
lies the necessity of the reduction of human uniqueness to the particularity 
of a human individual, to the condition of the citizen.” That latter particular-




20 Id., “De L’Unicité,” in Entre nous, 195–204. 
21 Ibid., 202.
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that already-ethically-experienced uniqueness it would itself be inconceiv-
able, it would never come to pass.22
Justice is in many ways disloyal to its ethical origins, unable to preserve 
its heritage in all its inner richness — but it won’t be justice if it forgets its ori-
gins and tries to preserve its birthmark. “It cannot abandon that uniqueness 
to political history, which finds itself subjected to the determinism of power, 
reason of the State and the seduction of the totalitarian temptations.”23 It 
must measure itself over and over again by the standards of original unique-
ness, however unattainable such standards may be among the multiplicity 
of citizens. Hence the indelible trait of all justice is its dissatisfaction with 
itself: “justice means constant revision of justice, expectation of a better 
justice.”24 Justice, one may say, must exist perpetually in a condition of noch 
nichtgeworden, setting itself standards higher than those already practiced.
The same paradox is pondered at length in the extensive conversations 
with Franqois Poirie. In the presence of the Third, said Levinas, “we leave 
what I call the order of ethics, or the order of saintliness or the order of mercy, 
or the order of love, or the order of charity where the other human being 
concerns me regardless of the place he occupies in the multitude, and even 
regardless of our shared quality as individuals of the human species. He con-
cerns me as one close to me, as the first to come. He is unique.”25 Beyond this 
order stretches the realm of choice, proportion, judgement and comparison. 
Comparison already entails the first act of violence: it is defiance of unique-
ness. This violence cannot be avoided since among the multiplicity of others 
certain divisions (assignment to classes, to categories) are necessary because 
they are “justified divisions.” Ethics demands, one may say, certain self-limi-
tation; for the ethical demand to be fulfilled, certain sacred axioms of ethics 
must be sacrificed.
The liberal state, said Levinas — the state grounded on the principle of 
human rights — is the implementation, and conspicuous manifestation, of 
that contradiction. Its function is nothing less than to “limit the original 
mercy from which justice originated.” But “the internal contradiction” of the 
liberal state finds its expression in perceiving “beyond and above all justice 




25 François Poirie, Emmanuel Levinas: Qui êtes-vous? (Lyon: Editions la Manufacture, 1987).
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eral state is never definitive.” “Justice is awakened by charity — such charity 
which is before justice but also after it.” “Concern with human rights is not 
the function of the State. It is a non-state institution inside the State — an ap-
peal to humanity which the State has not accomplished yet.” Concern with 
human rights is an appeal to the “surplus of charity,” one may say, to some-
thing larger than any letter of Law, than anything that the State has done so 
far. State-administered justice is born of charity gestated and groomed within 
the primary ethical situation. And yet justice may be administered only if 
it never stops being prompted by its original spiritus movens ; if it knows of 
itself as of a never ending chase of a forever elusive goal — the re-creation 
among the individuals/citizens of that uniqueness which is the birthmark of 
the Other as Face; if it knows that it cannot “match the kindness which gave 
it birth and keeps it alive” — but if it knows as well that it cannot ever stop 
trying to do just that.26
Just what can one learn from Levinas’s exploration of the “world of the 
Third,” the “world of the multiplicity of others” the social world? One can 
learn, to start with, that this world of the social is, simultaneously, the le-
gitimate offspring, and a distortion, of the moral world. The idea of justice 
is conceived at the moment of encounter between the experience of unique-
ness (as given in the moral responsibility for the Other) and the experience 
of multiplicity of others (as given in social life). It cannot be conceived un-
der any other circumstances, it needs both parents and to both of them it 
is genetically related, even if the genes, though being complementary, also 
contain contradictory genetic messages. Thus, paradoxically, morality is 
the school of justice even if the category of justice is alien to it and within 
the moral relationship redundant (justice comes into its own together with 
comparison, but there is nothing to compare when the Other is encountered 
as unique). The “primal scene” of ethics is thereby also the primal, ancestral 
scene of social justice.
One learns also that justice becomes necessary when the moral impulse, 
quite selfsufficient inside the moral party of two, is found to be a poor guide 
once it ventures beyond the boundaries of that party. The infinity of the mor-
al responsibility, the unlimitedness (even the silence!) of moral demand sim-
ply cannot be sustained when “the Other” appears in the plural (one may say 
that there is an inverse ratio between the infinity of “being for” and the infin-
26 Emmanuel Levinas, “L’Autre, Utopie et Justice,” in Entre nous, 235.
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ity of the others). But it is that moral impulse which makes justice necessary: 
it resorts to justice in the name of self-preservation, though while doing so it 
risks being cut down, trimmed, maimed or watered down.
can ethics earn its salvation?
In the Dialogue sur le penser-à-l’autre, the interviewer asked Levinas27:
As far as I am an ethical subject, I am responsible for everything in ev-
erybody; my responsibility is infinite. Is not it so that such a situation 
is unlivable for me, and for the other, whom I risk to terrorize with my 
ethical voluntarism? Does not it follow that ethics is impotent in its will 
to do good?28 
To which Levinas gave the following answer:
I do not know whether such a situation is unlivable. Certainly, such a 
situation is not what one would call agreeable, pleasant to live with, but 
it is good. What is extremely important — and I can assert this without 
being myself a saint, and without pretending to be a saint — is to be able 
to say that a human truly deserving that name, in its European sense, 
derived from the Greeks and the Bible, is a human being who considers 
saintliness the ultimate value, an unassailable value.29
This value is not surrendered once the uncompromising ethical requirement 
of “being-for” is replaced by a somewhat diluted and less stressful code of jus-
tice. It remains what it was, the ultimate value, reserving to itself the right to 
invigilate, monitor, and censure all deals entered into, in the name of justice. 
Constant tension and never becalmed suspicion rule in the relationship be-
tween ethics and the just State. Ethics is not a derivative of the State; the ethi-
cal authority does not derive from the State powers to legislate and to enforce 
the Law. It precedes the State; it is the sole source of the State’s legitimacy and 
the ultimate judge of that legitimacy. The State, one may say, is justifiable 
only as a vehicle or instrument of ethics.





This is much — but far too little to account for the complex social/politi-
cal processes that mediate between individual moral impulses and the over-
all ethical effects of political actions. Levinas’s view of the ethical origins of 
justice and the State itself as an instrument of justice (and, obliquely, of ethics 
itself) neither is nor pretends to be a sociological statement. It is in its inten-
tion and its final shape a phenomenological insight into the meaning of jus-
tice; or it can perhaps be interpreted as an “etiological myth,” setting the case 
for the subordination of the State to ethical principles and its subjection to 
the ethical criteria of evaluation. It can hardly be seen, though, as an insight 
into the process through which ethical responsibility for the other comes 
(or does not come, as the case may be) to be implemented on a generalized 
scale through the works of the State and its institution. It goes a long way 
towards explaining concerns with the plight of the “generalized other” — the 
far away Other, the Other distant in space and time; but it says little about the 
ways and means through which that concern may bring practical effects, and 
even less about the reasons for such effects falling so saliently short of needs 
and expectations, or not being visible at all.
Levinas’s writings offer rich inspiration for the analysis of the endemic 
aporia of moral responsibility. They offer nothing comparable, though, for 
the scrutiny of the aporetic nature of justice. They do not confront the pos-
sibility that, as with the case of assuming moral responsibility for the Other, 
the work of the institutions that Levinas wished to be dedicated to the pro-
motion of justice can fall short of moral ideals or even have consequences 
detrimental to moral values. Neither did he allow for the possibility that 
such detrimental consequences may be more than just side-effects of mis-
takes and neglect, being rooted instead in the very way such institutions 
can — must — operate to remain viable.
Quite a few insights into the latter issue can be found in the work of Hans 
Jonas. Unlike Levinas, Jonas puts our present moral quandary in historical 
perspective, representing it as an event in time, rather than an extemporal, 
metaphysical predicament. According to Jonas, for the greater part of human 
history the gap between “micro” and “macro” ethics did not present a prob-
lem; the short reach of the moral drive was not fraught with terminal dangers 
for the simple reason that the consequences of human deeds (given the tech-
nologically determined scale of human action) were equally limited. In re-
cent times, however, the magnitude of immediate and oblique consequences 
of human action has grown exponentially and the growth of theory has not 
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been matched by a similar expansion of human moral capacity. What we can 
do now, may have profound and radical effects on distant lands and distant 
generations we can neither explore nor imagine. Yet the same development 
which put in the hands of human kind powers, tools, and weapons of un-
precedented magnitude, requiring close normative regulation, “eroded the 
foundations from which norms could be derived; it has destroyed the very 
idea of norm as such.”30 Both departures are the work of science that brooks 
no limits to what humans can do, nor easily accepts that not all that could 
be done should be done. The ability to do something is, for science and for 
technology, science’s executive arm and is all the reason needed for doing it. 
As Jonas points out, while new powers need new ethics, and need it badly, 
they simultaneously undermine the very possibility of satisfying that need 
by denying ethical considerations the right to interfere with, let alone to ar-
rest, their own infinite, self-propelling growth.
This blind tendency must be reversed, Jonas demands. But how? By work-
ing out a new ethics, made to the measure of new human powers. This is a 
Kantian answer: what we need to pull ourselves out of our present quandary 
and stave off even greater catastrophes, in Jonas’s view, are certain rules so 
apodeictically true that every sane person would accept them. We need, in 
other words, a sort of a categorical imperative mark two — like, for instance, 
“Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of 
genuine human life.”31
Working out a categorical imperative for our present predicament is 
not easy, though. First, negation of any of the candidates for the “imperative 
mark two” status, unlike the original, Kantian imperative, does not entail 
logical contradiction. Secondly, it is notoriously difficult, nay impossible, to 
know for sure which actions inspired by the progress of technoscience are, 
and which are not “compatible with the permanence of genuine human 
life” — at least not before the damage, often irreparable, has been done. Even 
in the unlikely case of the new categorical imperative having been awarded 
unchallenged normative authority, the vexing question of its application 
would still remain open: how to argue convincingly that a controversial de-
velopment should be stopped, if its effects cannot be measured in advance 
with such a degree of precision, with that near algorithmic certainty, which 




scientific reason would be inclined to respect? If a truly algorithmic calcula-
tion of the looming dangers is not in the cards, Jonas suggests, we should 
settle for its second best substitute, a “heuristics of fear”: to try our best to 
visualize the most awesome and the most durable among the consequences 
of given technological action.32 Above all, we need to apply the “principle 
of uncertainty”: “The prophecy of doom is to be given greater heed than the 
prophecy of bliss.” We need, Jonas implies, a kind of “systematic pessimism 
ethics”33 so that we may err, if at all, solely on the side of caution.34
Kant’s trust in the grip of ethical law rested on the conviction that there 
are arguments of reason which every reasonable person, being a reason-
able person, must accept; the passage from ethical law to moral action led 
through rational thought — and to smooth the passage one needed only to 
take care of the non-contradictory rationality of the law, counting for the rest 
on the endemic rational faculties of moral actors. In this respect, Jonas stays 
faithful to Kant-though he is the first to admit that nothing as uncontrover-
sial as Kant’s categorical imperative (that is, no principle which cannot be 
violated without violating simultaneously the logical law of contradiction) 
can be articulated in relation to the new challenge to human ethical facul-
ties. For Jonas, as for Kant, the crux of the matter is the capacity of the legisla-
tive reason; and the promotion, as well as the eventual universality, of ethical 
conduct is ultimately a philosophical problem and the task of the philoso-
phers. For Jonas, as for Kant, the fate of ethics is fully and truly in the hands of 
Reason and its spokesmen, the philosophers. In this scheme of things there is 
no room left for the possibility that reason may, in some other of its incarna-
tions, militate against what is, in its name, promoted by ethical philosophers.
In other words, there is no room left for the logic of human interests, and 
the logic of social institutions — those organized interests whose function is, 
in practice if not by design, to do exactly the opposite to what Kantian ethical 
philosophy would expect them to do: namely, to make the bypassing of ethi-
cal restrictions feasible and ethical considerations irrelevant to the action. 
Neither is there room left for the otherwise trivial sociological observation 
that for the arguments to be accepted they need to accord with interests in 
addition (or instead of) being rationally flawless. There is no room either for 
another equally trivial phenomenon of “unanticipated consequences” of hu-
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man action — of deeds that bring results left out of account, or unthought-of 
at the time the action was undertaken. Nor is there room for the relatively 
simple guess that when interests are many and at odds with each other, any 
hope that a certain set of principles will eventually prevail and will be uni-
versally obeyed must seek support in a sober analysis of social and political 
forces capable of incurring that victory.
I suggest that a mixture of all those factors — overlooked or ignored and 
left out of account in Jonas’s search for the new ethics — can be blamed for 
the curious paradox of our times, in which the growing awareness of the 
dangers ahead goes hand in hand with the growing impotence in preventing 
them or alleviating the gravity of their impact. In theory, we seem to know 
that if catastrophe is to be averted, the presently unruly forces must be kept 
in check and controlled by other factors than endemically disperse and dif-
fuse, as well as short-sighted, interests. In practice, however, the consequenc-
es of human actions rebound with a blind, elemental force reminiscent more 
of earthquakes, floods, and tornadoes than of the model of rational and self-
monitored behavior. As Daniele Sallenave has reminded us, Jean-Paul Sartre 
could aver a few decades ago that “there are no such things as natural disas-
ters”; but today natural disasters have turned into the prototype and model 
of all the miseries that afflict the world, and one could as well reverse Sartre’s 
statement and say that “there are no other than natural catastrophes.”35 Not 
just the dramatic changes in the degree of livability of our natural habitat 
(pollution of air and water, global warming, ozone holes, acid rains, salina-
tion, or dessication of the soil etc.), but also the thoroughly human aspects of 
global conditions (wars, demographic explosions, mass migrations and dis-
placements, outbursts of ethnic hostilities, growing gaps between rich and 
poor, social exclusion of large categories of population) come unannounced, 
catch us unaware and seem utterly oblivious to the anguished cries for help 
and to the most frantic efforts to design, let alone to provide, the remedy.
ethics under siege
But a categorical imperative mark two and a heuristics of fear do not move 
us to follow Jonas’s ethical strategy. A dearth of ethical knowledge and un-
derstanding cannot be blamed for what is happening. No one except luna-
35 Daniele Sallenave, “L’alibi de la compassion,” Le Monde Diplomatique (July 1995): 32.
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tic fringes would seriously argue that it is good and beneficial to pollute the 
atmosphere, to pierce the ozone layer, to wage wars, to overpopulate the 
land, to deprive people of their livelihood or to make them into homeless 
vagabonds. Yet all this happens despite its consensual, almost universal and 
vociferous condemnation. Some factors other than ethical ignorance, or phi-
losophers’ inability to agree on principles, must be at work if the grinding, 
systemic consistency of the global damage outmatches the cohesion of ethi-
cal indignation. One may sensibly surmise that those other factors are en-
trenched in aspects of social reality that are unaffected by ethical philosophy, 
or are unable to withstand or bypass its pressures; or better still, to render 
ethical demands inaudible or — if audible — ineffective.
Among such factors, the increasingly deregulated market forces, exempt 
from all effective political control and guided solely by the pressures of com-
petitiveness must be awarded the pride of place. Thanks to technical advanc-
es aided and abetted by the progressive dismantling of political constraints, 
capital is now free to move whenever and wherever it desires. The potential 
promoters and guardians of social justice have been deprived of the econom-
ic muscle to enforce ethical principles. Political institutions stay local, while 
the real powers which decide the shape of things have acquired a genuine 
ex-territoriality. As Manual Castells puts it in his monumental three-volume 
study of The Information Age, power in the form of capital, and particularly 
financial capital, flows — while politics remains tied to the ground bearing 
all the constraints imposed by its local character.36 Power has been, we may 
say, “emancipated from politics.” But when this happens, the State in which 
Levinas invested his hopes for the promotion of morally inspired justice be-
comes wishful thinking. It is increasingly difficult to locate an agency capa-
ble of undertaking the task of implementing the new categorical imperative 
that Jonas sought. As a consequence, we may say that the problem of apply-
ing Levinas’s ethics to the troubles of a contemporary world is first and fore-
most the question of an agency gap.
Mobility has become the most powerful and most coveted stratifying fac-
tor; it is the stuff out of which new, increasingly worldwide, social, political, 
economic, and cultural hierarchies are daily built and rebuilt. The mobil-
ity acquired by the owners and managers of capital is new, indeed unprec-
edented, in its radical unconditionality and its disconnection of power from 
36 Manual Castells, The Information Age (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
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obligation. Mobility disconnects employers from duties towards employees, 
towards the younger, weaker and yet unborn generations — towards the 
self-reproduction of the living conditions of all. In short, mobility provides 
freedom from the duty to contribute to daily life and the perpetuation of the 
community. There is a new asymmetry emerging between the exterritorial 
nature of power and the continuing territoriality of the “whole life” of a lo-
cality — which the now unanchored powers, able to move at short notice or 
without warning, are free to exploit and abandon. Shedding responsibility 
for consequences is the most coveted and cherished gain that the new mobil-
ity brings to free-floating, locally unbound capital. The costs of coping with 
consequences need not be counted in the calculation of the “effectiveness” 
of investment.
This new freedom of capital brings to mind the absentee landlords of 
yore, notorious for their resented neglect of the needs of the populations that 
fed them. Creaming off the “surplus product” from the land they owned was 
their sole interest. There is certainly some similarity here but the comparison 
does not do full justice to the kind of freedom from worry and responsibility 
which the mobile capital of the late twentieth century has acquired, that ab-
sentee landlords could not secure.
In contradistinction to the absentee landlords of early modern times, the 
late-modern capitalists and land-brokers (thanks to the new mobility of their 
by now liquid resources) do not encounter limits sufficiently real — solid, 
tough, resistant enough — to enforce compliance. The limits that can make 
themselves felt are those administratively imposed on the free movement of 
capital and money. Such limits are few and far between and the handful that 
remain are under tremendous pressure. The moment when those on the re-
ceiving side — targeted or accidental victims of the profit-making drive — try 
to flex their muscle and make their strength felt, the capital has little dif-
ficulty packing its tents and finding more hospitable environment. Capital 
has no need to engage with consequences, if avoidance will do.
Rather than homogenizing the human condition, the technological and 
political annulment of temporal/spatial distances tends to polarize it. The 
emancipation of certain human beings from territorial constraints renders 
community-generating meanings extraterritorial, and at the same time, de-
nudes the territory of its meaning and its identity-endowing capacity, yet 
those left behind go on being confined to it. For some people capital provides 
unprecedented freedom, for others, it portends the impossibility to appropri-
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ate and domesticate the locality from which they have little chance of cut-
ting themselves free in order to move elsewhere. If distances no longer mean 
very much, localities lose much of their meaning. Some people move out of a 
locality at will, while others watch helplessly as the ground washes out from 
under their feet.
Information floats independently from its carriers. Bodies shift and rear-
range in physical space. For some people — for the mobile elite, the elite of 
mobility — that means literally, the “dephysicalization” or the new weight-
lessness of power. Elites travel in space and travel faster than ever before, but 
the spread and density of the power web they weave is not dependent on that 
travel. Thanks to the new “body-less-ness” of power, in its mainly financial 
form, the power-holders become truly extraterritorial even if, bodily, they 
happen to stay “in place.” Their power is not “out of this world,” not out of 
the physical world; they do build heavily guarded homes and offices. They 
are extraterritorial in the sense that they are free from intrusion, from un-
welcome neighbors, cut off from what may be called a local community and 
inaccessible to whoever is, unlike them, confined to it.
And so another gap yawns — alongside that of the agency. This gap grows 
and widens between the meaning-making elites and all the rest. In the same 
way that today’s power-holders remind us of pre-modern absentee landlords, 
so the learned, cultivated and culturally creative elites show striking simi-
larity to the similarly extraterritorial, Latin-speaking and writing scholastic 
elites of medieval Europe. It seems that the modern nation-building episode 
was the sole exception to a much more permanent rule. The excruciatingly 
difficult task of reforging the mishmash of languages, cults, lores, customs, 
and ways of life into homogenic nations under homogenic rule, for a time 
brought the learned elites into direct engagement with “the people.” (Both 
“intellectuals” and the “people,” as well as the link between knowledge and 
power, are modern inventions!). With that episode by and large over at least 
in the affluent part of the globe, the home of the most influential section of 
the cultural elite there seems to be no need for continuing that engagement. 
Cyberspace, securely anchored in web sites on the Internet, is the contem-
porary equivalent of mediaeval Latin, i.e., the space that the learned elite of 
today inhabit. There is little the residents of that space could talk about with 
those still hopelessly mired in an all-too-real physical space. Nor could they 
gain anything from that dialogue. The word “people” is quickly falling out of 
fashion, except during electoral campaigns.
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The new states, and longer-living ones in their present condition, are 
no longer expected to perform most of the functions once seen as the raison 
d’être of nation-state bureaucracies. The function that has most conspicu-
ously dropped out, or was torn out, of the hands of the orthodox state, is the 
maintenance (as Cornelius Castoriadis put it in La montée de l’insignifiance) of 
a dynamic equilibrium between the rhythms of the growth of consumption 
and the elevation of productivity. This task led sovereign states at various 
times to impose intermittently import or export bans, custom barriers, or 
state-managed Keynes-style stimulation of internal demand.37 The control 
of dynamic equilibrium is now beyond the means, and indeed beyond the 
ambitions, of almost all so-called sovereign (in the strictly order-policing 
sense) states. The very distinction between the internal and the global mar-
ket, or more generally between the “inside” and the “outside” of the state, is 
exceedingly difficult to maintain in any but the most narrow, “territory-and-
population policing” sense.
All three legs of the sovereignty tripod — economic, military and cul-
tural — have been shattered. The state is no longer capable of balancing its 
books, guarding its territory or promoting its distinctive identities; contem-
porary states turn more and more into executors and plenipotentiaries of 
forces that they have no hope of controlling politically. In the incisive verdict 
of a radical Latin American political analyst (reported in Le Monde Diploma-
tique, August 1997), thanks to the new “porousness” of all allegedly “nation-
al” economies, and to the ephemeral, elusive, non-territorial dimensions of 
space in which they operate, global financial markets impose their laws and 
precepts on the planet. Globalization is nothing more than a totalitarian ex-
tension of their logic on all aspects of life. States have not enough resources 
or freedom of movement to withstand the pressure, for the simple reason 
that “a few minutes is enough for enterprises and the states themselves to 
collapse” (as witnessed quite recently, we may add, in the case of Mexico, Ma-
laysia, or South Korea). In the cabaret of globalization, the state goes through 
a striptease and by the end of the performance it is left with the bare neces-
sities: its powers of repression. With its material basis destroyed, its sover-
eignty and independence annulled, its political class effaced, the nation-state 
becomes a simple security service for mega-companies. The new masters of 
37 Cornelius Castoriadis, La montée de l’insignifiance (Paris: Seuil, 1996).
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the world have no need to govern directly. National governments are charged 
with the task of administering affairs on their behalf.
The “economy” is being progressively exempted from political control; 
indeed the prime meaning conveyed by the term “economy” is that of “the 
area of the non-political.” The state is not allowed to touch what concerns 
economic life: any attempt in this direction is met with prompt and furious 
punitive action by the world markets: hence, the economic impotence of the 
state. According to the calculations of Rene Passet, purely speculative inter-
currency financial transactions reach the total volume of 300 billion dollars 
a day. This is fifty times greater than the volume of all commercial exchanges 
and almost equal to the total of one 500 billion dollars for the reserves of all 
the “national banks” of the world.38 “No state therefore,” Passet comments, 
“can resist for more than a few days the speculative pressures of the ‘market.”’ 
The sole economic task the state is allowed, is to handle and secure an equili-
brated budget by policing and keeping in check the local pressures for more 
vigorous state intervention in the running of businesses and for the defense 
of the population from the more sinister consequences of market anarchy. As 
Jean-Paul Fitoussi has recently pointed out:
Such programs, though, cannot be implemented unless in one way or 
another economy is taken out from the field of politics. A ministry of fi-
nances remains certainly a necessary evil, but ideally one would dispose 
of the ministry of economic affairs (that is, of the governing of economy). 
In other words, the government should be deprived of its responsibility 
for macroeconomic policy.39
For their liberty of movement and for their unconstrained freedom to pur-
sue their ends, global finance, trade and information industries depend on 
the political fragmentation, the morcellement, of the world scene. They all, 
one may say, have developed vested interests in weak states, that is, in states 
that are weak but nevertheless remain states. Deliberately or subconsciously, 
such interstate, supra-local institutions — as have been brought into being 
and are allowed to act with the consent of the global capital exert coordi-
nated pressures on all member or dependent states to systematically destroy 
38 René Passet, Le Monde Diplomatique (July 1997).
39 Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Le Monde (August 29, 1997).
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everything which could stem or slow down the free movement of capital and 
limit market liberty. Throwing open the gates and abandoning any thought 
of autonomous economic policy is the preliminary condition of eligibility 
for financial assistance from world banks and monetary funds, a condition 
that gains meek compliance. Weak states are precisely what the New World 
Order, all too often looking suspiciously like a new world disorder, needs to 
sustain and reproduce itself. Weak, quasi states are easily reduced to the (use-
ful) role of local police precincts, securing the modicum of order required for 
the conduct of business; it need not be feared that they will put the brakes on 
the global companies’ freedom.
The separation of economy from politics, and the exemption of the first 
from regulatory intervention of the second resulting in the disempower-
ment of politics as an effective agency, augurs much more than just a shift 
in the distribution of social power. As Claus Offe points out, political agency 
as such, i.e., “the capacity to make collectively binding choices and to carry 
them out”40 has become problematic “Instead of asking what is to be done, 
we might more fruitfully explore whether there is anybody capable of do-
ing whatever needs to be done.”41 Since “borders have become penetrable” 
(highly selectively, to be sure), “sovereignties have become nominal, power 
anonymous, and its locus empty.”42 We have not yet reached the ultimate des-
tination; the process goes on, and seemingly is unstoppable. “The dominant 
pattern might be described as ‘releasing the brakes’: deregulation, liberaliza-
tion, flexibility, increasing fluidity, and facilitating the transactions on the 
financial real estate and labor markets, easing the tax burden, etc.” The more 
consistently this pattern is applied, the less power remains in the hands of 
the agency that promotes it; and the less can an increasingly resourceless 
agency retreat from following the pattern, even if it wished or felt pressed 
to do so.
One of the seminal consequences of the new global freedom of movement 
is that it becomes increasingly difficult, perhaps altogether impossible, to re-
forge social issues into effective collective action. Sections of societies tradi-
tionally charged with the task of re-forging increasingly look the other way; 
nothing in their own position and socially framed vocations prompts them 
to take up the role which dropped, or was torn, out of their hands. These two 
40 Claus Offe, Modernity and the State: East, West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), vii.
41 Ibid., viii.
42 Ibid. viii, ixff.
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significant departures, taken together, make the present-day world ever less 
hospitable to Levinas’s ethics, while the clarion calls of Hans Jonas bear un-
canny resemblance to crying in the wilderness.
the case of the new poor
One phenomenon of the contemporary world provides a spectacular case 
of the overall trend: the fast-growing inequality of income and living condi-
tions (the quality of health, education or housing, life prospects, range of life 
choices and longevity of life). In the increasingly affluent world, the ranks of 
the poor are steadily expanding, and in the last decades expanding at a stead-
ily accelerating rate. Growing poverty is universally known and universally 
condemned; for an important majority, those better off, it is also a matter of 
shame; there is an urge not to stay idle but to do something to efface the stain 
on their conscience. Time and again, the miserable lot of the poor is brought 
dramatically into global awareness by widely publicized cases of famine and 
destitution, prompting spouts of massive charity. And yet the phenomenon 
grows instead of going away. Moral sensibility stops short of being reforged 
in the daily and effective concern with intersocietal, let alone global, justice.
The poor will always be with us (so the popular wisdom insists), but what 
it means to be poor depends on the kind of “us” the poor are “with.” It was 
not the same to be poor in a society of half a century or more ago. That was 
a society that needed every single adult member to engage in productive la-
bor. Our society, thanks to the enormous powers accumulated by centuries 
of labor, may well produce everything needed, and much more, without the 
participation of a large and growing section of its members. It is one thing 
to be poor in a society of producers and universal employment; it is quite 
different to be poor in a society of consumers, in which life projects are built 
around consumer choices rather than work, professional skills, or jobs. If 
“being poor” derived its meaning from the condition of being unemployed 
in an earlier time, today it draws its meaning primarily from the plight of 
being flawed consumers. This is a difference which truly makes a difference 
in the way living in poverty is experienced and in the chances and prospects 
to redeem its misery.
Societies have typically taken a characteristically ambivalent attitude 
toward the poor, reflected in an uneasy mixture of fear and revulsion on one 
hand, and pity and compassion on the other. Both ingredients in the social 
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attitude were equally indispensable. The first allowed for the harsh treat-
ment of the poor which the defense of order required; the second underlined 
the pitiful lot of those who fell below the standards, a lot that made all the 
hardships of following the norm for the norm-abiding part of the population, 
pale into insignificance. The latter circumstance awarded the poor a useful 
role in the promotion of obedience to noxious and stringent social norms of 
the time. Depending on its specific model of order and norm, each society 
constructs its poor in its own image, offering different explanations for their 
presence, finding a different use for the poor and deploying different strate-
gies for tackling the problem of poverty.
Pre-modern Europe came closer than its modern successor to finding an 
important function for its poor. The poor, like everybody else and everything 
else in pre-modern Christian Europe, were Children of God — a legitimate 
and indispensable link in the “Divine Chain of Beings”; as part of God’s crea-
tion they were, like the rest of the world before its modern desacralisation or 
“disenchantment,” saturated with meaning and purpose. The poor suffered, 
but their misery made them blessed, since their suffering was repentance for 
original sin and a warrant of redemption. It was up to the more fortunate to 
bring succor and relief to the sufferers and so to practice charity and in the 
process gain their own share in salvation. The presence of the poor was there-
fore God’s gift to everyone else: an occasion to practice self-sacrifice, to live 
a virtuous life, to repent from sin and to earn heavenly bliss. One can almost 
say that a society which sought the meaning of earthly life in life-after-death 
would need to invent another vehicle of personal salvation, were the poor 
not already at hand.
This was no longer the case in the “disenchanted” world of modernity, in 
which nothing that was had the right to be merely because of the accident of 
being there, and in which everything that was had to show a legitimate and 
reasonable proof of its right to be. Most importantly, the brave new world 
of modernity was one that set its own rules and took nothing for granted, 
subjecting everything extant to the incisive scrutiny of reason, recognizing 
no limits to its own authority and above all rejecting the “power of the dead 
over the living,” the authority of tradition, inherited lore or custom. The pro-
jects of order and the norm now replaced the placidly accepted, preordained, 
Divine Chain of Beings. Unlike the vision it replaced, order and norm were 
human products; they were designs yet to be implemented by human action 
82
extraterritorial ethics
things to be yet made or built, not things found and meekly addressed. If in-
herited reality did not match the projected order, all the worse for reality.
And so the presence of the poor became a problem (“problem” is some-
thing which causes discomfort, is illegitimate or abnormal, and thus prompts 
the urge to “resolve” it — to cure or to remove it). The poor were a threat and 
an obstacle to order; they also defied the norm.
The poor were double jeopardy. Since their poverty was no more the ver-
dict of Providence, there was no reason why they should humbly and grate-
fully accept their lot; they had reasons to complain and rebel against the 
more fortunate, who they blamed for their deprivation. On the other hand, 
the old Christian ethics of charity appeared now an intolerable burden, a 
drain on the nation’s wealth. The duty to share one’s good fortune with those 
who failed to curry fortune’s favors was no longer a sensible investment in 
life-after-death; charity “did not stand to reason” — certainly not to the rea-
son of the business of life here and now, on earth.
Soon a third threat was added to the other two: the poor who compli-
antly accepted their plight as Divine verdict and made no effort to extricate 
themselves from their misery, proved immune to blandishment to factory 
work and refused to sell their labor once the meager needs they grew accus-
tomed to, and perceived as “natural,” had been gratified. The early decades of 
industrial society were plagued by constant shortages of labor. The poor who 
were satisfied with their lot, or resigned to it, were a nightmare for industrial 
entrepreneurs: they were immune and unresponsive to the inducements of 
regular wages and saw no reason why they should go on bearing with the 
long hours of drudgery once they had enough bread to see them through the 
day. A vicious circle began: the poor objecting to their misery spelled rebel-
lion or revolution; the poor reconciled to their misery curbed and hampered 
the progress of industrial enterprise. Forcing the poor into perpetual factory 
labor seemed the miraculous way to square the circle.
And so the poor of the industrial era were redefined as the reserve army of 
labor, employment, steady employment; employment which left no room for 
mischief, had become a norm — while poverty had been identified with un-
employment, breaching of the norm, an anomaly. Under the circumstances, 
the obvious prescription for curing poverty and nipping it in the bud, was to 
induce the poor, or force them if need be, to accept the lot of factory labor. 
The most obvious means to achieve that effect was to deprive the poor of any 
other source of livelihood: accept the conditions on offer, however repulsive 
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they might be and however deeply you might resent them, or forfeit all hope 
for a helping hand.
Strictly speaking, given that no alternative was available, preaching 
about ethical duty was superfluous. And yet the work ethic was viewed al-
most universally as useful, perhaps indispensable medicine for the triple 
ailment of poverty, the insufficient supply of labor, and the threat of revolu-
tion. Opting for the work ethic was made much easier, indeed it seemed obvi-
ous and natural because the middle classes were already converted to it and 
viewed their own life in its light.
If one follows politicians, economists and other spokesmen for the public 
mood, one can be excused for getting an impression that the poor of today 
have retained the function assigned to them in the early years of the new, 
modern and industrial era as a reserve army of labor. Just as it did in the 
heyday of industrial expansion, this assignment casts doubt and suspicion 
on the probity of those not in active service, and points the way to bringing 
them back into line. This impression is false, though. The philosophy which 
once tried to grasp and articulate emerging realities of the industrial age has 
outlived its purpose and lost touch with the new reality emerging at the end 
of the modern age. The work ethic, which casts the poor in the role of the 
“reserve army of labor” began its life as a revelation; it leads its posthumous 
life as a cover-up.
Grooming the poor of today into the laborers for tomorrow used to make 
economic and political sense: it lubricated the wheels of an industry-based 
economy and served well the task of “social integration,” that is, of order 
maintenance and normative regulation. Neither of the two senses holds any-
more in a postmodern, consumer, society. The present-day economy does not 
need a massive labor force. It has learned how to increase, not just profits, but 
the volume of its products while cutting down on labor and its costs. At the 
same time, the obedience to norm and “social discipline” in general are by 
and large secured through the allurements and seductions of the commodity 
market, rather than through state-managed coercion and the drill adminis-
tered by the network of panoptical institutions. Economically and political-
ly, the late-modern or postmodern society of consumers may thrive, without 
dragging the bulk of its members through the millstones of industrial labor. 
For all practical intents and purposes, the poor cease to be a reserve army of 
labor, and invocations to the work ethic sound increasingly nebulous and 
out of touch with the realities of the day.
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Contemporary society engages its members primarily as consumers; 
only secondarily, and partly, does it engage them in the role of producers. 
To meet the norm, to be a fully-fledged member of society, one needs to re-
spond promptly and efficiently to the temptations of the consumer market; 
one needs to contribute to the “supply-clearing demand” and in the case of 
economic trouble be part of the “consumer-led recovery.” The poor do not fit 
in: they lack a decent income, credit cards and the prospect of a better time. 
Accordingly, the norm which is broken by the poor, which makes them “ab-
normal,” is the norm of consumer competence or aptitude, not that of em-
ployment. First and foremost, the poor of today are “non-consumers,” not 
“unemployed”; they are defined in the first place through being flawed con-
sumers since the most crucial of the social duties which they do not fulfill is 
that of the active and effective buyers of goods and services that the market 
offers. In a book-balancing consumer society, the poor are unequivocally a li-
ability, and by no stretch of the imagination can they be recorded on the side 
of present or future assets.
And so for the first time in recorded history, the poor are now purely and 
simply a worry and a nuisance. They have no merits that relieve, let alone 
balance, their vices. They have nothing to offer in exchange for the “taxpay-
er’s” outlay of resources. They are a bad investment, unlikely ever to repay, let 
alone bring profit. They are a black hole, sucking in whatever comes near and 
spitting back nothing — except, perhaps, trouble. Decent and normal mem-
bers of society — true consumers — want nothing from them and expect 
nothing. The poor are totally useless. No one who truly counts, speaks, and 
is heard, needs them. For them, it is zero tolerance. Society would be much 
better off if the poor just burnt their tents and left. The world would be that 
much more pleasant without them. The poor are not needed. They are un-
wanted. And because they are unwanted, they can be, without much regret 
or compunction, forsaken.
Not surprisingly, the Welfare State is in retreat virtually everywhere. The 
few countries where its provisions are yet intact or are being dismantled 
slowly or half-heartedly, are alternatively reproached or ridiculed for their 
imprudence and obsoleteness by the chorus of current economic authorities. 
They are warned by economic sages and world banking institutions against 
the impending “overheating of the economy” and other freshly invented hor-
rors. The sole choice brandished in front of governments by current econom-
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ic wisdom depicts a choice between fast rising unemployment, as in Europe, 
and the even faster fall of lower class income, as in the usa.
The poor of today are not only banished from the streets and other public 
places used by normal people. They are out of sight and out of heart: physical 
isolation is reinforced with mental separation, resulting in the banishment 
of the useless, “iniquitous” poor from the universe of moral empathy, the 
community of human beings, and the world of ethical duty. This is accom-
plished by rewriting their story, using the language of depravity to replace 
the language of deprivation. The poor supply the “usual suspects,” rounded 
up when the public hue-and-cry detects a fault in the habitual order. The 
poor are portrayed as lax, sinful, and devoid of moral standards. The media 
cheerfully cooperate with the police in presenting to the sensation — greedy 
public lurid pictures of the crime, drug, and sexual promiscuity infested 
“criminal elements” who find their shelter in the darkness of mean streets. 
And so the point is made that the question of poverty is, first and foremost, 
perhaps solely, the question of law and order — an issue of law breaking. 
Once it stops being an ethical problem, poverty tends to be criminalized.
All this is bad news for the prospects of moral sensitivity and responsibil-
ity for the Other who needs help. This is not the whole story, though, since, 
as Norberto Bobbio alerts us, “even if we console ourselves by saying that in 
this part of the world we have created affluence for two-thirds, we cannot 
close our eyes to the fact that in the majority of countries two-thirds, or even 
four-fifths or nine-tenths, are experiencing the opposite.”43 And yet most of 
us, most of the time, do close our eyes.
As Ryszard Kapuscinski, one of the most formidable chronographers of 
contemporary living, has recently explained, that effect is achieved by three 
interconnected expedients consistently applied by the media which preside 
over the charity fairs during which the plight of the poor is recalled, only to 
vanish back into oblivion shortly afterwards.44
First, the news of a successive famine or another wave of uprooting and 
enforced homelessness in some far away countries come as a rule coupled 
with the reminder that the same distant lands where the people “as seen on 
tv” die of famine and disease are the birthplace of “Asian tigers.” It does not 
matter, that all the “tigers” together embrace no more than a tiny per cent 
43 Norberto Bobbio, Destra e Sinistra (Rome: Donizelli, 1994).
44 Ryszard Kapuscinski, Lapidarium III (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1997).
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of the population of Asia alone. They are assumed to demonstrate what was 
to be proved — that the sorry plight of the hungry and the homeless is their 
sui generis choice-alternatives are available, but not taken, because they lack 
industry or resolve. The underlying message is that the poor themselves bear 
responsibility for their fate. They could, as the “tigers” did, choose a life of 
work and thrift instead — but apparently decided not to, due to inferior intel-
ligence or the lack of virtue.
Second, the news is so scripted and edited that it reduces the problem 
of poverty and deprivation to the question of hunger alone. This stratagem 
achieves two effects in one go: the real scale of poverty is played down (800 
million people are permanently undernourished, but something like four 
billion — two thirds of the world population — live in poverty), and the task 
ahead is limited to finding food for the hungry. But, as Kapuscinski points out, 
such a presentation of the problem of poverty (as exemplified by one of The 
Economist ’s recent issues analyzing world poverty under the heading “How to 
Feed the World”) “terribly degrades, virtually denies full humanity to people 
whom we want, allegedly, to help.” What the equation “poverty = hunger” 
conceals, are many other and complex aspects of poverty — “horrible living 
and housing conditions, illness, illiteracy, aggression, falling apart families, 
weakening of social bonds, lack of future, and non-productiveness” — afflic-
tions that cannot be cured with high-protein biscuits and powdered milk. 
Kapuscinski remembers wandering through African townships and villages 
and meeting children “who begged me not of bread, water, chocolate or toys, 
but a ballpoint pen, since they went to school and had nothing to write their 
lessons with.”
Let us add that all associations of the horrid pictures of famine presented 
by the media with the plight of the poor accused of violating the principles 
of the work ethic, are carefully avoided. People are shown together with their 
hunger but however the viewers strain their eyes, they would not see a sin-
gle work tool, plot of arable land or head of cattle in the picture. As if there 
was no connection between the emptiness of the work ethic’s promises in a 
world that needs no more labor, and the plight of people offered as an outlet 
for pent-up moral impulses. The work ethic emerges from this exercise un-
scathed — ready to be used again as a whip to chase the poor nearer home 
away from the shelter they seek in vain in the Welfare State.
Third, the spectacles of disasters, as presented by the media, support and 
reinforce the ordinary, daily moral withdrawal in another way, apart from 
87
the world inhospitable to levinas
unloading the accumulated supplies of moral sentiments. Their long-term 
effect is that “the developed part of the world surrounds itself with a sanitary 
belt of uncommitment; it erects a global Berlin Wall. All information com-
ing from ‘out there’ are pictures of war, murders, drugs, looting, contagious 
diseases, refugees and hunger; that is, of something threatening,” revolting 
and repulsive. Only rarely, and in a half-voice with no connection to scenes 
of civil wars and massacres, do we hear of the murderous weapons used, and 
even less often are we reminded of what we know but prefer not to be told 
about: that all those weapons used to make far-away homelands into killing 
fields have been supplied by our arms factories, jealous of their order-books 
and proud of their competitiveness, which is the lifeblood of our own cher-
ished prosperity. A synthetic image of the self-inflicted brutality sediments 
in public consciousness: an image of “mean streets,” “no go areas” writ large, 
a magnified rendition of a gangland, an alien, subhuman world beyond eth-
ics and beyond salvation. The message is chat attempts to save that world 
from the worst consequences of its own brutality may bring only momentary 
effects which in the long run are bound to fail; all the lifelines thrown even-
tually become nooses for the poor to hang themselves.
Next, the best tried, most trusty tool of “adiaphorisation”: the exemption 
of conduct from ethical significance and evaluation, comes into its own: the 
sober, rational calculation of costs and effects. Money spent on this kind of 
people is money wasted. Wasting money is one thing that, as everybody will 
readily agree, we cannot afford. The victims of famine are not ethical sub-
jects. Our own stance toward them is not a moral issue. Morality is for car-
nivals only, the spectacular, instantaneous, short-lived, explosive condensa-
tions of pity and compassion. When it comes to our, the affluents’ collective 
responsibility for the continuing misery of the world’s poor, economic calcu-
lation takes over, and the rules of free trade, competitiveness and productiv-
ity replace ethical precepts. When economy speaks, ethics better keep silent.
Unless, of course, it is the work ethic. This is the sole variant which the 
economic rule tolerates: an ethics which (contrary to Levinas’s image of eth-
ics and the idea of justice as whips for the sinners and watchdogs for the rul-
ers) is not an adversary of the economy bent on profitability and competi-
tiveness, but its necessary support and supplement. For the affluent part of 
the world and the affluent sections of well-off societies, the work ethic is a 
one-sided affair. It spells out the duties of those who struggle with the task of 
survival; it says nothing about the duties of those who rose above mere sur-
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vival and went on to more elevated, loftier concerns. In particular, it denies 
the dependency of the first upon the second, and so releases the second from 
responsibility for the first.
Today, the work ethic is instrumental in bringing the idea of “depend-
ency” (which, in the last account, is nothing but the flip side of our moral 
responsibility) into disrepute. “Dependency” is, increasingly, a dirty word 
and so also, by proxy is the idea of ethical responsibility. The Welfare State 
is accused of cultivating dependency, of raising it to the level of a self-per-
petuating culture and this is a crowning argument for dismantling it. Moral 
responsibility is the first victim of this holy war against dependency. But the 
dependency of the Other (it needs to be repeated over and over again) is but 
a mirror image of my responsibility, the starting point of any moral rela-
tionship and the founding assumption of all moral action. To denigrate the 
dependency of the poor and describe it as sin, the work ethic, in its present 




At no time since 
its “breakthrough” in 
Edmund Husserl’s Logische 
Untersuchungen (1900–1) has 
phenomenology been absent from 
the world’s philosophical stage, but today 
there are remarkable signs of the continuing 
vitality of this philosophical approach. It thus 
seems appropriate to ask just what it is that makes 
phenomenology a distinctive way of philosophizing. And 
with its centenary year recently behind us, it is also appropriate 
that this question be posed to the Logical Investigations, a work that 
Robert Sokolowski has described as “literally a new beginning” since 
what Husserl started here “cannot be considered as continuing a tradition 
that had taken shape before him.”1 Just what was the breakthrough that oc-
curred in the Logical Investigations, and what claim does it have on us today? 
These questions matter not only because they are important for Husserl 
scholarship, but because they are much disputed now, and upon their an-
swer depend our expectations of what phenomenological philosophy can ac-
complish, and what, if anything, lies beyond its scope. For if there is renewed 
interest in phenomenology today, this has brought with it — or is it the con-
sequence of? — a tendency to inflate the very concept of phenomenology. 
Today the borders between phenomenological philosophy, metaphysical 
speculation, and neo-Kantian construction show signs of collapsing. One 
reason for this is clear enough: the ascetic, anti-metaphysical “positivism” of 
Husserl’s early writing belongs to a cultural and philosophical milieu that is 
no longer our own, and if its residue cannot be excised from the phenomeno-
logical program, that program will be felt by some to be too restrictive. Yet 
 Originally published as Steven Galt Crowell: “Authentic Thinking and Phenomenological 
Method.” in Husserl’s Logical Investigations in the New Century: Western and Chinese Perspectives 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 119–33. Reprinted with the permission of Springer Netherlands.
1 Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000), 211.







Dominique Janicaud seems to speak well when he says that “[p]henomenol-
ogy is not all philosophy. It has nothing to win […] by an overestimation of its 
possibilities.”2 Must a renewal of phenomenology involve its overestimation?
The overestimation to which Janicaud refers frequently justifies itself 
by rejecting a principle of phenomenological method that the Logical Inves-
tigations deemed essential — the principle of intuitive givenness or Evidenz. 
If, following Martin Heidegger, we identify three elements of the “break-
through” to phenomenology made in the Logical Investigations — intention-
ality, categorical intuition, and the apriori3 — it is the theory of categorial 
intuition that forms the basis of the breakthrough, since the concept of in-
tuition that gets worked out there made it possible for Husserl to give a dis-
tinctly phenomenological sense to the Brentanian notion of intentionality and 
the Kantian notion of the apriori. Only by insisting on the epistemological 
primacy of intuition in just the way he did was Husserl able to develop a non-
psychological approach to intentionality and a non-constructivist concept of 
the apriori. And yet it is just this commitment to intuition that has seemed 
too restrictive to many phenomenologists. On the one hand, there are think-
ers like Jean-Luc Marion and Emmanuel Levinas who abandon the principle 
in favor of what might be called “speculation” — invoking “revelation” as a 
kind of givenness not reducible to intuition. On the other hand, there are 
thinkers like Eugen Fink who abandon the principle in favor of construc-
tion — arguing that intuition provides only the starting point for a phenom-
enology that can construct “Ideas” of what cannot be given with Evidenz. The 
question to be posed to any such proposal is whether phenomenology can 
transcend intuition while still remaining phenomenology. The present essay 
will begin to address this question, first by clarifying what Husserl’s concept 
of intuition actually entails and then by showing that while both specula-
tive and constructive phenomenology fail as phenomenology, at least some 
aspects of their agendas can be fulfilled without abandoning the principle of 
intuitive givenness.
2 Dominique Janicaud, “The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology,” in Phenomenology and the 
Theological Turn, ed. and trans. Bernard Prusak (New York: Fordham University, 2000), 34. Origi-
nally published as Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie, (Paris: Editions de l’éclat, 1991), 21.
3 Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, ed. Petra Jaeger, Gesamtausgabe 20 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1979), 34. Translated by Theodore Kisiel as History of the Concept of 
Time: Prolegomena (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 27.
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2. intuition and authentic thinking
The heart of the matter is found in the chapter of the Logical Investigations 
entitled “The Apriori Laws of Authentic and Inauthentic Thinking,” in which 
Husserl, writing in the heyday of neo-Kantianism, claims that his theory of 
categorial intuition has defined “the much used, but little clarified, relation 
between thinking and intuiting.”4 At first it seems odd to identify a philosophi-
cal breakthrough with a theory of intuition, since philosophy’s strength is 
usually taken to lie in thinking, the logos, the power that reason exercises 
over intuition. Certainly, philosophers such as Hermann Cohen and Hein-
rich Rickert would follow Kant’s dictum that intuitions alone are “blind,” a 
night in which all cows are black, a mythical “given” — to use Wilfred Sell-
ars’s term — that has no authority in the “space of reasons.” To hold thought 
accountable to intuition is to ask the sun to reflect the moon. And yet Hus-
serl’s breakthrough to phenomenology lies precisely in his recognition that 
both neo-Kantianism and its empiricist opponent operate with an unclarified 
view of thought and intuition — specifically, a view that holds them to be 
distinct kinds, distinct “faculties.” For Husserl the genuine contrast is not be-
tween thought and intuition, but between signification and intuition5 — that 
is, between empty or “merely symbolic” intentions and intentions that are 
fulfilled in the way appropriate to them — and this allows him to determine 
the concept of thinking in a wholly new way. This he does in the chapter 
on authentic thinking, whose bold thesis is that thinking is itself a kind of 
intuiting, categorial intuiting. As Husserl puts it, “authentic acts of thinking […] 
lie in […] the intuitions of states of affairs, and all intuitions which function as 
possible parts of such states of affairs.”6 To assess the implications of this for 
phenomenological method, let us look more closely at the concept of intui-
tion that facilitates Husserl’s move beyond the Kantian dichotomy.
The apriori laws of authentic thinking occupy the role in Husserl’s Logi-
cal Investigations that transcendental logic occupies in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason: they express the conditions which “no knowledge can contradict […] 
4 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 1970), II:832. Origi-
nally published as Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, Zweiter Teil, ed. Ursula Panzer Husserli-
ana XIX/2 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984), 730.
5 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 833 [732].
6 Ibid., 825 [722].
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without at once losing all content, that is, all relation to any object.”7 In Hus-
serl’s terms, a “pure” logic deals with the apriori laws of “meaning,” that is, 
“all possible matters and all possible categorial forms.” But since, as he ar-
gues, the “realm of meaning is much wider than the realm of intuition,” not 
every such categorial formation can attain “reality.”8 The laws of authentic 
thinking, then, are the “laws […] of categorial intuitions” — that is, of those cat-
egorial forms to which “a unitary correlate of fulfillment can correspond.”9 
Like Kant’s transcendental logic, Husserl’s laws of authentic thinking are a 
“logic of truth,” delimiting those categorial combinations that are possible 
cognitions. Unlike Kant, however, Husserl neither sets out a restricted set of 
categories nor determines possible cognitions in terms of a presupposed fac-
ulty of sensuous intuition. Thus, where Kant can claim an apriori content 
for his transcendental logic, Husserl’s laws of authentic thinking have no 
such content. Rather, he admits that “what categorial formations are in fact 
permitted by given materials of perception or imagination” cannot be deter-
mined by the laws in advance.10 At best one can say that given the reality of 
a certain categorial formation, certain other ones are logically possible and 
impossible. But why do Husserl’s laws not reduce to mere empiricism, then? 
What is it in Husserl’s theory that serves the critical function that, in Kant’s 
theory, is served by the apriori intuitions of space and time?
Husserl’s answer turns on rejecting Kant’s dualism between thinking and 
intuiting altogether: authentic thinking is defined not as a thinking accom-
panied by confirming intuition, but as that very intuition itself. Husserl notes 
that though acts of “categorial union and formation” are not “necessarily” 
given by the material upon which they are founded — since what is given 
in straightforward fashion allows for multiple categorial articulations — this 
“freedom […] still has its law-governed limits.” These limits are exposed pre-
cisely in the attempt to “carry out [vollziehen]” the categorial acts in question. 
This Vollzug is what gives “reality” to the categorial act; it is categorial “intui-
tion.” But it is also nothing other than (authentic) thinking itself. As Husserl 
puts it, we “can no doubt ‘think’ any relation between any set of terms […] 
7 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1968), 
100. Originally published as Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften 3, ed. Königlich 
Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1904/11), A63/B87.
8 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 824 [721].
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 823 [719]. This is why there can be nothing in Husserl that corresponds to the chapter of 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason entitled “The Analytic of Principles.”
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think them, that is, in the sense of merely meaning them. But we cannot re-
ally carry out “foundings” on every foundation: we cannot see sensuous stuff 
in any categorial form we like.”11 Husserl thus replaces Kant’s dualism with a 
three-fold distinction. There is, first, a concept of thinking that is equivalent 
to mere signification, according to which we can combine any term with any 
other, subject only to syntactic rules of meaning. Thus I can say (or “think” 
in this sense): “The camera is part of the lens.” This, however, is not properly 
called “thinking” at all, since it is the mere indication of a categorial act. Thus, 
second, there is thinking in the pregnant sense, namely the attempt to carry 
out a categorial “founding” on some given “foundation.” Such thinking is not 
mere signification but a concrete attempt to grasp some given material (in 
this case the perceived camera) in light of some specific categorial form (here, 
part — whole). This leads, thirdly, to a concept of authentic thinking, which, 
as categorial intuition, is the successful carrying out of the categorial act — as 
when I succeed in “seeing” that “the lens is part of the camera.” That this is 
not a grammatical truth should be obvious; just as it should be obvious that I 
cannot authentically think that the musical note, middle C, is purple — that 
is, I cannot carry out a categorial synthesis of identification on this material.
It is the notion of categorial intuition as carrying out (Vollzug), then, that 
allows Husserl to get beyond Kant’s dilemma: Kant failed to extend “the con-
cepts of perception and intuition over the categorial realm” because he failed 
to grasp “the deep difference between intuition and signification”12 — that 
is, between authentic thinking and signification. Instead, he worked with a 
concept of thinking that was equivalent to signification, and thus could not 
see how categorial acts could of themselves be intuitive. For this reason Kant 
had no choice but to treat sensuous intuition as normative for cognition, 
with the psychologistic consequences Husserl seizes upon. For Husserl, in 
contrast, intuition continues to play its cognitively critical or normative role 
with respect to signification, but it does so precisely as thinking, thus not as 
something foreign to the space of reasons. There is no gap between thinking 
and intuiting and hence no anxiety that thinking, restricted to what can be 
intuited, might fall short of truth.
The implications of Husserl’s move here are quite far-reaching. For it is 
not merely that intuition insures that thinking can attain at least some truth. 
11 Ibid., 821 [771].
12 Ibid., 833 [732].
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Rather, the very idea of a truth-functional discourse is tied to the laws of au-
thentic thinking. As Husserl puts it, “categorial intuitions […] impart to state-
ments […] the logical values of truth and falsehood.” In the absence of possible 
categorial intution, one cannot assign to a statement any relation to truth, 
since it is on the “laws” of authentic thinking that “the normative regula-
tion of purely signitive, or admixedly signitive, thought depends.”13 Hence, 
to suppose that there could be a kind of thinking that would both escape the 
restrictions of intuitive givenness and remain truth-functional — a supposi-
tion made both by speculative and constructivist phenomenologists — is to 
suppose that symbols have a life of their own.
And yet proponents of a post-intuitionistic phenomenology might well 
object that categorial intuition is called “intuition” only by equivocation; 
thus that authentic thinking and the norm of truth is not tied to “intuition” 
in any interesting sense of the word. In what sense, then, is it true that for 
Husserl all that is “given” is “intuitively given”? Husserl introduces the no-
tion of categorial intuition by contrasting it with sense intuition, arguing 
that “in the mere form of a judgment” — for instance, “S is P” — “only certain 
antecedently specifiable parts […] can have something which corresponds 
to them in intuition” — namely “S,” “P” — “while to other parts” — namely 
“is” — “nothing intuitive possibly can correspond.”14 One might then suppose 
that Husserl limits intuition in the strict sense to the sensuously given, while 
leading phenomenology beyond that to the categorial — and so beyond in-
tuition. One might also point out that Husserl says only that the “state of 
affairs” constituted in the categorial act expressed in the “is” must be “given 
to us […] by way of an act which gives it, an analogue of common sensuous 
intuition”15 — which, precisely as an analogue, need not really be an intui-
tion. Thus, even when Husserl states explicitly that the “essential homogene-
ity of the function of fulfillment […] obliges us to give the name ‘perception’ 
to each fulfilling act of confirmatory self-presentation, to each fulfilling act 
whatever the name of an ‘intuition,’ and to its intentional correlate the name 
of ‘object,’”16 one might insist that this, being a mere analogy, should carry no 
weight in defining phenomenological method.
13 Ibid., 823 [720].
14 Ibid., 778 [663].
15 Ibid., 784 [670].
16 Ibid., 785 [671].
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Husserl has already anticipated this objection, however. Even before he 
speaks of an “analogy” between sensuous and categorial fulfillments, he 
maintains a more nuanced view about the way in which terms like “intuition” 
and “perception” operate, noting that “Perception and object are concepts that 
cohere most intimately together, which mutually assign sense to one another, 
and which widen or narrow this sense conjointly.”17 Thus while Husserl’s in-
troduction of categorial intuition “made use of a certain mutually delimited, 
natural, but also very narrow concept of perception (or of object)” — namely, 
that of sense perception — this does not mean that some literal meaning of 
intuition has been analogized to other kinds of fulfillments in a perhaps il-
legitimate way. Rather, Husserl simply takes seriously an obvious feature of 
our everyday talk: “I see what you mean,” “I finally got insight into the mat-
ter,” “I perceive a discrepancy between your statement and your behavior.” 
In such cases of what Donn Welton has called “natural meaning,” there “is 
not a clean difference between literal and metaphorical meaning.”18 The rel-
evant difference between sense perception and other perception/object cor-
relations is not between literal intuitive givenness and merely analogically 
intuitive givenness, but between “straightforward” or direct, and categorially 
structured, perception.19 Thus there can be no talk of an object without a cor-
responding notion of perception or intuition; an in principle imperceptible 
object is not thinkable, since to be an object at all is to be perceptible in some 
modality or other, whether directly or synthetically.
If this is so, then to tie phenomenological method to intuition is not to tie 
it to a restricted domain of objects — the intuitively given ones, as opposed 
to the “unapparent” — but to open it responsibly, as authentic thinking, to 
anything that can be an object of thought at all. Here, however, a more seri-
ous objection arises, one that will force us to consider some views that hold 
phenomenology’s intuitionism to be phenomenologically unsupportable. For 
it may be that the notions of perception and object mutually define one an-
other, but phenomenological investigation itself uncovers phenomena — for 
instance, the alter ego, temporality, and the world — that cannot be taken to 
be objects at all. And if they do not have the structure of an object, there may 
be no reason to think that they are intuitively given or perceived. If phenom-
enology uncovers such phenomena, then it has already transcended its own 
17 Ibid., 781 [666].
18 Donn Welton, The Other Husserl (Bloomington, in.: Indiana University, 2000), 386.
19 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 791 [679].
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supposed intuitionism.20 On this objection, authentic thinking (categorial 
intuition) is not necessary for phenomenology, and this would explain why 
Husserl drops both the notion of categorial intuition and authentic thinking 
after the Logical Investigations.21 To answer this objection, it is necessary to 
show that the structure of authentic thinking is indeed at work in uncover-
ing these horizonal phenomena. This task will be approached in two steps. 
First, some of the arguments put forth by those who propose to abandon Hus-
serl’s principle of intuition in favor of speculation will be criticized (Section 
3). Then a proper and an improper sense of phenomenological “construction” 
will be distinguished so as to show that the former retains precisely the struc-
ture of categorial intuition or authentic thinking (Section 4).
3. speculative phenomenology?
Calling into question the centrality of intuition for phenomenological 
method has brought phenomenology into contact with a strain of thought 
to which, at the time of the Logical Investigations, Husserl was manifestly hos-
tile: speculation. This is evident in the work of those whom Dominique Jani-
caud associates with a “theological turn” in French phenomenology — for 
instance, in the writings of Jean-Luc Marion. Now Marion’s thought, which 
develops Heidegger’s late suggestion of a “phenomenology of the unappar-
ent” into a post-metaphysical approach to God without Being, is a fecund 
provocation that is not to be dismissed in a sentence. However, as Janicaud 
remarks, “we are not forced to take or leave any œuvre as a whole,” but have 
the “right, and even the duty,” to question and test its individual steps.22 Thus 
we shall restrict ourselves to a critical examination of that point in the Logical 
Investigations where Marion claims to find already a break with the principle 
20 In Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 
First Book, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983), 10, originally published as Ideen zu einer 
reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und 
phänomenologische Forschung, vol. 1 (1913), 11, Husserl offers another definition of “object” as “any 
subject of possible true predications,” and on that definition, of course, all horizonal phenom-
ena would count as objects. Whether this means that they must therefore be intuitable — as is 
implied by the Logical Investigations” conception of the correlation of object and perception — or 
whether Husserl would be willing to abandon the correlation thesis under pressure from this 
“logical” concept of object is an interesting question that cannot be explored here.
21 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 662–3 [535]: “It does not affect what I have said to add that, after 
twenty years of further work, I should not write at many points as I then wrote, and that I do not 
approve of much that I then wrote, e.g., the doctrine of categorial representation.”
22 Janicaud, “The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology,” 51 [40].
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of intuition that, he believes, leads from a “reduction to the intuitively given” 
to a reduction of intuition itself.23
Marion begins by asking whether “the characteristic of givenness [is] 
equivalent to the characteristic of presence through intuition”24 and con-
cludes by asserting the “unconditional primacy of the givenness of the phe-
nomenon,” of which “intuitive givenness” is only a particular “illustration.”25 
What authorizes this split between givenness and intuition, such that phe-
nomenology is defined essentially in terms of the former and only inciden-
tally in terms of the latter? Is there any authorization in Husserl’s text for 
thinking givenness without intuition?
It does not appear so. Marion’s whole argument turns on the claim that 
signification is a kind of givenness without intuition, and this argument 
seems to be based on an equivocation. To establish what he calls the “intui-
tive extraterratoriality of signification,”26 Marion follows Derrida in noting 
that for Husserl signification is supposedly “valid without the confirmation 
of an intuition,”27 that there is a kind of “autonomy of signification” with 
respect to intuition. But what exactly is meant by “valid” here? Certainly, 
Husserl claims that signification operates without fulfilling intuition — that 
is, that there can be empty intentions — but in what sense can we speak of 
“autonomy” from intuition? It is not as though the act of signification, emp-
ty though it may be, eluded intuition and presence in some absolute sense, 
since phenomenological reflection is able to grasp such acts in their intuitive 
presence. To say that signification can be “valid” without a confirming intui-
tion — that is, can be empty — is not yet to say that it is “extraterritorial” with 
respect to intuition. Nevertheless, Marion takes Husserl’s remark about the 
“deep difference between intuition and signification” to mean that “significa-
tion […] is defined as the other of intuition” and therefore is somehow “before 
intuition.”28 Just here, however, we find a crucial equivocation.
First, it is true that signification is defined as the “other” of intuition in 
the sense that terms can be combined without fulfilling intuition — indeed, 
without any possible fulfillment. But in contrast to Husserl, who ties significa-
23 Jean-Luc Marion, Reduction and Givenness, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Evanston, il: Northwestern 
University Press, 1998), 30. Originally published as Réduction et donation: recherches sur Husserl, Hei-
degger et la phenomenologie française (Paris: puf, 1989), 49.
24 Marion, Reduction and Givenness, 6 [14].
25 Ibid., 32 [53].
26 Ibid., 22 [38].
27 Ibid., 20 [35].
28 Ibid., 23 [39].
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tion back to authentic thinking or intuitively fulfilled categorial acts, Marion 
understands “purely symbolic” thought — for instance, in mathematics — as 
a “capacity to think significations that remain irreducible to any intuition.”29 
This is, to say the least, an astounding position to attribute to Husserl, who 
from first to last sought to show how purely symbolic thinking — especially 
the “technology” of mathematical symbolism — was not irreducible to in-
tuition. Leaving this point aside, however, Marion’s argument for the inde-
pendence of signification from intuition is based, secondly, on the following 
equivocation. Claiming, correctly, that for Husserl “every expression […] has 
a signification, whether or not it has an intuitive fulfillment,” Marion con-
cludes that Husserl rejects the view that “signification becomes ‘true’ only by 
finding its foundation in intuition.”30 But here we must note that if by “true” 
is meant “valid” (Gelten, holding), this conclusion does not follow. We saw 
clearly how for Husserl it is the possibility of intuitive fulfillment, authen-
tic thinking, that “imparts” to signification a relation to truth or falsity.31 On 
the other hand, if by “true” is meant only that a Bedeutung is present even in 
the absence of fulfilling intuition, it is only by equivocation that one could 
claim, as Marion does, that signification is “given evidently” in a mode that is 
itself non-intuitive, a “mode of presence [that is] deployed sui generis when sig-
nification, by itself and itself alone, presents itself.”32 For though the signify-
ing act be empty of fulfilling intuition, its correlate, the Bedeutung, is no more 
something whose presence would escape the functional concept of intuition 
Husserl outlines33 than is categoriality itself. Signification is itself given in-
tuitively if it is given at all: it is given intuitively to that phenomenological 
reflection that thematizes signification itself “in person” rather than merely 
signifying (talking about) it. There is nothing to suggest that this “in person” 
is somehow autonomous from intuition in Husserl’s functional sense, and 
therefore nothing in the phenomenon of signification, as Husserl presents it, 
that would challenge the correlation between intuition and givenness.
On this slender basis, however, Marion feels entitled to argue that when 
Husserl invokes the fundamental “correlation between the appearing and 
29 Ibid., 24 [40].
30 Ibid., 26 [43].
31 Though there is no room to make the argument here, consideration of the role played by the “telos 
of truth” in Husserl’s genetic phenomenology would show that were there no “relation to fulfill-
ing intuition” there would be no signification at all.
32 Marion, Reduction and Givenness, 28 [47].
33 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 785 [671].
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that which appears as such” in the Crisis, this constitutes a “belated recogni-
tion” that “appearing” was never properly tied to intuition but rather counts 
“first as the givenness of what thus appears.” Givenness is then taken to be in-
dependent of intuition since it is “the appearing” — and not intuition — that 
“gives that which appears.”34 But if nothing in the Logical Investigations al-
lows us to argue that givenness (“appearing”) can be separated from intui-
tion — that is, if there is no leibhafte Gegebenheit that would not be intuitive 
presence35 — then the claim that what matters to phenomenology is given-
ness, and that phenomenological method can extend itself to supposedly 
non-intuitive givens without becoming groundless speculation, has no basis.
Without claiming to do justice to the depth of Emmanuel Levinas’s phe-
nomenology of radical alterity, it is possible to locate in it, too, a point at 
which authentic phenomenological thinking moves “with aplomb” — that 
is, with mere affirmation — into speculation.36 Levinas’s thought proceeds, 
with a double movement, first from an ontological phenomenology that re-
mains intuitive to an ethical phenomenology that challenges the primacy of 
intuition in the experience of the “face” of the Other; and then, secondly, to 
an affirmation of the infinity and even divinity of this face. While Levinas’s 
first move seems phenomenologically justified, similar phenomenologi-
cal authorization is lacking for his second move. When Levinas writes that 
“[i]t is our relations with men […] that give to theological concepts the sole 
signification they admit of,”37 he utters the precise point at which phenom-
enology, bounded by the intuitive givenness of our “relations with men,” 
wanders forth into speculation, that is, into a theological stance that is nei-
ther necessarily nor sufficiently motivated by phenomenology. And it may 
well be that if the apriori laws of authentic thinking circumscribe the field of 
what can have the “logical values of truth and falsehood,” statements of the 
sort Levinas (and Marion) propound may not be assessable in terms of truth 
or falsity — though they may respond to other normative principles.
But what makes Levinas’s first move — in which the principle of intui-
tion is already challenged in the name of the experience of the “face” of the 
Other — phenomenologically compelling? If this is not already an instance 
34 Marion, Reduction and Givenness, 32 [52].
35 Ibid., 34 [56].
36 On this “aplomb,” see Janicaud, “The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology,” 25 [14].
37 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 
1969), 79. Originally published as Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l’exteriorité (The Hague: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 1961), 51; 
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of speculation it must be possible to reconstruct Levinas’s insight in such a 
way that the principle of intuition, or authentic thinking, is preserved. This 
can be achieved by distinguishing between an improper and a proper con-
cept of phenomenological “construction,” a task to which the final section of 
the present essay is devoted.
4. phenomenological constructions, proper and improper
In stating why his investigation “owes everything to the phenomenological 
method,” Levinas identifies the very spot at which the motive for a construc-
tive phenomenology becomes apparent. Reflecting on intentional acts, phe-
nomenology discovered them “to be implanted in horizons unsuspected by 
[these acts],” horizons that “endow them with a meaning.” “What does it mat-
ter,” Levinas continues, “if in the Husserlian phenomenology taken literally 
these unsuspected horizons are in their turn interpreted as thoughts aiming 
at objects! What counts is the idea of the overflowing of objectifying thought 
by a forgotten experience from which it lives.”38 The question is whether, in 
order to get at these “unsuspected horizons,” phenomenology must give up 
its principle of intuitive givenness. Can horizonality be thought authenti-
cally in the sense of the Logical Investigations?
One answer is provided by the “constructive phenomenology” that Eu-
gen Fink proposed in his Sixth Cartesian Meditation.39 Starting with the intui-
tive givenness of the “living present,” a regressive phenomenology unfolds 
all the horizonal intentional implications that “become accessible through 
the phenomenological reduction.”40 These unfoldings remain intuitively 
given (in a sense to be explored below), but at a certain point regressive analy-
sis encounters “horizons” that refer “to something that precisely by its tran-
scendental mode of being is in principle deprived of givenness.”41 For this rea-
son, Fink argues, “the theorizing directed to them” — namely, constructive 
phenomenology — “is not an ‘intuitive having-given,’ is not ‘intuitive.’” For 
instance, regressive analysis moves back along the temporally sedimented 
38 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 28 [16–17].
39 Eugen Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation, trans. Ronald Bruzina (Bloomington, in: Indiana University, 
1995). Originally published as VI. Cartesianische Meditation. Teil I: Die Idee einer transzendentalen 
Methodenlehre, ed. Hans Ebeling, Jann Holl, and Guy van Kerckhoven, Husserliana Dokumente II,1 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988).
40 Ibid., 57 [63].
41 Ibid., 56 [62].
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constitutions of a single ego, uncovering the horizons that give meaning to 
its current intentionalities. With the phenomena of “birth and death,” how-
ever, it reaches a “limit” or horizon that, though it contributes “sense,” cannot 
be “exhibited in an immediate way in the being-context of ongoing world 
constitution.” Thus, if we are “to gain any understanding at all,” writes Fink, 
“we have to ‘construct.’”42
Fink’s constructive phenomenology is thus motivated largely — if not 
exclusively43 — by questions of wholeness or totalities that, precisely as to-
talities, elude the grasp of intuitive reflection. However, there lurks in this 
concern for totality what Kant calls a “transcendental illusion,” and if this 
is so, then the rationale for a non-intuitive constructive phenomenology is 
not compelling.44 Recalling that for Husserl it is not possible to carry out a 
given categorial synthesis on just any material whatsoever, it is evident that 
precisely the sort of material Fink focuses on — world, temporal stream, his-
tory, as horizons of the transcendental field itself — cannot be authentically 
thought in the category of part–whole. Just as they are not properly objects, 
neither can they be totalized; in the attempt to do so one encounters antino-
mies. It is thus extremely problematic to say, as Robert Sokolowski does, that 
phenomenology takes “a view that is appropriate to the whole” and to argue 
that “mind and being are moments to each other,” since it is not clear that the 
category of part–whole applies to notions like “mind” and “world” at all.45
Interestingly, Donn Welton raises this objection against Husserl himself 
as he tries to show how Husserl’s thinking about the world-horizon was held 
captive to a “Cartesian way” of posing phenomenological problems. In re-
sponse, Welton argues for a version of constructive phenomenology that, un-
like Fink’s, does not relinquish the principle of intuition but proposes only 
to recognize the “mediating role of argument in establishing transcendental 
structures.”46 A look at what Welton means by the “mediating role of argu-
ment” can help us both to appreciate the continuing relevance of Husserl’s 
concept of authentic thinking and to distinguish between what can respon-
42 Ibid., 62 [70].
43 Ibid., [63] 70–1.
44 For further discussion of Fink’s position, see my Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths 
Toward Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, il: Northwestern University Press, 2001), chap. 
13: “Gnostic Phenomenology: Eugen Fink and the Critique of Transcendental Reason.” This essay 
may also be found in The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy I (2001), 
257–77.
45 Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 209 and 25.
46 Welton, The Other Husserl, 289.
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sibly be said to belong to those horizons to which Levinas referred and what 
remains groundless speculation.
According to Welton, phenomenological constructions are needed to get 
at horizonal phenomena such as the lifeworld. Do such constructions tran-
scend the principle of intuition? Welton sometimes suggests as much, saying 
that “the horizon is not itself an appearance but is always ‘pregiven,’” and that 
“the world does not appear.”47 But such statements are directed only against 
a very restricted notion of intuition — namely, Husserl’s “Cartesian strategy 
of directly intuiting consciousness,”48 according to which “appearances” are 
objects for epistemic intentionality. To treat the world as “appearing” in this 
sense is to treat it exclusively as an object for consciousness and thus to miss 
its horizonal character. On Welton’s view, because Husserl linked his “notion 
of intuition” to a “Cartesian notion of evidence” with its claim to transpar-
ency, adequacy, and immediacy, he had no choice but to treat the world as an 
object for consciousness.49 But once the restrictions of the Cartesian notion of 
evidence are abandoned, nothing stands in the way of recognizing that the 
world-horizon appears as the “correlate of experience or intuition.” One must 
simply avoid characterizing it in categorial terms that inappropriately “total-
ize” it.50 What then is the specific relation between construction and intui-
tion in the phenomenological method that grasps the world-horizon as such?
Welton argues that Husserl turns to construction when he recognizes 
the impossibility of defining the transcendental field through “directly in-
tuiting” consciousness. Given the temporal structure of consciousness, the 
demand for adequate intuitive evidence seems to reduce phenomenology to 
the “sterile ‘I am.’”51 At the very least phenomenology must incorporate rec-
ollection and so become, “in a minimal sense, historical reflection.”52 It might 
seem, then, that phenomenology must renounce the principle of basing its 
claims solely upon intuitive evidence, thereby placing its trust in empty sig-
nifications. But here Welton invokes the “mediating role” of “transcendental 
arguments” in uncovering elements of the horizon that condition intention-
ality, the experience of meaningful objects.53 And although he does not note 
47 Ibid., 332.
48 Ibid., 270.
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the connection, Welton’s account of transcendental arguments retrieves pre-
cisely Husserl’s doctrine of authentic thinking.
First, there is something quite elusive about this idea of a transcendental 
“argument.” As Welton admits, it is not really an argument in the sense of a 
deduction.54 Further, if he correctly describes Husserl’s genetic or construc-
tive practice as a “methodologically induced reflective analysis that opens up 
the transcendental as a field to direct intuition and then uses eidetic variation to 
regressively discover different sets of transcendental conditions,”55 it seems 
that transcendental arguments require little beyond the staples of phenom-
enological method. Apparently, the mediating role of argument functions in 
the process of eidetic variation itself. Just what kind of thinking, then, is in 
play in such arguments?
Welton borrows a central feature of his account from Charles Taylor, who 
suggests that transcendental arguments lay out a “chain of indispensabili-
ty claims” that “articulate a certain insight we have into our experience.”56 
Taylor, for instance, finds such an argument at work in Merleau-Ponty, who 
shows that given the phenomenologically discernible features of our sense 
perception, a “field of this structure can only be experienced by an embodied 
agent;” hence, our sense of ourselves as embodied agents “is not a contingent 
fact we might discover empirically” but is “constitutive of our experience.”57 
This differs from a Kantian transcendental deduction because, in working 
back to the transcendental condition (embodied subjectivity), I do not work 
back to something that, though itself incapable of being experienced (like 
the “unity of apperception”), is posited as necessary for the experience I do 
have. Rather, I recover something that in a certain sense I have always al-
ready known. This condition has the character of a horizon: although my 
embodiment is not an intentional object, it is horizonally experienced, pre-
given, and thus intuited along with my direct perception of objects. And only 
because it can be recovered, made intuitively explicit, as having been expe-
rienced, does it count as a phenomenologically established feature of tran-
scendental subjectivity. By contrast, the claim that a “body made up of car-
bon molecules” is indispensable to such perceptual intentionality would not 




57 Charles Taylor, “Transcendental Arguments,” in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University, 1995), 24–25.
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it is not something that can be established by a transcendental “argument” or 
phenomenological construction in the relevant sense.
What makes the difference here? It is precisely the demand that transcen-
dental arguments must articulate an insight that we have into our experi-
ence — that is, that the conditions be tied to intuitive evidence of the actual 
features of my experience. In this sense, the notion of a “condition” is relative 
to the level at which one starts (just as “material” for categorial formation is 
relative: it can already be categorially formed). For instance, if one starts with 
a phenomenology of perceptual experience, embodied agency may emerge 
as the implicit horizonal condition. But one could also begin with our sense 
of ourselves as embodied agents and find that its condition is a certain im-
plicit character of world or time. The crucial point is that at every step the in-
dispensability claim must be cashed in on the basis of “an insight I have into 
my own experience.” The argument just brings to light what is intuited — or 
given — precisely there. Thus a constructive phenomenology does not move 
from the intuited (part) to the unintuitable (whole), as Fink suggested, but 
from the explicitly intuited to its implicitly intuited horizonal condition. 
And though such a move can be put in the form of an argument, it is clear 
that eidetic variation does all the work.58
But if this is what constructive phenomenology amounts to, then it is not 
a break with Husserl’s doctrine of authentic thinking so much as its essential 
elaboration. For authentic thinking is just the actual carrying out of those 
categorial syntheses that are allowed on the basis of a certain material. The 
fact that in this case the material is the transcendental–phenomenological 
field itself does not mean that such thinking has changed its stripes. Actually 
carrying out these categorial elaborations just is the intuiting of the struc-
tures that condition this field — not a construction of, or inference to, what 
does not appear. In this respect, constructive phenomenology is no different 
than any other phenomenology. All authentic thinking is beholden to its 
material, whether it is directed as a particular state of affairs or at one that 
is mediated by transcendental “arguments,” that is, by eidetic variations that 
yield insight into necessary conditions. Indeed, only authentic thinking in 
the sense of categorial intuition can show that the categories appropriate to 
objects (e.g., part–whole) are not necessarily appropriate to horizons — pre-
58 For one thing, the argument is circular. For another, if one relies on such arguments alone, one 
can generate naturalistic, non-phenomenological conditions, such as the “necessity” of carbon 
molecules.
105
authentic thinking and phenomenological method 
cisely by trying and failing to carry out such categorial syntheses on that ma-
terial. At no point, then, does constructive phenomenology provide a ration-
ale for abandoning the field of intuitive, first-person evidence.
The importance of this may be illustrated, in conclusion, by returning to 
Levinas’s claim that one of the horizons of object-intentionality is the face of 
the Other. The whole of Totality and Infinity can be read as a transcendental 
argument designed to show that not only do the way things show up in our 
practical and theoretical dealings with them depend on intersubjectivity, as 
Husserl already knew, but that this very intersubjectivity is phenomenologi-
cally constituted by a response to an ethical claim (the face of the Other as 
the phenomenon of obligation). If this is truly a phenomenological result, it 
should be possible to show that this indispensability claim articulates an in-
sight we have into our own experience. This I do by actually carrying out the 
thought of its conditioning; that is, by showing, through eidetic variation, 
that the sort of intersubjective world I inhabit is unthinkable without my al-
ways already having acknowledged the Other’s ethical claim on me. Thus, if 
Levinas asserts that the face of the Other is not an “appearance,” that it “tran-
scends intuition,” and so on,59 this can be understood to mean that it is not an 
intentional object. But in thinking it authentically — in carrying out the cat-
egorial syntheses that link it, as condition, with what it conditions — I do in 
fact intuit the face, in Husserl’s sense. By contrast, the further claim that this 
face (ethical obligation) is a “trace of the Divine” as the “absolutely unappar-
ent” or “infinite,” cannot be accepted as phenomenological. It is speculative 
(mere signification). Even a world bereft of God is thinkable only in terms 
of a face that makes an ethical claim on me, and just here lies the difference. 
I can eidetically vary divinity out of the face in a way that I cannot vary its 
ethical claim — just as I can vary carbon molecules out of embodiment in a 
way that I cannot vary its agency. This does not mean that Levinas’s theologi-
cal turn makes no sense, any more than it means that the chemistry of carbon 
molecules makes no sense. But if phenomenology understands itself, it will 
be no more at home with the one than with the other. Its contribution lies 
in tethering philosophy to authentic thinking, thereby allowing it to serve a 
deeply important critical role. And nothing in either chemistry or theology 
provides a convincing rationale for it to abandon that role.
59 See, e.g., Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 50–1 [21–2].








lished an article titled 
“We Refugees” in a small 
English-language Jewish 
publication, the Menorah Journal. 
At the end of this brief but significant 
piece of writing, after having polemi-
cally sketched the portrait of Mr. Cohn, the 
assimilated Jew who, after having been 150 percent 
German, 150 percent Viennese, 150 percent French, 
must bitterly realize in the end that “on ne parvient pas 
deux fois,” she turns the condition of countryless refugee — a 
condition which she herself was living — upside down in order to 
present it as the paradigm of a new historical consciousness. The refugees 
who have lost all rights and who, however, no longer want to be assimilated 
at all costs in a new national identity, but want instead to contemplate lu-
cidly their condition, receive in exchange for assured unpopularity a price-
less advantage. “History is no longer a closed book to them and politics is no 
longer the privilege of Gentiles. They know that the outlawing of the Jewish 
people of Europe has been followed closely by the outlawing of most Europe-
an nations. Refugees driven from country to country represent the vanguard 
of their peoples.”1
One ought to reflect on the meaning of this analysis, which after fifty 
years has lost none of its relevance. In is not only the case that the problem 
presents itself inside and outside of Europe with just as much urgency as 
then. It is also the case that, given the by now unstoppable decline of the 
nation-state and the general corrosion of traditional political-juridical cat-
egories, the refugee is perhaps the only thinkable figure for the people of our 
time and the only category in which one may see today — at least until the 
 Originally published as Giorgio Agamben, “Beyond Human Rights,” in Means Without End: Notes 
on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2000), 15–28. Reprinted with the permission of University of Minnesota Press. 







process of dissolution of the nation-state and of its sovereignty has achieved 
full completion — the forms and limits of a coming political community. It is 
even possible that, if we want to be equal to the absolutely new tasks ahead, 
we will have to abandon decidedly, without reservation, the fundamental 
concepts through which we have so far represented the subjects of the politi-
cal (Man, the Citizen and its rights, but also the sovereign people, the worker, 
and so forth) and build our political philosophy anew starting from the one 
end only figure of the refugee.
×
The first appearance of the refugees as a mass phenomenon took place at the 
end of World War 1, when the fall of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ot-
toman empires, along with the new order created by the peace treaties, upset 
profoundly the demographic and territorial constitution of Central Eastern 
Europe. In a short period, 1.5 million White Russians, seven hundred thou-
sand Armenians, five hundred thousand Bulgarians, a million Greeks, and 
hundreds of thousands of Germans, Hungarians, and Romanians left their 
countries. To these moving masses, one needs to add the explosive situation 
determined by the fact that about thirty percent of the population in the new 
states created by the peace treaties on the model of the nation-state (Yugosla-
via and Czechoslovakia, for example), was constituted by minorities that had 
to be safeguarded by a series of international treaties — the so-called Minor-
ity Treaties — which very often were not enforced. A few years later, the ra-
cial laws in Germany and the civil war in Spain dispersed throughout Europe 
a new and important contingent of refugees.
We are used to distinguishing between refugees and stateless people, but 
the distinction was not then as simple as it may seem at first glance, nor is it 
even today. From the beginning, many refugees, who were not technically 
stateless, preferred to become such rather than return to their country. (This 
was the case with the Polish and Romanian Jews who were in France or Ger-
many at the end of the war, and today it is the case with those who are politi-
cally persecuted or for whom returning to their countries would mean put-
ting their own survival at risk.) On the other hand, Russian, Armenian, and 
Hungarian refugees were promptly denationalized by the new Turkish and 
Soviet governments. It is important to note how, starting with World War 
1, many European states began to pass laws allowing the denaturalization 
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and denationalization of their own citizens: France was first, in 1915, with re-
gard to the naturalized citizens of “enemy origin”; in 1922, Belgium followed 
this example by revoking the naturalization of those citizens who had com-
mitted “antinational” acts during the war; in 1926, the Italian Fascist regime 
passed an analogous law with regard to citizens who had shown themselves 
“undeserving of Italian citizenship”; in 1933, it was Austria’s turn; and so on, 
until in 1935 the Nuremberg Laws divided German citizens into citizens 
with full rights and citizens without political rights, Such laws — and the 
mass statelessness resulting from them — mark a decisive turn in the life of 
the modern nation-state as well as its definitive emancipation from naive no-
tions of the citizen and the people.
This is not the place to retrace the history of the various international or-
ganizations through which single states, the League of Nations, and later, the 
United Nations have tried to face the refugee problem, from the Nansen Bu-
reau for the Russian and American refugees (1921) to the High Commission 
for Refugees from Germany (1936) to the Intergovernmental Committee for 
Refugees (1938) to the un’s International Refugee Organization (1946) to the 
present Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (1951), whose activity, 
according to its statute, does not have a political character but rather only a 
“social and humanitarian” one. What is essential is that each and every time 
refugees no longer represent individual cases but rather a mass phenomenon 
(as was the case between the two world wars and is now once again), these 
organizations as well as the single states — all the solemn evocations of the 
inalienable rights of human beings notwithstanding — have proved to be 
absolutely incapable not only of solving the problem but also of facing it in 
an adequate manner. The whole question, therefore, was handed over to hu-
manitarian organizations and to the police.
×
The reasons for such impotence lie not only in the selfishness and blind-
ness of bureaucratic apparatuses, but also in the very ambiguity of the fun-
damental notions regulating the inscription of the native (that is, of life) in 
the juridical order of the nation-state. Hannah Arendt titled the chapter of 
her book Imperialism that concerns the refugee problem “The Decline of the 
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Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man.”2 One should try to take seri-
ously this formulation, which indissolubly links the fate of the Rights of Man 
with the fate of the modern nation-state in such a way that the waning of the 
latter necessarily implies obsolescence of the former. Here the paradox is that 
precisely the figure that should have embodied human rights more than any 
other — namely, the refugee — marked instead the radical crisis of the con-
cept. The conception of human rights based on the supposed existence of a 
human being as such, Arendt tells us, proves to be untenable as soon as those 
who profess it find themselves confronted for the first time with people who 
have really lost every quality and every specific relation except for the pure 
fact of being human.3 In the system of the nation-state, so-called sacred and 
inalienable human rights are revealed to be without any protection precisely 
when it is no longer possible to conceive of them as rights of the citizens of 
state. This is implicit, after all, in the ambiguity of the very title of the 1789 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, in which it is unclear whether 
the two terms are to name two distinct realities or whether they are to form, 
instead, a hendiadys in which the first term is actually always already con-
tained in the second.
That there is no autonomous space in the political order of the nation-
state for something like the pure human in itself is evident at the very least 
from the fact that, even in the best of cases, the status of refugee has always 
been considered a temporary condition that ought to lead either to naturali-
zation or to repatriation. A stable statue for the human itself is inconceivable 
in the law of the nation-state.
×
It is time to cease to look at all the declarations of rights from 1789 to the 
present day as proclamations of eternal metajuridical values aimed at bind-
ing the legislator to the respect of such values; it is time, rather, to understand 
them according to their real function in the modern state. Human rights, in 
fact, represent first of all the originary figure for the inscription of natural 
naked life in the political-juridical order of the nation-state. Naked life (the 
human being), which in antiquity belonged to God and in the classical world 





was clearly distinct (as zoè) from political life (bios), comes to the forefront in 
the management of the state and becomes, so to speak, its earthly foundation. 
Nation-state means a state that makes nativity or birth [nascita] (that is, naked 
human life) the foundation of its own sovereignty. This is the meaning (and 
it is not even a hidden one) of the first three articles of the 1789 Déclaration: 
it is only because this declaration inscribed (in articles 1 and 2) the native 
element in the heart of any political organization that it can firmly bind (in 
article 3) the principle of sovereignty to the nation (in conformity with its 
etymon, native [nario] originally meant simply “birth” [nascita]). The fiction 
that is implicit here is that birth [nascita] comes in to being immediately as 
nation, so that there may not be any difference between the two moments. 
Rights, in other words, are attributed to the human being only to the degree 
to which he or she is the immediately vanishing presupposition (and, in fact, 
the presupposition that must never come to light as such) of the citizen.
×
If the refugee represents such a disquieting element in the order of the 
nation-state, this is so primarily because, by breaking the identity between 
the human and the citizen and between nativity and nationality, it brings 
the originary fiction of the sovereignty to crisis. Single exceptions to such 
a principle, of course, have always existed. What is new in our time is that 
growing sections of humankind are no longer representable inside the na-
tion-state — and this novelty threatens the very foundations of the latter. In-
asmuch as the refugee, an apparently marginal figure, unhinges the old trin-
ity of state–nation–territory, it deserves instead to be regarded as the central 
figure of our political history. We should not forget that the first camps were 
built in Europe as spaces for controlling refugees, and that the succession of 
internment camps–concentration camps–extermination camps represent 
a perfectly real filiation. One of the few rules the Nazis constantly obeyed 
throughout the course of the “final solution” was that Jews and Gypsies could 
be sent to extermination camps only after being fully denationalized (that is, 
after they have been stripped of even that second-class citizenship to which 
they had been relegated after the Nuremberg Laws). When their rights are 
no longer the rights of citizen, that is when human beings are truly sacred, in 





The concept of refugee must be resolutely separated from the concept of 
the “human rights,” and the right of asylum (which in any case is by now in 
the process of being drastically restricted in the legislation of the European 
states) must no longer be considered as the conceptual category in which to 
inscribe the phenomenon of refugees. (One needs only to look at Agnes Hel-
ler’s recent Theses on the Right of Asylum to realize that this cannot but lead 
today to awkward confusions.) The refugee should be considered for what 
it is, namely, nothing less than a limit-concept that at once brings a radical 
crisis to the principles of the nation-state and clears the way for a renewal of 
catagories that can no longer be delayed. 
Meanwhile, in fact, the phenomenon of so-called illegal immigration 
into the countries of the European Union has reached (and shall increasingly 
reach in coming years, given the estimated twenty million immigrants from 
Central European countries) characteristics and proportions such that this 
reversal of perspective is fully justified. What industrialized countries face 
today is a permanently resident mass of noncitizens who do not want to be 
and cannot be either naturalized or repatriated. These noncitizens often have 
nationalities of origin, but, inasmuch as they prefer not to benefit from their 
own states’ protection, they find themselves, as refugees, in a condition of de 
facto statelessness. Tomas Hammar has created the neologism of “denizens” 
for these noncitizen residents, a neologism that has the merit of showing 
how the concept of “citizen” is no longer adequate for describing the social-
political reality of modern states.4
On the other hand, the citizens of advanced industrial states (in the 
United States as well as Europe) demonstrate, through an increasing deser-
tion of the codified instances of political participation, an evident propensity 
to turn into denizens, into noncitizens permanent residents, so that citizens 
and denizens at least in certain social strata are entering an area of potential 
indistinction. In a parallel way, xenophobic reactions and defensive mobili-
zations are on the rise, in conformity of the well-known principle according 
to which substantial assimilation in the presence of formal differences ex-
aeerbates haterd and intolerance.
4 Tomas Hammar, Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens, and Citizens in a World of Interna-




Before extermination camps are reopened in Europe (something that is al-
ready starting to happen), it is necessary that the nation-states find the cour-
age to question the very principle of the inscription of nativity as well as the 
trinity of state–nation–territory that is founded on that principle. It is not 
easy to indicate right now the ways in which all this may concretely hap-
pen. One of the options taken into consideration for solving the problem of 
Jerusalem is that it become — simultaneously and without any territorial 
partition — the capital of two different states. The paradoxical condition of 
reciprocal extraterritoriality (or, better yet, aterritoriality) that would thus 
be implied could be generalised as a model of new international relations. In-
stead of two national states separated by uncertain and threatening bounda-
ries, it might be possible to imagine two political communities insisting on 
the same region and in a condition of exodus from each other — communi-
ties that would articulate each other via a series of reciprocal extraterritori-
alities in which the guiding concept would no longer be the ius (right) of the 
citizen but rather the refugium (refuge) of the singular. In an analogous way, 
we could conceive of Europe not as an impossible “Europe of the nations,” 
whose catastrophe one can already foresee in the short run, but rather as an 
aterritorial or extraterritorial space in which all the (citizen and noncitizen) 
residents of the European states would be in a position of exodus or refuge; 
the status of European would then mean the being-in-exodus of the citizen 
(a condition that obviously could also be one of immobility). European space 
would thus mark an irreducible difference between birth [nascita] and nation 
in which old concept of people (which, as is well known, is always a minor-
ity) could again find a political meaning, thus decidedly opposing itself to the 
concept of nation (which has so far unduly usurped it). 
This space would coincide neither with any of the homogeneous nation-
al territories nor with their topographical sum, but would rather act on them 
by articulating and perforating them topogically as in the Klein bottle or in 
the Mobius strip, where exterior and interior in-determine each other. In this 
new space, European cities would rediscover their ancient vocation of cities 
of the world by entering into a relation of reciprocal extraterritoriality.
As I write this essay, 425 Palestinians expelled by the state of Israel find 
themselves in a sort of no-man’s-land. These men certainly constitute, ac-
cording to Hannah Arendt’s suggestion, “the vanguard of their people.” But 
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that is so not necessarily or not merely in the sense that they might form 
the originary nucleus of a future national state, or in the sense that they 
might solve the Palestinian question in a way just as insufficient as the way 
in which Israel has solved the Jewish question. Rather, the no-man’s-land in 
which they are refugees has already started from this very moment to act 
back onto the territory of the state of Israel by perforating it and altering it in 
such a way that the image of that snowy mountain has become more internal 
to it than any other region of Eretz Israel. Only in a world in which the spaces 
of states have been thus perforated and topologically deformed and in which 
the citizen has been able to recognize the refugee that he or she is, only in 




politics is the great 
play of power across 
a solid continuous Euclid-
ian surface. Cut apart by linear 
borders, the state system — a territori-
ally based juridical formation — appeared to 
dominate all forms of sovereignty over individu-
als and action. Later we began to imagine all solid 
national spaces were melting into a single smooth ocean 
of ever-present connectivity. We assumed borders were replaced 
with bureaucracies, issues with concepts, and that regulation was 
replaced with boundless flow. 
But various fault lines have now steered against this order. Just as along 
Norwegian coasts — fjords, islands, and lakes break the coherent continuity 
of both water and land — political surface has now splintered into discon-
tinuous territorial fragments set apart and fortified by makeshift barriers, 
temporary boundaries, or invisible security apparatuses. Instead of its edges 
clearly demarcated by continuous lines, political spaces have now grown to 
resemble a territorial patchwork of introvert enclaves located side by side, 
each within the other, simultaneously and in unprecedented proximities.
These shreds are islands — externally alienated and internally ho-
mogenized extraterritorial enclaves, spaces of political void or strategic 
implants — lying outside the jurisdiction that physically surrounds them. 
islands are the territorialized nodes of a deterritorialized power — one dis-
tributed through military, political or financial networks. It is although, 
and perhaps because the new world-order, governed by super-national and 
“Islands”: The Geography 
of Extraterritoriality 
Anselm Franke, 
Eyal Weizman & 
Ines Weizman
 This text was first published as the introduction to a special issue of Archis titled islands , edited 
by Anselm Franke, Ines Geisler (now Weizman), and Eyal Weizman and published in December 
2003. It has been edited and extended for a catalogue titled islands+gettos, published in the 
frame of an exhibition project by Heidelberger Kunstverein, Germany, 2008: Anselm Franke & 
Eyal Weizman & Ines Weizman: “Islands: The Geography of Extraterritoriality,” archis 6 (2007): 
18–54, and was presented at an Exterritory Project Symposium, May 8, 2012, Jaffa, Israel. 
118
extraterritorial geographies
non-localized institutions, is non-territorial, that it increasingly relies on the 
physical infrastructure that only real space can provide.
islands are reminiscent of the complex political architecture that domi-
nated Europe before the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, characterized by a mul-
tiplicity of overlapping quasi-sovereign powers, a dispersed control over the 
use of coercion and organized violence and the whole presence of fortifica-
tions in an evolving landscape of permanent conflict. Then, islands as city-
states provided an exclusive citizenship; islands as places of refuge provided 
sanctuary from persecution; islands as tax-free ports provided financial ha-
vens. But within this political landscape of feudalism, the Catholic church 
provided perhaps the clearest example of power operating a deterritorialized 
political system; its physical manifestations — churches, palaces and monas-
teries, much like the present-day Vatican — were placed (mostly) beyond the 
reach of the political order within whose territory they rested.
islands were later exported to the margins of European geography, thus 
extending its frontiers. Europe’s encounters with realms “outside” of the 
global colonial order also produced extraterritorial islands of jurisdiction 
in China, Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Morocco, Persia, Siam, and Abyssinia. 
In the nineteenth century, capitulations or “un-equal treaties” were the 
principal expression of the subaltern status of non-European powers. Under 
the capitulation system, merchants, military personal, missionaries and new 
settlers enjoyed liberty of trade religion along with immunity from local 
jurisdiction and taxation. Beyond the reach of the laws in the countries in 
which they chose to reside, they generally lived in enclaves that were subject 
to the legal and social norms represented by the leaders of the expatriate com-
munities — consuls or, in the case of Constantinople, ambassadors — and ac-
cording to the laws of their nation states. The system ended only in the 1960s 
when the Master of Pembroke College, Oxford, ceased to exercise jurisdiction 
over Commonwealth citizens in the Persian Gulf Emirates.1
These places were seen as “outposts of civilization,” in a sea of as-yet “unor-
dered barbarity” and their spatial layout expressed a geography of segregation 
and exclusion, as well as response to the Western politics of hygiene. The Eng-
1 Capitulations began with the concessions granted by the Ottoman Empire to Venice in the six-
teenth century. The demise of the system began with the first demand for liberation. Japan freed 
itself of this extraterritorial jurisdiction in the 1980s, Turkey in 1923, Egypt in 1936, and China in 
gradual process that stretched from 1924 to 1946.  
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lish extraterritorial zones that spread across the colonial world were reveal-
ingly described by Jane Austen as “a retention of an England outside itself.”
Figures of extraterritoriality returned to haunt current political order. 
They become the nodes of a deterritorialized system that operates across geo-
political networks. They are the physical infrastructure for the distribution 
of finance and strategic power. This return to dormant colonial practices is 
what critical geographer Derek Gregory has called the “colonial present” — a 
world that is looking forward but moving backwards, culturally (seemingly) 
post-colonial but politically regressing into a new form of colonialism. This 
colonial present is simultaneously marked by increased deterritorialization 
and trans-border connectivity for the global rich and increased territorial-
ized segregation and exclusion for the global poor. Instead of the illusionary 
promise of a smooth and networked “flat world,” we have found ourselves 
negotiating the fragments of a fenced-up apartheid planet.    
The historical islands of extraterritorial refuge and sovereignty have 
evolved into today’s zones of humanitarian intervention — set in responses 
to states of emergency or extreme humanitarian crisis. The ancient military 
outposts into present days military camps (in the Green Zone in Baghdad 
American mobile phones operate on American dialing codes)  — deployed 
for the defense of foreign investments, natural resources, international trans-
port or on behalf of nationals abroad; or “Special Enterprise Zones” — set as 
manufacturing enclaves for the financial exploitation of advancing nations 
by advanced ones. 
Humanitarian zones, temporarily set up around sites of “natural” or 
“man-made” catastrophes (although the difference is not always clear), fre-
quently evolve into cordoned-off, improvised islands where normal sover-
eignty is suspended. Ad hoc tent cities mushroom and even diurnal rhythms 
are confused in the never-ending day of 24-hour floodlit humanitarian ac-
tivity. Humanitarian spaces become small universes operating by their own 
rules. The French doctor and activist, Rony Brauman, former president of 
Doctors Without Borders, famously and more or less felicitously coined the 
metaphor of the “humanitarian bubble”: 
Trucks, four-wheel drive vehicles, walkie-talkies, satellite phones, and 
computers create an artificial environment, whose perverse effect is to 
put the terms in a quasi-virtual world where time and space are measured 
in different units from those the country where they find themselves. So 
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they find themselves, almost without knowing it, in a bubble, a “non-
place,” a humanitarian mission which could be everywhere and which 
is nowhere. 
In international law, the term extraterritoriality refers to those instances 
where a state extends its jurisdiction or effective control over zones, indi-
viduals or activities beyond its borders. The concept may apply to military 
movements of foreign soil as well as to embassies or diplomats in the form of 
diplomatic immunity. Extraterritoriality is therefore rooted in the concept of 
sovereignty, although it is usually considered as its violation. 
There are other very different circumstances too, in which the term extra-
territoriality applies, namely when a state fails to exercise its sovereignty over 
all its territory, in which case fissures and lacunae appear within its formerly 
coherent geographical order, giving shape to territorial units that are beyond 
the reach of state power. Extraterritoriality violates thus juridical territorial-
ity in a way that sets a clear challenge to the sovereign power of the state in 
which it exists, and indeed to the Westphalian state system in general.
There exist, as well, spaces of another type of interiority, shadowing the 
more visible economical and political network. These are “lawless” zones 
in various states of “anarchy, poverty, decay and crime.” The refugee camp, 
the favela and the protected corridors in Afghanistan or Central America are 
for the drug traffickers and arms dealers what Tax Havens and international 
banking are to the financial market. Here they are shadow islands of dis-
order floating within the smooth sea of ordered international flows. Partly 
retreating, partly forced into isolation, shadow islands are governed by war-
lords, private entrepreneurs, clan chiefs, armies for hire, or youth gangs, and 
are in a state of low intensity, permanent conflict. Indeed of the 70 recognized 
political conflicts across the world today, only six manifest themselves as war 
between two or more sovereign state actors, while at least half are carried 
out besides any juridical framework of any legitimate power. These shadow 
conflicts most often only come into light when they disturb the official 
flow of goods, capital and resources. At the frontiers, when shadow islands 
meet the space of flow, counter warlords of various types emerge — private 
security companies and other such mercenaries of various types operating 
“Anywhere, Anytime” — offering their form of violence to the service of the 
middle classes as a ready-made product on the market.
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Pirates, the natural inhabitants of islands, learn how to abuse the advan-
tage of their geography — the political voids and legal loopholes help consti-
tute an alternative, faster, deadlier, more efficient systems of flow. Piracy was 
indeed for trans-oceanic trade what terrorism is for economic globalization. 
The extraterritorial nature of terrorism (and the narcotics trade) prompted 
the creation of a legal system aspiring to an equal extraterritorial nature. This 
form of legal extraterritoriality applies to individuals or activities, such as 
those of us citizens, regardless of their location outside the territory of their 
state. Extraterritorial extension of modern American criminal law means in 
some cases that the us national is legally considered as an embodiment of 
the State abroad.
United Nations trust territories in the Pacific, the Panama canal, Bosnia 
Herzegovina, tax havens in the Caribbean, Palestinian refugee camps, no fly 
zones, international courts, Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, gated communities in 
Orange County and in China, warships cruising the high seas, or settlements 
perched on occupied land, may all be extraterritorial spaces designating an ex-
ceptional juridical state while being alienated from their surrounding order. 
islands are sites of internally regimented order. Utopia has ever been im-
agined as an island artificially cut off from the land — a place of exile for 
the perfection of society. In fact, every effort made since for the realization of 
Utopia began with the establishment of an extraterritorial space surrounded 
by the “social matter” it aimed to leave behind.
islands are fragments of a “left-over” geography, an enclaved type of 
space set for the colonization of internal frontiers from which “there is no 
longer an outside.” Their diversity of conditions exemplify the inconsistent 





mean to be outside 
territory? I’m going 
to discuss this question in 
three registers: conceptually; 
historically; politically. The first two 
will be brief; the third literary.
being outside territory conceptually
Territory, for me, is actually quite a specific concept. If territo-
ry extends from a room, a building, a group of them, to a campus, 
an urban area, a city, a region, a nation-state, and so on, it seems to me 
that the term becomes so general that it becomes not especially helpful. If 
we extend a human notion of “territory” to understand animals, as etholo-
gists did in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this may yield some fruitful 
insights. But it does not seem, to me, to be especially helpful then to take that 
notion of animal behavior, a notion of territoriality, of hunting and mating 
areas, to understand humans. Thus, for me, territoriality is a consequent no-
tion to that of territory; not the means to understand it. Territoriality is one 
of a number of strategies that produce territory, but conceptually it succeeds 
it. Territoriality is that which produces territory. The latter term still needs 
conceptual unpacking. It does not seem especially helpful to understand ter-
ritory simply as the outcome of territoriality.
Nor are standard definitions of territory as a “bounded space” or the state 
as a “bordered power container” especially helpful. This might open up the 
kinds of questions we need to ask — What do we mean by boundary? What 
kind of space? What relations of power? — but only as a spur to further ques-
tions. Conceiving of territory as the bringing together of a range of differ-
ent political phenomena — economic, strategic, legal, and technical — is not 
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trasted with other ones. Rather it is an attempt to raise the kinds of questions 
we would need to ask to understand how territory has been understood and 
practiced in a range of different times and places.1
Territory is then, a historically and geographically limited notion, one 
that needs to be understood and comprehended in its specificity. This means 
that there is a role for other concepts such as area, region, place, space, do-
main — these, it seems to me, open up ways of understanding geographies 
that are, in an important, conceptual sense, outside territory. 
In my book The Birth of Territory, I try to account for the emergence of this 
concept of “territory.”2 There is no time today to sketch the aspects of the his-
tory of the concept of territory in Western political thought. Nonetheless, on 
my terms, and contrary to many accounts, territory is not that central or even 
general a category of geography; not all problems should be seen through a 
territorial lens; and while it is certainly of fundamental importance in the 
modern period, territory historically is not the key concept of political the-
ory and its relation to place. Rather we should recognize the emergence of a 
concept out of a complicated and multi-layer set of chronologies, fragments 
and aporias. 
being outside territory historically
Following this, if territory has a history, and emerged at a particular conjunc-
ture, then it follows that before this there were political-spatial orderings 
that were not territory. We can therefore think of examples of configurations 
of the relation between power and place that were not territorial, that is what 
is outside territory historically.
One thing that is worth noting is that, initially, “territory” was the out-
side. Territorium — an extremely rare word in classical Latin — was the area 
surrounding a place, perhaps a town or a colony. The suffix -orium means area 
around; a notion we maintain in words like sanatorium, auditorium, and cre-
matorium. The territory was the area around a settlement, the surrounding 
agricultural lands. This is the way it is used in Cicero, in Varro — who claims 
it is the area trodden on most — and in Seneca. (Of the other uses of the term 
in classical Latin, Pliny the Elder uses it in the neutral sense of an area.) In the 
1 Stuart Elden, “Land, Terrain, Territory,” Progress in Human Geography 34, no. 6: 799–817.
2 Id., The Birth of Territory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
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later Roman Empire, Ammianus Marcellinus makes the point that while they 
avoided the towns, the Germanic tribes frequented their territories. So, there 
is a story to be told about how territory moved from being the thing that was 
outside, outside the city walls and external to the urbs, to becoming the thing 
within which the city was located, within which the law was exercised. 
There are political spaces, then, that were other than territory. This could 
be polities such as the Greek polis, which had surrounding lands, khora, but 
was not inside them in a complete way; the Roman urbs or the empire, which 
while divided into territoria did not see the areas outside as such; the medie-
val church or kingdom. Did the native Americans or African tribes have their 
own territory, in the specific sense, before Europeans reordered the spaces of 
their lands? Or did they have a different way of experiencing, ordering and 
understanding that was transformed into territories and through “territory”? 
Each of those different configurations would need to be understood through 
the words, concepts and practices that would have made sense to those who 
lived in, fought over, worked in and wrote about them. Equally there are 
areas that are outside territory in the spaces between such designated and 
designed sites.
being outside territory politically
This is what I meant by being outside territory politically, which I am going 
to explore through some literary examples.
If the first text of the Western tradition, the Iliad is about struggle over 
a city and its lands, or what we might today call territory, Homer’s Odyssey, 
where Odysseus journeys home after the Trojan wars, is about what it means 
to be outside it. In Sophocles’ tragedy Oedipus at Colonnus, one of Oedipus’s 
most plaintive pleas in exile is when he asks “will they even shroud my body 
in Theban soil?”3 In the play about one of his daughters, and the fate of his 
sons, Antigone, the whole story is around the question of burial and site, and 
the dislocation of familial and political relations.4
In the Anglo-Saxon poem Beowulf there are isolated human settlements 
such as the village of Heorot where the mead hall stands. But outside, espe-
3 Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonnus, in The Theban Plays, trans. Robert Fagles (London: Penguin, 1984), l. 
406.
4 For a reading of Antigone in this regard, see Stuart Elden, “The Place of the Polis: Political Blindness 
in Judith Butler’s Antigone’s Claim,” Theory and Event 8 (2005).
126
extraterritorial geographies
cially after dark, there are spaces of great danger, what we might today call 
the wild. Grendel, for instance, is described as a mearcstapa, a march-stepper 
or border-walker; a figure who prowls the margins, the edges, the limits, the 
liminal.5 The mere — the pool of deep water — where his mother dwells is 
similarly beyond the reach of ordinary man, though not the hero Beowulf 
himself. Similarly dangerous places, outside territory or dominant ordering 
of political space, puncture the Norse myths of the Edda.6
So it is with Shakespeare. Perhaps the most famous of such places is the 
heath in King Lear, where Lear in his madness, Kent in his exile, Edgar in his 
disguise as Poor Tom, and Gloucester in his blindness all end up.7 All are 
outside, outsiders in some way, all are outside territory, the political space 
that was divided by the King between his daughters in the famous opening 
scene: “Since now we shall divest us both of Rule,  /  Interest of territory, cares 
of state.”8
Such a sense runs through a number of Shakespeare’s plays. Exile is a re-
current theme. Take, for example, As You Like It, where the deposed Duke ends 
up in the Forest of Arden, a kind of site that is a place outside of enclosure. 
But the play is ambiguous because the new society is, at the end, replaced 
by the return of the old, and the exiles, with the exception of Jacques, return 
to the place they left.9 Enclosure was, of course, a key issue at Shakespeare’s 
own time, explored perhaps most interestingly in Edward Bond’s play Bingo: 
Scenes of Money and Death.10 In that play, Shakespeare himself is a landowner, 
5 Beowulf: A Student Edition, ed. George Jack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), l. 103. At ll. 
1348–52, both Grendel and his mother are described this way, as those who trod “the path of exile.” 
On these themes, see Manish Sharma, “Metalepsis and Monstrosity: The Boundaries of Narrative 
Structure in Beowulf,” Studies in Philology 102, no. 3 (2005): 247–75, 265–6; and S.L. Higley, “Aldor 
on Ofre, or the Reluctant Hart: A Study of Liminality in Beowulf,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 87 
(1986): 342–53. For a fuller discussion, see Stuart Elden, “Place Symbolism and Land Politics in 
Beowulf,” Cultural Geographies 16, no. 4 (2009): 447–63.
6 Snorri Sturlson, The Prose Edda, trans. Jesse L. Byock (London: Penguin, 2005); The Poetic Edda, trans. 
Carolyne Larrington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
7 On this see Henry S. Turner, “King Lear Without: The Heath,” Renaissance Drama Vol. 28 (1997): 
161–83.
8 William Shakespeare, King Lear, Act I, scene i. For a discussion of the complexities of this scene 
and the play as a whole, see Stuart Elden, “The Geopolitics of King Lear: Territory, Land, Earth,” 
Law and Literature 25, no.2 (2013): 147–65. For Shakespeare’s plays I have used the most up-to-date 
version of the Arden Shakespeare.
9 See Richard Wilson, “‘Like the Old Robin Hood’: As You Like It and the Enclosure Riots,” Shakespeare 
Quarterly 43, no 1. (1992): 1–19; and more textually, Andrew Barnaby, “The Political Consciousness 
of Shakespeare’s As You Like It,” Studies in English Literature: 1500–1900 36, no. 2 (1996): 373–95. On 
the complications, see A. Stuart Daley, “The Dispraise of the Country in ‘As You Like It,’” Shake-
speare Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1985): 300–14.
10 Edward Bond, Plays Three: Bingo, The Fool, The Woman, Stone (London: Methuen, 1987). For a 
contemporary updating of Shakespeare to land struggles, see Martin Orkin, Shakespeare Against 
Apartheid (Craighall: Ad. Donker, 1987). A recent excellent study is Alvaro Sevilla-Buitrago, “Ter-
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trying to work out if he should accept William Combe’s offer of protection 
for his own lands at the expense of local farmers.11 Bond himself writes of 
Shakespeare that while he “created Lear, who is the most radical of all social 
critics.”12 “His behaviour as a property-owner made him closer to Goneril 
than Lear. He supported and benefitted from the Goneril-society — with its 
prisons, workhouses, whipping, starvation, mutilation, pulpit-hysteria and 
all the rest of it.”13
Another play where the forest plays an important role is Titus Andronicus. 
Much of the initial action takes place in the forest, a wild site, which relates 
to the homeland of the Goths Tamora and her sons, in contrast to the urban 
Rome. It is in the forest, this outside to the city, that Titus’s daughter Lavinia 
is raped, muted and mutilated; that her lover (and brother to the Emperor) 
Bassianus is murdered; and that Titus’s sons Martius and Quintus are framed 
for his death. It is here that we discover than Aaron the Moor is lover to Ta-
mora, now married to the Emperor Saturninus. I won’t go into the details of 
all the deaths in the play, one of Shakespeare’s most shocking, but at the end 
Tamora’s body is thrown outside the city to be devoured by wild beasts; and 
Aaron is buried chest-deep within it to starve and thirst to death. 
Coriolanus works with the figure of exile in a related way. Despite his mili-
tary prowess on behalf of the city, when he stands for political office he so 
outrages the people that the tribunes end up expelling him. Sicinius declares:
And in the power of us the tribunes, we,
Ev’n from this instant, banish him our city,
In peril of precipitation
From off the rock Tarpeian, never more
To enter our Rome gates.14
Yet Coriolanus’s response is forthright and characterizes his attitude to the 
city — “I banish you!”
ritory and the Governmentalisation of Social Reproduction: Parliamentary Enclosure and Spatial 
Rationalities in the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism,” Journal of Historical Geography 38, 
no. 3 (2012): 209–358.
11 Bond bases his account on the papers in E.K. Chambers, William Shakespeare: A Study of Facts and 
Problems, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).
12 Bond, “Bingo: Introduction,” Plays Three, 4.
13 Ibid., 6.
14 Coriolanus, III, iii, 99–105.
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You common cry of curs, whose breath I hate
As reek o’th’rotten fens, whose loves I prize
As the dead carcasses of unburied men
That do corrupt my air: I banish you!
And here remain with your uncertainty!
… Despising
For you the city, thus I turn my back.
There is a world elsewhere!15
When he does leave, it is to the Volscian city of Antium. In the compressed 
dramatic action of the play, his journey is short and his arrival, disguised, 
follows quickly after. But the recent film version directed by and starring 
Ralph Fiennes, captures this effectively in showing a lengthy journey whose 
passage of time is tracked by the transformation in Fiennes’s appearance. 
Shaven head and face become ever lengthening hair and a thick beard. By 
the time he arrives in Antium, the transformation is such that stage devices 
such as a hooded cloak are unnecessary. But the geographical complications 
are shown in this version. The play is set by Shakespeare in early Republi-
can Rome, not long after the uprising against and expulsion of the Tarquin 
kings. The play is written in early 17th century England. The film is set in a 
near contemporary pseudo-Balkans. It was shot in Serbia and Montenegro. 
The film, making effective use of newsreel and tv, shows that the Volscians 
are in close proximity to the “place calling itself Rome.” The initial war foot-
age, of the siege of the Volscian city of Corioli which gives Coriolanus his 
name, talks of a “border dispute.” That implied a more proximate location, 
or at least, a contested front between the sides that appeared largely absent 
when he is making his way to Antium. The means used to mark the tran-
sition at other points in the film, where a motorway is punctuated by road 
blocks, with a kind of no-man’s-land between them, was more effective. But if 
this is so, and the two neighbors share a narrow, effectively modern border, a 
boundary, where does Coriolanus go when he moves into exile? Why does it 
take him so long to move between these places?
And yet, in republican Rome, it is indeed the case that there would have 
been areas outside of Rome that were not yet part of its neighbors. Places that 
were not yet spaces; lands that were not yet cultivated, not yet territory. In 
15  Ibid., 117–35.
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the early seventeenth century, Shakespeare could effectively play this spatial 
politics. Exile was still a potential punishment, and features importantly in 
his history plays. The transportation of convicts to the new world or slavery 
were merely modern examples of an age-old practice. In the later 17th cen-
tury John Locke would discuss the “Indian who knows no Inclosure, and is 
still a Tenant in common” and yet still laid claim to private property and thus 
a nascent form of civil society;16 Locke declaring that “in the beginning, all 
the World was America.”17 Not all places within Shakespeare’s England were 
yet enclosed, much less if Scotland and Ireland were included.
But in the late 20th and early 21st century, and especially in the Balkan 
setting which is otherwise so effective in Fiennes’s adaptation, the idea of a 
place outside territory is harder to grasp. Where is Coriolanus as he moves 
through that sequence of locations, sleeping rough and his hair growing ever 
longer? He could be in isolated locations. He is undoubtedly making his way 
through war-ravaged landscapes, contested places in the present or recent 
past. But given the modes of modern warfare and territorial settlements, he 
is either still within the “place calling itself Rome,” or behind enemy lines. 
It’s hard to conceive of a no-man’s-land of such extent that the time could 
have passed in such a way. He is effectively either in one territory or another. 
It’s hard to imagine him outside of territory, but for early Rome, or even in 
Shakespeare’s England, it’s not so difficult.
Richard II is another play where banishment is a crucial element. The 
King wants to prevent bloodshed on the land between the feuding noble-
men Bolingbroke and Mowbray: “For that our kingdom’s earth should not be 
soiled / What that dear blood which it hath fostered.”18 As as result he stops 
their duel and banishes them. The punishment is for life for Mowbray; short-
er for Bolingbroke. 
Therefore, we banish you our territories.
You cousin Hereford, upon pain of life,
Till twice five summers have enriched our fields,
Shall not regreet our fair dominions,
But tread the stranger paths of banishment.19
16 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988 [1960]), V, 26.
17 Ibid., V, 49.
18 Shakespeare, Richard II, I, iii, 125–6.
19 Ibid., I, iii, 139–143.
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He wants to make sure they do not plot against the land. But Bolingbroke’s 
father, John of Gaunt, makes the powerful and famous speech where he both 
praises the land and deplores what it has become: 
This royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle,
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise,
This fortress built by Nature for herself
Against infection and the hand of war, […]
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England, […]
Is now leased out — I die pronouncing it — 
Like to a tenement or pelting farm.
England, bound in with the triumphant sea,
Whose rocky shore beats back the envious siege
Of wat”ry Neptune, is now bound in with shame,
With inky blots and rotten parchment bonds.
That England that was wont to conquer others
Hath made a shameful conquest of itself.20
This is a play suffused with the language of soil, land, earth, and ground. 
The King is condemned for selling rights and farming the realm. He is con-
demned as “Landlord of England… not king.”21 He has also, crucially, dispos-
sessed the exiled Bolingbroke of the lands and title he inherits from Gaunt. 
He thus creates a legitimate grievance in Bolingbroke, who returns to Eng-
land at the head of an army. He does this while Richard is abroad seeking to 
pacify the Irish rebellion. This is part of the reason Richard needed the funds 
he raised by such illegitimate means, suggesting “We are enforced to farm 
our royal realm.”22
While Bolingbroke claims to only be after his own title and lands, he ends 
up with Richard’s crown and kingdom as well. The King complains that “Our 
lands, our lives and all are Bolingbroke’s.”23 And then, in one of their final 
exchanges, Bolingbroke states “My gracious lord, I come but for mine own,” 
to which King Richard replies “Your own is yours, and I am yours and all.”24 
20 Ibid., II, I, 31–66.
21 Ibid., II, I, 113.
22 Ibid., I, iv, 42.
23 Ibid., III, ii, 251.
24 Ibid., III, iii, 196–7.
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Returning to one of the opening images, Carlisle says that if Bolingbroke is 
crowned King “The blood of English shall manure the ground.”25 And then, 
in two of the final lines of the play, King Henry IV, the former Bolingbroke, 
looks for redemption through geography; through the voluntary exile of pil-
grimage: “I’ll make a voyage to the Holy Land / To wash this blood off from 
my guilty hand.”26
The Tempest is another play in which the question of inside and outside, 
possession and dispossession of territory or land, take a crucial role. Four key 
figures are important here: Prospero and Caliban, naturally, but also Antonio, 
the usurper, and Gonzalo, the advisor.
Prospero is the rightful Duke of Milan, but has been dispossessed of his 
lands. He is banished but becomes the colonizer of the island; removing it 
from Caliban. Of his own dispossession, Prospero is eloquent:
To have no screen between this part he played
And him he played it for, he needs with be
Absolute Milan. Me, poor man, my library
Was dukedom large enough. Of temporal royalties
He thinks me now incapable; confederates,
So dry he was for sway, wi’th’ King of Naples
To give him annual tribute, do him homage,
Subject his coronet to his crown, and bend
The dukedom yet unbowed (alas poor Milan)
To most ignoble stooping.27
This needs a little explanation. Antonio wanted no distinction between his 
own role and the position he aspired to, occupied by Prospero. He needed to 
be absolute ruler of Milan. Prospero suggests he — “poor man” — had other-
worldly concerns. (We hear later how Antonio had paid off Prospero: “Know-
ing I loved my books, he furnished me / From mine own library with volumes 
that / I prize above my dukedom.”28) “Temporal royalties’ are secular, as op-
posed to spiritual, powers; incapable means that he is both unable to exercise 
them but also unable to pass them on: the standard lineage has been broken. 
25 Ibid., III, iv, 138.
26 Ibid., v, vi, 49–50.
27 Shakespeare, The Tempest, I, ii, 107–116.
28 Ibid., I, ii, 166–8.
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So thirsty for power, Antonio has entered into an alliance with the King of 
Naples, to whom he pays allegiance, and has bound his rule (the coronet) to 
the larger kingdom (the crown). A previously proud and superior Milan now 
bows to Naples.
Caliban is the son of the “foul witch Sycorax,”29 and Prospero recounts to 
the spirit Ariel how “the blue-eyed hag was hither brought with child / And 
here was left by th” sailors.”30 While Prospero thus acknowledges that Cali-
ban was born on the island, and before he, Prospero, arrived, he does every-
thing he can to diminish his birth-right. After Sycorax died, Prospero con-
tends that “Then was this island / (Save for the son that she did litter here, / A 
freckled whelp, hag-born) not honoured with / A human shape.”31 Ariel re-
sponds in a more humanizing way: “Yes, Caliban, her son,”32 but Prospero 
seeks to deny the humanity. While he too uses the word “son,” he uses the 
verb “litter,” more commonly used of animal births than human; “freckled 
whelp” suggests a canine pup; “hag-born” again demeans the mother. He even 
denies that Caliban shares the shape of humans. Shortly after, Prospero calls 
Caliban “Thou poisonous slave, got by the devil himself / Upon thy wicked 
dam [mother].”33
Caliban is thus the dispossessed, and directly claims this of Prospero. 
“This island’s mine by Sycorax, my mother, / Which thou tak’st from me.”34 
He notes that at first Prospero treated him with kindness, and that he re-
sponded by love and showing him “all the qualities o’th’isle: / The fresh 
springs, brine pits, barren places and fertile.”35 Now, Caliban alone is “all the 
subjects that you [Prospero] have, / Which first was mine own king; and here 
you sty me / In this hard rock, whiles though do keep from me / The rest o’th’ 
island.”36 Initially he was his own master, a king, ruler of and able to roam 
over the whole island, but now he is imprisoned within a specific site, a slave, 
the only subject of a new master, reduced to an animal — sty again implies 
a bestial dwelling. Prospero responds that he is only imprisoned because of 
what he has done, which we learn is an attempted rape of Prospero’s daugh-
ter Miranda. Caliban dreams of colonizing the island for himself, wishing 
29 Ibid., I, ii, 258.
30 Ibid., I, ii, 269–70.
31 Ibid., I, ii, 281–284.
32 Ibid., I, ii, 284.
33 Ibid., I, ii, 320–1. Slave, service, and servant are frequently used of both Caliban and Ariel.
34 Ibid., I, ii, 332–3.
35 Ibid., I, ii, 338–9.
36 Ibid., I, ii, 343–5.
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this had been done, with the idea of how he would have “people else / This 
isle with Calibans.”37 Shakespeare uses the phrase “violate / The honour of 
my child.”38 Rape, of course, while today having primarily a sexual sense, 
comes from the Latin word rapere meaning to seize, to abduct, to capture.39 
The rape of Caliban’s island through Prospero’s actions is paralleled by Cali-
ban’s attempted rape of Prospero’s daughter. 
Caliban continually stresses his dispossession: “As I told thee before, I am 
subject to a tyrant, / A sorcerer, that by his cunning hath / Cheated me of the 
island.”40 “I say, by sorcery he got this isle. / From me he got it.”41 And he uses 
these to try to persuade the butler Stephano and the jester Trinculo of his 
right to the island, and to get them to help him re-seize it. Caliban’s initial 
welcome of Prospero is paralleled by that he shows to Stephano and Trin-
culo: “I’ll show thee every fertile inch o’th’ island, / And I will kiss thy foot. 
I prithee, be my god. / … I”ll swear myself thy subject.”42 For Vaughan and 
Vaughan, Caliban is “in tune with nature and lord of the island until over-
thrown by Prospero and later corrupted by Stephano and Trinculo.”43 It is the 
latter that may perhaps be most important in the long run, but the former is 
the spur to his immediate grievance.
Antonio has seized the territory of Naples from Prospero, but then is lost 
at sea. His old counsellor Gonzalo speaks for them all when he declares:
Now would I give a thousand furlongs of sea for an acre of barren 
ground — long heath, brown furze, anything. The wills above be done, 
but I would fain die a dry death.44
We thus have a triumvirate with relations to territory: the one who is outside 
territory who creates it anew, truly a place he can be master of the domain; 
the one who is dispossessed and enslaved but dreams of a biological coloniza-
tion of his own; and the one who dispossessed but then himself loses all. All 
37 Ibid., I, ii, 351–2.
38 Ibid., I, ii, 347–8. 
39 Stuprum — defilement, dishonor, disgrace — is the more common Latin word for “rape” in the 
modern, sexual sense.
40 Ibid., III, ii, 40–2.
41 Ibid., III, ii, 50–1.
42 Ibid., II, ii, 145–49.
43 Alden T. Vaughan and Virginia Mason Vaughan, Shakespeare’s Caliban: A Cultural History (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
44 Shakespeare, The Tempest, I, i, 65–68.
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three figures have colonizing tendencies; all three have moments when they 
are set outside of territory.
There is an unusual interlude in the play when Iris and Ceres appear in 
Prospero’s masque. Their speeches are profoundly geographical. What Pros-
pero’s masque accomplishes is the idea of agri-culture, of improving the land 
more than those who merely lived in it, of — in the language of a modern 
colonial project — making the desert bloom.45
Later Gonzalo wishes he had “plantation of this isle,” with its clear colo-
nial connotation of the plantations first in Ireland and then in the new world; 
though Antonio and Sebastian (brother to the King) respond with more ag-
ricultural ideas: “He’d sow’t with nettle-seed. / Or docks, or mallows.”46 But 
Gonzalo has loftier ideals:
I’th’ commonwealth I would by contraries
Execute all things, for no kind of traffic
Would I admit; no name of magistrate;
Letters should not be known; riches, poverty
And use of service, none; contract, succession,
Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard — none;
No use of metal, corn, or wine, or oil;
No occupation, all men idle, all;
And women, too, but innocent and pure;
No sovereignty — […]
All things in common should produce
Without sweat or endeavour; treason, felony,
Sword, pike, knife, gun, or need of any engine
Would I not have; but nature should bring forth
Of its own kind all foison, all abundance, 
To feed my innocent people. […]
I would with such perfection govern, sir.47
Despite Antonio and Sebastian’s interruptions, and often modern editor’s 
accusations of hyperbole, Gonzalo is actually outlining a near-utopian 
45 In The Tempest, II, I, 37, Adrian says this place “seems to be desert,” which while he most obviously 
means deserted, relates the idea of a place that is un- and under-inhabited.
46 Ibid., II, i, 144–45.
47 Ibid, II, i, 148–65.
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commonwealth. There are many aspects to be noted. The commonwealth 
or body politic will not be ruled by the market or commerce (“traffic”); no 
bureaucracy or written records (“letters”); no discrepancy of wealth or inden-
tured servitude; no inheritance; no “bourn” (a boundary or limit) or “bound 
of land” — again, a critique of enclosure — and no agricultural working of 
the soil; no occupation — a multi-faceted term that means a literal sense of 
seized presence, and employment, but also marital cohabitation; no sover-
eignty; but instead shared property, an absence of ills, producing abundance 
and happiness. But if this is a commonwealth without internal divisions, it 
is still hard to imagine it without boundaries on the outside, to imagine it 
entirely outside territory.
conclusion
Shakespeare was writing at a time when the modern conception of sover-
eign territory was emerging and so he helps us understand its variant aspects, 
tensions, ambiguities and limits. In his own England the dominant form of 
political power was absolutism, conducted in a space that was, by his time, 
relatively ordered and bordered. But its recent past — explored in the history 
plays such as, notably, Richard II — was anything but. The earlier setting of 
King Lear shows a place that is historically distant and spatially disrupted. 
In that it is more similar to the Europe in which he set most of his tragedies, 
and comedies. This was a space that was contested and fractured, both politi-
cally and spatially. We see that, especially, in Coriolanus. And in The Tempest 
he explores what this might mean when Europe came into contact with its 
outside. Shakespeare helps us to understand what it means to be outside ter-





It is not 
particularly 
worrying if you 
and I, ladies and gentle-
men, do not know exactly 
what money is. But it is abso-
lutely terrifying if even the specialists 
and those who are responsible for money 
don’t know, don’t really know what money is. 
— J.P. von Bethmann, 19841
introduction: two disappearances, one return
The graph climbs steadily, business as usual, shares trading nor-
mally almost up to the moment of collapse. Things start to dip a little 
as media reports proliferate, but nothing catastrophic. Then, suddenly on 
September 15, 2008, the graph drops like a stone — the point at which the 
global economy goes into free fall. This was the moment us Bank Lehman 
Brothers collapsed and became the first major casualty of the “credit-crunch.” 
Lehman did not cause the ensuing crisis single-handedly (though they cer-
tainly did their bit), but their demise has nevertheless come to symbolize 
the collective insanity and ineptitude that gripped the financial markets 
and institutions at the time. In the days following the Lehman collapse we 
all learned more about “sub-prime markets,” “toxic debt” and “market correc-
tion” than we’d ever wanted, and that us$ trillions had been “wiped” from the 
value of the global economy. That’s the disappearance everyone knows about.
The lesser known disappearance happened 17 months later. To be pre-
cise it happened at 2.45pm, est, May 6, 2010. In fact the “Crash of 2.45” as it 
became known (more commonly the “Flash-Crash’) unfolded over a slightly 
longer period of time — about half an hour all in — 2.45 representing the 
bottom of a dizzying 995.55 point fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. 
 This text was first presented in an Exterritory Project Symposium in collaboration with Kadist Art 
Foundation and with the support of Evans Foundation, May 2, 2012, Le Comptoir Général, Paris, 
France. 
1 Joseph Beuys et al., What is Money?: A Discussion (Forest Row: Clairview Press, 2010).






Shortly before 2.45 someone had the wherewithal to pull the plug on the 
machines that, in the space of a few hectic minutes, had traded away much 
of America’s (and by extension the world’s) accumulated and future wealth. 
Once again, $us trillions were “wiped” off the value of the major us stocks. 
This time, however, and much to everyone’s relief (and surprise), shortly af-
ter 2.45 the machines started behaving themselves and within half an hour 
or so most of the value of the markets had been restored. A few people got 
very rich, some got burned, some of the sillier trades had to be cancelled, but 
by and large things went back to “normal.” In the case of the Flash Crash, this 
is to say, the “wiped” us$ trillions came back.
In 2008, once the scale of the disaster became apparent, the question, 
“Where has all the money gone?” was routinely asked. Given the way that the 
“losses” were reported in the media, this seemed eminently logical. If, as eve-
ryone claimed, the markets were worth $x trillion one day, hour or minute, 
and $x–n trillion the next, what did this mean in practice? The response to 
this question — technically correct, but unsatisfactory — was that the lost 
“money” had never actually existed. Rather, what was being described as a 
“loss” was the difference between the nominal values of stocks, assets, secu-
rities, cash and the rest before and after market “corrections.” If, however, 
the “losses” reported in 2008 were simply “corrections,” was this also true of 
all that reported value “regained” in the minutes after 2.45 on May 6, 2010? 
The restoration of market value once the machines had calmed down was 
certainly treated as real enough at the time. If the money lost in 2008 never 
actually existed, surely the money regained in 2010 was similarly illusory? 
This, of course, begs the further and much more important question: “What 
is money, anyway?” And this question, again routinely asked in 2008, was not 
really answered at all, even by (perhaps especially by) Bethman’s “specialists 
and those who are responsible for money.”
In practice the “what” and the “where” of money are, at any given time, 
intimately connected, if never simple. If the questions provoked by the 
“disappearances” of 2008 and 2010 were not answered satisfactorily this is 
because the nature of this interconnection is both ambiguous and counter-
intuitive. This is partly because of the peculiarity of money as a “substance.” 
Money’s effectiveness, as has been observed many times before, is a function 
of its mobility — the velocity with which it circulates and the spaces within 
and across which it is able to move. These spaces include, of course, the ones 
we imagine when we read media reports about the economy which rough-
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ly equate to the ones we see when we consult a world-map — areas of flat 
color enclosed by neat black lines. These are supposed to be the “national 
economies” of, say, France, Greece, Australia, Russia, Somalia, and the other 
190 or so (depending on what and who you count) “sovereign” states. But the 
spatiality of money cannot be reduced to the “formal” spaces of sovereignty. 
Not only can money’s mobility not be explained fully through conventional 
spaces of economy, its complexity also creates “other” spaces — spaces with-
out magnitude and without territory, but which arguably represent the true 
domain of contemporary money. Money, this is to say, is intrinsically extrater-
ritorial: — it is always beyond territory however much we might kid ourselves 
that “we” have pinned it down.2 And this begs the question not only of where 
it might go during and after financial crises, but what it is and where it might 
have started from in the first place.
mobile money: venezuelan taxis, ghost coins and the state
One of the counter-intuitive aspects of money stems from the “truths” about 
it we, as economically active citizens of states, have had drummed into us 
throughout our lives: that it is both fixed and legible. Fixed, because we give it 
a name that connects it unambiguously to a territory or territories — Pound, 
Dollar, Euro, Rouble, Dinar, Rupee, Real, Yen, etc. National and/or inter-nation-
al currencies, but all connected in our minds with known places and spaces. 
Legible, because whenever money is discussed, these are the terms used to es-
tablish a common frame of reference and, therefore, exchange. That common 
frame always involves some level of allusion to, or simply assumption of, 
money’s territoriality even if in practice we might be a bit hazy about what 
actually means. Defining money in this way is, however, always problematic. 
Although, as suggested above, the currencies we use in daily life all have 
some form of territorial referent, the money they represent (and here it is im-
portant to note that currency is not money, but a representation of it3) moves 
very freely. Should we, as happily cash-rich individuals, for example, wish 
to move a sterling-denominated bank account or even a suitcase of sterling 
2 In the terms of this project money is also fundamentally “exterritorial” — without territory alto-
gether rather than simply being outside territories, which is the literal meaning of extraterritorial. 
Exterritorial is rarely used in English and so I will stick to extraterritorial for the purposes of this 
paper.
3 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (London: Routledge, 1991); Geoffrey Ingham, The Nature of 
Money (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
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notes into Euros there is little or no restriction on that movement. This is be-
cause both the £ and the € are freely exchangeable with each other and with 
most other major national and international currencies. Whilst most of us 
now simply take this for granted this was not always the case. Until relatively 
recently many states imposed tight controls on the scale of exchanges with 
other currencies in an attempt to protect their reserves of “hard currency” and 
thus their balance of payments with international trading partners. Although 
this has now become a distant memory for most people in the so-called “ad-
vanced” economies, such attempts to restrict monetary mobility persist. 
Travelers from the wealthier “advanced” economies of the world trave-
ling to Venezuela, for example, encounter the difficulties of “currency con-
trols” even before they arrive, and from an unexpected source. Booking a taxi 
from the airport to Caracas involves not just arranging a time and destina-
tion, but also a brief but important lesson in Venezuela’s complex monetary 
system. The local taxi firm “Taxi to Caracas” devotes an entire section of its 
website to helping its prospective clients negotiate the anachronism of state-
controlled money. The site helpfully includes a brief account of Venezuela’s 
recent monetary history, including the devaluation of 2008 in which the Bo-
livar Fuerte was adopted resulting in the confusing circulation of three dif-
ferently denominated local currencies. More importantly, it provides user-
friendly advice in faultless English on how to circumvent the poor official 
exchange rates through the local black-market in foreign currencies:
The black market gives far higher rates of exchange than the official, gov-
ernment regulated ones. If you do not use the black market rate, Venezu-
ela is a very expensive country to visit. The only way a tourist will usually 
encounter the black market is in the form of a man approaching you (at 
the airport for example), quietly saying “dollars, euros.” Changing money 
this way has a huge amount of risk (you could be given old bills/notes or 
simply be led away and robbed), however it is the only way to get the best 
value for your currency and consequently the best value for your visit to 
Venezuela.4 
4 “Venezuela’s Currency Control System,” Taxi to Caracas. http://www.taxitocaracas.com/cambio-
dinero.html (accessed July 13, 2012). 
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The emphasis on the risks of black market transaction may not be entirely 
unrelated to the firm’s invitation to help with “useful tips” on currency ex-
change further down the page. Indeed, it is possible that this firm is offering 
more than transport. However, what is important here is what this says about 
Venezuela’s “national” money. The attempt by the government to control the 
flows of currency in and out of Venezuelan currency space — in an effort to 
protect the Bolivar Fuerte from the ravages of the international monetary 
system — is clearly simply stimulating alternative routes. The controls will 
slow down the flows of currency to some extent, but the evident freedom 
with which the black market operates suggests not by very much. 
Venezuela’s attempts to control currency flows at a time when most 
states have long-abandoned such restrictions highlights a peculiarity of mod-
ern “state” money. Venezuela’s attempts to control its currency does not have 
a significant effect on the global economy, but others, particularly China, can 
inhibit the circulation of major capital flows, hence the pressure China has 
been under from many capital-starved “advanced” economies to float, even 
partially, the Renminbi on international markets.5 It is often assumed that the 
historical transition from monies based on and often made from specie (pre-
cious metals such as gold and silver) to paper banknotes and electronic cur-
rencies, signals increasing mobility. In practice, however, the creation of “na-
tional” currencies guaranteed by law rather than backed by metal (though 
the two systems have often run concurrently and not without confusion) was 
an attempt to curb money’s tendency to move freely. Prior to the introduction 
of fully paper monetary systems (starting at the very end of the 18th century, 
but taking over a century to fully develop6) and also before any form of func-
tional currency control, specie money was, paradoxically, highly mobile. In 
Europe, for example, during the seventeenth century many hundreds of dif-
ferent currencies were in circulation at the same time. Their mobility arose 
not from where they were issued or by whom, but by the capacity of the net-
work of money-changers (precursors to modern banks) to translate between 
coinages on the basis of the weight of metal they contained. Thus, for exam-
ple, London merchant Gerard de Malynes’s Lex Mercatoria first published in 
5 Sebastian Mallaby and Olin Wethington, “The Future of the Yuan: China’s Struggle to Internation-
alize Its Currency,” Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb 2012): 135–46.
6 Glyn Davies, A History of Money From Ancient Times to the Present Day (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 2002); Eric Helleiner, The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspec-
tive (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
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1622 as a guide to “international’7 trade, lists hundreds of different coins with 
their corresponding weights, fineness, and, therefore, relative values.8,9 Most 
of these would have circulated within relatively small geographical areas, 
but some, such as the solidus (or bezant) — the so-called “dollar of the Middle 
Ages” — were used for long-distance trade over centuries.10 
The gradual process of “standardizing” money began with institutions 
such as the Bank of Amsterdam (f. 1609) which, at the centre of one of the 
world’s predominant trading ports at the time, had to process many differ-
ent coinages. To make transactions within the port simpler and cheaper, the 
Bank took in any coinage or bullion as deposits and recoined and reissued 
the whole lot as the standard guilder.11 This standardization of coinage greatly 
increased the efficiency and profitability of Dutch trade and over time be-
came the model used by “national” banks as they emerged at the end of the 
seventeenth century (e.g., Bank of Sweden, f. 1668; Bank of England, f. 1694). 
Although the standardization of coinages happens everywhere even-
tually, it is not in itself a simple process whereby money becomes steadily 
and more legibly materialized. This is because even long before the advent 
of paper and electronic monies, functional money need never have any 
material embodiment. Writing about the major “currencies” of the Euro-
pean middle ages, for example, Carlo Cipolla notes the strange existence of 
spectral coinages:
[H]ere the mystery begins, during the greatest part of the Middle Ages and 
the first centuries of the modern period, with the exception of a few short 
periods, nobody ever saw many of these “moneys” about which every-
body talked. For instance, nobody for centuries saw a real pound, for the 
simple, but paradoxical, reason that the pound during the greatest part of 
7 As this was prior to what we would now call either inter-national or even “global” trade, this term 
is a little misleading. De Malynes and his colleagues and competitors could trade with anyone, 
anywhere and in any currency they liked, the only restrictions being the geographic reach of ship-
ping and the difficulties of translating monetary and commodity values. The Lex Mercatoria was 
intended to ease the latter of these.
8 Gerard de Malynes, Lex Mercatoria: Or, the Ancient Law-Merchant Divided into Three Parts of Traffick 
(London: 1685).
9 A transcription of the names of all the coins cited in Malynes’ treatise can be found here: http://
xenotopia.wordpress.com/2010/10/21/the-poetry-of-money/ (accessed Jan 13, 2016).
10 Robert Sabatino Lopez, “The Dollar of the Middle Ages,” The Journal of Economic History 11, no. 3 
(1951): 209–34.
11 Jan de Vries, The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600–1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1976), 229.
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its life did not materialize into a real, visible, and touchable coin. It was 
a ghost money.12
Ghost, “imaginary,” “bank,” “political” moneys, and “money of account” were 
all categories used to describe the phenomenon of monetary units in use in 
daily calculations of prices (particularly by banks and merchants, but also 
the wider population when needed), and treated as coins, but which were 
seldom, if ever, actually coined. Although used largely for the convenience of 
accounting (it is much more practical to tally large sums in “ghost” pounds 
than in “real” silver shillings), in the context of Europe’s burgeoning banking 
and finance markets these imaginary monies became every bit as “real” as 
their metal counterparts and were, of course, the distant forerunners of the 
“fiat” money of the modern state.13
The imperative to limit the territorial mobility of money coincides with 
the efforts of the state to define its boundaries (social, cultural, political, le-
gal, as well as economic) and to define a “national” population — the “im-
agined community” of the nation state.14,15 The standardization of money in 
the form of national currency is part of the efforts by emergent states par-
ticularly in the nineteenth century to create what Mary Poovey described as 
a “social body”16 — the state as a single, integrated, quasi-organic, corporeal 
whole. In Britain, for example, which because of its industrial power largely 
defined what a “normal” state would look like,17 shift from specie-based to 
wholly paper money — starting with the “Suspension Act” of 1797 — led to 
the introduction of, among other things the income tax (1799), disciplinary 
“Poor Laws” (1820s onwards), the reining in of the autonomous power of 
“Municipal Corporations” (1835), banking “reform” (i.e., consolidation and 
agglomeration, 1844 onwards) and much else that forced the “nation” to-
gether and disciplined the way it used money. As Pierre Bourdieu noted with 
respect to the significance of taxation to the creation of a “disciplined” and 
12 Carlo M. Cipolla, Money, Prices, and Civilization in the Mediterranean World, Fifth to Seventeenth Cen-
tury (New Haven: Princeton University Press, 1956), 38.
13 Luigi Einaudi, “The Theory of Imaginary Money from Charlemagne to the French Revolution,” in 
Enterprise and Secular Change: Readings in Economic History, ed. Lane and Riemersma (Homewood: 
Richard D. Irwin, 1953), 229–61.
14 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Rise of Nationalism (London: Verso, 
1991).
15 Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan, The Imagined Economies of Globalization (London: Sage, 2004).
16 Mary Poovey, Making a Social Body: British Cultural Formation 1830–1864 (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1995).
17 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Polity, 1992).
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monetized national community such legislation and tendencies towards ter-
ritorialization were mutually reinforcing:
The institution of the tax (over and against the resistance of the taxpay-
ers) stands in a relation of circular causality with the development of the 
armed forces necessary for the expansion and defense of the territory un-
der control, and thus for the levying of tributes as well as for imposing 
via constraint the payment of that tax. The institution of the tax was the 
result of a veritable internal war waged by the agents of the state against 
the resistance of the subjects, who discover themselves as such mainly 
if not exclusively by discovering themselves as taxable, as tax payers.18 
Money in the form of national currencies and tax systems was used to consol-
idate “territory” and to link it, for a time at least, with a “national population,” 
but this does not mean that money itself is necessarily territorialized. This is 
why despite the restrictions, foreign travelers, black market traders, and, on 
occasions, taxi firms can circumvent the strong nation-state simply by creat-
ing a temporary extraterritorial monetary space between themselves. This 
also explains why, as the routes by which money can circumvent the con-
ventional legal space of the state proliferate (whether through helpful taxi 
firms or, more likely, the Internet), we are increasingly discovering ourselves 
as nations of “tax-avoiders.”19
something for nothing — placeless money
That we no longer have “ghost” or “imaginary” money as formal account-
ing categories, is not because money has all somehow become real, but be-
cause since all money is now effectively fictive such categories are redun-
dant. Contemporary state money — so-called fiat money — is fundamentally 
a creature of law.20 There is nothing new, of course, about the legalization of 
18 Pierre Bourdieu, Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field, trans. Loïc J.D. 
Wacquant and Samar Farage, Sociological Theory 12, no. 1 (1994): 1–18, at 6 (emphasis in the origi-
nal).
19 At the time of writing (July 2012), for example, the issue of tax avoidance is gaining extensive 
news coverage in the uk and continental Europe. In the uk many wealthy “celebrities” are being 
exposed as “tax-dodgers” by pressure groups such as ukuncut, whilst in Europe, the ongoing crises 
of the Greek, Italian, and Spanish economies in particular are in part being attributed to endemic 
tax avoidance among both corporations and the general population.
20 F.A. Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money: With Special Reference to Comparative Private and Public Interna-
tional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Ingham, The Nature of Money.
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money — not least because at least since the beginnings of the centralized 
monarchic states of the early European Middle Ages, the issuance and regula-
tion of money has been a function of “sovereignty” — hence the many coin-
ages named in relation to “sovereign” entities: sovereigns themselves most 
obviously, but also riyals, crowns, nobles, ducats, krone, etc.
Until the introduction of first paper and then fiat monies, the value of 
money was, at least in theory, fundamentally guaranteed by the substance 
from which it was made — gold, silver, and copper/bronze. As has been noted 
many times, however, even during periods when specie coinages were para-
mount, metal alone was never enough to define or maintain value.21 This is 
partly because of the perennial problem of “debasement” — monarchs ma-
nipulating the metal content of coinages to artificially, and always tempo-
rarily, increase their apparent wealth — but also because the relationship 
between “tale” (what a coin is supposed to be worth and/or the number 
stamped on it) and “weight” (what its metal content is actually worth accord-
ing to the money-changers’ scales and the vagaries of the market) was never 
stable.22 Values fluctuated both in relation to other coinages of the same met-
al and to the many thousands of fractional currencies of different metals that 
circulated alongside larger value coins.23 It is for this reason that economic 
historian Luigi Einaudi described the experience of the modern analyst look-
ing at medieval money as being “to wander for a while in a dark forest.”24 If 
the standardization of money during the period of the “strong” nation state 
(roughly 1870s to 1950s) was supposed to make this dark forest easier to navi-
gate, by thinning out both the trees and the undergrowth, more recent events 
have caused it to grow back more strongly than ever. 
To return briefly to the first of our “disappearances” above, for example, 
the precise nature of money with respect to some of Lehman’s later trans-
actions is at best ambiguous. The Valukas Report,25 commissioned by the 
sec to explain the collapse of Lehman, closely examined the bank’s use of 
a particular accounting technique called “Repo 105.” This monetary sleight 
21 John Maynard Keynes, “What is Money” [Review of A Mitchell Innes’s Article], The Economic Jour-
nal 24, no. 95 (1914): 419–21.
22 Davies, A History of Money.
23 Richard H. Timberlake, “The Significance of Unaccounted Currencies,” The Journal of Economic His-
tory 41, no. 4 (1981): 853–66; Thomas J. Sargent and François R. Velde, The Big Problem of Small 
Change (Princeton University Press, 2002).
24 Einaudi, “The Theory of Imaginary Money,” 235.
25 Anton R. Valukas, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Chapter 11 Proceedings Examiner Report (Chicago: 
Jenner & Block, 2010). http://www.jenner.com/lehman/ (accessed December 7, 2012).
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of hand involved Lehman making a “loan” to the financial markets, but, 
by undertaking to repay 105% of the value, the loan was defined as a sale. 
The sum in question — around us$ 20 million worth of outstanding debt 
in Lehman’s case — was thus removed from the books until the “sale” was 
completed. According to the Valukas Report: “Lehman’s Global Financial 
Controller confirmed that ‘the only purpose or motive for [Repo 105] transac-
tions was reduction in the balance sheet’ and that ‘there was no substance to 
the transactions.’”26
Although not clarified in the report, “substance” here refers primarily 
to the transaction because no “real” asset was transferred. Essentially Repo 
105 and related processes use legal and accounting loopholes to redefine one 
asset in terms of another in order to conceal it and/or to make it more “tax 
efficient.” However strange and sometimes fraudulent such activities may 
seem, they are routine aspects of the management of the byzantine financial 
structures of contemporary corporations. The various activities that allow 
wealth to be concealed in the world’s many tax-havens or protected by the 
many varieties of “tax-shelter” currently marketed by the world’s account-
ancy industry, all involve the manipulation of the legal meaning and/or 
location of money.27 Such activities are only possible because the money in 
which such transactions are denominated is itself without substance. Since 
money is already a legal fiction, this is to say, it is not very surprising that 
enterprising lawyers and accountants find ways of rewriting that fiction to 
their own advantage.
These substanceless transactions on the part of Lehman, for all the dam-
age they ultimately caused, were relatively minor examples of the abstract 
nature of contemporary money, particularly those rarified creatures of the 
global financial markets that circulate on a very large scale — Eurocurren-
cies, Eurobonds and derivatives of all kinds. Such monies — for all that they 
continue to be reported in familiar currency terms — are in practice of a very 
different “substance” to the money embodied in the notes and coins used 
for ordinary daily circulation. As Jean-Joseph Goux noted some years ago 
even with respect to small-scale transactions, the means of payment — cash, 
check, or charge — has a determinant effect on the meaning of money and 
26 Ibid. (emphasis in the original).
27 Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan, The Imagined Economies of Globalization (London: Sage, 2004); 
Angus Cameron and Peter North, “Money and Liberation: The Micropolitics of Alternative Cur-
rency Movements.,” Economic Geography 84, no. 3 (2008): 373–4.
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our personal relationship to it.28 This is even more the case with transactions 
that take place in the distanciated currencies of high finance and the obscure 
mathematical markets through which they continuously flow. It is partly be-
cause of this that no adequate or final explanation has yet been found either 
for what caused the flash-crash or, more worryingly, perhaps, what the “loss” 
and “return” of so much ostensible “value” actually means.29
Because of their social as well as economic significance, various attempts 
have been made to make sense of these monies over recent years, particularly 
in terms of their location. Brian Rotman famously described the “placeless” 
monies of the Eurodollar markets that emerged in the late 1950s, for exam-
ple, as “xenomoney” (literally “strange money”):
For “Euro” and “dollars” one should write “xeno” and “money” respective-
ly. The Eurodollar has long since shed its attachment to Europe. It is in 
fact, no longer geographically located, but circulates within an electronic 
global market which, though still called the Eurodollar market, is now 
the international capital market.30
Rotman is correct to emphasize the separation of “euro” currencies from the 
territorial space of Europe (they are so named because they originated in the 
1950s as us$ traded in European interbank markets31), but this does not mean 
that they have no geographical location. The “space” of Eurocurrency trades 
may no longer equate to the territories of the currencies they adopt, but that 
does not remove it altogether as though the domains printed on the map ex-
haust the possibilities of space.32 A rather different way of visualizing this 
space comes more recently from Italian economists Amato and Fantacci, in 
trying to explain the nature of finance after the crisis of 2008: 
28 Jean-Joseph Goux, “Cash, Check, or Charge?,” in The New Economic Criticism: Studies at the Inter-
section of Literature and Economics, eds. M. Woodmansee and Osteen (London: Routledge, 1999), 
114–28.
29 Various explanations have been put forward blaming, variously, anomalous trades, algorithmic 
and high volume trading systems, worries about the Greek economy (a riot against fiscal austerity 
took place in Athens just before 2.45pm), an extra 0 added to a purchase order by mistake by a 
“fat-finger” on a keyboard, etc. The sec report into the Flash Crash did not reach a definitive expla-
nation, but recommended the installation of circuit breakers to trading system to at least prevent 
the fall being so great if, or perhaps when, such an event recurs.
30 Brian Rotman, Signifying Nothing: The Semiotics of Zero (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 
90.
31 Gary Burn, “The State, the City and the Euromarkets,” Review of International Political Economy 6, no. 
2 (1999): 225–61.
32 Angus Cameron, “Splendid Isolation: ‘Philosopher’s Islands’ and the Reimagination of Space,” Geo-
forum 43 (2012): 741–9. 
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It was precisely in virtue of the totally free space reserved for capital 
movements on the eurodollar market that it was possible to prevent 
them from generating pressure on balances of payments and hence on 
national currencies, at least as long as that space remained separate from 
the national monetary and financial systems. On this condition — which, 
however, remained implicit and problematic — the eurodollar market 
can be considered an autonomous monetary area with its own currency.33
In contrast to Rotman’s non-geographical space, Amato and Fantacci are sug-
gesting that the Eurodollar markets effectively have their own mode of quasi-
territoriality — an “autonomous monetary area with its own currency.” Whilst 
this may make the Euromarkets seem more legible as monetary spaces, it 
does not really capture their spatial peculiarity. Eurocurrencies, for all they 
are traded completely independently of their “home” currency domain, nev-
ertheless trade on the existence of that home: even as they undermine its “fis-
cal sovereignty.” Similarly, Eurocurrency markets are not defined positively 
in terms of an “area” they create, but negatively in terms of the territorial 
currency area that they do not inhabit. This means that they are defined as the 
very antithesis of territorial money. 
Whatever the strengths and limitations of these attempts to explain cur-
rent monetary realities, it is important to note that both start from the as-
sumption that money is normally territorialized. Hence, although they do it 
differently, both accounts find a way to express the relationship of the “new” 
money of the Eurodollar markets using the language of “normal” spatiality. 
However, as suggested above, the “strong” territorialization of money prac-
ticed by the nation state and its national currency has in fact been a relatively 
short exception (less than a century) in a much longer history of monies with 
little or no necessary connection to territory. 
Although this comes as a surprise to many commentators for whom 
all money is necessarily territorial, the intrinsically exterritorial nature of 
money is a function of its more general and fundamental lack of substance. 
This aspect of money was explored throughout the 1970s by performance 
artist Joseph Beuys who staged many events that sought both to highlight 
and investigate the paradoxical “nothingness” of money. These involved, for 
example, “defacing” banknotes with slogans such as “Kunst = Kapital” (art 
33 Massimo Amato and Luca Fantacci, The End of Finance (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), 104.
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equals capital) and signing them. Such an act both destroyed the face value 
of the note as money, but at the same time massively increased its value as 
an object by turning it, with a few strokes of a pen, into an artwork. Beuys 
was commenting as much on the dubious and still controversial relation-
ships between art, money and systems of value as he was on the nature of 
money itself, though many of his “lectures” dwelt almost exclusively on the 
latter.34 This aspect of his work culminated in a public panel discussion held 
in 1984 in Ulm that brought together Beuys himself with a group of bank-
ers and economists to address the question, “What is Money?” The difficulty 
of defining money in substantive terms was posed directly by development 
economist Rainer Willert in his opening remarks to the meeting:
“What is Money?” “Nothing”: that’s the only possible answer. But it 
works. Money works because in our heads, yes, we don’t think of it as 
nothing. And because entire networks of institutions — here I’ll mention 
only banks and the pricing system — emerged from this same falsehood 
and established themselves on its basis, making it their business to hide 
this nothingness from view. So money works. And its most important 
work is to secure its future: in other words to make sure we go on desiring 
it in [the] future too.35
The “nothingness” of money is, paradoxically, crucial to its capacity to carry 
and store value in advanced economies. In place of the relatively inflexible 
(though arguably more stable) currencies of the period of the gold standard 
(which finally died with the unpegging of the us$ in 1971), contemporary 
money derives its value from a highly complex mix of legal decree, global 
market interactions, banking policies and practices and the definition of what 
“counts” as money at all. Only a money evacuated of any and all substance 
(including a fixed territorial location) can function in such a complex system. 
It is because money is essentially nothing that also means that it is potentially 
everything — money is a “meta-commodity” that is universally applicable. 
Beuys own interest in money stemmed precisely from this transcendent uni-
versality, something he felt had been undermined by contemporary monetary 
practices (such as the style of high-risk banking practiced by the likes of Leh-
34 For a recent exploration of these same issues, see Maria Lind and Olav Velthuis, eds., Art and Its 




man), but which nevertheless had an emancipatory potential. Just as Beuys’s 
ethos as an artist was based on the idea of universal participation, so he envi-
sioned a de-institutionalised money that would serve mankind.36
This potentiality of money was noted a long time ago by Jorge Luis Borges 
in his short story “The Zahir” in which the main protagonist considers the 
power of a “substanceless” coin: 
[…] I reflected that there is nothing less material than money, since any 
coin whatsoever (let us say a coin worth twenty centavos) is, strictly 
speaking, a repertory of possible futures. Money is abstract, I repeated; 
money is the future tense. It can be an evening in the suburbs, or music by 
Brahms; it can be maps, or chess, or coffee; it can be the words of Epictetus 
teaching us to despise gold; it is a Proteus more versatile than the one 
on the Isle of Pharos. It is unforeseeable time, Bergsonian time, not the 
rigid time of Islam or the Porch. The determinists deny that there is such a 
thing in the world as a single possible act, id est an act that could or could 
not happen; a coin symbolizes man’s free will.37
The “substance” of money is, therefore deeply ambiguous. The mobility of 
contemporary money is both a product of its successive abstraction from na-
tional currencies (i.e., from attempts to regulate in through territorial legal/
political systems) and the source of its power and value. Although the veloc-
ity at which huge volumes of electronic “money” can now circulate is partly 
a function of its lack of material substance, the significance of velocity to its 
function has long been recognized. Hence Georg Simmel in his Philosophy of 
Money noted — after paper money was the norm, though before fully-fledged 
“national” currencies had been fully realized: “The functional value of mon-
ey exceeds its value as a substance the more extensive and diversified are the 
services it performs and the more rapidly it circulates.”38 In other words, the 
functionality of money stands in inverse proportion to its physical “reality.”
36 Cf. Keith Hart, Money in an Unequal World (New York: Texere Publishing, 2001); Peter North, Money 
and Liberation: The Micropolitics of Alternative Currency Movement (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2007).
37 Jorge Luis Borges, The Aleph and Other Stories (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 2004 [1949]).
38 Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, 143.
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money in between or money’s morbidity?
If money has more functional “substance” the less real it is, however, this 
begs a question about the nature of its mobility. If there is no substance — as 
Lehman’s financial controller happily admits — what moves? The immedi-
ate answer is, of course, nothing. If money is, as Willert suggests above,39 fun-
damentally nothing, then the answer to “Where has all the money gone?” is 
easy (if troubling): it has gone nowhere. 
Although this may sound peculiar, historically money has not necessar-
ily been a mobile thing in its own right, but a special sort of boundary zone 
through which other things, commodities of various kinds, are able to move. 
Money, this is to say, is fundamentally a means of intermediation — trans-
lating the worth of disparate objects, services and entities through a com-
mon framework of value. As such, money is the means by which mobility 
is achieved for commodities, rather than being a mobile commodity itself. 
This mediating boundary function of money and markets is of great antiq-
uity, long predating the creation of the stuff we now call money. For exam-
ple, idea of a money/market space was attributed by the ancient Greeks to 
Hermes — messenger of the Gods (and thus, just like money, able to move 
between states of being), but also in his own right God of both theft and the 
market place. In his analysis of Hermes the Thief, Norman O. Brown describes 
the connection between the divine trickster and the spatialization of trade: 
The most primitive form of trade, “silent” trade, has features which we 
have already noticed in the cult of Hermes. In “silent” trade the parties to 
the exchange never meet: the seller leaves the goods in some well-known 
place; the buyer takes the goods and leaves the price. The exchange gen-
erally takes place at one of those points which are sacred to Hermes — a 
boundary point such as a mountaintop, a river bank, a conspicuous stone 
or a road junction.40
Money and the “sacred” space of the market here perform no other function 
than intermediation — a neutral, exterritorial space (with divine protec-
tion) — through which trade could be managed without conflict. This exter-
39 Cf. Rotman, Signifying Nothing.
40 Norman Oliver Brown, Hermes the Thief: The Evolution of a Myth (Madison, wi: University of Wis-
consin Press, 1947), 39.
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nalized and externalizing feature of money and trade continued for centuries 
until the market place and the institutions of money were gradually brought 
inside the city walls of medieval Europe and then progressively interpolated 
into the territories of the state.41
At its most fundamental, money however defined and whatever it hap-
pens to be made of retains this intermediating function and for that it needs 
no substance. However, over many centuries we have given money concrete 
form as currency and, in doing so, allowed it to become not just the con-
duit for commodity value, but a commodity in its own right. This produces 
the paradoxical-sounding situation whereby money as currency is traded 
through the intermediating space of money — territorial money mediated 
by extraterritorial money. 
The question, “Where has the money gone?” therefore appears not 
as “wrong,” but as anachronistic: it assumes that money has one set of es-
sences — solidity, durability, physicality and, above all, territoriality, when in 
practice all of these have largely dissipated. Contemporary money retains a 
vestige of these attributes because to function as a commodity, it must main-
tain a connection — even if only negatively — to a territorial currency and, 
more importantly perhaps, to the various institutions, laws, debts, assets and 
the other paraphernalia of contemporary societies through which its value 
is established. The abstraction of currency into the quasi-spatiality of the Eu-
romarkets has allowed some articulations of “currency” (the currencies used 
by the markets rather than the ones embodied in the notes and coins in your 
pocket) to become very close to money in the “pure” sense, but without ever 
losing its capacity for that internal differentiation (a consequence of borders, 
interest rates, banking reserve requirements, taxation, etc.) that allows it to 
generate profits. Why trade in the messy and unpredictable corporeality of 
a “real” commodity, when — assuming you can trade enough of them, fast 
enough — the marginal fluctuations between the commodity monies of the 
forex markets will generate vast revenues. And because the substance and 
spatiality of currency is already fictional, the new fictions generated by the 
hedge funds, the futures markets, the accountants and the lawyers cannot be 
excluded from the mix of commodity monies in circulation. As the “treas-
ury function” of the world’s bigger companies has gradually overtaken their 
41 Cf. Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital 
and European Cities: ad 990–1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
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manufacturing and trading functions as a source of profit, so “money” in all 
its strange and abstracted forms, has more and more come to dominate eco-
nomic global activity.
Although the scale of this shift in the nature and importance of money 
has grown at a geometric rate in recent decades (particularly since the vast 
influx of petrodollars into the forex markets in the 1970s), the uneasy rela-
tionship between money as intermediary and money as commodity is not 
new. John Maynard Keynes recognized the dangers inherent in it long before 
it grew beyond our collective control. Dreaming of a future when we would 
not value money as something to own and horde, he argued:
We shall be able to afford to dare to assess the money motive at its true 
value. The love of money as a possession — as distinguished from the 
love of money as a means to the enjoyments and realities of life — will be 
recognized for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those 
semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which one hands over 
with a shudder to the specialist in mental disease.42
Commodity money, territorialized money, Keynes was already suggesting in 
the 1930s, is a sign of collective insanity. The curious disappearances of 2008 
and 2010, and our manifest inability to comprehend them, despite their con-
cerning that substance that we use every day of our lives — money — might 
seem to confirm the madness at the heart of our economies.
conclusion: changing the mental map
For all his condemnation of what territorial money had become, Keynes did 
not suggest that it should or could simply be abolished. Rather he envisaged 
a gradual change over the course of a century or so, after which the contra-
dictions in and unsustainability of modern money would render it obsolete. 
Whether his prognosis will prove accurate remains to be seen, but it is cer-
tainly possible that the crises witnessed since 2008 not just in the function-
ing of money but in its very meaning, signal what Amato and Fantacci sug-
gest might be the “end of finance.”43
42 John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (London: Macmillan, 1931), 369.
43 Amato & Fantacci, The End of Finance.
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At the very least our “terrifying” collective inability to understand the 
true nature of money — “you and I, ladies and gentlemen, and the special-
ists” — should cause us to start to re-examine it. With respect to its location, 
international political economist Benjamin Cohen concluded his analysis of 
The Geography of Money in the following terms: 
If public policy is to remain at all effective [...] we must update our mental 
maps of money to close the widening gap between image and fact — be-
tween the conventional myth of One Nation/One Money and the reality 
of a deterritorialized galactic structure of currency. Westphalia’s territo-
rial trap must be avoided. We all need to learn to think anew about the 
spatial organization of monetary relations.44
More recently, the “Occupy Wall Street” protesters began to issue new men-
tal “maps” of money, using money itself. To highlight inequalities in the us 
economy, they overstamped dollar bills with graphic representations of the 
huge disparities of income and wealth in the us.45
This may not look like a map, mental or otherwise, but that is only because 
we assume that all money is the same — a dollar is a dollar. But in addition 
to pointing out how unequal the distribution of dollars of all kinds is, the 
“Occupy George” bill also subtly alludes to the fact that the dollars repre-
sented to the left — those controlled by the four hundred richest Ameri-
44 Benjamin J. Cohen, The Geography of Money (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 168.
45 There are various different versions, all available to download from: http://www.occupygeorge.
com/ (accessed July 13, 2012).
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cans — have a fundamentally different location to those on the right. Where 
money is, where money goes and, ultimately, what money is, are, therefore, a 
matter of scale. Those to the left of the Occupy George Bill are able to access 
the extraterritorial world of the so-called hnwis and Ultra-hnwis.46 Most of 
those to the right have no choice but to live within the confines of territorial 
money — the relatively immobile domain of state controlled money: of cash.
Clearly, and despite the efforts of Occupy George, our mental maps are 
not yet up to date with the emergent geographies of money. The anomalous, 
partial explanations of the crises of 2008 and 2010 — both of which are, of 
course ongoing — further underline the disconnect Cohen observes between 
the “image” and the “fact” of money. That we cannot yet with any degree of 
certainty answer the question, “Where has all the money gone?,” suggests 
that we need not just an “updating” of our mental maps, but some fundamen-
tal changes in the way extraterritorial money is created, managed, regulated, 
and distributed.
46 “High-Net Worth Individuals” and “Ultra- High-Net Worth Individuals.” There are various defini-
tions for these people, but the most commonly used is that hnwis have at least us$1 million in 






of the Internet to 
territory is complex, 
contradictory, and chang-
ing. Exploring the diverse and 
shifting ways that Eritreans in 
diaspora have used websites to partici-
pate in national politics from outside the 
country sheds light on the dynamics of digital 
extraterritoriality and its significance for politics. 
At first cyberspace may be appear to be simply an extra-
territorial space, where websites are constructed as spaces 
with no territorial location. A contributor to a recent volume on 
digital anthropology notes that, “few aspects of digital media, cyber-
space or the network society are as commonly perceived as fundamental 
as its disembodying aspects, its placelessness and subordination of physical 
proximity to network connectivity.”1 At the same time it can be said that, “[a] 
cardinal rule of the geography is that social life takes place in ‘constructed’ 
spaces.”2 If we understand cyberspace as a constructed space, its significant 
feature is not its extraterritoriality but rather that the space of cyberspace is 
ambiguous and elastic, allowing it to support diverse constructions, alterna-
tive imaginaries, and multiple forms of territoriality and extraterritoriality. 
Eritrea is located in the Horn of Africa bordered by Ethiopia, Sudan, Dji-
bouti, and the Red Sea. First colonized by Italy, Eritrea was later annexed by 
Ethiopia in 1962. Three decades of war fought on Eritrean soil followed.3 The 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front won independence in 1991 and Eritrea has 
been governed since then by ex-guerilla fighter Isaias Afewerki and his rul-
ing party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice. The original Eritrean 
1 Lane DeNicola, “Geomedia: The Reassertion of Space within Digital Culture,” in Digital Anthropol-
ogy, ed. H. Horst & D. Miller (London and New York: Berg, 2012), 81.
2 Ronan Palan, “Offshore and the Institutional Environment of Globalization,” in Political Space: 
Frontiers of Change and Governance in a Globalizing World, ed. Y.H. Ferguson and R.J.B. Jones (Albany: 
suny Press, 2002), 212.










diaspora was a product of the war with Ethiopia that drove Eritreans to flee 
their homes or stranded them abroad as was the case for Eritrean students 
studying overseas who could not safely return. Hundreds of thousands of 
Eritreans were forced to make new lives for themselves in other lands under 
various circumstances. The Isaias regime entered into a new conflict with 
Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000 over the border between the two nations. From 
2001 on, its policies and practices became increasingly repressive. This has 
created a new diaspora, particularly among young people who have been 
fleeing the country in thousands every month.4 
Diaspora, much like cyberspace, allows new imaginaries of the meaning 
of territorial locations and borders and makes possible new spatializations of 
relationships. Diaspora can be understood as a form of extraterritoriality. Di-
asporas possess no territory; they exist, not through occupying space, but by 
transcending it. Migrants, refugees, diasporas, and similar populations live 
in ambiguous and simultaneous relationships with multiple territorial loca-
tions and communities. They are at once connected to and disconnected from 
the places where they live and work on a daily basis (where they may con-
sider themselves temporary and/or be treated like outsiders), and also from 
the territory they no longer inhabit (the places they left behind but to which 
they still belong or feel attached). The concept of diaspora and related no-
tions of displaced people capture the disconnect between such populations 
and territory, giving them an extraterritorial identity. Moreover, the extrater-
ritorial aspect of diasporic identity is not simply the fact of living outside a 
homeland. Diasporic belonging is extraterritorial in the way that it bridges 
and creates continuity out of the discontinuous spaces occupied by members 
of dispersed populations. Diasporas, thus, are not simply located outside of 
the nations they left; through their presence and their absence they remap 
citizenship and sovereignty across and within national territories. 
The Internet also makes possible new forms of connection and discon-
nection involving mediated absences and presences. The next section of this 
paper considers how the metaphor of space has been used in relation to the 
Internet in ways that lead us to conceptualize it as extraterritorial. Then I 
consider how we might complicate our conceptualization of the Internet as 
extraterritorial. I do so through an analysis of Eritrean diaspora websites that 
reveal more complex possibilities of the relationship of digital media to ter-
4 Gaim Kibreab, Eritrea: A Dream Deferred (Rochester: James Currey, 2009).
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ritory and to extraterritoriality. This suggests that the Internet is best viewed 
not simply as extraterritorial, but as enabling the re-envisioning of territo-
rial relations. In particular, the Internet can be used to remake our sense of 
place in a number of ways that are significant for nations, states, and sover-
eignty. The Internet is more than simply a cheap, convenient mode of com-
munication. Cyberspace does more than simply shrink distances, it serves 
diasporas as a space that is ambiguously located, easily accessed, and in some 
sense equidistant from all locations on the globe. It is at once neither here 
nor there (neither inside the nation nor outside it), and yet it is also both here 
and there simultaneously. Cyberspace thus disrupts the homeland/diaspora 
dichotomy. The political impact of new media, moreover, appears to be much 
greater outside of established democracies, in autocratic systems where in-
formation and public debate are state-controlled or highly centralized. 
extraterritoriality and conceptions of the Internet 
The connectivity of the Internet is both a deterritorializing force and a reter-
ritorializing force. Through the Internet people communicate across politi-
cal and geographic borders in ways that can make location seem invisible or 
irrelevant. Digital connectivity can upend our sense of geography by shrink-
ing distances and bridging physical gaps thereby bringing faraway places 
close. A sense of “co-presence” is created online.5 The Internet also allows for 
the production of virtual spaces. We “visit” websites, we take “virtual tours.” 
We “go” online and “go to” or “visit” websites, we speak of web “sites” rather 
than “sights” even though we are looking at visual data on a screen. We speak 
of “cybersquatting” and “lurking.” Spatiality may be a distinctive feature of 
cyberspace as a medium. We do not experience or conceptualize our engage-
ment with other media whether print, radio, or film in quite these ways. 
Our notion of cyberspace as space and websites as places is a cultural con-
struction. Schulte writes of this development:
As Internet use gained popularity, two initially separate practices, “com-
puting” and “the Internet,” began to merge. This terminological melding 
signaled a conceptual collapse, as computing was increasingly imagined 
5 Jeffrey Juris, “Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social Media, Public Space, and Emerging Log-
ics of Aggregation,” American Ethnologist 39, no. 2 (2012): 259–79.
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as networking and the computer apparatus was imagined primarily as a 
gateway to the Internet. As the Internet lost its body, in a sense, it became 
easier to imagine the Internet as a deterritorialized space or experience 
rather than a product of hardware.6
This process was neither natural nor inevitable, as Schulte points out:
Internet hardware and software development, institutions of govern-
ment finance, state regulation, and corporate prerogatives actively re-
imagined the Internet as a space to explore or inhabit or as a state of be-
ing rather than a product of digital code and programs contained within 
computer infrastructures and networking wires.7 
Cloud computing is a growing development in digital media that is repre-
sented by a new extraterritorial metaphor. People talk about “the cloud” as if 
cyberspace exists above our heads, even though we know that servers, com-
puters, and users are all situated in specific locations on the ground. Data you 
store “in the cloud” may not be located on your device, but it is stored in a 
terrestrial location somewhere. 
While cyberspace is imagined as an extraterritorial place, the focus of 
much Internet scholarship on the virtual, on online communities, and on 
the distinctiveness of digital media has tended to obscure the interpenetra-
tion of online and off-line worlds. As Christensen, Jansson, and Christiansen 
note, the Internet too often has been seen “as a territory in its own right” and 
thus detached from context.8 Yet, as they argue, “It is precisely these processes 
of co-construction, the interplay between structural forces and the social and 
cultural affordances of online media, that call for a critical re-examination 
of how territories are (re)produced and legitimized.”9 Diasporas similarly 
trouble assumptions about the meaning of territory and its relation to social 
formations and political orders.
6 Stephanie Ricker Schulte, Cached: Decoding the Internet in Global Popular Culture (New York and Lon-
don: New York University Press, 2013), 3.
7 Ibid., 10.
8 M. Christensen, A. Jansson, and C. Christiansen, “Introduction: Globalization, Mediated Practice 
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diaspora, territory, and cyberspace
Diaspora involves territorial connections and disjunctures that engender 
acts of imagination and affect that are linked to territory, yet not bound by it. 
Eritreans in diaspora were early adopters of digital media as a means of con-
necting to Eritrean politics.10 The speed of communications on the Internet 
is significant for politics because it makes distant places seem as close and 
accessible as near ones and, moreover, eliminates the delays normally asso-
ciated with distance. This technologically constructed proximity achieved 
through Internet communications makes it possible for members of the di-
aspora to respond immediately to current events, national crises, and scan-
dals in Eritrea. In this way they can actually participate in unfolding events, 
framing issues, shaping opinions, and mobilizing action. 
Eritreans in diaspora created public space for themselves online through 
the establishment of several key websites that have proven long-lasting. 
These websites (most notably Dehai, Awate, and Asmarino11) form an online 
public sphere that constitutes Eritrean space in cyberspace. This Eritrean 
space online was not established purely for the diaspora or primarily as an 
online community sui generis but was intended to connect Eritreans in dias-
pora to Eritrea and serve Eritreans wherever they might be located. 
Through the websites they established, Eritreans in diaspora created Eri-
trean space online. Eritrean online space is not simply extraterritorial, but 
serially and simultaneously engaged in multiple and shifting relationships 
to Eritrea itself. Sometimes websites serve as national space that extends the 
nation beyond its borders and sometimes websites serve as national space 
that is outside the nation and independent from it. In this latter sense web-
sites may serve not as extraterritory in the sense of a non-terrestrial space, 
but rather more as extra territory, Eritrean national space that is outside the 
nation and, therefore, free of government control. Websites may serve as 
extraterritorial when the aspect of virtual space is foregrounded, offering a 
space that has no particular location but is everywhere and accessible from 
anywhere. The ambiguity of location on the Internet thus makes possible 
different forms of territorialization, deterritorialization, reterritorialization 
and, extraterritoriality. 
10 Victoria Bernal, “Eritrea On-line: Diaspora, Cyberspace, and the Public Sphere,” American Ethnolo-
gist 32, no. 4 (2005): 660–75.
11 Respectively, http://www.dehai.org, http://www.awate.com, http://www.asmarino.com.
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We can complicate the notion of the Internet as extraterritorial by con-
sidering the ways that cyberspace can be used not only to deterritorialize, 
but also to reterritorialize. Eritreans in diaspora, for example, sometimes 
treat websites as national space where they in effect relocate themselves 
within the nation of Eritrea, even writing their posts in ways that sound as 
if they are inside the country, as for instance, when writing things like “if 
we are to develop this country,” meaning Eritrea, when the writer is actually 
posting from Germany, where they live. Cyberspatiality blurs the distinction 
between Eritreans inside Eritrea and Eritreans outside it. Since Eritreans in 
diaspora have more access to the Internet and are responsible for creating 
and maintaining the popular Eritrean websites, as well as for producing most 
of the posts, this blurring of spatial distinctions works as a kind of illusion 
that bridges the diaspora’s separation from Eritrea, concealing their distance 
from Eritrea and their dispersal from one another. In this sense, the websites 
they created reterritorialize the diaspora, locating them in Eritrea. Some-
times, cyberspace and diaspora are not so much outside of Eritrea as they are 
extensions of Eritrea.
I consider cyberspace as a space where the Eritrean diaspora is located. As 
Daniel Miller has argued, “Instead of regarding sns [social networking sites] 
as simply a means to communicate between two given localities, it is also 
possible to start thinking about sns as places in which people in some sense 
actually live.”12 Georgiou found that among the Greek Cypriot diaspora, “For 
those active participants of online Greek Cypriot fora, an online territoriality 
of community emerges against a grounded territoriality that excludes them 
from participating in what happens at the actual place (Cyprus as a nation-
state and as a grounded territory.”13 Through their websites Eritreans can be 
inside and outside Eritrea at the same time. 
Dehai was the first computer-mediated network of Eritreans and is now 
the longest-running Eritrean website. It has been part of Eritrean politics 
since 1992, the year before Eritrea was officially recognized as a nation. Dehai 
was established by a group of Eritreans in diaspora in the us and by design it 
was devoted to Eritrean politics and nation-building. Dehai built upon a non-
technological worldwide web of Eritrean nationalist associations that had 
been organized in many countries by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
12 Daniel Miller, “Social Networking Sites,” in Digital Anthropology, 155–56.
13 Myria Georgiou, “Diaspora, Mediated Communication and Space: A Transnational Framework to 
Study Identity,” in Online Territories (2011): 208.
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throughout the 1970s and ’80s, and on other social networks and kinship 
relations that sustained a transnational Eritrean community of interlinked 
and overlapping networks.14 Dehai remained the gathering place for Eritre-
ans around the world through the 1990s. Since connectivity within Eritrea 
was largely limited to government offices throughout that time, the Internet, 
furthermore, offered a special conduit from Eritreans in diaspora to the state. 
Through Dehai Eritreans used the Internet to expand the boundaries of the 
nation so that it encompassed the diaspora and the virtual national space of a 
website. Dehai could be seen as an extension of national territory rather than 
existing outside it. The catch-phrase underneath Dehai on the website’s home 
page is “Eritrea online” suggesting that the site is meant to be experienced as 
Eritrea or to be understood as representing the nation. The extraterritoriality 
or placelessness of cyberspace is thus turned to the opposite purpose of creat-
ing Eritrean national territory. 
The space of cyberspace is elastic; it can connect the diaspora and the 
homeland online in ways that blur the distinction between Eritreans living 
in Eritrea and those settled abroad. In that sense, it reterritorializes the dias-
pora and reshuffles territory-related distinctions. A recent post referring to 
an event where a speaker critical of the government was challenged by au-
dience members proclaimed: “Here are Eritrea’s volunteer sons & daughters 
right in the heart of North America fighting tooth and nail once again against 
all odds, so that our precious nation & people remain fiercely independent 
forever & ever.” The author went on to say “it is my strong belief that the 
good bad and the ugly we have gone through pre & post independence has 
brought us all, the people and the leadership more closer than ever before 
with strong & resolute determination never seen before to stay the course of 
absolute unity indefinitely.”15 Here is a vision of the nation that transcends 
place, binding “the people and the leadership” in “absolute unity.” 
This is not to say location has no place online. In fact, Dehai posters of-
ten mention their city or country of residence or include it in their signature 
line. Posters generally use their real names and Dehai includes their email 
addresses from which their country can be determined since email addresses 
outside the us have a country suffix — itself an interesting expression of ter-
ritoriality online. Yet the cyberspatial public sphere appears borderless since 
14 Victoria Bernal, “Eritrea Goes Global: Reflections on Nationalism in a Transnational Era,” Cultural 
Anthropology 19, no. 1 (2004): 3–25. 
15 Dehai post, January 17, 2015.
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people access it from diverse countries, and analyses, comments, and debates 
from anywhere appear seamlessly in conversation. Furthermore, while post-
ers’ identities and even locations may be known, readers are anonymous and 
their locations unknown. This, along with the belief that Eritrea’s leaders not 
only read posts, but might themselves post under pseudonyms all have con-
tributed to a sense of accessing Eritrea itself through the Internet. A recent 
post exemplifies the pro-government stance of many Dehai posters while 
blurring the boundaries between diaspora and homeland and between the 
people and the state in its call to defend Eritrea: 
Still the evil mission of the Human Rights Group is in action. Therefore, 
it is up to us Eritreans all over the world to stop it. Yes we can stop it for 
we are armed by the same if not more powerful weapon to fight back. We 
have eri-tv [the state television] as the vanguard and then add all the fol-
lowing patriotic websites to give them hell. They are: www.shabait.com, 
www.shaebia.org, www.dehai.org.16
The list of patriotic websites puts Dehai right after the official websites of the 
government and the ruling party and then goes on to include a number of 
other websites, while not including politically critical websites like Asmarino 
or Awate.
Sometimes what the Internet offers might best be understood not as ex-
traterritorial, but as extra territory. In analyzing Eritrean experience I have 
likened diaspora and websites to a kind of “offshore” that is important for 
the loosened grip that national sovereignty can exercise over it.17 Successful 
rival Eritrean websites, Asmarino and Awate, being paramount among them, 
began to compete with Dehai in the aftermath of the devastating border war 
that Eritrea and Ethiopia waged between from 1998 to 2000. To say that Dehai, 
Asmarino, and Awate serve as Eritrean territory does not mean that no others 
ever go there, but rather, that when they do, they are entering Eritrean space. 
The Eritrean character of the websites is their defining feature as evidenced 
by the Eritrean identities of their web managers and content producers, the 
focus of their content on Eritrean national politics, and even the names of the 
websites. Dehai is a Tigrinya word that means both “voice” and “news,” Awate 
16 Dehai post, January 24, 2015.
17 Victoria Bernal, “Nation as Network: Diaspora, Cyberspace, and Citizenship (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2014).
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is the name of a nationalist hero, and Asmarino is a term for someone from 
Asmara, Eritrea’s capital. 
Like Dehai, Asmarino, and Awate were founded by Eritreans living in the 
us; but from the start they differed from Dehai. Dehai used the Internet to ex-
tend Eritrean national territory and sovereignty to the diaspora and to cyber-
space, supporting President Isaias Afewerki and the ruling party, the People’s 
Front for Democracy and Justice. Through Dehai Eritreans in diaspora par-
ticipate in Eritrean nationalism and nation-building. Asmarino and Awate, in 
contrast, used cyberspace more like an offshore territory from which Eritre-
ans could develop alternative and independent perspectives from those of 
the state, and challenge the legitimacy of the Isaias regime. While still con-
stituting Eritrean territory online, these websites used cyberspace to create 
Eritrean space that is not dominated by the government. Asmarino’s tag line 
is “Independent.” These websites have responded to growing repression and 
the lack of independent media within Eritrea since 2001 when the govern-
ment closed down the free press and imprisoned journalists along with high 
officials who had who had publicly expressed criticism of President Isaias 
Afewerki. Awate and Asmarino attracted posters and readers by attempting 
to transcend the self-censorship and policing that often inhibited dissent and 
critical debate on Dehai. A recent example from Dehai employs the common 
theme of accusing critics of being traitors allied with Eritrea’s enemies, par-
ticularly Ethiopia. 
[S]ince the 1950s, Eritrea has had her fair share of elements who betrayed 
Eritrea. The ugliest and the most disgraceful of these elements were the 
one[s] who wanted us to be “Ethiopians”? Where are these elements these 
days? Where else. Just like their predecessors, they are counting their 
days in this life with no country and people to belong to. Just like the rest, 
one after another they will evaporate into thin air in “no man’s land.”18
It is significant that the disastrous fate envisioned for these critics is non-ex-
istence represented as a kind of extraterritory —  “no-man’s-land.” It is not a 
question, then, of living in diaspora rather than in the homeland, but rather of 
social death symbolized by being cut off from meaningful, inhabited territory.
18 Dehai post, January 24, 2015.
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The Internet has expanded the spaces available to people to express 
their views, engage in debate and discussion, petition, protest, and organize. 
Awate ’s motto, “Inform. Inspire. Embolden. Reconcile” conveys in the word 
“embolden” the need for Eritreans to overcome fear of expressing themselves. 
This is all the more significant for Eritreans because within the country no 
opposition is allowed, the media are controlled by government, and dissent-
ers are harshly punished. The significance of Eritrean space in cyberspace is 
heightened by the fact that people can experience freedoms of expression 
and critical debate not possible on Eritrean soil. As Sassen points out, 
Electronic space is, perhaps ironically, a far more concrete space for social 
struggles than that of the national political system. It becomes a place 
where nonformal political actors can be part of the political scene in a 
way that is much more difficult in national institutional channels.19 
The diaspora websites, particularly Asmarino and Awate, have come to be 
used as an offshore platform for civil society where Eritreans engage in 
national politics outside the authority of the state. In these online spaces, 
politically independent perspectives and subjectivities can be developed col-
lectively as posters construct alternative histories and reframe and revise na-
tional narratives, engaging in activities not possible on Eritrean soil. 
The use of websites as a space for Eritrean civil society and expression 
is thus particularly important since government repression makes it impos-
sible for these to take place in Eritrea. A recent post on Asmarino calls for 
donations to support the website “so that it will continue to keep the lights 
on for a new generation of Eritreans to be reporters, editors, poets, writers, 
commentators, designers, artists, painters, etc. Most importantly, to continue 
to be the voice of the voiceless Eritreans at home and elsewhere.”20 A post on 
Awate urging Eritreans to testify about human rights abuses to the United 
Nations Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea notes the difficulty of speaking 
against the regime. It also presents a vision of the nation that foregrounds 
mutual obligations among countrywomen and men rather than ties to land 
or loyalty to a government: 
19 Saskia Sassen. “Electronic Markets and Activist Networks: The Weight of Social Logics,” in Digi-
tal Formations: it and New Architectures in the Global Realm, ed. Robert Latham and Saskia Sassen 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 82.
20 Asmarino post, January 9, 2015.
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It takes courage to give testimony on behalf of oneself or on behalf of 
those whose rights were violated by pfdj [Eritrea’s ruling party]. And yes, 
there may be certain deterrents that discourage one from speaking out; 
the sense of shame or betrayal are examples of familiar cultural offenses. 
Nevertheless, the courage to speak out, in this case, is just as much a quest 
for justice on behalf of an entire nation as it is on behalf of oneself and 
other victims. To stand up for your rights and for those of your country-
women and men, is to stand up for the future welfare of the nation that 
thousands have bled, died and sacrificed for…21
In the beginning Eritreans used the Internet in ways that extended the na-
tion-state beyond its territorial borders and blurred the boundaries between 
the homeland and the diaspora. On Dehai the distinction between the peo-
ple and the state was also left ambiguous and undefined in posters’ focus on 
the deterritorialized nation. These effects are created when diaspora posters 
write as if they are located in Eritrea, and when posts discuss Eritrea as if the 
citizens, the diaspora, and the state were a single entity. While these prac-
tices continue in some posts on any of the websites up to now, Awate and 
Asmarino generally operate as spaces that are distinct and separate from the 
nation-state and the ruling party. As an offshore civil society, then, websites 
like these allow Eritreans inside and outside of Eritrea to challenge the gov-
ernment from cyberspace. The online public sphere operates as an offshore 
platform outside state authority, offering important counterpoints to the 
state’s authority and to the national media it controls. 
As emerges from this discussion, there are interesting parallels and syn-
ergies between diasporas as extraterritorial populations in relation to their 
homeland, and cyberspace as used by Eritreans and other diasporas as an ex-
traterritorial space that does not reflect their territorial location, but rather 
their affective ties or emotional location. Although Eritreans in diaspora 
have settled abroad and made new lives for themselves as citizens of other 
countries, their sense of who they are is not defined by their legal status or 
place of residence, but rooted in Eritrea’s turbulent past, uncertain present, 
and possible future in which all Eritreans have a stake. 
The dynamic online territory of Eritrean websites reconfigures territorial 
relations. Through Asmarino and Awate Eritreans in diaspora have used cy-
21 Awate post, October 17, 2014.
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berspace to de-center the nation, shifting its primary locus from the state’s 
center of power in Asmara, to Eritreans wherever they may be located. This 
was particularly striking in the virtual national war memorial established 
online by the Eritrean diaspora website Awate. The Martyrs Album as it was 
called, commemorated Eritrean lives lost in the 1998–2000 border war.22 The 
texts of the memorial written by the web managers of Awate constructed the 
Eritrean nation as rooted in Eritrean people themselves, in contrast to offi-
cial narratives that locate Eritrea in national territory and the sovereign state 
that controls it under the leadership of President Isaias Afewerki. Eritrean 
websites reveal the creative strategies of the less powerful to construct new 
spaces and strategies of political participation and to expand the boundaries 
of what can be publicly expressed.
conclusion
Cyberspace can be an extraterritorial space in the sense of “an autonomous 
sphere at a removal from the confines of any one national territory.”23 Yet, 
in profound ways it remains tethered to the earth and to the geo-political 
configurations of power and relations of sovereignty. The Internet’s freedom 
from constraints has often been overestimated by scholars and others. Per-
haps the vision of openness and equality associated with the Internet rep-
resents merely a hypothetical potential that we can seek to approach but 
can never reach. In practice, identities, power differentials, and authority are 
reproduced online as well as contested. Censorship and self-censorship of 
various kinds define what is and is not expressed on Eritrean websites, for ex-
ample. Self-appointed citizens monitor and seek to police online spaces and, 
Eritreans believe that in some cases they are recruited by the state to serve 
this purpose. All of the three websites are expressly democratic in their mis-
sion statements and ideals and their claims to being uncensored are credible. 
Nonetheless there is a paradox in that the Internet appears to be unbounded 
and totally open, and was likened by some scholars to a new frontier, while 
in practice, it is structured and limited by the ways people use it. The Eritrean 
online public sphere is not boundless and completely free of constraints. 
Even though websites are not administered or regulated by the state, or even 
22 Victoria Bernal, “Diaspora, Digital Media, and Death Counts: Eritreans and the Politics of Memori-
alisation,” African Studies 72 (Nov. 2013): 246–64.
23 Extraterritory Project (June 16, 2013). http://exterritory-project.org (accessed Jan. 25, 2016).
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censored by web managers, posters impose political norms on themselves 
and on others that construct the boundaries of what is expressed and what 
is suppressed. There are ongoing tensions arising from existing political and 
cultural structures that do not vanish simply because a group has access to 
the Internet. Though many have theorized the democratizing potential of 
the fact that in principle anyone can post any view online, in practice people 
are often intimidated to post unpopular or dissident perspectives and those 
who do are met with harsh responses that serve to silence others. 
In the wake of Snowden’s revelations about nsa data collection, it is be-
coming ever more clear that the often invisible architecture of the Internet, 
the servers and cables that constitute its infrastructure, as well as the loca-
tions of developers, designers, web managers, and posters are territorial and 
that their locations make a political difference in jurisdictions, regulations, 
and rights. As Castells reminds us, “The Internet Age has been hailed as the 
end of geography. In fact, the Internet has a geography of its own, a geogra-
phy made of networks and nodes that process information flows generated 
and managed from places.”24
Nonetheless as the Eritrean experience shows, the Internet remains a 
powerful tool for reconfiguring territorial relations and unsettling distinc-
tions between categories of experience. It has altered the landscapes of citi-
zenship and sovereignty and given rise to new political spaces. Eritreans 
have developed new political practices and discourses to negotiate the deter-
ritorialized relations between citizens and the state. Eritreans in diaspora are 
experimenting online in ways that suggest new forms of citizenship, democ-
racy, and the public sphere emerging out of the new technologies and the 
heightened mobility of our times. Diasporas and other mobile populations 
are altering nations’ centers of gravity through the powerful transnational 
fields they sustain, in part, through the Internet. Eritreans’ engagement with 
the Internet shows we cannot define its quality of extraterritoriality or its 
relation to territory in narrow or fixed terms. We need to explore the various 
and shifting permutations of cyberspatial and territorial relations that are 
always both grounded and virtual.
The affordances of digital media are increasingly woven into the fabric 
of people’s lives, and today cyberspace is perhaps no more magical than elec-
24 Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 207.
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tricity. Yet the Internet remains an inspiration, stimulating imaginaries of 
an unbound world where borders are crossed with ease and intimacies tran-
scend distance, where collaboration and community persist on the basis of 
mutual interest rather than on repression, and where new spaces of creativ-
ity and connection continue to be sited. 








What is at stake if 
our justice authorities 
decide to hack a computer 
system that is physically located 
on a server outside the territory of the 
state they represent, for instance because 
a webbot was operated from that location,1 
causing serious harm to a variety of computing sys-
tems in our own jurisdiction — harm that renders the 
perpetrator criminally liable under our own criminal law? 
How would we respond to Ukrainian, Chinese, Iranian, British, 
or Argentinian justice authorities that hack a computer system that 
is located within our own jurisdiction? Does it make a difference whether 
the hack by law enforcement authorities targets a dissident whose right to 
free speech is denied or a network disseminating child pornography? Should 
we evaluate such groping for extraordinary jurisdiction in terms of just ver-
sus unjust causes (a bellum iustum privatum?) or is this about the Westphalian 
interplay of internal and external sovereignty? Might the attempt to extend 
or initiate extraterritorial jurisdiction-to-enforce be understood as an oc-
cupatio, grounded in what Schmitt coined “a-legality,”2 or should we follow 
 Originally published as Mireille Hildebrandt, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Enforce in Cyber-
space? Bodin, Schmitt, Grotius in Cyberspace,” University of Toronto Law Journal 63, no. 2 (2013): 
196–224. Reprinted with the permission of University of Toronto Press. This text was presented at 
an Exterritory Project Symposium in collaboration with Stedelijk Museum, March 15, 2015, Ste-
delijk Museum, Amsterdam, Netherlands. This chapter was published in the University of Toronto 
Law Journal 63, no. 2, (Spring 2013): 196–224. 
1 A bot is “an automated software program that can execute certain commands when it receives 
a specific input (like a ro-‘bot’),” see http://www.techterms.com/definition/bot. On the web it is 
used to search or crawl the web to retrieve information. In the case of cybercrime “[a] zombie (also 
known as a bot) is a computer that a remote attacker has accessed and set up to forward transmis-
sions (including spam and viruses) to other computers on the Internet. The purpose is usually 
either financial gain or malice. Attackers typically exploit multiple computers to create a botnet, 
also known as a zombie army.” See http://searchmidmarketsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/
zombie.
2 E.g., (based on Carl Schmitt) Hans Lindahl, “A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal 
Boundaries,” Modern Law Review 73 (2010): 30; Markus D. Dubber, “Common Civility: The Culture 
of Alegality in International Criminal Law,” Leiden Journal of International Law 24 (2011): 923.
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Grotius’s Mare Liberum and consider cyberspace to be a common good that 
requires us to reinvent natural law theory? 
In the following I start out with a brief introduction on the move “from 
computer crime to cybercrime,” explaining how it connects to the notions 
of cyberspace and cybernetics (Section 2). Next I discuss “sovereignty and 
the makings of territorial jurisdiction,” fleshing out the territorial spatiality 
of modern jurisdiction by tracing the history of mutually exclusive juris-
dictions, generated by the technologies of cartography, tracking down the 
connection between terror and Bodin’s absolute sovereignty,3 and finally 
inquiring into the notion of occupation as central to territorial sovereign 
jurisdiction (Section 3). Next I investigate the powers of “extraterritorial ju-
risdiction in the light of Grotius’s Mare Liberum,” interpreting the freedom 
of the seas as an “economic theology’4 and as a solution based on natural 
law theory (Section 4). Finally, I discuss the idea of a “cyberspace liberum,” 
beginning with the question of the experiental unregulability of cyberspace, 
following up with an account of various attempts to gain control over parts 
of cyberspace — for instance by means of so-called indirect extraterritorial 
effect. I conclude with a question. Studying the implications of the use of 
extraterritorial search and seizures in cyberspace confronts us with the is-
sue of spatiality. Cyberspaces demand a reconceptualization of jurisdiction 
in terms of novel spatialities. This means a critical stance toward cyberspace 
as a mere utopia and a rejection of cyberspace as a mere isotopia that can be 
framed on the regulation of territorial sovereignty and the freedom of the 
sea. The question is whether we can sustain cyberspace-as-a-passage and a 
global commons even though cyberspace is a heteropia,5 crossing over into 
the landscape of territorial jurisdiction while also evading its mutually ex-
clusive boundaries. It would be grotesque to pretend that I can do more in 
this article than spell out the pertinence of this question (Section 5).
3 Jean Bodin, Bodin: On Sovereignty, ed. Julian H Franklin (Cambridge University Press, 1992 [1576]). 
4 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Govern-
ment, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa & Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
5 On these terms, building on Foucault, see Julie E. Cohen, “Cyberspace as/and Space,” Columbia Law 
Review 107 (2007): 213.
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2 from computer crime to cybercrime
In the “old” days one could speak of “computer crime,” conveniently discrim-
inating between criminal offenses against computers (hacking), offenses with 
computers (a distributed denial of service attack ddos), or offenses whereby 
computers played an incidental role (for instance, storing the evidence).6 The 
exponential growth of the Internet, the world wide web, search engines, on-
line gaming and social networking sites and a host of applications for mobile 
devices have resulted in the integration of offline and online life worlds, cre-
ating a continuity of cyberspaces that interconnect, transform and redirect 
spaces, events and time lines. This has not only changed our sense of place 
and duration, it has also altered the unity of time, place and action that in-
formed the notion of actus reus in the criminal law. Physical actions behind 
a computer screen can easily trigger devastating consequences in other time 
zones, on other continents, stretching the scope of what qualifies as an ac-
tion. Understanding an action in terms of its effects, even if they occur at a 
distance from the original physical motion, is not a new thing. People can act 
through various types of instruments and even use other people to commit 
fraud, murder or criminal damage. In fact, this has led to the effects doctrine 
in the case of transnational crime: if criminal harm has been caused in the 
territory of a state, that state can punish the perpetrator even if she was out-
side the territory whence committing the crime. For a long time, however, 
the default has been that the criminal law applies only to those within the 
territory of the state; extraterritorial jurisdiction has been the exception. This 
is even more clearly the case for jurisdiction to enforce. In the famous Lotus 
case the Permanent Court of International Justice decided that extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction to prescribe is allowed in the case of an effect within the ter-
ritory or to a national of the state, whereas extraterritorial jurisdiction to en-
force is in principle not allowed, unless the other state agrees (by treaty or in 
the course of judicial or police cooperation).7 This prohibition is challenged 
by the emergent transnational cyberspace to the extent that the investiga-
tion of crimes committed with or against computing systems cannot restrict 
6 Patricia L Bellia, “Chasing Bits Across Borders,” University of Chicago Legal Forum 35 (2001): 37–8, n 
11.
7 SS Lotus (France v Turkey Case) (1927) PCIJ (Ser A) No 10.
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itself to “local” computing systems. The gradual shift towards cloud comput-
ing amplifies this challenge.8
Meanwhile, the distinction between crimes with or against computers 
seems to miss the point, since the most salient factor in cybercrime is not a 
stand-alone computer but a networked computing system that is intercon-
nected with other computing systems, rfid-tagged commodities,9 human im-
plants, smart mobile devices, and smart homes. Attacks against these systems 
proliferate, vulnerabilities abound, malware is refined, reinvented, copied, 
and commodified and the number, the effects and the gravity of cybercrime 
offenses increase by the minute. The combination of simultaneity, speed and 
automation of machine-to-machine communication in cyberspace produces 
the famous “network effect” that constitutes potentially critical threats to 
identity management systems (idms), personal data, trade secrets and public 
infrastructure.10 One of the major software security companies, Symantec, re-
ported more than 403 million unique variants of malware over 2011; world-
wide around 1.1 million identities were exposed per data breach, amount-
ing to a total of 232.4 million breaches. Vulnerabilities in mobile computers 
(smartphones) increased by 42% in 2011, while in toto 4,989 new vulner-
abilities were detected. Rustock, the largest botnet of 2010 had well over 1 
million bots under its control, it was shut down in 2011 causing spam rates 
to plummet (from 88.5% of all email in 2010 to 75,1% in 2011). In 2010, in 
an underground economy advertisement 10.000 bots were promoted for $15 
(often used for ddos attacks), whereas the price range for a stolen credit card 
number was between $0.07 and $100.11 Most, if not all of the attacks summed 
up, can be made from outside the territory of the targeted state and even if an 
8 In that respect the jurisdictional vacuum of cyberspace may add up to that of the high seas, cf. Ste-
ven R. Swanson, “Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and International Law,” Connecticut 
Law Review 43 (2009): 709.
9 “rfid tags are intelligent bar codes that can talk to a networked system to track every product that 
you put in your shopping cart. […] rfid tags, a technology once limited to tracking cattle, are track-
ing consumer products worldwide. Many manufacturers use the tags to track the location of each 
product they make from the time it’s made until it’s pulled off the shelf and tossed in a shopping 
cart. Outside the realm of retail merchandise, rfid tags are tracking vehicles, airline passengers, 
Alzheimer’s patients and pets.” http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/high-tech-gadgets/
rfid.htm.
10 E.g., on the “network effect” for cybersecurity issues, Konstantin Beznosov and Olga Beznosova, 
“On the Imbalance of the Security Problem Space and Its Expected Consequences,” Information 
Management & Computer Security 15 (2007): 429. On network effects and its relevance for law, see 
e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg et al, “Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Applica-
tion to the “Patent Explosion,”” Berkeley Tech Law Journal 21 (2006): 1294.
11 Symantec Enterprise Security, Internet Security Threat Report 16 “Trends for 2012” (2011); Symantec 
Enterprise Security, Internet Security Threat Report 17 “2011 Trends” (2012); http://www.symantec.
com/threatreport/.
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attack is initiated within the same state there is a high probability that com-
puting systems outside that state will be somehow involved, for instance but 
not only in the case of cloud computing. Instead of speaking of “computer” 
crime it makes sense to use the term “cybercrime,” highlighting the fact that 
many of the relevant crimes take place in the realm of interconnected com-
puting systems and are somehow related to both cyberspace and cybernet-
ics.12 To understand the challenges to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the age 
of interconnected digital infrastructures, we need to at least briefly explore 
the notions of cyberspace and cybernetics. 
2.1 Cyberspace
The term cyperspace was coined by science fiction author William Gibson in 
1984, in his novel Neuromancer. He describes it as:
[a] consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate 
operators, in every nation , by children being taught mathematical con-
cepts. […] A graphical representation of data abstracted from the banks of 
every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of 
light ranged in the non-space of the mind, clusters and constellations of 
data.13
We should note that Gibson coined the term before anything like what we 
now call cyberspace existed. In fact, the Internet, the interconnection be-
tween different computing systems on the basis of the tcp/ip protocol, was 
still under construction when he published his novel. The world wide web 
originated even later, in the early 1990s, on the basis of the http and html pro-
tocols that enable hyperlinking, thus creating what is often called a “virtual 
space” in which humans and machines from anywhere can communicate, 
exchange information and present themselves anytime anywhere to anyone. 
The unprecedented collapse of geographical and temporal distance that was 
12 In principle, the present chapter restricts itself to criminal jurisdiction to enforce, though we 
must admit that the distinction between crime and war will require hard work in cyberspace. 
On espionage and foreign intelligence see e.g., David E. Sanger, “Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberat-
tacks Against Iran” The New York Times (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/
middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html (accessed Feb. 2, 2016). On cy-
berterrorism Kelly Gable, “Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism 
and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent” (2009), SSRN Working Paper Series, http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1452803.
13 William Gibson, Neuromancer (New York: Ace, 1984), 51.
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generated by the Internet and Web created the euphoria of cyber-utopianism 
and cyber-exceptionalism. The idea was that cyberspace allowed for a new 
type of direct democracy, outside the reach of territorial governments or 
commercial enterprise. In 1996 John Perry Barlow published his “cyberspace 
manifesto,”14 claiming that cyberspace was inherently unregulable — that 
its technological foundations resisted territorial boundaries, thus disabling 
law enforcement based on a physical monopoly of violence. In the wake of 
such optimism Castells announced the demise of the nation state, still based 
on mutually exclusive jurisdictions, suggesting that territorial states are like 
dinosaurs in the evolving network society.15 Legal scholarship developed 
along similar lines: also in 1996 Johnson and Post wrote their famous “Law 
and Borders — The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,” arguing that Cyberspace is a 
distinct, separate space where geographical borders and territorial jurisdic-
tion make no sense. They explain that cyberspace is not a physical space and 
therefor does not fall under the powers of sovereigns whose control is limited 
to whoever and whatever stays within their territory; they continue to point 
out that in cyberspace the assumption that the effects of any particular be-
havior is restricted by physical proximity does not hold. They suggest that 
such proximity informed the legitimacy of territorial government, notably 
because these physical constraints allow governments to give notice of a 
change in the law. They proclaim:
Because events on the Net occur everywhere but nowhere in particular, 
are engaged in by online personae who are both “real” (possessing repu-
tations, able to perform services, and deploy intellectual assets) and “in-
tangible” (not necessarily or traceably tied to any particular person in 
the physical sense), and concern “things” (messages, database, standing 
relationships) that are not necessarily separated from one another by 
any physical boundaries, no physical jurisdiction has a more compelling 
claim than any other to subject these events exclusively to its laws.16
14 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Davos, Switzerland, 1996), 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (accessed Feb. 2, 2016).
15 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1996); Jan Van 
Dijk, The Network Society: Social Aspects of New Media, 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2006).
16 David R. Johnson and David B. Post, “Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,” Stanford 
Law Review (1996): 1367.
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In “Cyberspace as/and space” Julie Cohen traced the various positions on 
what she calls the “cyberspace metaphor.”17 She discusses Johnson and Post’s 
cyber-exceptionalism, various types of traditionalism that view cyberspace 
as just another communications network, postmodernist cultural studies 
that claim to uncover undesirable political and ideological implications, and 
finally she considers the cognitive theory that proclaims the inevitability 
of place- and space-based metaphors as dictated by our cognitive make-up. 
Cohen, however, rejects the easy dichotomies between cyber- and physical 
space that inform much of the debate. She notes that:
To say that humans reason spatially is not to say that we are place-bound, 
or property-bound, but simply to say that we are embodied, situated be-
ings, who comprehend even disembodied communications through the 
filter of embodied, situated experience.18
Her point is that understanding cyberspace as either a separate space (often 
a utopia) or a regular part of physical space (an isotopia) are two easy ways 
out of a far more complex challenge. Referring to Foucault’s term “heterto-
pia” she denotes cyberspaces as real spaces in which ordinary rules of be-
haviour may be suspended or transformed as compared to ordinary spaces, 
thus highlighting the relation between cyber- and ordinary spaces as well as 
“the embodied spatiality of cyberspace users, who are situated in both spaces 
at once.”19 She concludes that utopian theories of cyberspace as an entirely 
separated space fail not because of their unregulability but because of the 
untenable presumption of experiental separateness. Thereby she goes one 
radical step further than Lessig and Reidenberg, who demonstrated that the 
unregulability of cyberspace was “neither a permanent nor a technologically 
necessary feature.”20 In opting for a heterotopian conception of cyberspace 
Cohen acknowledges both the “malleability of cyberspace” and the fact that 
such malleability can be made to serve the economic and political goals of 
businesses as well as governments.21 In foregrounding the embodied spatial-
17 Cohen, “Cyberspace as/and Space,” 210.
18 Ibid., 213.
19 Ibid., 214–5, referring to Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” Diacritics 16 (1986): 22; Kevin Hether-
rington, The Badlands of Modernity: Heteropia and Social Ordering (London: Routledge, 1997), 20–38.
20 Ibid., 217, referring to Lawrences Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic, 1999); 
Joel R. Reidenberg, “Lex Informatica: The Formulations of Information Policy Rules through Tech-




ity of cyberspace users she can moreover come to terms with the fact that 
cyberspace is not a unitary phenomenon but a rich variety of entanglements 
between virtual and physical spaces that are real to the extent that they gen-
erate real consequences. Cybercrime, from this point of view, is a unitary 
concept for a diversity of criminal offenses that play out on the nexus of 
the Internet, the Web and a plethora of applications that generate real con-
sequences for legal subjects across a multiplicity of national jurisdictions. 
Geography and territory seem to loose their hold on the effects of malicious 
attacks due to the unprecedented possibilities for the invisible remote con-
trol of computing systems.
2.2 Cybernetics
This explains the relevance of the notion of “cybernetics,” which derives 
from the same Greek root as governing, both meaning “to steer, rule, guide.”22 
Cybernetics refers to the study of control at a distance, coined as such by 
Norbert Wiener in 1948.23 It concerns the use of technologies to affect the 
behaviors of remote systems and is closely related with the development 
of artificial intelligence. It is important to observe that cyberspaces — situ-
ated at the nexus of online and offline life-worlds — are built on a compu-
tational layer that produces sophisticated artificial intelligence for business 
enterprises and governmental agencies. In both cases algorithms are used to 
mine so-called “big data” to predict consumer or criminal behaviors, aiming 
to pre-empt human intention on the basis of profiling technologies such as 
machine learning, artificial neural networks and the more.24 Cyberspace is 
not merely a “place” where registration is becoming paramount, pervasive 
and highly profitable. Increasingly it is becoming a space rooted in a layer of 
automated decision-making systems. These computational layers enable and 
inform all kinds of remote control, which are not only used to create added 
22 Online Etymology Dictionary, sub verbo “cybernetics,” http://www.etymonline.com/index.
php?term=cybernetics.
23 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 1965). For an interesting overview of cybernetics and artificial intel-
ligence, see N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, 
and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
24 Andrew McStay, The Mood of Information: A Critique of Online Behavioural Advertising (New York: 
Continuum, 2011), 3. McStay indicates how proactive computing allows for the pre-empt of users” 
intention by always remaining one step ahead of them on the bases of machine learning tech-
niques. For a critiques of such predictive analytics in the sphere of the criminal law see Bernard E. 
Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 2007).
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value for the industry or to uncover criminal networks; they also underpin 
malicious attacks against both individual netizens and private and public 
organizations. The increasing usage of tracking technologies to enable data 
analytics produces a host of novel vulnerabilities that enable misuse, abuse 
and attacks against individuals, systems, and infrastructure. The fact that the 
Internet facilitates remote control across national borders at low costs basi-
cally means that the fundamental assumptions of territorial criminal juris-
diction will increasingly fail to accurately describe what is at stake. This pre-
sents an intriguing challenge to the territorial basis of internal and external 
sovereignty as we know it.
3. sovereignty and the makings of territorial jurisdiction
At this point I want to remind us that the interplay of internal and exter-
nal sovereignty that defines the modern state is not only constitutive for the 
power to enact, to enforce and to speak the law within a specific territory. It is 
also a condition of possibility for the protection of human rights and for the 
internal division of sovereignty that defines the Rule of Law. Such protection 
depends on the monopoly of violence within a specific jurisdiction, that ena-
bles to enforce the law as determined by the courts. Though Montesquieu is 
rightly applauded for having argued for the internal division of sovereignty,25 
it is imperative that we acknowledge that without such sovereignty there is 
nothing to divide. Without some form of sovereignty as we know it, there is 
no actor that can be addressed as the subject of negative and positive obli-
gations that constitute human rights law. If territory loses its defining role 
in constituting jurisdiction we cannot take for granted that such historical 
artifacts as human rights and the Rule of Law will be sustainable. We should 
admit that even the enforcement of international human rights law depends 
on national courts and national enforcement.26 To come to terms with the 
consequences of a post-territorial spatiality we need to inquire into the spe-
cific “makings” of jurisdiction in the era of territory. To this end I will investi-
25 See for an unconventional but convincing interpretation of his maxim on the judge as “bouche de 
la loi,” K. M. Schoenfeld, “Rex, Lex et Judex: Montesquieu and La bouche de la loi Revisted,” European 
Constitutional Law Review 4 (2008): 274.
26 This is why the study of International Relations cannot assume the balance of power that inheres 
in the Rule of Law, often taking refuge in a social scientific — often coined “realist” — understand-
ing of international law. A refreshing alternative can be found in Claude Lefort, Writing: The Politi-
cal Test, trans. David Ames Curtis (Duke University Press Books, 2000).
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gate the rise of territorial jurisdiction and its relation to modern cartography, 
followed by an analysis of terror, territory and occupation as the foundations 
of modern sovereignty.
3.1 The Territorial Spatiality of Modern Jurisdiction
“Jurisdiction” is a term first encountered in the early fourteenth century, 
initially referring to the administration of justice and soon meaning “ex-
tent or range of administrative power.” The term “territory” first appeared 
in the early fifteenth century, then meaning “land under the jurisdiction of 
a town, state, etc.”27 Thus “jurisdiction” is the older term and “territory” was 
initially defined in terms of jurisdiction. This suggests that jurisdiction need 
not be based on territorial rule and that the concepts of sovereignty and of 
territory, defining characteristics of jurisdiction, emerged simultaneously in 
modern history. In “Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction),” Richard Ford 
develops two theses on the history and scope of territorial jurisdiction.28 One 
thesis is that territorial jurisdictions, “the rigidly mapped territories within 
which formally defined legal powers are exercised by formally organized 
governmental institutions,”29 are a recent invention, even though we tend 
to take them for granted and have problems imagining jurisdiction that is 
not defined by territory. The second thesis is that territorial jurisdiction is 
an affordance of modern cartography,30 in the sense that it could not have 
developed without the modern, scientific demarcation of distinct territories 
that depends on cartography as its enabling technology.31 This observation is 
of great import for our investigation, because, if correct it raises the question 
of whether cyberspace will overrule the specific production of space that is 
inherent in cartographic mappings and its affordances in terms of territorial 
jurisdiction. Ford highlights four prototypical characteristics of modern, ter-
27 Online Etymology Dictionary, sub verbo “jurisdiction,” and sub verbo “territory.”
28 Richard T. Ford, “A History of Jurisdiction,” Michigan Law Review 97 (1999): 843.
29 Ibid.
30 On the role of cartography in the formation of the modern state, see also: Michael Biggs, “Putting 
the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and European State Formation,” Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 41 (1999): 374; Mark Neocleous, “Off the Map On Violence and Cartography,” 
European Journal of Social Theory 6 (2003): 409.
31 The concept of an affordance was coined by psychologist Gibson. See James G. Greeno, “Gibson’s 
Affordances,” Psychological Review 101 (1994): 338: “The term affordance refers to whatever it is 
about the environment that contributes to the kind of interaction that occurs.” It thus indicates 
what a specific technology makes possible for a specific organism or type of person, entailing a 
non-deterministic and relational understanding of both technology and the human subject. This 
implies that technologies have normative implications, see Mireille Hildebrandt, “Legal and Tech-
nological Normativity: More (and Less) Than Twin Sisters,” Techné 12, no. 3 (2008): 169.
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ritorial jurisdiction: first, he confirms that if jurisdiction is territorially de-
fined, this means that authority is to be exercised primarily by area, instead 
of status or family, second, he notes that territorial jurisdiction is definitely 
bounded, while these boundaries are not ambiguous or contested (except in 
times of crisis or transition), third, he notes that territory is abstractly and 
homogeneously conceived, meaning that jurisdiction refers to an abstract 
space in the sense that the authority does not depend on the concrete char-
acteristics of the territory it concerns. Ford points out that such abstract and 
homogeneous mapping implies authority over an empty space, defined by 
latitude and longitude, not by its contingent contents. As a result such map-
ping “eliminates the need for the specific enumeration and classification” of whatev-
er resides in the territory, at least for the constitution of authority.32 A related 
implication is that actual social relations and distribution of resources are 
invisible from the perspective of the abstract map; the abstraction of mod-
ern jurisdiction presents social and political relationships as impersonal. 
One could sum this up as the proposition that modern jurisdictional space 
is conceptually empty: it “reduces space to an empty vessel for government 
power.”33 His fourth point is that cartographic mapping produces a “‘gapless’ 
map of contiguous political territories,”34 thus grounding the Westphalian 
system of mutually exclusive territorial jurisdictions. Ford goes on to explain 
that territorial jurisdictions are inherently synthetic (artificial) to the extent 
that they do not depend on an organically grown Gemeinschaft ; they stipu-
late whoever falls within the scope of their jurisdiction irrespective of social 
status or family relationship. Thereby the individual becomes the primary 
agent, instead of the religious, ethnic or other group she may belong to. This 
allows governments to base their rule on a strange combination of artificial 
administrative units and an appeal to the loyalties of a “thicker” community, 
which is not given requires construction work. In short, Ford’s history of 
modern jurisdiction demonstrates that: “The abstract space created by mod-
32 Ford, “A History of Jurisdiction,” 854.
33 Ibid., 854. The notion of mutually exclusive territorial jurisdictions as the enabling metaphor for 
the Westphalian system describes a way of looking at jurisdiction. It creates the institutional fact 
of internal and external sovereignty. Compare Friedrich Kratochwil, Of Maps, Law, and Politics: 
An Inquiry into the Changing Meaning of Territoriality, Danish Institute for International Studies 
Working Paper (2011). Kratochwil notes the fuzzy reality and the many counterveiling claims 
made against the unitary and monopolistic tendencies of the Westphalian system, already from 
its inception.
34 Ford, “A History of Jurisdiction,” 854.
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ern cartography, what we will call territorial jurisdiction, was the midwife of 
the administrative state.”35
3.2 Terror and Modern Sovereignty 
In The Ethos of Pluralization, Connolly discusses the notion of territory in a 
way that seems remarkably relevant for our purpose. The following passage 
is worth quoting at length:
Territory, the Oxford English Dictionary says, is presumed by most moderns 
to derive from terra. Terra means land, earth, soil, nourishment, suste-
nance; it conveys the sense of a sustaining medium that fades off into 
indefiniteness. People, you might say, feel the claim the land they belong 
to makes upon them. This experience of belonging to a place, as long as it 
does not exclude other identifications, and as long as it incorporates the 
disruptive experiences of earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, and firestorms 
into the experience itself (this essay is being written during a year in 
California), can play a positive role in the cultivation of care and critical 
responsiveness. But the form of the word territory, the oed says, suggests 
something different from the sustenance of terra. Territory derives from 
terrere, meaning to frighten, to terrorize, to exclude. And territorium is “a 
place from which people are warned.” Territorium seems to repress the 
sustaining relation to land that it presupposes. Perhaps a modern terri-
tory, then, is land organized and bounded by technical juridical, and mili-
tary means. Perhaps the experience of land as sustenance is both presup-
posed and repressed by the modern organization of territory. To occupy 
territory, then, is both to receive sustenance and to exercise violence. To 
become territorialized is to be occupied by a particular identity.36
We could summarize Connolly as proposing that “territory is sustaining land 
occupied and bounded by violence.”37 I would like to suggest that this links 
territorial jurisdiction to the monopoly of violence, and claim that the ter-
ritorial monopoly of violence is the foundation of the modern state. It pro-
vides a “gapless” map of mutually exclusive sovereign entities that defines 
35 Ibid., 870.
36 William E. Connolly, “Introduction,” The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Min-
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and determines their internal and external sovereignty since the peace of 
Westphalen. This “gapless” map also underlies Bodin’s triple definition of ab-
solute power that still informs our understanding of sovereignty, even when 
we confront its limits.38 The impact of Bodin’s On Sovereignty (1576) warrants 
a brief discussion here, linking notions of territory with those of occupation 
and a-legality.
As Goyard-Fabre has argued, Bodin should not be understood as an advo-
cate of corrupt absolutism.39 His main concern was the protection of the res 
publica, which he thought could only be safeguarded if the sovereign cannot 
be corrupted by other powers within his realm. The sovereign should not 
be seen as the most powerful person, but as the highest office, tasked with 
the safety and the well being of his subjects. Bodin articulated three constitu-
tive conditions for such sovereignty: the puissance publique de commandement, 
the continuité de la puissance publique, and the puissance absolue. The first marks 
the transition from “suzerainty” — feudal lordship based on a complex 
asymmetrical reciprocity — to sovereignty. The public power to command 
implies a unilateral public competence to enact laws that bind the subjects; 
the validity of the law does not depend on the consent of those to whom it 
applies. This entails a transition from jurisdiction that is mainly based on 
adjudication to one firmly grounded in legislation.40 The second marks the 
transition from rule by man to rule by law, from the military or economic 
power of a person to the institutional authority of an abstract sovereign. The 
continuity of the public power is thereby constituted, generating a type of le-
gal certainty that transcends the arbitrary power of the king as a person. This 
conforms the position taken by Kantorowicz in his The King’s Two Bodies that 
explain sovereignty as an abstract institution that is capable of surviving the 
death of whoever happens to fulfil the role of the king.41 The fact that sover-
eign power does not depend on the person of the king, nor on the contingent 
consent of his subjects is seen here as a protection against arbitrary rule and 
as a particular type of legal certainty that is not available in the negotiations 
that nourish feudal suzereignty. Finally, the third condition marks the transi-
38 Bodin, Bodin: On Sovereignty, Book 1, Ch. 10 (“On the True Marks”).
39 Simone Goyard-Fabre, Jean Bodin et le droit de la République (Paris: puf, 1989).
40 On the shift from adjudication to legislation as the core of jurisdiction, see Harold Berman, Law 
and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), e.g., at 404–5.
41 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957).
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tion from a system of interdependent lords and overlords that requires per-
manent military and economic struggle, to a centralized hierarchical distri-
bution of authority that guarantees the independence of the sovereign from 
his subjects and towards his fellow sovereigns. Absolute power defines the 
independence of the sovereign, but for Bodin it did not imply that the sover-
eign can rule according to “le bon plaisir du prince.” He is still bound by “les 
lois divines et naturelles; les lois fundamentales du royaume et le respect du 
droit de propriété.”42 This entails that the sovereign has absolute power but is 
still bound by laws; for Bodin this tension within his concept of sovereignty 
was not a problem. The king had to give an account of his actions to God, 
which was a much more powerful constraint than the contingent opinion 
of his subjects. 
It seems that the role of territory in jurisdiction emerged from the simul-
taneous appearance of a particular technology — and the birth of the abstract 
sovereign state, based on an effective territorial monopoly of violence. As re-
counted above, Connolly proposes that “territory is sustaining land occupied 
and bounded by violence.”43 To the extent that jurisdiction is territorial the 
making of jurisdiction would be a matter of occupation: the taking of land 
is part of establishing sovereign jurisdiction. Occupation in this particular 
case must be understood as the process of terrorizing both the inhabitants 
(internal sovereignty) and the rulers of other lands (external sovereignty). 
“Terrorizing” then has the double meaning of ruling by means of the threat 
of terror and protecting those within the territory against threats of terror by 
their fellows (criminal law) or by the rulers of other lands (law of war). Ter-
ror refers then to the monopolies of violence that prevail within mutually 
exclusive territories. 
3.3 Occupation and Modern Sovereignty
In his Political Theology Carl Schmitt argues that “sovereign is he who decides 
on the exception.”44 He finds that “the precondition as well as the content of 
jurisdictional competence in such a case [of extreme emergency, mh] must 
necessarily be unlimited.”45 Schmitt refers to Bodin’s understanding of sov-
ereignty as indivisible, thus — according to Schmitt — finally settling the 
42 Goyard-Fabre, Jean Bodin, 162–3.
43 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, xxii.
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question of power in the state. This relates to Bodin’s answer to the question 
of whether the sovereign is bound by natural or divine laws in a case of emer-
gency.46 Bodin finds that in cases of urgent necessity the sovereign must take 
the law in his own hands instead of becoming dependent upon whatever 
other powers within the state think. In the end, sovereignty resides in the au-
thority to suspend valid law. Such authority is deemed even more fundamental 
than and preconditional for the authority to command new laws. The decision 
on the exception is in fact an occupatio that reduces the territory to a res nullius 
that is “taken” by the sovereign on the basis of his factual dominion. Schmitt 
explains the emergence of a new political order at the end of the middle ages, 
created by the constitution of the territorial state:
First, it created clear internal jurisdictions by placing feudal, territorial, 
estate, and church rights under the centralized legislation, administra-
tion, and judiciary of a territorial ruler. Second it ended the European civ-
il war of churches and religious parties, and thereby neutralized creedal 
conflicts within the state through a centralized political unity. […] Third, 
on the basis of the internal political unity the state vis-à-vis other po-
litical unities, it constituted within and of itself a closed area with fixed 
borders, allowing a specific type of foreign relations with other similarly 
organized territorial orders.47
This new territorial legal order derives from the initial a-legal occupation that 
precedes the institution of legality. In his discussion of nomos (Greek for law) 
Schmitt reminds the reader of its first meaning, that he claims to be “to take” 
or “to appropriate,” whereas the second would be “to divide or distribute’: “the 
division and distribution, i.e., the suum cuique, presuppose the appropriation 
of what is to be distributed, i.e., and occupatio or appropriatio primaeva.”48 To 
give, to enact the law, the competence to make jurisdiction must first be oc-
cupied, conquered and according to Schmitt even Kant admitted that acquisi-
tion of land precedes the rule by law.49 By implication such occupation must 
be a-legal, since it precedes as well as constitutes a legal order.50
46 Ibid., 8, referring to Bodin, Bodin: On Sovereignty, Book 1, Ch. 10 (“On the True Marks”).
47 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York: 
Telos Press, 2006), 128–9.
48 Ibid., 326, n 6.
49 Ibid., 328.
50 On a-legality see Lindahl, “A-Legality”; Dubber, “Common Civility.”
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4. extraterritorial jurisction in the light of grotius’s mare liberum
At some point during his discussions on the primacy of occupatio, Schmitt ar-
rives at “the distinction between the surfaces of firm land and free sea, which 
was important for the distinction between land war and sea war. Each had 
its own concepts of enemy, war, and plunder.”51 This refers to the different 
jurisdiction that applies to the “free sea” as compared to that of the “occupied 
territories.” Schmitt explains that the legal regime that rules the mare liberum 
has major consequences for the relationships between territorial states that 
meet outside their territories on the high seas; the abstract cartographic or-
der that determines sovereignty in the spatial order of firm land is absent at 
sea. Noting Julie Cohen’s depiction of cyberspace as/and space, it may be of 
interest to look more closely into the non-territorial jurisdiction of the high 
sea. Julie Cohen proposed that “[t]o understand cyberspace’s spatiality, one 
must disentangle the concept of experienced spatiality from abstract, con-
ceptual models of ‘space,’ and also from the related but distinct concepts of 
place and property.”52 In this section I will tease out the manner in which 
the humanist legal scholar Grotius disentangled the spatiality of the high 
seas from the concepts of place and property. He advocated that the sea, as a 
res communis, is distinct from both private and public property. Basically he 
claimed that the sea may be a res nullius, but not one that — due to its expe-
riental unruliness — lends itself to any kind of occupation. Grotius depicted 
the high seas as a passage instead of a place and a common good instead of a 
private or public property.
In his Mare Liberum (1608) Grotius contested the monopolist claims of 
Spain and Portugal on parts of the high seas,53 which they aimed to appropri-
ate as part of their trade route to South and South-East Asia. Grotius, who was 
asked to defend free trade on the high seas in order to safeguard the interests 
of the Dutch Republic, argued that the high seas cannot be appropriated. 
While land was occupied, divided and distributed, the sea remained open to 
all. Whereas lands turned into territory, the sea remained outside the grasp 
of territorial sovereignty. It was considered as part of a different spatiality, 
not portioned into mutually exclusive jurisdictions but left to the rights and 
51 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, 184.
52 Cohen, “Cyberspace as/and Space,” 227.
53 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, ed. & trans. Ralph Van Deman Magoffin (New York: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Oxford University Press, 1960 [1688]).
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obligations of Grotius’s natural law, the same natural law that obligated peo-
ple before they concluded the social contract that constituted their territorial 
sovereign.54 Remaining outside the realm of sovereignty his law of the sea 
must also be distinguished from his other radical invention: the laws of war 
that constitute the rules for a ius ad bellum (the rules for determining what 
makes for a just cause) and the ius in bello (the rules for the conduct of warring 
states irrespective of whether their cause is just or not). 
4.1 Mare Liberum as an Economic Theology 
In the introductory note to the English translation of Mare Liberum Brown 
Scott refers to “the famous Latin tractate of Grotius” as “proclaiming, explain-
ing, and in no small measure making the ‘freedom of the seas.’”55 This high-
lights the constructive as well as performative nature of jurisdiction at sea. 
According to Johannes Thumfart, Grotius uses the text to put forward his 
“normative ideals of global free trade, including those of equality, reciprocity 
and private responsibility,” thus for instance influencing the founding father 
of the invisible hand of political economy, Adam Smith.56 Thumfart detects a 
theological undercurrent in Grotius’s treatise, which he shares with and took 
from the Spanish Dominican Francisco de Vitoria who defended free trade as 
an implication of the Christian mission. Thumfart suggests that both assume 
“a historico-teleological tendency inherent in global free trade, such that the 
purpose of free trade is to unite the world in peace.”57 He finds that this escha-
tological understanding of global free trade fits what Agamben has called an 
“economic theology” and, mutatis mutandis, Schmitt’s “political theology.”58 
It entails that theological notions such as salvation are transformed so as to 
survive in the secular era, while still producing a series of expectations and 
legitimizations that derive from their discarded theological roots. In the case 
of the freedom of the seas this eschatological notion of salviation by means 
of global free trade provided the legitimacy for the Dutch trading company, 
the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, “to secure its trading expeditions 
54 Natural law is an essentially contested concept that might mean anything to anyone. For a view 
on Grotius’s engagement with natural law see Jon Miller, “Hugo Grotius,” in The Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/ 
grotius/ (accessed Feb. 2, 2016).
55 James Brown Scott, “Introductory Note,” in Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, v.
56 Johannes Thumfart, “On Grotius’s Mare Liberum and Vitoria’s De Indis, Following Agamben and 
Schmitt,” Grotiana 30 (2009): 68.
57 Ibid., 69.
58 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory; Schmitt, Political Theology.
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by military means, which also included preemptive strikes.”59 We may notice 
that, in the struggle for a free Internet, various stakeholders come up with 
very similar arguments, based on the idea that a free Internet will automati-
cally bring salvation for oppressed people outside the West.60 We will return 
to this point later. For now, it seems interesting to trace Grotius’s argument 
for the freedom of the sea, since it legitimizes what he coined a bellum ius-
tum privatum, paraphrasing what the voc had coined “coophandel met force” 
(trade supported by the force of arms).61 If cyberspace, like the high seas, is 
structured as a spatiality different from that of the territorial state, some of 
Grotius’s arguments may be relevant for the extraterritorial jurisdiction to 
enforce in cyberspace.
4.2 Mare Liberum as Natural Law Theory
Apart from “making” the freedom of the seas, Grotius was one of the found-
ing fathers of natural law theory, opening his tractate with a dedication that 
posits a fundamental difference between things that are to be enjoyed in 
common with all men and things that belong distinctly and exclusively to 
one individual. This difference is based on the nature of things as created by 
God and inscribed in the minds of men, ruling out that this could be a matter 
of convention or opinion. In the first chapter, Grotius claims that:
[E]very nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it. 
[…] So by the decree of divine justice it was brought about that one people 
should supply the needs of another, in order, as Pliny the Roman writer 
says, that in this way, whatever has been produced anywhere should 
seem to have been destined for all. 62
From this Grotius concludes that trading routes — especially those over 
seas — should be free for all to use. In the fifth chapter Grotius argues that 
sovereign nations cannot gain property or sovereignty over parts of the high 
59 Thumfart, “On Grotius’s Mare Liberum,” 70.
60 Compare Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: PublicAf-
fairs, 2011); Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Milton Mueller, “The New Cyber-Conservatism: Gold-
smith/Wu and the Premature Triumphalism of the Territorial Nation-State: A Review of Gold-
smith and Wu’s “Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World,” Internet Governance 
Project (2006). http://internetgovernance.org/pdf/MM-goldsmithWu.pdf (accessed Feb. 2, 2016).
61 Thumfart, “On Grotius’s Mare Liberum,” 76.
62 Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, 7, Ch. 8.
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sea by means of occupation. He explains that the sea is often framed as hav-
ing the legal status of a res nullius, a res communis, or a res publica. His point is, 
however, that the high seas fall within the scope of natural law and he claims 
that nature of itself knows no exclusive rights such as sovereignty or private 
property. The emergence of private property originates in an act of occupa-
tion, mostly of things formerly held in common. On the one hand, this act of 
occupation was initiated by individuals, resulting in private property; on the 
other hand, states began to occupy certain territories that resulted in public 
property. He concludes that all property has arisen from occupation and that 
non-rivalrous goods cannot and should not be occupied, since nature has 
clearly meant to exclude exclusive rights to such goods.63 He refers to sun, air 
and, waves as incapable of becoming private property and calls them public 
gifts. This means that the seas are “common” to all men, first because they can-
not be occupied and second because they have been marked out for common 
use. He continues to argue that whatever cannot become individual private 
property also cannot become the public property of a state, since this would 
exclude parts of what he calls the human race from enjoying the common 
use of these goods. It seems that Grotius hidden assumption is that the experi-
ental spatiality of land — though originally used as a common good — lends 
itself to occupation, division and distribution as private or public property, 
whereas the experiental spatiality of the outer sea does not lend itself to such 
compartmentalization. This claim was countered in 1652 by John Selden in 
his Mare Clausum,64 who advocated the British claims to jurisdiction over the 
high seas surrounding the isles. Let’s note that Grotius views the spatiality of 
the outer sea as a passage, a route to conduct trade and to travel between dif-
ferent nations. He argues that “even over land which had been converted into 
private property either by states or individuals, unarmed and innocent pas-
sage is not justly to be denied to persons of any country, exactly as the right to 
drink from a river is not to be denied.”65 Grotius thus claims that even territo-
rialized lands retain the spatiality of a passage. The difference with the high 
63 Ibid., 27. Grotius often mingles “is” and “ought,” one of analytical philosophy’s mortal sins. If the 
sea cannot be appropriated, it makes no sense to discuss whether it should be so. If it should not 
be appropriated we assume that it can be so. There is logic in this, but perhaps reality is more fuzzy 
and more complex. In some ways you probably could not occupy the seas at that point in time, in 
other ways you could (the Spanish and the Portuguese did, in their way). In that sense “can” and 
“should” are interdependent when “making” an institutional fact like jurisdiction.
64 John Selden and Marchamont Nedham, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea, reprint of the first 
edition in English. (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 2004).
65 Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, 43–4.
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seas seems to be that its spatiality is exhausted by the metaphor of the pas-
sage, as — according to Grotius — they are not conducive to occupation and 
distribution. His freedom of the sea is grounded in the sea as an in-between, 
a connection, a passage from one nation to another, the precondition for the 
global free trade that will achieve global peace and well-being according to 
economic theology of the laws of nature. The fact that Grotius’s vision won 
out over Selden’s attempted refutation was not obvious; it is a prime example 
of the “making” of a special type of jurisdiction that seems to defy the logic of 
occupation. Attempts to achieve some form of command over the commons 
of the high seas are not uncommon,66 and the distributed jurisdiction over 
the high seas that was consolidated in the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (unclos) cannot be taken for granted.67
What does this imply for extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce? For 
a start, let’s acknowledge that Grotius admits of no monopoly of violence 
on the high seas; the freedom of the seas signifies the absence of sovereign 
claims that exclude other nations. This implies that natural law applies; 
there is no social contract that stipulates the establishment of a human-made 
jurisdiction. For Grotius natural law rules in three types of situations: first, it 
rules the interactions of people that have not established a state on the basis 
of a social contract; second, it rules the interactions between states in times of 
war and peace; third, it rules the interactions of both state and private actors 
on the high seas. Grotius’s natural law starts from the notion of individual 
rights, that derive from the need for self-preservation and the need for soci-
ety. Before the social contract is concluded these individual rights pertain to 
individual persons, after the social contract these rights are also attributed 
to sovereign states, while the subjects of the state will lose some of their 
rights and will be attributed rights on the basis of sovereign legislation. Mare 
Liberum argues that at sea both sovereign states and private parties under the 
flag of a sovereign state have the natural right to defend themselves and the 
duty to respect the communal character of the sea as a route for free trade. 
Pirates can be caught and punished by all parties since they “beset and infest 
66 Craig H. Allen, “Command of the Commons Boasts: An Invitation to Lawfare?,” in Global Legal 
Challenges: Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications and Natural Disasters, ed. Michael D. 
Carsten (Newport, ri: Naval War College Press, 2007), 21.
67 See Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, 1833 unts 3, pt VII, arts 86–120 (entered 
into force November 16, 1994). For an interesting attempt to compose a clone of the Convention 
regarding the legal regime of cyberspace, see Raymond K. Joe, “Cyberspace and the Seas: Lessons 
to Be Learned,” Master Thesis, mit (Cambridge, ma: 1998), http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/han-
dle/1721.1/47725/42662346.pdf?sequence=1.
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our trade routes”;68 nations can agree to bring pirates under a specific juris-
diction when caught in this or that part of the sea, but such agreements have 
no binding force on those not party to the agreement.69 If a party attempts to 
monopolize a trade route by prohibiting passage, natural law allows others 
to take up arms:
If many writers, Augustine himself among them, believed it was right to 
take up arms because innocent passage was refused across foreign ter-
ritory, how much more justly will arms be taken up against those from 
whom the demand is made of the common and innocent use of the sea, 
which by the law of nature is common to all?70
In fact he suggests that whoever hinders free trade by obstructing the use of 
roads or the export of merchandise must be prevented from doing so “via facti 
even without waiting for any public authority.”71 This natural right against 
whatever hinders free trade constitutes a cause for a just war, even if it is a 
private party that retaliates. In that case Grotius speaks of a bellum iustum 
privatum — a private just war.
In what sense could cyberspace be equivalent with Grotius’s high seas? 
It may be interesting to compare the relationship between territorial sover-
eignty and the freedom of the sea, with the relationship between territorial 
jurisdiction and the often claimed unregulability of the Internet. Taking it 
from there, we can investigate how the notion of extraterritoriality depends 
on a particular spatial mapping that may not apply in the case of either Gro-
tius’s sea or our own cyberspace. 
5. cyberspace liberum?
Julie Cohen suggested that “[t]o understand cyberspace’s spatiality, one must 
disentangle the concept of experienced spatiality from abstract, conceptual 
68 Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, 10. See uncls, art. 100: “All States shall cooperate to the fullest 
possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the juris-
diction of any State.” For the definition of piracy see art. 101 uncls.
69 Ibid., 35. The uncls stipulates in art. 92(1) that ships “shall sail under the flag of one State only,” 
and subject to minor exceptions “shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.” 
Art. 97(3) stipulates exclusive penal jurisdiction to enforce for the flag State.
70 Ibid., 74. Note that the rhetorical strategy of quoting the Ancients was a canonical method to con-




models of “space,” and also from the related but distinct concepts of place 
and property.” Grotius, who lived on the verge of a new area, in which ab-
stract spatiality was the new kid on the block in the arts, politics and the 
law, reinvented the abstractions of natural law theory and developed a law 
of nations that matched an abstract spatial understanding of the surface of 
the earth.72 The exception he argued for jurisdiction at sea partly rests on the 
experiental unregulability of the high seas at that point in time. For another 
part the natural law that he proposes depends on an abstract conception of 
individual actors with individual rights; Grotius was indeed one of the first 
authors to develop the abstract notion of subjective rights that do not depend 
on privilege and exist as legal rights beyond moral entitlement.73
5.1 Experiental Unregulatity of Cyberspace?
In the first decade of its existence, cyberspace seems to have evoked an expe-
riental unregulability similar to Grotius’s high seas. Even the eschatological 
undertones detected in Grotius’s expectations of world peace based on free 
trade returned with the birth of cyberspace. In the preface to their Who Con-
trols the Internet?, Goldsmith and Wu cite the following passage:
The new technologies will bring “every individual […] into immediate 
and effortless communication with every other,” “practically obliterate” 
political geography, and make free trade universal. Thanks to technologi-
cal advance, “there [are] no longer any foreigners, “and we can look for-
ward to “the gradual adoption of a common language.”74
These words were, however, inspired by the telegraph, one century before the 
emergence of cyberspace. They resonate with numerous writings on the chal-
lenges posed to the rule of nation states in the last decade of the 20th century, 
reiterating the eschatological expectations unmasked by Schmitt’s notion 
of a political theology and Agamben’s economic theology. Some would say 
72 Earlier natural law theory developed within the realm of scholasticism, notably in Aquinas’s 
Summa Theologiae. At that point natural law theory was still a branch of moral philosophy that 
determined the validity of positive law. With Grotius natural law theory begins the process of 
disentanglement from theology.
73 William A. Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
17–22.
74 Goldsmith & Wu, Who Controls the Internet?, vii, quoting Julian Hawthorne, “June 1993,” The Cos-
mopolitan (Feb. 1893): 456–7, recounted and quoted in Carolyn Marvin, When Old Technologies Were 
New: Thinking About Electric Communications in the Late Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1988), 201–2.
195
extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce in cyberspace?
that eschatological expectations must be hardwired into our cognitive make-
up. Though the idea of a political theology referred to the notion of territo-
rial sovereignty as a road to salvation for a divided humanity, cyber-utopism 
seeks salvation in an undivided global cyberspace under the banner of Inter-
net Freedom. Goldsmith and Wu summarize the dreams of cyber-utopism 
as those of “self-governing cyber-communities that would escape geography 
forever.”75 But, in their history of the (partial) territorialization of cyberspace 
they argue that even if geography no longer rules, national states still man-
age to pulls the strings — or, rather, the wires. This has required hard work, 
by legislators and especially courts, in order to come to terms with the un-
precedented extraterritorial effects of action in cyberspace. They describe the 
Yahoo case,76 in which a French court decided that the us First Amendment 
does not have force of law in French jurisdiction. The case concerned the sale 
of Nazi paraphernalia on an Internet auction site that could be accessed in 
France, where the sale of Nazi relics is a criminal offense. Yahoo claimed that 
it could only comply with French law if it blocked access to the site for all its 
users — which would practically enforce French law in the us. Once it be-
came clear that it is technically possible to discriminate between users based 
on their geo-location, the court ordered the us-based provider Yahoo to block 
access to certain Web sites for French users. Reidenberg has described this 
decision under the heading of “the democratisation of the Internet,” arguing 
that it demonstrates respect for local, i.e., national, democratic constituen-
cies.77 This may be a relevant argument for territorial demarcations in the 
case of democracies, but as Goldsmith and Wu discuss at some length, such 
demarcations are also used by non-democratic states like China, to prevent 
their subjects from gaining unrestricted access to the global public sphere. 
Mueller goes even further, raising the difficult question of the relationship 
between human rights and democracy:
They [Goldsmith and Wu] criticize the global extension of the First 
Amendment and its implied universalism. But why not extend it globally? 
If you believe that individuals have rights that are over and above those of 
states, how does the fact that a (possibly temporary) majority happened to 
75 Goldschmidt & Wu, Who Controls the Internet?, vii.
76 Trib gr inst Paris, Ordonnance de refere du 20 nov. 2000, online: http://www.juriscom.net/txt/ju-
risfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.htm. Unofficial English translation at http://www.lapres.net/yahen11.
html (accessed Feb. 2, 2016).
77 Joel R. Reidenberg, “Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet,” Jurimetrics 42 (2001/2002): 261.
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seize political control in one territory for a few years alter the basis of the 
claim? And if you believe that it is illegitimate to apply the First Amend-
ment stand globally, why is it legitimate to apply Goldsmith and Wu’s 
amoral utilitarian standard? Some standard has to be applied.78
Mueller agrees that the cyber-utopism of early adapters of the Internet is not 
only naïve but dangerous, because it turns a blind eye to the sophisticated 
methods used by nation states to regain — remote — control over whatever 
affects their jurisdiction. However, he warns against what he calls the new 
cyber-conservatism that assumes that cyberspace does not pose critical threats 
to the system of nation states. Apart from this contestable assumption such 
cyber-conservatism often involves a normative position, claiming that only 
the combination of internal and external sovereignty of nation states can 
provide adequate solutions for the governance of cyberspace. Goldsmith 
and Wu justify this normative position by means of mainstream utilitarian 
arguments,79 even though they recognize the fact that oppressive govern-
ments can use the Internet to achieve an unparalleled granular control over 
their subjects. Mueller warns, however, that cyberspace does pose unique 
challenges, and at the same time generates novel opportunities to counter 
some of the drawbacks of the rule of mutually exclusive territorial monopo-
lies of force.80 He finds that intellectual property, cyber-security, content 
regulation, and the control of critical Internet resources (domain names and 
ip addresses that are the condition of possibility of any cyberspace) require 
transnational governance at a level and in a manner that cannot be provided 
by any nation state in itself for itself. 
5.2 Regaining Control: Indirect Extraterritorial Effect?
In 2001, before the us ratified the Cybercrime Convention (in 2007), Gold-
smith wrote a paper on the legitimacy of remote cross-border searches.81 He 
describes one of the first known cases of remote cross-border searches and 
seizures in the context of cyberspace. After tracing the source of malicious 
hackings into computing systems of banks, Internet service providers (isps) 
78 Mueller, “The New Cyber-Conservatism.”
79 E.g., Goldsmith & Wu, Who Controls the Internet?, 153.
80 Milton L. Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance (Cambridge, ma: mit 
Press, 2010).
81 Jack Goldsmith, “The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border Searches,” The Univer-
sity of Chicago Legal Forum (2001): 103.
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and other us firms to data servers in Russia, the fbi tried to gain Russian as-
sistance in monitoring and redressing the criminal activities. When the 
Russian authorities turned out to have other priorities the fbi “decided to 
act unilaterally.”82 They obtained a search warrant in the us, figured out the 
hackers” usernames and passwords via a keystroke “sniffer” and thus gained 
access to the servers in Russia, downloading the information necessary to 
charge them and to prevent further attacks. Goldsmith recalls that the “nor-
mal” way to proceed in the case of extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce is 
judicial or police cooperation, but he explains:
The problem is that such cooperation is often difficult. Sometimes the 
source-country government lacks legal authority to seize and freeze com-
puter information within its borders. Sometimes it lacks the technologi-
cal capacity. Sometimes the enforcement machinery in the source coun-
try will simply take too long, because evidence of the crime can quickly 
be destroyed or anonymized. And sometimes, as in the opening example, 
the source country government simply fails to cooperate.83
He notes that “for these and other reasons, officials in the target country 
might take matters into their own hands.”84 Goldsmith then refers to interna-
tional law, observing that many authors would find this a violation of the ter-
ritorial sovereignty of the source-country.85 His essay, however, is meant to ar-
gue that remote searches are indeed restricted by international principles of 
enforcement jurisdiction, but that such restrictions cannot be deduced from 
norms of territorialism. He adds that, though he does not see jurisdictional 
grounds to prohibit unilateral extraterritorial searches, there may be other 
grounds to restrict or prohibit these searches, notably potential violations of 
privacy or free speech rights. The main reason why Goldsmith contends that 
under certain conditions states are free to engage in remote searches is neces-
sity. He observes that the Cybercrime Convention prohibits unilateral exter-




85 Ibid. He refers to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 432, 
comment b (1987). Note that he does not refer to international law, but to the us restatement of its 
position on obligations under international law.
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fluence on crimes committed from safe-haven nations that do not ratify it.”86 
Necessity will require officials to take the law in their own hands, and — for 
Goldsmith — this evokes another necessity: the need to reinterpret the pro-
hibition on extraterritorial jurisdiction. In short, Goldsmith proposes that 
remote searches do not violate this prohibition because the officials doing 
the search do not leave the territory of the us. The argument — which returns 
in Who Controls the Internet? — is that states will find ways to achieve indirect 
extraterritorial effect; they will use local infrastructure, local isps and local 
divisions of foreign companies to target the source of the harm they wish to 
redress. Just like cyberspace destroys the unity of time, place and action of 
the actus reus of a cybercriminal, it does the same for the enforcement action 
of national authorities; the scope of the extraterritorial effect of territorial 
action is transformed by cyberspace. Goldsmith actually links this effect to 
cross-border surveillance on the high seas and international air space and 
concludes that “[n]orms of ‘territorial sovereignty’ have never precluded such 
offshore espionage.”87 Goldsmith’s argument oscillates between pragmatic 
arguments entailing that because judicial cooperation does not always work 
unilateral action is needed and a curious understanding of international law 
entailing that states can always act in their own best interest. To the extent 
that this violates international law, he asserts that the law will simply have 
to be changed: “There is little doubt that if such searches prove necessary to 
redress cross-border internet attacks, international law will adapt to permit 
them in some circumstances.”88
There is no doubt that, for Goldsmith, the sovereign is he who decides 
on the exception. Norms are nice, but in case of necessity we are better off 
with decisions.89 He acknowledges potential abuse — for instance, if officials 
resort to cross-border searches even if alternative means of investigation are 
available — and warns against the threat of reciprocity and retaliation, for in-
stance if Russia decides to engage in cross-border enforcement in cyberspace 
on the territory of the us. But ultimately the claim stands that unilateral 
86 Ibid., 106; at 106 n 14 he refers to art. 19, 20, 23(a) and 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime, November 
23, 2001, ets No 185 that restrict cross-border searches to publicly available data or consent in the 
case of private data.
87 Ibid., 114. It is not clear what is the relevance of this observation, since espionage is not the same 
as extraterritorial enforcement of the criminal law.
88 Ibid., 116.
89 On Schmitt’s view of legal order in terms of legal norms and a-legal decisions, see Mireille Hilde-
brandt, “The Indeterminacy of an Emergency: Challenges to Criminal Jurisdiction in Constitu-
tional Democracy,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2010): 161.
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actions are inevitable and require adjustment of international law. Interest-
ingly, after his paper was published the us ratified the Cybercrime Conven-
tion, which forbids these searches without express permission of the source 
country. What does this mean for the competence of us officials to engage 
in unilateral cross-border search? Are they bound by their agreement to the 
Convention, or is there space for an a-legal decision in the case of necessity? 
In their book on the control over the Internet, Goldsmith and Wu advocate 
that territorial sovereignty will hold in cyberspace, whereas Goldsmith’s ear-
lier position suggests that territorial sovereignty will be redefined to allow 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction in cyberspace. It seems that Schmit-
tian decisionism will rule cyberspace when things get nasty, leaving interna-
tional law and respect for the internal sovereignty of other states for times of 
relative peace. 
6. conclusions: novel spatialities, cyberspace as passage and common good?
Let us now return to Grotius’s Mare Liberum. I briefly recall the four dimen-
sions of territorial jurisdiction, distinguished above: territorial demarcation 
overrules personal status, it creates abstract boundaries that define an empty 
space, capable — I might add — of a simple way of producing an inside and 
an outside, that produces a gapless map of contiguous jurisdictional territo-
ries. The high seas escaped this totalitarian scheme due to their value as a 
common good, their status as a passage and the vigilance of different play-
ers who resisted occupation. Cyberspace can be territorialized, but only by 
redefining territory in a way that defies the original connection of the no-
tion of territory to the land, to the earth. As discussed above, this connection 
portrays territorial jurisdiction as exclusive and gapless; there is no outside 
that is not an inside and a subject or an object cannot be inside two differ-
ent territories. The novel connection to territory, however, would have to be 
inclusive and overlapping; as soon as there is an inside there are numerous 
ways to extend the inside — for instance by means of what Goldsmith calls 
indirect extraterritorial effect. 
This marks the difference between cyberspace and Grotius’s high seas: 
the high seas — unlike cyberspaces — were not everywhere nor anywhere.90 
This difference implies that the metaphor of Mare Liberum has its limits, 
90 Thanks to Markus Dubber for pointing this out during the workshop in Toronto, June 2012.
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because — other than cyberspace — it depends on the territoriality of the 
land it surrounds. This is precisely why cyberspaces require novel negotia-
tions between jurisdiction and spatiality. The boundaries of the high seas 
were determined by those of the land; there was no overlap. The boundaries 
of territory in the era of cyberspace are, however, liquid.91 Cyberspace does 
not stop where ordinary space begins. This means that territorialisation of 
cyberspaces easily generates cross-border communication, commerce and 
crime, situating the same action seamlessly in different territories (both 
online and offline). On the side of cybersecurity this will trigger universal 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce. As we have seen above, as long as the 
official conducting a remote extraterritorial search is physically located in 
the territory of the investigating state some will define the action as an in-
traterritorial search with indirect extraterritorial effects. It may be the case 
that the legal requirement that the other state must agree to such a search is 
contingent upon a previous spatiality, on artificial demarcations that have 
run out of steam. 
A redefinition of the scope of territorial jurisdiction that justifies indirect 
extraterritorial effects will nevertheless run into problems. It builds on an a-
legal occupatio because it claims and seizes access to computing systems locat-
ed in the realm of another state that may decide to exercise its monopoly on 
violence. Retaliation and reciprocity may turn cyberspace into a platform for 
cyberwar; to the extent that our critical infrastructure is increasingly rooted 
in cyberspace such a-legality is not something to look forward to. The recent 
history of the malware program “Olympic Games” is a primary example of 
such a-legal occupation. The program, developed by the National Security 
Agency of the us and Israel’s secret services with the aim to disturb the nu-
clear plant at Natanz (Iran), sets an example that will be — and undoubtedly 
has been — followed.92
We thus have to face the question of whether cyberspace liberum grounds 
a-legal occupatio or requires “grounding” in a novel version of natural law 
91 Cf. Julie JCH Ryan, Daniel Ryan, and Eneken Tikk, “Cybersecurity Regulation: Using Analogies 
to Develop Frameworks for Regulation,” in International Cyber Security Legal & Policy Proceedings 
(Tallinn: ccd coe, 2010). They distinguish between the natural commons (notably the sea, air, the 
Antarctic, outer space, and cyberspace).
92 See Symantec Enterprise Security, Internet Security Threat Report 16 & 17. Note that the example 
does not refer to criminal jurisdiction to enforce but to something more like cyberwar. Obviously 
the distinction may not hold in cyberspace, unless we find a way to construct an effective legal 
demarcation that re-invents the distinction between internal sovereignty (criminal law) and ex-
ternal sovereignty (war) for the era of cyberspace. 
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that attributes subjective natural rights based on a distributed control over 
cyberspace infrastructure.93 Part of Grotius’s scheme may work, namely 
where we view cyberspace — in analogy to the high seas — as a passage that 
affords international trade, communication at a distance, the proliferation of 
information and of the techniques to transform information into knowledge. 
This would entail that we see cyberspace as a global commons. But, even if 
we manage to escape the temptations of an “economic theology” that takes 
the benefits of cyberspace as a global commons for granted, we still need to 
find ways to ensure that cyberspace “as a passage, a conduit” is instituted and 
maintained as a res communis that cannot be appropriated, may not come 
under exclusive sovereign control and requires a vigilant international com-
munity to safeguard the distributed control that is needed to prevent violent, 
exclusionary monopolies.94
 This seems to be the challenging alternative to accepting that the power 
will be with those who take control, thus imposing their sovereignty in cy-
berspace to the extent that others let them.95 However, to face this challenge 
we still need to figure out what it means to take care of a common good that 
cannot be separated from the territorial landscape it pervades. Cyberspace 
is “everyware.”96 If we want to save ourselves from an a-legal cyberspace we 
need to build a new — heterotopian — spatiality, taking into account the 
novel mappings that cyberspace affords. We must remember that sovereign 
jurisdiction entails unilateral enforcement of the criminal law, but — so 
far — is also the precondition of the unilateral enforcement of human rights 
such as the fair trial, privacy, and non-discrimination. The challenge will be 
to sustain a measure of safety, freedom, and respect for human rights in cy-
berspace, based on a legality that cannot, however, be grounded in the mo-
nopolistic spatiality of territorial sovereignty.
93 Though the idea of “natural rights” seems to defy the idea of attribution this is precisely the point 
of natural law: it attributes rights it claims to be inherent in the nature of human beings. This rhe-
torical strategy is based on the performative nature of the construction of reality and some relate 
it to the so-called endowment effect of our cognitive make-up, cf. Edmundson, An Introduction to 
Rights, 13.
94 On potential threats to the distributed control over the root structure of cyberspace (the Internet) 
see one of the founding fathers of the Internet, Vinton Cerf, “Keep the Internet Open,” The New 
York Times (May 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/opinion/keep-the-internet-open.
html. Also Mueller, Networks and States.
95 Cf. Allen, “Command of the Commons Boasts.”






nal justice deals 
with a limited number 
of core crimes, which have 
a deep impact on the interna-
tional community: genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. All 
of these crimes are usually described as ordi-
nary crimes committed in extraordinary circum-
stances, which lawyers call contextual elements. If one 
takes the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(icc), a murder can amount to a crime against humanity if it’s 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population with knowledge of the attack pursuant of 
an organizational policy to commit such an attack. 
The international criminal justice system had tremendously developed 
itself since the end of the Cold War. Schematically speaking, it rests on three 
different concentric circles:
 — The smaller circle comprises national judges, each of whom investigates 
international crimes in his own country where they occurred, just like he 
would do with ordinary crimes. Inside this limited territory, the so-called 
“national judge” can use very important coercive police powers to search 
for evidence.  
 — The middle circle comprises extraterritorial judges who can claim extra-
territorial jurisdiction by prosecuting crimes committed abroad between 
strangers. These foreign national judges can resort to police force to in-
vestigate inside their own country, but they depend on the cooperation 
of other States to collect evidence abroad. 
 — The largest circle comprises the eighteen “international judges” of the 
icc, which territorial jurisdiction expands as increasing numbers of 
States ratify the Rome Statute signed in 1998, although an investigation 







 This text was first presented in an Exterritory Project Symposium, December 12, 2013, Beit HaGe-
fen, Haifa, Israel. 
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can also be triggered by the Security Council on any situation in the 
world. Despite the fact that the Prosecutor of the icc has its own team of 
investigators, fact-finding mainly depends on international cooperation, 
since there is no international police force.
Looking at this three-legged system, it is striking to notice how the coercive 
powers of the different judicial bodies that compound the international 
criminal justice system diminish as their jurisdiction widens.
In this essay, I would like to show that the balanced, multi-layered in-
ternational criminal justice system is the result of two seemingly opposite 
processes of universalization of the jurisdiction to prescribe and territori-
alization of the jurisdiction to enforce, which are both essential to the fight 
against impunity.
1. denationalization of law
International criminal law emerged at the crossroads of national criminal 
law and public international law. On the one side, national criminal lawyers 
created the International Criminal Law Association (icla) in 1889 to address 
the existence of conflicting independent national law order. On the other, 
international law professors created the International Law Institute (ili) in 
1873 in an effort to build an international public law independent from in-
ternational private law. The career of Henri Donnedieu de Vabres illustrates 
the rising of this new combined legal discipline, which is both criminal and 
international, all along the 20th century. He started his career as a national 
criminal law professor, worked on the coordination of States for the control 
of immigration and ended his professional life as the French international 
judge at the Nuremberg Trial. 
At the start, the notion of universal jurisdiction was a topic of academic 
discussion which referred to an attempt to encourage the cross application 
of national criminal law, that is the possibility for a national judge to imple-
ment the law of a foreign State, even if the crime cannot be found in its own 
criminal code. Henri Donnedieu de Vabres will defend this idea in his famous 
book, the first textbook ever written on international criminal law, entitled 
Les principes modernes du droit pénal international (Modern Principles of Interna-
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tional Criminal Law), published in 1926.1 He requests the duty of every state 
to take an active part in the repression of a foreign national order: “universal 
jurisdiction is the negation of the rights of asylum just like extradition.”.Even 
if this reform has never been implemented, this first move towards the dena-
tionalization of law is very important intellectual step because it weakens 
the identification of the law with the State. 
As the dramatic event of the beginning of the twentieth century un-
folded, the definition of universal jurisdiction changed. Until the First World 
War, international crises had been regulated by the “bons offices” of good-
willing high-profiled leaders. Lawyers were only asked to translate the will 
of the State they represented into judicial babble. However, the deepening 
of the international crisis in post-war Europe requested the professionaliza-
tion of mediation embodied by the creation of the League of Nations and the 
permanent international Court of Justice. With the rise of these institutions, 
diplomats started taking an interest in the academic discussion about uni-
versal jurisdiction. 
Within these new legal and political dynamics, the definition of univer-
sal jurisdiction stopped referring to the cross-application of national law to 
point to the possibility for a national judge to prosecute on its own territory 
crimes directly defined by the international community. This new approach 
to universal jurisdiction surfaced with the development of transnational 
criminality which breached the direct interest of different countries at the 
same time: the international community agreed on a legal definition of 
money counterfeiting in 1929, state representatives held an international 
meeting on terrorism in 1934 to fight the multiplication of political assas-
sination all over Europe and so forth with war crimes committed during in-
ternational armed conflicts, human trafficking or plane hijacking. From the 
1930s onward, an individual could now be held accountable directly to the 
international community for a limited number of crimes and brought to jus-
tice in any signing State Party to these different treaties under the aut dedere 
aut judicare principle, a Latin formula meaning, “either you prosecute or you 
extradite.”2
1 Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, Les principes modernes du droit pénal international (Paris: Panthéon-
Assas, 2005).
2 Marc Henzelin, “Universal Jurisdiction,” in Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 
ed. D. Shelton, vol. 3 (Farrington Hills, Michigan: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 1116–23.
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After the Second World War, the scope of universal jurisdiction was 
slowly expanded form transnational criminality to human rights violations, 
which can occur inside the border of one given country. However, there is 
quite a big historical gap between the codification of international human 
rights law and the prosecution of human rights violations through universal 
jurisdiction just like transnational crimes. If the convention for the repres-
sion of genocide signed in 1948 was a step forward, the delegates rejected the 
aut dedere aut judicare principle, fearing that international private litigation 
targeting the internal affairs of one country would be politically driven.3 
Although they agreed on the fact that genocide could be prosecuted by an 
international judge, they were not taking much of a risk since the icc did 
not exist back then, and was not likely to be created anytime soon in a world 
stage divided between two ideological antagonistic systems known as capi-
talism and communism. 
However, the initial rejection of universal jurisdiction for human rights 
violations should not only be blamed of political cynicism. Most country 
delegates felt strongly that investigations abroad would be very complicated 
to conduct, an issue that is still pervasive nowadays, even if it is partially ad-
dressed by the development of a web of ngos, which monitor most conflicts 
all around the world with very professional commitment. As a matter of fact, 
the legal breakthrough was stirred by the dedication of a famous ngo, Am-
nesty International, during the negotiation of the convention against torture 
was ratified in 1984. Amnesty International’s senior legal advisor, Sir Nigel 
Rodely, recalled that the Swedish proposal to enshrine the aut dedere aut judi-
care principle into the torture convention was first discussed inside an Am-
nesty International caucus and that other countries accepted it only after a 
strong lobbying by the same organization.4 By attending the conference and 
reporting on the debate, ngos prevent State delegates from developing too 
many interest-driven arguments and automatically raise the debate towards 
more universal norms. As a matter of fact, the successful efforts of Amnesty 
International are a good example on how potential shaming before the pub-
lic eye is able to change the structure of a legal agreement. 
3 Matthew Lippman, “The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide,” Boston University International Law Journal (1984): 1–64.
4 Rodley Nagel, “ngo and the Prevention and Repression of Torture,” in International Human Rights 
Law and Non-Governmental Organizations, ed. G. Cohen-Johnathan and Jean-François Flauss (2005), 
103–17.
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This denationalization of law is very important for the protection of hu-
man rights. No one is now able to hide behind its national laws to avoid being 
held accountable for the most serious crimes. However, this process of dena-
tionalization of law should not be mistaken for the process of deterritoriali-
zation of law, which has been largely rejected by the States. 
2. territorialization of enforcement
Since the degree of control of the State over the judicial process is directly 
measurable by the level of independence it is willing to give the Prosecutor, 
the scope of the icc’s jurisdiction has been under important scrutiny at the 
Rome Statute. In this controversy, there were two radical opposite sides. On 
the one hand, the ngos’ Coalition for the International Criminal Court assert-
ed that the legal incrimination developed in the Rome statute had already 
reached the level of international customary law long before the start of the 
negotiations. According to them, the future icc Prosecutor should therefore 
be entitled with the right to investigate crimes committed worldwide and 
prior to the establishment of the Court. In other words, they supported a de-
territorialized universal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crimes. 
On the other side, most state delegates reminded that the icc Prosecutor’s 
jurisdiction should not extend to countries which are not members of the 
Rome Statute by stressing that an international treaty cannot bind third par-
ties which have not signed it. According to them, States should have the ex-
clusive power to trigger the jurisdiction of the Prosecutor over a specific situ-
ation happening either in their own country or in another country if they 
can claim a legal interest.
Under the intensive scrutiny and mobilization of ngos, the negotiation 
between the countries’ delegation led to a compromise: member states are 
able to refer a situation occurring on their territory, the Prosecutor is able to 
trigger an investigation at his own initiative to investigate crimes committed 
on the territory of any state party, and the Security Council can ask the Pros-
ecutor to open an investigation of a situation in any country in the world. 
Thus, the Prosecutor of the icc has been granted territorial jurisdiction over 
an area solely composed of all the State parties and the deterritorialized uni-
versal jurisdiction has been strictly subdued to a Security Council decision. 
Even if it carries us away from the question of territoriality, it is important 
to add that the Prosecutor’s territorial corset is strengthened by a judicial re-
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view. In exchange for the right of the Prosecutor to launch an investigation 
on his own, the States decided that a Preliminary Chamber should be created 
to monitor the prosecutor’s action on very carefully chosen legal grounds. 
In several steps of the proceedings, the Prosecutor has to obtain the judges’ 
green light to move forward in his investigation, to issue an arrest warrant 
and to go to trial. 
To understand how the icc deals with territorial challenges, we can take a 
look at the great difficulties encountered in the arrest of Omar El-Beshir, the 
current President of Sudan, who is wanted for crimes against humanity and 
genocide.5 To grasp different aspects of this hard case, we have to recall a few 
facts. The situation in Sudan was referred to the icc by the Security Council 
in 2005 and was followed by an arrest warrant in 2009 issued by the Prelimi-
nary Chamber. As of today, Beshir has visited several countries in the world 
without being arrested: Qatar, Egypt, Chad, Malawi, Kenya, and Nigeria. All 
these different failures to arrest cannot be set on the same level, but they all 
pertain interesting questions of territoriality. 
Since the situation in Darfour has been referred to the Court by the Secu-
rity Council, one could argue that every State has the duty to arrest President 
Beshir. Although this option could be considered a logical consequence of the 
United Nations referral, the international community has not accepted the 
logic of deterritorialization of law entailed by this mechanism. The Security 
Council has never taken any steps to request that all countries be obligated to 
execute arrest warrants targeting crimes committed in a situation it has itself 
referred to the icc. Without any pressure from the Security Council, it is not 
surprising that non-members of the icc like Egypt or Qatar have not arrested 
the Sudanese President. If the lack of adherence of non-member States to the 
Rome Statute thrives on the United Security Council’s inaction, the refusal 
of member States to arrest El-Beshir is based on a vigorous legal advocacy by 
the African Union. The African regional organization rests on the argument 
of Article 98 of the Rome Statute which states that the Court may not proceed 
with a request for surrender or assistance that would require the requested 
State to act inconsistently with its obligations under customary interna-
tional law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity. Without going 
into the legal debate, one must acknowledge a conflict between Article 27 of 
5 Gwen P. Barnes, “The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms: The 
Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir,” Fordham International Law Journal 34, no. 6 (2011): 1584–
619.
209
the rise of legal cosmopolitism
the International Criminal Court which rebuts immunity for international 
crimes and the case-law of the International Court of Justice which forbids 
national authorities to arrest a foreign sitting head of State since the Yero-
dia judgement issued in 2002. After examining this legal conflict, the icc has 
decided that regarding arrest warrants, Article 27 should prevail over article 
98.6 Far from abating, the conflict has now became a political problem for 
States, which are both party to the African Union and the Rome Statute, and 
has yet radicalized to another extent with the indictment of the President of 
Kenya for his alleged responsibility in the 2007 post-election violence. 
All these examples mean to show that the icc has to face huge territorial 
issues. Although this could be described as a weakness of the international 
justice system, one must keep in mind that member States have given birth 
to the icc precisely because the Statute respects the core elements of sover-
eignty, and especially, territoriality. To my mind, the problem lies more in the 
fact that the Security Council does not take any action to oppose the advo-
cacy of the African Union against a decision of the icc. Since the signature 
of the Rome Statute in 1998, many activists have nevertheless tried to over-
come the territorial limits of the International Criminal Court by promoting 
the deterritorialized universal jurisdiction of national judges. The case law 
shows however that they faced the same obstacle of territorialization they 
had encountered in the debates around the creation of the icc.7 
If you look at the Spanish arrest warrant sent to Britain for the arrest of 
Pinochet who was undergoing medical treatment in the uk, you will notice 
that it is based on the murder of a Spanish citizen under Pinochet’s rule. On 
the 16th of October 1998, the Judge of the Audiencia Nacional had based its 
decision on passive jurisdiction, which allows a Court to prosecute crimes 
committed against one of its nationals, precisely because they distrusted 
universal jurisdiction, which was not sustained by any previous case-law. 
However, the human rights activist described in the media this arrest war-
rant as the first attempt to implement deterritorialized universal jurisdiction 
in order to push the agenda that had been rejected at the Rome Conference 
a few months earlier in July 1998. This media coverage was efficient enough 
to change the course of the proceedings. In its decision on the arrest warrant 
6 Dire Tladi, “The icc Decisions on Chad and Malawi: On Cooperation, Immunities and Article 98,” 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 11, no. 1 (2013): 199–221.
7 Julien Seroussi, “The Cause of Universal Jurisdiction: The Rise and Fall of an International Mobi-
lization,” in Lawyers and the Construction of Transnational Justice, ed. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth 
(London: Routledge, 2012), 48–61.
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review, filed on the November 5, 1998, the High Court of Spain decided to live 
with the newly raised expectations of international public opinion by mov-
ing to universal jurisdiction. According to this decision, Spain was now seek-
ing from England the extradition of Pinochet for crimes committed against 
Chileans in their home country since his 1973 coup d’état. Moreover, the Brit-
ish House of Lords followed the same path by deciding on the November 25, 
1998, to lift Pinochet’s immunity in order to proceed with his extradition to 
Spain. As we all know, this decision did not prevail in the end and Pinochet 
was able to go back to Chile on health grounds, but the activist had a case-law 
stating that prosecutions was not limited in time or space when it comes to 
grave breaches of human rights and they were willing to try to strengthen it 
with new cases. 
From the Pinochet case onward, multiple attempts have been carried to 
foster the deterritorialized universal jurisdiction of national judges, but law-
makers have curbed the ngo’s enthusiasm by imposing important territorial 
constraints. The most eloquent example is the case against Hissene Habre, 
the former dictator of Chad, who settled in Senegal after he was ousted form 
power by his successor. Although Belgium has managed to compel Senegal 
to judge Habre under the aut dedere aut judicare principle, after winning an 
arbitration of the International Court of Justice in 2012, the Belgian law, 
which allowed the judges to have jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad 
with no territorial link whatsoever, was cancelled in 2003. In other words, 
the Habre proceedings are only a surviving case of a former law which had 
been stripped from the Belgian criminal code already a decade ago. After a 
worldwide debate over the limits of universal jurisdiction, most counties 
consider now that only the presence of the accused on their territory is able 
to set off the judicial process. As far I know, only Spain still supports deter-
ritorialized universal jurisdiction, but it has not had the opportunity to go 
beyond preliminary investigations. Also, it seems that the prime minister of 
Spain is contemplating amendments to its Universal Jurisdiction law after 
arrest warrants against top Chinese politicians for alleged crimes committed 
in Tibet recently infuriated Beijing.
Fearing the loosening of the fight against impunity, many activists were 
disappointed by the territorial limits imposed on jurisdiction to enforce, but 
others think that it grants national judges with the necessary legitimacy to 
prosecute crimes committed in another country. The presence of the accused 
on the territory gives a very objective triggering mechanism that shields the 
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judges from the very frequent accusation of neo-colonization that interna-
tional criminal justice has to regularly face. Also, it enables the government 
to justify itself in front of its own public opinion, which does not always un-
derstand why so many resources should be spent on crimes which did not 
cause a tort to any citizen of the country. 
3. empowering the territorial state
The relationship between the International Criminal Court and the States 
is encapsulated by the principle of complementarity, regulated by Article 17 
of the Rome Statute, which states that it is first and foremost the duty of na-
tional courts to prosecute the perpetrators of the most serious international 
crimes. If the purpose of this principle is to give clear primacy to the territo-
rial States over the icc, the international judges monitor the States to verify 
whether they are taking active investigative steps. In the words of Article 17, 
the judges have to check if the State is able and willing to prosecute crimes 
falling in the Court’s jurisdiction. Until the examination of the Libyan Seno-
ussi case, every time a State had requested to judge the suspect by itself, the 
judges of the icc ruled that the government was not giving sufficiently speci-
fied evidence that it was conducting serious investigations into the crimes. 
While the judges are setting a minimal international standard of fair trial 
against which most states have stumbled on, the icc Prosecutor is genuinely 
trying to foster national action by providing direct assistance and advice 
to countries, among the different situations on which he is carrying out a 
preliminary investigation. For example, the Prosecutor of the icc is advising 
the Colombia government on different aspects of the “Legal Framework for 
Peace” and the “Military Reform Act” to ensure that this new piece of legisla-
tion will enable the national judges to prosecute international crimes that he 
might otherwise have to investigate himself.8
Notwithstanding legal arguments regarding complementarity, the fact 
that the international judges have to rule over crimes committed in foreign 
countries creates a number of challenges, which also explain the effort to 
foster the natural judge. Firstly, the International Criminal Court has to face 
translation issues. For example, the English lawyer of Germain Katanga was 





listening to witness through an English interpreter who translated what the 
French interpreter was himself translating from Congolese Swahili. Obvi-
ously, the risk of losing some key contents increases with the numbers of 
interpreters. In the Katanga case, one witness testified for several days about 
airlifts between one city and the line of combat by using the Swahili word 
mbegu to talk about the freight. For a while, the interpreter translated this 
Swahili word as “seed” before one Swahili speaker in the Courtroom said that 
this word is a metaphor to say “ammunition.”9 With this new translation, the 
whole interpretation of the testimony radically changed from exculpatory 
to incriminating. Therefore, the manifestation of the truth in a case before 
the International Criminal Court stems from the permeation of the language 
of the witness, the interpreters choices of translation and the lawyer’s strat-
egy. Although the ideal of justice would require to stay as close as possible 
to what the witness has come to say, every translator knows that switching 
languages is not a neutral operation and every lawyer is willing to use these 
discrepancies to his benefit. 
Needless to say, the problem of language is not only a question on trans-
parency but introduces us to the sensitive issue of understanding someone 
else’s culture in order to understand the meaning of what he says when he 
testifies. In the Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo case, the prosecu-
tor discarded the local specificities of the armed groups led by the accused 
to focus on what most resembles a Western chain of command. If you read 
the transcript of the trial, you will notice that the soldiers paid a lot of re-
spect to sorcerers who were dispatched in every single camp. As the Pros-
ecutor had dismissed all these allusions to the feticheurs as non-essential, he 
denied himself evidence that could have helped him in his case, particularly 
in the demonstration of the automatic compliance of soldiers. If he had taken 
witchcraft seriously, he might have been able to use the fact that the lead-
ers also exerted control over their troopers through the distribution of fetish, 
which is as essential as weapons for local militiamen.10 This relative inability 
to engage in thick description of the mobilization is not a question of opposi-
tion between the Western world and the African world since the prosecution 
teams put together people from different national backgrounds. It is related 
9 International Criminal Court, transcript of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui and Germain Katanga at 
the International Criminal Court, T-302, August 31, 2011, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/do 
c1235418.pdf, 1–6.
10 Trial Chamber II, “Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” December 18, 2012, http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1579080.pdf, para. 122.
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to the fact that the understanding of judicial categories is still too dependent 
on Nazi and Communist ideologically driven political experience. 
Beyond the question of truth, investigations conducted abroad raise the 
more pervasive question of trust. If the course of a trial moves away from 
historical truth, it will never impede the proceedings, but the trial will not 
be able to proceed at all if judges cannot rest on reliable evidence. In the case 
against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo, the Court had to face the 
important issue of assessing the age of witnesses who said they were child-
soldiers during the Congolese wars. According to the Rome Statute, a com-
batant qualifies as child-soldier if he (or she) is under fifteen years old. Yet 
what everyone expected to be a very simple identification process became 
quite complicated. For each witness, passports, school reports, demobiliza-
tion cards and oral testimony bare different birthdates which brought us by 
turns under or over the fifteen years old threshold. The disarray became very 
significant when one realizes that the question is not whether the witness 
was telling the truth or not, but that one simply did not have the right reli-
ability test to assess it.11 In the end, the prosecutor himself gave up the fac-
tual allegations stating that several of his witnesses were in fact under fifteen 
years old when they participated in the attack. Trust is conveyed through 
various signs that differ from one country to another, some are very explicit, 
such as signatures and stamps on documentary evidence, and others are very 
evanescent, such as a way of looking or the tone of a voice of a witness. One 
has to know a society from the inside as much as possible to assess the cred-
ibility of any piece of evidence. 
Complementarity regulates the relationship between the international 
judges and the national judges of its member States. There is no equivalent 
mechanism to organize the relationship between the extraterritorial judge 
and other state national judges. Obviously, one can expect an extraterrito-
rial judge to accept the extradition of a suspect to his home country if it can 
guarantee a fair trial to him. Nevertheless, it is hard to tell on what basis one 
country can assess the proper functioning of the judicial system of another. 
Once the question of death penalty has been set aside, a national judge does 
not have the legitimacy of the icc to assert that a foreign State requesting a 
suspect through a fair extradition process is either unable or unwilling to 
11 Office of the Prosecutor, “Mémoire Final,” Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui and Germain Katanga at the 




judge. Similarly, there is no legal grounds enabling an extraterritorial judge 
to prosecute a suspect that acquitted by its own national courts after an over-
indulgent trial. According to me, it would be interesting if the question of 
conflicting jurisdiction between the national and the extraterritorial judges 
could be submitted to the Appeal Chamber of the International Court which 
could render a decision on the basis of Article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
×
Denationalization of law is an important cornerstone in the fight against im-
punity as it forbids anybody to hide behind its national legislation to commit 
heinous crimes. However, when you consider enforcement, territorialization 
of law is an important pillar of the international justice system as the closer 
the judge is to the case the better he can understand it. It is true that the ter-
ritorial restrictions imposed on universal jurisdiction explain that some sus-
pects can slip through the net. However, the primacy given to territorializa-
tion guarantees better the ability to find compelling evidence against those 






propound that ethical 
duties are universal, and 
apply regardless of nationality, 
citizenship, race etc. In pure cosmo-
politanism, individuals owe ethical duties 
towards other individuals who are worse off, 
wherever on earth they may be. Individual agency 
is not particularly practical, however. Therefore, global 
justice advocates have proposed to mediate individuals’ 
ethical duties via institutions, in particular international (gov-
ernmental) organizations.1 In this institutional view, international 
organizations ought to be oriented towards furthering cosmopolitan 
ideals and tackling collective action problems, such as protecting human 
rights and the environment, guaranteeing collective security, and ensuring 
distributive justice, in particular alleviating world poverty.2 Some such in-
stitutions, such as the United Nations, have been duly created. But because 
of design faults, political unwillingness, or resource limits, they have not 
been able to deliver on the promises they initially held: human rights are 
still trampled on, corruption remains rampant, and global warming contin-
ues unabated.
International institutions’ failure to adequately tackle collective action 
problems invites the question of whether instead, “bystander” states should 
not assume their cosmopolitan responsibility, apart from catering to the 
 This contribution draws on the author’s inaugural address accepting the Chair of Public Interna-
tional Law at Utrecht University, March 30, 2015, “Unilateral Jurisdiction and Global Values” (pub-
lished with Eleven 2015), and has been sumbitted for publication in a law review. The research 
which resulted in this publication has been funded by the European Research Council under the 
Starting Grant Scheme (Proposal 336230 — unijuris) and the Dutch Organization for Scientific 
Research under the vidi Scheme.
1 E.g., Michael J. Green, “Institutional Responsibility for Global Problems,” Philosophical Topics 30, 
no. 2 (Fall 2002): 79, 85–6.
2 Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (New York and Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2005), 159. See on poverty in particular Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: 
Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).
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needs of their own citizens. Contemporary political theorist Simon Caney, 
in any event, is of the view that individual states do have global responsi-
bilities: while they are free to pursue their own ends and to discharge their 
“contractual” duties towards their own citizens, they should do so “within 
the context of a fair overall framework,” i.e, “a set of parameters defined by a 
theory of justice.”3 These words echo international lawyer Emmer de Vattel’s 
statements in his classic treatise Le droit des gens (The Law of Nations, 1770): 
while a nation is under an obligation to preserve itself and its members,4 it 
also has duties for the preservation of others, and to contribute to the perfec-
tion of other nations.5 In this contribution, I examine an aspect of this state 
cosmopolitanism, namely the question whether states can unilaterally extend 
their jurisdiction to address global ills. Put differently, I inquire how a state 
can apply its own laws to address globally undesirable situations that arise 
(largely) extraterritorially, i.e., outside their territorial borders. Well-known 
instances of such unilateral jurisdiction are the us Department of Justice’s 
indictment of corrupt fifa officials, Spanish Investigating Judge Garzon’s at-
tempts to have former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet extradited to Spain 
to stand trial for international crimes, and the European Union’s move to sub-
ject foreign air carriers to the eu’s own stringent climate change legislation to 
the extent that they frequent eu airports. 
Such an inquiry requires that we confront the centrality of the principle 
of sovereignty in modern international law, while keeping our eyes open for 
more global justice-friendly semantic understandings which the principle 
may have taken on (Section 1). Such an inquiry also invites us to ascertain 
the existence of common values or interests which states acting unilaterally/
extraterritorially supposedly vindicate on behalf of an alleged “international 
community” (Section 2). The legitimacy of such action obviously suffers if 
the state only promotes its own idiosyncratic values. But even where values 
are more or less universally shared, the question remains whether individual 
states rather than international institutions should be entrusted with cos-
mopolitan jurisdictional powers. Can benevolent hegemons be trusted, or 
does trusteeship risk degenerating into imperialist imposition (Section 3)? 
3 Ibid., 139–40.
4 Emer de Vattel, Le droit des gens (Paris: Guillaumin, 1863), Book I, Ch. II, para. 16–18.
5 Ibid., Book II, Ch. I, para. 1–6. Justifying the latter duties toward others, he approvingly cites the 
Roman orator Cicero, who said in De Officiis that “[N]othing is more agreeable to nature, more 
capable of affording true satisfaction, than, in imitation of Hercules, to undertake even the most 
arduous and painful labours for the benefit and preservation of all nations.” 
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While acknowledging the risk of self-serving behavior, this contribution 
is inclined to support benevolent unilateralism, as the alternative — no ac-
tion — may be worse. It argues that the justification of such unilateralism 
should be sought in the substantive values it furthers rather than in tired 
“anti-commons” legal formalisms (Section 4). 
1. cosmopolitan state jurisdiction: from territorial sovereignty to correc-
tive justice 
Advocates of the unilateral cosmopolitanism posit that states can, and per-
haps should assume responsibility for, and on behalf of all members of a per-
ceived international community irrespective of artificially created national bor-
ders. Its adherents should not fail to realize that this — laudable — position is 
in apparent tension with a principle on which the entire temple of contem-
porary international law has been built: the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
The pedigree of this principle can be traced from the Peace of Westphalia of 
1648, a series of treaties which ended the Thirty Years’ War and introduced 
the concept of co-existing states with full internal and external sovereignty, 
until the present times.6 Territorial sovereignty implies that final political 
authority and jurisdiction is exclusively vested in a territorially delimited 
political community, and that no other authority has a legal say (juris dicere) 
over this community.7 The role of international law is simply to ensure that 
this sovereignty is not trampled on, and that the territorial state-based sys-
tem survives. In practice, state sovereignty has at times been violated when 
one state reasoned that respect for another state’s sovereignty was not in its 
interest — which may lead one to question indeed whether sovereignty is 
not just organized hypocrisy. But it remains an enduring “cognitive script” 
that guides the actions of participants in international relations,8 and re-
quires them to at least pay lip-service to the principles of non-intervention 
and territoriality. 
6 See for a historical account: Derek Croxton, Westphalia: The Last Christian Peace (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2013); and for a discussion of the influence of the Peace until the 20th century: 
Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948,” American Journal of International Law 42 (1948): 
20.
7 See also Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 11.
8 Ibid., 69 (arguing that sovereignty — while being organized hypocrisy in his opinion — has 
proved remarkably “durable in the sense that it has affected the talk and conception of rulers 




The law of jurisdiction, with which we are concerned here, is closely 
related to the principle of territorial sovereignty, and may even be co-ex-
tensive with it. It contains rules of the road that limit the reach of a state’s 
prescriptive, adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdiction to the state’s terri-
torial boundaries, with some limited exceptions to protect and punish its 
own nationals (personality principle), its political independence (protective 
principle), and certain enemies of mankind (universality principle). The ba-
sic rule of territoriality, and the limited extraterritorial exceptions to it, are 
geared towards protecting the sovereignty and self-interest of states.9 Jurisdiction-
al rules may also be inspired by a utilitarian rationale based on efficiency 
and procedural economy,10 and, as such, prevent courts and prosecutors from 
wasting scarce state resources to address problems that are another state’s 
concern. The presumption against extraterritoriality as it is applied in the 
us — a canon of statutory construction pursuant to which the us Congress 
is presumed not to legislate extraterritoriality — appears to be largely based 
on this rationale.11
Such understandings of jurisdiction — which consider states, with ter-
ritorial boundaries, as the primary units of analysis — are not particularly 
amenable to cosmopolitan action. For cosmopolitans indeed, individuals, 
making up an international community with common values, are the focus of 
attention.12 Nevertheless, in recent international law scholarship and prac-
9 This applies both in a positive and a negative sense: states are allowed to unilaterally project their 
power, but when so doing, they should not unduly interfere in other states’ affairs. Theoretically, 
reciprocity ensures that states will by and large respect the requirement of non-interference, al-
though in reality, as a result of disparities of power, strong states have an incentive to extend their 
jurisdiction to the detriment of other states’ sovereignty, without being hampered by a concern 
over adverse foreign reactions (notably the us, European states and the eu have been at the van-
guard of exercising “extraterritorial” jurisdiction).
10 Adeno Addis, “Community and Jurisdictional Authority,” in Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Le-
gal Authority in an Age of Globalization, ed. Gunther Handl, Joachim Zekoll, Peter Zumbansen, (Bos-
ton and Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 16–17, appears to consider this efficiency-based rationale 
to be the main informant of the norms of jurisdiction, stating that “jurisdictional norms emerge 
for the purpose of maximizing aggregate social welfare.”
11 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
69–70.
12 Cosmopolitans do not necessarily deny the existence, or use of states, but for them, states only 
have instrumental value, insofar as they contribute to the primary cosmopolitan ideal of real-
izing the worth of every human being. See Roland Pierik and Wouter Werner, “Introduction,” in 
Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives from International Law and Political Theory (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4–5. Note that non-cosmopolitan moral philoso-
phers, however, may well ascribe moral value to (territorially delimited) states. See e.g., Mervyn 
Frost, Ethics in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 155 (“sover-
eign states and the system of sovereign states are necessary to the flourishing of individuals”). A 
similarly “Hegelian” view is even embraced by John Rawls, whose theory on — national — justice 
cosmopolitans have applied to international relations. In one of his last works, The Law of Peoples 
(Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press: 1999), Rawls adheres to a society of states approach to 
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tice, sovereignty has lost some of its discursive power, and considerations of 
humanity have instead risen to prominence.13 This humanity-centeredness 
has also found its way to the law of jurisdiction, part of which has become 
based on the rationale of corrective justice, i.e., on the cosmopolitan notion 
that states owe ethically-based duties towards citizens of other nations.14 
This ethical imperative has already grounded legal principles that allow, 
and — under certain circumstances — even require states to exercise so-called 
“universal jurisdiction” over a number of treaty- and customary law-based 
international crimes, such as war crimes and torture,15 in the absence of any 
territorial or personal link of the crime or the presumed offender with the 
asserting state.16
The incorporation of the obligatory dimension of this imperative — ju-
risdiction as a duty of states rather than just a discretionary choice that is 
restricted by international law — has been hailed as a shift in jurisdictional 
thinking. It points to a reconceptualization of the regulation of jurisdiction, 
in Mills” words, “a not merely a “ceiling,” defining the maximum limits of 
state power, but also […] as a “floor,” reflecting minimum requirements for the 
exercise of regulatory power by states in order to satisfy their international 
obligations.”17
One could envisage that this notion of jurisdiction as corrective, cosmo-
politan justice may also inform and justify jurisdictional assertions beyond 
international morality, considering peoples organized in states as the primary units of analysis. 
This is reminiscent of the work of Frost and Hedley Bull, the main representative of the so-called 
English school in international relations, who similarly regarded the state-based system as the 
best system to realize justice. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World 
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) 287–8. Pierik and Werner have incisively ob-
served that Rawls’s approach is very much in keeping with the Westphalian structure of current 
international law: it gives pride of place to state sovereignty, self-determination, and the principle 
of non-intervention (ibid., 8).  
13 See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Boston and Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2006); Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
14 Addis, “Community and Jurisdictional Authority,” 17.
15 See, e.g., Article 7(1) of the un Torture Convention. 
16 States may however require the presumed offender’s posterior territorial presence for jurisdiction 
to be triggered. Also the operation aut dedere aut judicare clause that features in a number of inter-
national conventions is based on the presence of the offender within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the state, as States Parties to such conventions only have the choice to extradite or prosecute the 
presumed offender when the latter is present in their territory in the first place. See e.g., Article 
5(2) un Torture Convention (1984) (“Each State Party shall […] take such measures as may be neces-
sary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present 
in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him […]”).
17 Alex Mills, “Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law 84 
(2014): 187, 209–12 (also stating at p. 212 that “the fact that (particularly positive) jurisdictional 
obligations have been recognized with growing frequency and scope supports the thesis of a 
broader shift in international law”).
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the sphere of international criminal law. To bring about a more just world, 
in keeping with the tenets of institutional cosmopolitanism set out above, 
states may wish to regulate corporations’ overseas business practices that 
adversely affect human rights or the environment, or violate global anti-
corruption standards; they may fine foreign-flagged vessels docking in their 
ports, even in relation to activities on the high seas (e.g., illegal or unsustain-
able fisheries, or pollution of the marine environment); they may restrict or 
prohibit the importation of goods of which the foreign production process 
runs afoul of human rights standards or contributes to global warming; they 
may use remote technology to address global Internet criminality; or they 
may extend their data protection laws to data processed abroad.18 When 
states — or regional organizations such as the European Union — thus flex 
their muscles, they exercise unilateral jurisdiction to protect some notion of 
“global values” or “the common interest.” In so doing, they compensate for 
the lack of international progress on governance challenges regarding global 
public goods, values, and interests. As is known, such progress requires the 
participation of all, or at least a substantial number of members of the inter-
national community.19
Admittedly, unilateral action may appear to be only a second-best option 
compared to consent-based, and supposedly more legitimate multilateral ac-
tion. However, as Voltaire famously noted in his memoirs, le mieux est l’ennemi 
du bien (“the perfect is the enemy of the good”). Therefore, one could posit 
that states may exercise unilateral action to further the global interest, at 
least strategically, to up the ante until adequate multilateral action is taken. 
In that sense, unilateralism could be considered as temporary mechanism 
of pressure. 
Empowering individual states to further the global interest in fact sits 
well with our current pluralistic and pluri-centric world, where different 
centers of power take experimental bottom-up global action, thereby provid-
ing best practices and inspiration for others to follow. The sociologist Saskia 
18 These are, as it happens, the PhD topics of seven of my PhD researchers on two five-year projects 
funded by the European Research Council and the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research 
(2013–2018).
19 Nico Krisch, “The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods,” Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 108, no. 1 (2014): 1. This may not apply to single-best effort global 
public goods, for the realization of which no aggregate effort is required, e.g., geo-engineering 
techniques in which only one state, or a small group of states invests, but that may deliver benefits 
for the entire international community. 
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Sassen’s work on global cities comes to mind here.20 Moreover, some cosmo-
politans themselves, wary of a Leviathan-like supreme world government 
responsible for dispensing global justice,21 have admitted that “there is a case 
for different institutions operating at different levels,” which has the advan-
tage of preventing the centralization of coercive power.22 They may have in 
mind, in the first place, different international organizations addressing dif-
ferent policy issues, and keeping each other in check. But there is no reason to 
exclude individual states from this pantheon. In fact, Kant saw separate states 
rather than international organizations as the cosmopolitan duty-bearers in 
Perpetual Peace.23 Also Rawls defended the society of states in his approach to 
justice in The Law of Peoples (although then he famously went on to doubt 
the possibility of global justice and solidarity within a society of states that 
do not all share a liberal justice outlook).24 And Bartelson, one of the leading 
contemporary sovereignty theorists, foregrounded the role of states as media 
and instruments of global justice in Sovereignty as Symbolic Form : 
[T]he universalistic visions invoked to justify the projection of […] govern-
mental strategies into the global realm today operate under the assump-
tion that the international system of states is the only available medium 
for realizing such visions in the near future.”25
20 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013). This work chronicles how New York, London, and Tokyo became command centers for 
the global economy and in the process underwent a series of massive and parallel changes. What 
distinguishes Sassen’s theoretical framework is the emphasis on the formation of cross-border 
dynamics through which these cities and the growing number of other global cities begin to form 
strategic transnational networks.
21 See already Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), reprinted in Kant: Political 
Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 102 (submitting that “laws progres-
sively lose their impact as the government increases its range, and a soulless despotism, after 
crushing the germs of goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy”).
22 Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 163.
23 Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, “Does Humanity-Law Require (or Imply) a Progressive Theory of 
History? (and Other Questions for Martti Koskenniemi),” Temple International and Comparative 
Law Journal 27, no. 2 (2013): 377, 383 (writing that “according to Kant, we need the state as well 
as an order of cosmopolitan right where individuals can claim, as humans, to be treated in a cer-
tain way regardless of territorial boundaries,” citing Kant’s emphasis on the republican federation 
in Perpetual Peace); Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” Ethics 103 (Oct. 1992): 
48–75.
24 Rawls, The Law of Peoples.
25 Jens Bartelson, Sovereignty as Symbolic Form (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 78.
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Ultimately, as the state remains a — or even the — central actor in interna-
tional law-making and -implementation, one has to make do with states as 
the primary cosmopolitan actors.26
Practically speaking, when acting in a cosmopolitan manner, states recast 
global problems in local terms in order to take advantage of local political or 
social resources,27 e.g., by locally suing foreign corporations participating in 
a global antitrust conspiracy, by prosecuting corporations engaging in for-
eign corrupt practices or foreign human rights violations, or by prosecuting 
individuals who committed atrocities abroad. These states do not act on their 
own account, but as agents of the international community. 
2. states vindicating common interests: a vainglorious quest for an objec-
tive “international community”
When a state desires to tackle global problems through the exercise of uni-
lateral jurisdiction, from a justice perspective they may obviously want to 
ensure that others view these problems as global too, lest such jurisdiction 
be seen as illegitimate, self-serving, and intruding on other states’ justified 
policy choices. It can be posited that the justification of a unilateral/extrater-
ritorial measure hinges on the international community’s recognition of the 
object of regulation (e.g., a stable climate, human rights, sustainable fisher-
ies, a corruption-free world…), and thus on internationally shared values. When 
the international community has recognized an object as in need of protec-
tion, the assumption is that states may be justified in protecting this good 
unilaterally,28 as they are, arguendo, just vicariously enforcing community 
26 Roland Pierik and Wouter Werner, “Can Cosmopolitanism Survive Institutionalization?,” in Cos-
mopolitanism in Context: Perspectives from International Law and Political Theory (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 283 (noting also that “international treaties that embrace 
cosmopolitanism endow States with the primary task of guarding the interests of individuals and 
global society as a whole”).
27 Hannah L. Buxbaum, “National Jurisdiction and Global Business Networks,” Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 17 (2010): 165, 167.
28 Cf. Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998), para. 31 (observing that extraterritorial trade meas-
ures could in principle be justified when the measure concerns a shared resource, of which the 
value of its protection is as such recognized by the international community: “[g]iven the recent 
acknowledgement by the international community of the importance of concerted bilateral or 
multilateral action to protect living natural resources, and recalling the explicit recognition by 
wto Members of the objective of sustainable development in the preamble of the wto Agreement, 
we believe it is too late in the day to suppose that Article XX(g) of the gatt 1994 may be read as 
referring only to the conservation of exhaustible mineral or other non-living natural resources. 
Moreover, two adopted gatt 1947 panel reports previously found fish to be an “exhaustible natu-
ral resource” within the meaning of Article XX(g). We hold that, in line with the principle of ef-
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values. The international dimension encourages29 and “multilateralizes” uni-
lateral action, and nuances its interventionist character. Unilateralism and 
multilateralism should therefore not necessarily be seen as opposites: con-
textualized unilateralism may in fact resemble multilateralism, where the 
unilaterally acting actor enforces multilaterally shared norms and values.30
The persuasiveness of this thesis is obviously a function of the actual ex-
istence of such shared norms, and of an international community of which 
the state purportedly is a guardian. It is an understatement in this respect 
that this notion of “international community” — an “imagined community” 
of principle that transcends borders and of which the members do not know 
each other31 — is a particularly elusive one. Still, the notion is widely used in 
progressive international legal scholarship, where it denotes a community 
premised on common international interests that prevail over individual 
state interests. In international law, the best-known contemporary propo-
nent of the international community and its interests is arguably former In-
ternational Court of Justice judge Bruno Simma, who defined international 
community interests as a “consensus according to which respect for certain 
fundamental values is not to be left to the free disposition of States, indi-
vidually or inter se, but is recognized and sanctioned by international law 
as a matter of concern to all States.”32 This definition, which harks back to 
fectiveness in treaty interpretation, measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether 
living or non-living, may fall within Article XX(g)” (footnotes omitted). See also Friedl Weiss, “Ex-
tra-Territoriality in the Context of wto Law,” in Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority 
in an Age of Globalization, ed. Gunther Handl, Joachim Zekoll, Peter Zumbansen, (Boston and Lei-
den: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 481 (observing in respect of Article XX(g) gatt that trade-restrictive 
environmental measures adopted pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements easier to 
justify than fully unilateral measures).
29 Cf. Daniel Bodansky, “What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and Legiti-
macy,” European Journal of International Law 23 (2012): 651, 660 (citing the transformative effect of a 
characterizing an obligation as an international one: “The existence of an international obligation 
[…] gives domestic actors both within and outside government a ‘hook’ for their arguments”).
30 Pierik and Werner, “Can Cosmopolitanism Survive Institutionalization?,” 286, relying on Jack M. 
Balkin, “Nested Oppositions,” Yale Law Journal 99 (1990): 1669 (drawing attention to the specific 
context in which conceptual opposites receive their meaning, and arguing that “in certain con-
texts concepts may appear to be radically opposed, while in others they may look quite similar”).
31 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Lon-
don and New York: Verso Books, 2006); Addis, “Community and Jurisdictional Authority,” 20. It is 
pointed out that the very fact the its members do not know each other has been used to discredit 
the notion of international community. See Pierik and Werner, “Introduction,” 9–10 (citing the 
critique of cosmopolitanism that “humanity as a whole too large and abstract to evoke genuine 
passions of unity, loyalty and obligation”).
32 Bruno Simma, “From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law,” in Recueil des 
Cours (Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1997), 217, 233 (also expressly including environmental protection as a community 
interest). See against consensualism also icj, Accordance with international law of the unilateral decla-
ration of independence in respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), Declaration of Judge Simma (speaking 
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such ethically-inspired international lawyers as Suarez, Grotius, Vattel, and 
Lauterpacht, who assumed the existence of an “international society” with a 
“general interest,” brackets the principle of state consent and signals that the 
notion of international community has natural law roots.33
The problems with natural law are well-known: universal morality is 
arguably subjective, and enables powerful states to articulate a particularist 
view of it, while downplaying the potential conflict between conceptions 
of natural law held by different actors.34 Grotius himself, for that matter, 
opened his Mare Liberum (1609) with a vehement critique of the great mari-
time nations of the era, Spain and Portugal — whose hold on the oceans had 
out against “anachronistic, extremely consensualist vision of international law, expressed in the 
Lotus judgment”). Also other icj judges have not shied away from referring to the “international 
community,” including in their judicial opinions. Former icj Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui famous-
ly declared in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion that “[t]he resolutely positivist, voluntarist 
approach of international law […] has been replaced by an objective conception of international 
law, a law more readily seen as the reflection of a collective juridical conscience and a response to 
the social necessities of States organised as a community.” See icj, Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (Advisory Opinion), Declaration of Judge Bedjaoui, icj Reports 1996, 1345 (para. 13). Cur-
rent icj Judge Cançado Trindade even has the habit of appending lengthy individual, and often 
dissenting opinions to icj judgments, in which he criticizes the majority for taking the interests of 
the international community, humanity, or justice insufficiently into account (see, e.g., icj, Croatia 
v. Serbia, 2015, diss op Cancado Trindade, para. 2: “I thus present with the utmost care the founda-
tions of my own entirely dissenting position […] guided above all by the ultimate goal of precisely 
the realization of justice”). In fact, many international lawyers have embarked on a reformist pro-
ject to give the interests of the international community a more prominent place in the current 
legal system. Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law in a Post-Realist Era,” 1 (“our discipline has 
implied a program for reforming the present international structures, perhaps to reflect better 
the ‘interests of the world community’”). Note that a journal is also named after it: International 
Community Law Review. 
33 See for probably the earliest legal articulation: See also F. Suarez, Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Leg-
islatore (1612), Book II, ch. 19, § 5 (“Mankind, though divided into numerous nations and states, 
constitutes a political and moral unity bound up by charity and compassion; wherefore, though 
every republic or monarchy seems to be autonomous and self-sufficing, yet none of them is, but 
each of them needs the support and brotherhood of others, both in a material and a moral sense. 
Therefore they also need some common law organizing their conduct in this kind of society”). See 
also Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht. The law 
of Peace. International Law in General, ed. E. Lauterpacht, vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975), 88 (opining that the “relation of the state to the international community was not 
based on self-sacrifice nor blind acceptance of the overriding superiority of the general interest 
of the international society, but enlightened self-interest which admits the advisability in given 
circumstances, of the sacrifice of an immediate sectional interest for the sake of the general inter-
est”). Note that Lauterpacht did not explicitly state that there is an international community that 
could be dissociated from the consent of states; rather he urged states to consensually abandon 
narrow state interests for the sake of the general interest.
34 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1993), 42 (arguing that “there is 
more than one conception of universal morality, and that which of them prevails is relative to 
the strength of the powers that claim and hold the right to articulate it”); Immanuel Wallerstein, 
European Universalism: the Rhetoric of Power (New York: The New Press, 2006) 45 (“there are multiple 
versions of natural law that are quite regularly at direct odds with each other”); Koskenniemi, 
“International Law in a Post-Realist Era,” 8–9 (“Even if we agreed on the need to understand the 
international in terms of interests, we would have difficulty in identifying the subjects whose 
interests count. Is it States, or perhaps ‘peoples.’ human beings or the global ‘community’”).
225
extraterritorial state action in the global interest
to be broken to advance the maritime interests of the Dutch United Provinc-
es — on the ground that they mistook their particularist justice conceptions 
for universal justice.35 Invoking humanity or objective justice may in fact 
just be a front for furthering one’s own subjective preferences and interests.36 
Or as Proudhon and Schmitt have famously pointed out: “whoever invokes 
humanity, wants to cheat.”37 Thus, the question is whether global values 
can really exist in a non-egalitarian world, dominated by Western power in 
particular,38 and characterized by very divergent value conceptions. 
Cosmopolitan political theorists would counter this critique by positing 
that certain values are truly internationally shared: since there is a common 
human nature, there is often no principled disagreement regarding basic 
moral norms, which can be said to converge globally.39 Communities may 
sometimes cherish other ideals, but this may be so because they face different 
scenarios and challenges,40 or because they may be misled by self-interested 
rulers.41 Even where some divergence is noticeable, cosmopolitan philoso-
phers would argue that this can be accommodated within a culturally sensi-
tive universalist framework that affirms a pluralism of values.42 
35 Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum, translated by Ralph van Deman Magoffin as The Freedom of the Seas: 
A Dissertation by Hugo Grotius (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916), 1 (“The delusion is as old 
as it is detestable with which many men, especially those who by their wealth and power exercise 
the greatest influence, persuade themselves, or as I rather believe, try to persuade themselves, 
that justice and injustice are distinguished the one from the other not by their own nature, but 
in some fashion merely by the opinion and the custom of mankind. Those men therefore think 
that both the laws and the semblance of equity were devised for the sole purpose of repressing the 
dissensions and rebellions of those persons born in a subordinate position, affirming meanwhile 
that they themselves, being placed in a high position, ought to dispense all justice in accordance 
with their own good pleasure, and that their pleasure ought to be bounded only by their own view 
of what is expedient. This opinion, absurd and unnatural as it clearly is, has gained considerable 
currency; but this should by no means occasion surprise, inasmuch as there has to be taken into 
consideration not only the common frailty of the human race by which we pursue not only vices 
and their purveyors, but also the arts of flatterers, to whom power is always exposed”). 
36 E.g., Bartelson, Sovereignty as Symbolic Form, 71 (pointing to the danger of universal thinking that 
“whatever is subsumed under the category of the global and its cognates will always necessarily 
reflect particularistic interests and identities, and will thus also represent imperial or hegemonic 
aspirations in disguise”); Ulrich Beck, “War is Peace: On Post-National War,” Security Dialogue 36 
(2005): 5, 15 (arguing that in so-called “humanitarian” military interventions, State interests may 
play a larger role than humanitarian concerns).
37 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 54.
38 Wallerstein, European Universalism, 28 (noting that “we are far from yet knowing what [global 
universal] values are,” which requires “a structure that is far more egalitarian than any we have 
constructed up to now”), observing at 51 that Europeans have considered their universalist claim 
as a scientific “assertion of objective rules governing all phenomena at all moments of time.”
39 Caney, Justice Beyond Borders 45–6.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 49 (pointing out that some disagreement arises from error, selfishness, and indoctrination, 
and that “values can be justified to all persons when those persons’ reasoning is not distorted by 
self-interest, factual mistakes, complacency, and so on”).
42 Ibid., 47 (citing Isaiah Berlin).
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International lawyers steeped in the modern “positivist” tradition, how-
ever, have intuitive reservations about an instinctive reliance on a common 
human nature. In order to escape the risk of subjective determinations, they 
would demand evidence of officially sanctioned commonalities (“state prac-
tice”) before they dare speak about “global values” or an “international com-
munity.” When espousing this positivist mindset, an analysis of relevant 
state practice yields the conclusion that, indeed, some version of an interna-
tional community, although a relatively thin one at that, could be witnessed, 
as states have entering into particular treaties affirming community interests 
that go beyond states’ (joint) immediate interests: a substantial number of 
treaties and customary norms protect interests that are considered as com-
mon to humanity, such as human rights and the environment. These treaties 
and norms do not maximize states’ interests, but limit their scope of action 
to the benefit of their true addressees: a global community consisting of indi-
viduals, the environment, and the global commons. The international com-
munity character of the pertinent treaties is reinforced by the fact that states 
parties to the relevant treaty may have been given the power to invoke the 
responsibility of the violating state on behalf of the international commu-
nity, or at least of the collective state parties to that treaty.43 This non-injured 
state’s “cosmopolitan” right to unilaterally invoke another state’s responsibil-
ity in respect of violations of obligations owed to the international commu-
nity, is laid down as a secondary rule of international law in the International 
Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts (2001).44 These articles codify the erga omnes obligations 
pioneered by the icj in the Barcelona Traction case (Belgium v. Spain, 1970), 
in which the Court held — developing an idea enunciated by Kant in his 
Perpetual Peace 45 — that “the obligations of a State towards the international 
43 Individuals and the environment do not often have the power or capacity to directly call to ac-
count state violators of obligations laid down in the treaty, although some human rights treaties, 
such as the European Convention on Human Rights, provide for standing of individuals before a 
supranational court.
44 Article 48(1)(b) of the Articles. This article provides that any State other than an injured State is 
entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State, among other scenarios, “if the obligation 
breached is owed to the international community as a whole.” The Articles also make reference to 
the “international community” in Article 25(1) regarding necessity as a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness: “Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongful-
ness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: (a) 
is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; 
and (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the 
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.” (emphasis added).
45 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 107–8 (“The peoples of the earth have […] entered in varying degrees into a 
universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of 
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community as a whole” are “by their nature” “the concern of all States,” and 
that, “[i]n view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held 
to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.”46 
This recognition of norms in which the “international community” and 
its constituent parts — states — have an interest, is surely a watershed in in-
ternational law: it is an acknowledgment that international law is not just 
concerned with the interests of states but also those of individuals and the 
international community at large.47 The doctrine of erga omnes enables states 
not injured by violations of international law (e.g., international human 
rights law) to act in a cosmopolitan fashion, and represent the international 
community through the mechanism of invocation of state responsibility. 
Regardless, the international community established by such obligations is 
necessarily a partial one. Given the abiding relevance of the principle of state 
consent to be bound by international legal norms, states are under no obliga-
tion to enter into treaties, or to accept the validity of a customary norm of the 
general international law in the common interest. Thus, legally speaking, the 
positivistic international community is a limited, consent-based one. As long 
as states do not formally sign up to legal commitments, they are not bound, 
and fellow states, posing as guardians of the international community can-
not invoke their responsibility, since legally such an international commu-
nity does simply not exist beyond the treaty or customary law regime. 
This state of affairs may lead to serious collective action problems, where 
(major) states fail to join the protective legal regime, and global values ac-
cordingly do not enter the legal realm. Moreover, even the partial interna-
tional community — or rather communities — established by law, are hardly 
beyond reproach when it comes to addressing collective action problems, 
for a variety of reasons. First, states joining treaty regimes protecting com-
munity interests often only pay lip-service to these interests; they may join 
out of reputational concerns rather than out of conviction.48 Secondly, the 
erga omnes character of the community obligations in practice rarely has the 
consequence that bystander states invoke the responsibility of the violating 
the world is felt everywhere”).
46 icj, Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain) (Second Phase), icj Rep 1970 3, para. 33. 
47 Alex Mills, “Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law 84 
(2014): 187, 213 (although not using the term erga omnes in this respect).
48 Andrew T. Guzman, “Chapter 3: Reputation,” in How International Law Works: A Rational Choice 
Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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state, for obvious political reasons.49 Thirdly, invocation of responsibility, 
when it occurs, rarely has far-reaching consequences, as it is just a speech act 
naming and shaming an alleged violator.50 It does not come with any enforce-
ment powers, except retorsions, unfriendly but lawful measures that states 
can take anyway, even in the absence of a prior breach.51 And fourthly, while 
the characterization of an obligation as erga omnes may foster the legitimacy 
of the exercise of unilateral jurisdiction over a violation of an obligation, it 
does not automatically confer a legal right on states parties to exercise ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction over the violation, unless the treaty contains an 
explicit clause conferring extraterritorial/universal jurisdiction on the states 
parties (some treaties indeed feature such a clause). 
A contradiction may thus be discerned: although erga omnes treaties ap-
pear to offer a high level of protection to community values, and give more 
states the right to address a breach, in practice fewer take the initiative — or, 
as Pauwelyn has observed, “the actual protection of international entitle-
ments is […] inversely related to how strongly international law aims or pre-
tends to be protecting the entitlement.”52 This is not to say that the norms 
enshrined in these treaties are not enforced. Sometimes international courts 
have been established to bring states or individuals to account, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights, which offers direct standing to individual 
49 Joost Pauwelyn, Optimal Protection of International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 190–1 (arguing that no one is willing to invoke the responsibility of others if they are not 
directly harmed, and that the ensuing collective action problem — no one protects the good — is 
the “result of the nature of the subject-matter”). See for a rare example of a state invoking another 
State’s responsibility for violating erga omnes obligations, even before the International Court of 
Justice: icj, Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment 
of July 20, 2012 (Belgium invoking the international responsibility of Senegal for failing to com-
ply with the duty to either prosecute or extradite a presumed torturer present on Senegal’s terri-
tory).
50 Where a bystander State invokes another State’s responsibility before an international court, 
however, the chances that change is brought about, are much higher, as non-compliance within 
binding decision has reputational repercussions for the State proved wrong by the decision. See 
on the role of reputation in inducing compliance with international law: Guzman, How Inter-
national Law Works. For example, after the icj rendered its judgment in Belgium v. Senegal (icj, 
Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment of 20 July 
2012), and found that Senegal had violated its obligations under the un Torture Convention, Sen-
egal established Extraordinary Chambers within its criminal justice system, so as to bring the 
presumed torturer to justice. See Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts 
of Senegal created to prosecute international crimes committed in Chad between June 7, 1982 and 
December 1, 1990 (Unofficial translation by Human Rights Watch), available at http://www.hrw.
org/news/2013/09/02/statute-extraordinary-african-chambers (accessed March 17, 2015).
51 Non-affected States cannot take countermeasures, only “lawful” measures. See International Law 
Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, 
Article 54. Contra: Christian Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 250.
52 Pauwelyn, Optimal Protection of International Law, 194–5.
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plaintiffs, or the International Criminal Court, which has an independent 
prosecutor who can start investigations. And obviously, reputational con-
cerns and fear of sanctions may exert a pull towards compliance. But it re-
mains that the international community obligations confirmed in such trea-
ties are under-enforced. 
Accordingly, the formal international community conception based on 
erga omnes obligations fails in its mission to protect international commu-
nity interests and to address collective action problems — even those which 
the erga omnes regime was precisely supposed to address. It overestimates the 
potential of the invocation of state responsibility as a remedial mechanism 
and does not as such give states a mandate to exercise unilateral jurisdiction 
to protect the said obligations. And it is held hostage by the “anti-commons” 
principle of consent, which allows states not to subscribe to a globally desir-
able collective regime. In other words, we are confronted with the inherent 
limits of a purely positivist approach to international community interests: 
such an approach may fail to ground the exercise of states’ unilateral jurisdic-
tion in the common interest. 
Faced with these limits, and in particular with the collective action prob-
lems relating to international community interests that have not (yet) risen 
to the level of international obligations, recent scholarship, borrowing from 
institutional economics, has cast the international community in non-legal 
global public goods (gpg) terms. gpgs could be defined as goods that are “non-
rival” and “non-excludable,” meaning that no-one can be excluded from their 
benefits and that consumption by one person does not diminish consump-
tion by another. The provision of such goods in not self-evident, as prison-
ers’ dilemmas may prevent necessary multilateral action from being taken. 
Where individual states take action, other states may tend to free-ride, i.e., 
fail to take action but hope to profit from other states’ investment in provid-
ing gpgs. The potential for free-riding behavior may ultimately discourage 
individual state action. However, if such action could bring free-riders with-
in the state’s jurisdictional ambit through extraterritorial jurisdiction, gpgs 
could yet be provided, even without multilateral intervention. Accordingly, 
the gpg approach holds particular promise for legitimating unilateral action 
in the common interest, as the relevant question is not whether states have 
enshrined this interest in international law but rather whether it is expedient 
for such action to be taken so as to avert a perceived threat posed to the gpg. 
In gpg-inspired unilateralism discourse, the end — gpg protection — may 
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justify the means — nonconsensual action. State consent becomes less ma-
terial, and unilateral action is hailed as a mechanism to compensate for 
multilateral regulatory failures,53 and the lack of third-party enforcement in 
international law.54
gpgs have been defined rather broadly. Not only do they include common 
resources or goods that belong to “the common concern of mankind,” such 
as the global climate, the ozone layer, the prevention of pollution, fish stocks, 
and biodiversity,55 they may also cover such “values” as human rights, peace, 
and accountability for international crimes.56 This may render them indis-
tinguishable from “global problems,” i.e., problems that concern the world 
at large, and “cannot be separated into different sub-problems that can be 
solved individually.”57 In this respect, Ralph Michaels has usefully catego-
rized global problems as “global by nature” (e.g., climate change and other 
collective action problems that need to be solved by aggregate efforts of the 
international community), “global by design” (e.g., the globally accessible In-
ternet), and “global by definition,” even if these problems occur within one 
territory (e.g., crimes against humanity, which are directed at humanity at 
large, and thus at what it means to be an international community).58 All 
these problems may arguably be amenable to the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in the common interest. 
53 Krisch, “The Decay of Consent,” 2 (stating that unilateral action appears “more useful for problem 
solving and the effective exercise of power than formal institutions and the increasingly firm and 
demanding processes of multilateral treaty making”). Ibid., 4 (“consent-based structure presents a 
structural bias against effective action on global public goods, especially given the large number 
of foreign states today”); see also, but critically Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of 
International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 87.
54 It is conspicuous that Pauwelyn, after concluding that third-party enforcement does not work, 
suggests as alternatives robust community enforcement, direct standing for private parties, inter-
national procedure against individual criminals, and domestic courts, but not unilateral action 
(Pauwelyn, Optimal Protection of International Law, 196–7).
55 un General Assembly, Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind, 
un Doc A/RES/43/53 (1988), para. 1 (“Recognizes that climate change is a common concern of 
mankind, since climate is an essential condition which sustains life on earth”); Frank Biermann, 
“‘Common Concern of Humankind’: The Emergence of a New Concept of International Environ-
mental Law,” Archiv des Völkerrechts 34 (1996): 426, 449; Thomas Cottier, “The Emerging Princi-
ple of Common Concern: A Brief Outline,” Working Paper No 2012/20, NCCR Trade Regulation 
(2012). Compare with the “common heritage of mankind,” a term used to denote in particular 
areas beyond national jurisdiction, such the deep seabed and the celestial bodies. See, e.g., Treaty 
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Includ-
ing the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
56 See with respect to peace Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 87.
57 Ralf Michaels, “Global Problems in Domestic Courts,” in The Law of the Future and the Future of Law, 
ed. Sam Muller et al. (Oslo: Torkel Opsahl 2011), 167.
58 Ibid., 171 (stating that a crime against humanity “is by definition de-territorialized, simply be-
cause humanity transcends all territoriality,” and terming it a “world event”).
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However collective action failures are precisely characterized, what 
unites these characterizations is that they consider state consent and inac-
tion, and ultimately sovereignty, as threats to the realization and protection 
of gpgs, global interests, or global values.59 It is believed that unilateral action 
may remedy these failures where one state (or group of states such as the 
eu) extends its jurisdiction to include within its ambit foreign-based persons 
subject to an unduly permissive regulatory regime in their home or territo-
rial state. Such unilateral action could be based on a (territorial or personal) 
nexus with the asserting state (e.g., a foreign corrupt person wired the pro-
ceeds of his activities to a bank account located in the state), or on no nexus 
at all, but simply on the underlying global value or interest to be protected 
(e.g., a génocidaire is brought to trial in a state without the latter having any 
territorial or personal connection with the crime or the criminal).
Approaches based on gpgs or global problems attempt to bypass the sub-
jectivity of natural law approaches to the common interest by casting global 
remedial action in terms of efficiency, welfare-enhancement, urgency, or 
even plain human or planetary survival. However, also these approaches can-
not entirely escape the legitimacy problems coming with “subjective” unilat-
eral action. Even where an objective, quasi-scientific consensus exists on the 
good to be protected, unilateral action can cause distributional effects that 
lack international legitimacy in the absence of multilateral consent. States 
exercising unilateral jurisdiction could thus single-handedly decide on a 
global distribution of resources, with major resource allocation shifts being 
brought about as a result of the choice for a specific jurisdictional trigger. For 
instance, a broadly defined territoriality principle which brings foreign eco-
nomic operators within the ambit of the asserting state may shift important 
resources from these operators and their home states to the asserting state.60 
The danger is real here that individual states will in reality be self-serving, 
by bringing about inward shifts of international resources under cover of 
defending the global interest. Having calculated the efforts required to ad-
59 Also Martti Koskenniemi, “What Use for Sovereignty Today?,” Asian Journal of International Law 
1 (2011), 61 (writing that international lawyers have criticized sovereignty from a functional per-
spective on the ground that it fails to deal with global threats).
60 See, e.g., Joanne Scott, “The New eu ‘Extraterritoriality,’” Common Market Law Review 51 (2014): 
1343, with respect to the territorial extension of eu law (arguing that “the eu’s choice of trigger 
bears deeply upon the distribution of the burden of complying with eu law and upon how easy 
this burden is to evade,” and “also impacts significantly upon how great a contribution a measure 
may make to the attainment of its stated objectives as well as upon the distribution of the benefits 
that flow from eu law”).
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dress a global public good challenge, e.g., reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
individual states may well impose disproportionate burdens on foreign opera-
tors and states, e.g., via market access requirements or criminal prosecution. 
Moreover, different global public goods and values may be in tension with 
each other.61 For example, justice considerations, which are arguably served 
by prosecuting human rights offenders, even in the courts of bystander 
states, may be in tension with the imperative to create peace and reconcilia-
tion, which is arguably served by deferring or foregoing prosecution of high-
ranking perpetrators with a vocal constituency. Climate change mitigation 
for its part, which militates in favor of important emissions reductions, even 
if unilaterally imposed via market access requirements, may be in tension 
with the right to social and economic development, which precisely mili-
tates against such reductions. Balancing conflicting public goods and values, 
as well as deciding on issues of burden-sharing, are inherent to global public 
goods or global problems-inspired unilateralism. They are essentially moral 
choices which states make in — what they believe is — the global interest. 
3. the cosmopolitan state as a benevolent hegemon
Where global problems have not been addressed by treaties or multilateral 
institutions, or where treaties or customary law have not conferred remedial 
jurisdiction on states to act in the global interest, pure positivism will equal 
defeatism. Those who believe in humanity’s progress, however, do not con-
sider such defeatism as a viable option in light of contemporary global justice 
and governance challenges. They have, as an alternative, explored the relaxa-
tion of the principle of state consent to the exercise of cosmopolitan jurisdic-
tion. In so doing, they have in essence replaced positivism with naturalism 
as a legitimating doctrine. When advocating natural law, however rationally 
its contents may have been constructed, one should be keenly aware of the 
charges of subjectivism that have been leveled at it. These charges pertain 
particularly to the danger of unilateral hegemonic imposition of the values 
and norms of the powerful on the weak, with the former’s life choices sup-
planting the latter’s.
61 Bodansky, “What’s in a Concept?,” 651, 656 (submitting that “different actors will have different 
preferences about which norm to choose,” and that every choice will accordingly have distribu-
tive consequences).
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But is cosmopolitan unilateralism’s goal of “serving humanity” really a 
thinly disguised attempt at realizing imperialist or hegemonic ambitions, i.e., 
at dominating a weaker group?62 To answer this question, let us first reflect 
on what hegemony actually means. In our times, thanks to Marxist writers 
such as Gramsci and Laclau, it surely has acquired an imperialist connotation 
of one society exercising power over a subordinate society, with the former 
forcing the latter to adapt to its own wishes and its own benefit.63 Etymologi-
cally speaking, however, the Greek word hegemon simply means “leadership” 
or “rule.”64 No one will gainsay that, in order to address global collective action 
problems, some leadership is needed. Such first movers may first want to push 
the envelope at the multilateral level, by convincing other agora participants 
of the need for international action. Yet when these efforts fail to bear fruit as a 
result of myopic anti-cosmopolitan sentiment harbored by those participants, 
unilateral action may be appropriate. Such action need not be hegemonic in 
the domination sense of the word, i.e., interfering on an arbitrary basis with 
the range of options available to another agent.65 Indeed, cosmopolitan action 
is not aimed at subordinating foreign peoples. Instead, it has emancipatory 
and empowering potential, in that it is protective of the human rights of the 
world’s downtrodden or of a neglected natural environment.66
62 Unilateralism indeed generally remains a suspect word, conjuring up images of subjectivism at 
best and colonialism at worst. See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, “Interpreting the Fall of a Monument,” 
German Law Journal 4 (2003): 701, 706 (“justification through international law can, and should be 
replaced by the unilateral, world-ordering politics of a self-appointed hegemon.”); Pierik and Wer-
ner, “Introduction,” 9–10, citing the concern that cosmopolitanism may risk “becoming part and 
parcel of imperialistic policies,” and referring in this respect to Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and 
Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (New York: Routledge, 2007). Note that the terms 
“imperialism” and “hegemony” have also been used in the context of extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
especially as exercised by the us. See Jeffrey Lena and Ugo Mattei, “U.S. Jurisdiction over Conflict 
Arising Outside of the United States: Some Hegemonic Implications,” Hastings International and 
Comparative Law Review 24 (2001): 381, 382 (“[T]he expansionist thrust of the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts […] may be viewed as a sort of legal imperialism”).
63 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (New York and London: Verso, 1985).
64 In ancient Greek times “hegemony” was notably used to denote one city-state’s exercise of lead-
ership over a league of city-states. Sparta, for instance, was the hegemon of the Peloponnesian 
League (6th–4th century bce), Athens was the hegemon of the Delian League (5th century bce), 
and Macedonia was the hegemon of the League of Corinth (4th century bce). See, e.g., Encyclopae-
dia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/ (accessed March 19, 2015).
65 Bartelson, Sovereignty as Symbolic Form, 101.
66 Howse and Teitel, “Does Humanity-Law Require (or Imply) a Progressive Theory of History?,” 377, 
384–5 (admitting that one may perhaps discern kinds of hegemonic power structures underlying 
or supporting “law among liberal nations,” but arguing that this need to be fatal to hopefulness 
concerning the direction of the cosmopolitan project, citing the empowering potential of cosmo-
politanism is the most important point). Ibid., 385 (submitting that worrying on behalf of the 
non-West may in itself be “a form of neo-colonial condescension”).
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To counter the critique of sovereigntists — who would consider cosmo-
politan action as intervening in other states’ internal affairs — such action 
could even be said to strengthen and restore rather than undermine sovereignty. 
One may object that such a strategy necessarily embraces a truncated view 
of sovereignty that isolates desirable, individual autonomy-enhancing as-
pects of sovereignty (democracy, human rights, accountability, the ability 
to deliver public goods) from undesirable aspects (militarization, quest for 
great power status, beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies),67 and in so do-
ing reduce the very analytical purchase of the concept of sovereignty. At the 
same time, however, one can only concur with Bartelson’s observation that 
sovereignty has no meaning apart from its actual function.68 Sovereignty is 
no more than a social construct. In the contemporary era, epistemic forces 
have embedded it in a larger international governance project that requires 
state authority to be exercised “responsibly.” While the international com-
munity may leave a margin of appreciation to states as to the implementa-
tion of responsible authority, the core contours of the concept are defined at 
the international rather than national level. 
Because of capacity advantages, it is obviously more likely that power-
ful states will take the lead to exercise cosmopolitan jurisdiction. This need 
not disqualify them, however, as powerful states are not necessarily intent on 
just furthering their own interests. Powerful states could well be enlightened 
and, as benevolent hegemons, use their stronger enforcement capacities to 
protect international community interests. In fact, precisely because they 
have more power and capacity, in accordance with the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities, it may be incumbent on them to do more 
than others to further the global interest, and thus to behave in — what may 
just in appearance be — a hegemonic fashion.69 Thus, the notion of “power” 
should not be reified, or negatively stereotyped as militating against cosmo-
67 Bartelson, Sovereignty as Symbolic Form, 80 (submitting that “recent strategies for interfering in the 
domestic affairs of states are justified on grounds that such interference is necessary to strengthen 
their sovereignty” and that the concept of sovereignty is disaggregated and unbundled “so that its 
unnecessary or destructive aspects can be eliminated, before the health and useful aspects can be 
glued back together and imposed on the target state”).
68 Ibid., 10 (drawing on the linguistic turn in philosophy and social sciences and stating that “sover-
eignty is what we make of it through our linguistic practices, given the contextual constraints at 
hand”).
69 Cf. Karinne Coombes, “Universal Jurisdiction: A Means to End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly 
International Relations,” The George Washington International Law Review 43, no. 3 (2011): 419, 457 
(“there is the danger that universal jurisdiction may be perceived as hegemonistic jurisdiction 
exercised mainly by some Western powers against persons from developing nations”) (emphasis 
added).
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politan action. Rather, as Howse and Teitel have observed, it may be a shifting 
reality, becoming intertwined with “humanity-law.”70
The view that state power should be used to further the international, 
rather than just the national interest is not new. It was a wildly popular idea 
in dominant progressive internationalist circles in the us in the early 20th 
century, that came to be championed by the us President himself, Woodrow 
Wilson (in office from 1913 through 1921). Triggered by the cataclysm of the 
First World War, Wilson held in his 1914 4th of July address that a great na-
tion such as the us should use its influence and power not for aggrandize-
ment and material benefit only, but to improve the world (“it is patriotic to 
concert measures for one another”).71 For Wilson, confronted with similar 
global governance challenges more than 100 years ago, this task was not just 
a matter of political morality, but of plain historical necessity:72 the very sur-
vival of mankind arguably depended on the us taking the lead. This Wilso-
nian view informed the multilateral establishment of the League of Nations, 
and later the United Nations, but also the taking of us unilateral action to 
spread global values such as democracy and human rights.73
I am the first one to admit that such action has sometimes been heavy-
handed and that “humanity” has been used a pretext for naked power inter-
ventions. But as far as the exercise of cosmopolitan jurisdiction is concerned, 
I do not hesitate to submit that, in various respects, the us has done a great 
service to humanity by extending its laws to address such global ills as cor-
ruption (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act), racketeering (Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organized Act), antitrust conspiracies (Sherman Act), and hu-
man rights violations (Alien Tort Statute) — even if the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has sometimes militated against a wide reach of us leg-
islation. Also the European Union and European states have been serving 
humanity by projecting their environmental legislation abroad (notably to 
counter global warming), and by prosecuting the vilest international crimi-
nals. 
70 Howse and Teitel, “Does Humanity-Law Require (or Imply) a Progressive Theory of History?,” 377, 
396 (citing “the endlessly dynamic relation of law to social reality”).
71 Woodrow Wilson, 4th of July address, July 4, 1914, PWW 30:251.
72 Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 68–9.
73 Before Wilson took office, the us also acted unilaterally, notably in its Latin American backyard 
under the Monroe doctrine. As Ninkevich has pointed out, however, such interventions were 
justified by anxiety about European intervention, or by economic rhetoric, whereas the interven-
tions authorized by the Wilson were justified on the ground that they spread law, order, and de-
mocracy (Ninkevich, The Wilsonian Century, 51–2).
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Critics may go on to object that oftentimes the powerful are not very 
likely to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in the global interest without 
some national interest being present, and that this national interest rationale is 
bound to engender justified international suspicion. In the field of business 
and environmental regulation, for instance, states will typically exercise 
unilateral jurisdiction when (also) the integrity of domestic regulation is un-
dermined, and domestic actors’ rights and interests are affected by foreign 
activity, e.g., where foreign cartels are preying on domestic markets, or for-
eign companies import substandard products.74 This focus on safeguarding 
the business opportunities of domestic operators tends to create an impres-
sion of self-centeredness, arbitrariness,75 exclusivity to the detriment of less 
powerful actors,76 domination,77 or outright legal imperialism.78 One should 
realize, however, that such action is not meant simply to advance, in some 
sort of zero-sum game, one state’s national interest to the detriment of an-
other state’s national interest. Rather, it levels a playing field that has become 
unhinged as a result of globally undesirable lax foreign regulation that puts 
domestic operators, who had already become subject to stricter regulation, at 
a competitive disadvantage. For instance, in the environmental field, the eu, 
in response to market distortions and citizen pressure, has provided for such 
a high level of environmental protection,79 also with respect to global envi-
ronmental goods such as a stable climate, that eu-based businesses have lost 
economic opportunities, which can only be restored by either scaling back 
regulation, or by “extraterritorializing” regulation, i.e., subjecting foreign op-
74 Tonya L. Putnam, “Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of us Extraterritoriality in the 
Regulatory Sphere,” International Organization 63, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 459, 468; Jonathan Tur-
ley, “When in Rome: Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,” 
Northwestern University Law Review 84 (1990): 598.
75 Anthony J. Colangelo, “A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality,” Virginia Law Review 97 (2011): 
1019, 1107 (“Unlike international law, other nations may not have consented to, say, unilateral 
projections of U.S. securities or antitrust laws within their territories, and absent a U.S. nexus, the 
choice of U.S. law appears arbitrary.”)
76 Krisch, “The Decay of Consent,” 31 (“nonconsensualism […] creates more exclusive decision-mak-
ing structures that reduce the number of decision-makers”); Ibid., 39 (nonconsensualism “does 
away only with the consent of the less powerful, and it can easily become a tool of hierarchy and 
control”).
77 Jeffrey A. Meyer, “Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of U.S. Law,” Minnesota Law Review 95 (2010): 110–11 (“A superpower [the us] no longer bent 
on conquering more territory stands to benefit when it instead can unilaterally project its law and 
corresponding enforcement resources to regulate what people do in other countries”).
78 Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? The Evolution of Extraterritoriality in American 
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 224 (submitting that extraterritorial jurisdiction 
“enabl[es] the United States to unilaterally manipulate legal difference so as to better serve its 
interests” while “enhancing American power and interests on the world stage”).
79 Thanks to Natalie Dobson for pointing this out to me.
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erators to eu law in the global interest. Surely, the latter option is preferable 
from an international community vantage point. 
“Hegemonic” actors such as the us or the eu may thus have been first 
movers as far as globally desirable regulation is concerned, subjecting their 
domestic operators to strict rules regarding e.g., accountability for human 
rights violations, corruption, antitrust conspiracies, securities fraud, or cli-
mate change. They subsequently wish to cast the regulatory net wider, so as 
to allow their domestic operators to remain in business, and at the same time 
to more efficiently tackle global problems which may be exacerbated by busi-
nesses moving offshore to evade strict regulation. In this second stage, states 
“extraterritorialize” their laws, but in a manner that is less unilateral than 
may meet the eye.80 Ultimately, they may just be enforcing shared values of, 
or challenges facing the international community, which, moreover, are often 
recognized by various binding or non-binding international instruments.81
4. reinterpreting state consent: beyond formalism
It will have become clear by now that the cosmopolitan action addressed in 
this contribution cannot be captured by orthodox legal positivism that puts 
a high premium on explicit state consent. However, neither is such action 
entirely subjective, pie-in-the-sky, or natural law based. True, where legal and 
political instruments do not confer extraterritorial jurisdictional authority 
on states to enforce the values enshrined in them, the exercise of such author-
ity may transcend the explicit consent of states and thus undermine the main 
80 Hannah L. Buxbaum, “Transnational Regulatory Litigation,” Virginia Journal of International Law 
46 (2006): 251, 255, 268, 298 (arguing that in “transnational regulatory litigation” cases, the us 
domestic regulatory law that is applied extraterritorially, e.g., regarding antitrust, securities, and 
corruption, “reflects an internationally shared norm”). But see opinion Justice Breyer in the Hoff-
mann-LaRoche case, F Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd v. Empagran SA, 542 US 155, 169 (“where foreign injury 
is independent of domestic effects, Congress might have hoped that America’s antitrust laws […] 
would commend themselves to other nations as well […] if America’s antitrust policies could not 
win their own way in the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must assume, 
would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperialism, through legislative fiat”).
81 See e.g., un Convention against Corruption (New York 2004), un General Assembly resolution 
58/4 of October 31, 2003; oecd Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (Paris 1997); Kyoto Protocol to the un Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (1997); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, un General Assembly Resolution 260 (III) A (1948); Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (1998). See as regards cooperation in the field of antitrust law: the International 
Competition Network, which counts 104 competition agencies from 92 jurisdictions (www.in-
ternationalcompetitionnetwork.org). For cooperative networks in the field of securities/capital 
markets regulation: International Organization of Securities Commissions (iosco), the Financial 
Stability Board (fsb), the Council of Securities Regulators of the Americas (cosra), and the Finan-
cial Action Task Force (fatf). 
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tenet of positivism. But as this authority is not made out of thin air, but finds 
its normative basis in international instruments and broadly defined interna-
tional norms and policies, it can still be traced back to the consent of states. 
Most assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction indeed enforce values which 
the community of states have deemed worthy of protection: international 
crimes and human rights violations are proscribed by treaties and customary 
international law, anti-corruption conventions have been widely ratified, and 
global environmental goods (e.g., a stable climate, biodiversity) have been rec-
ognized by a host of legal and political instruments. State consent may pos-
sibly not extend to all procedural issues of enforcement, but the relevant issue 
is that it pertains to certain substantive values. So as to strengthen the impact of 
such values, and eventually the rule of law, states may surely place their legal 
enforcement machinery at the international community’s disposal. 
This view ties in well with recent anti-formalistic legal scholarship that 
emphasizes extra-positivist sources of international law authority, namely 
those based on substantive authority and effectiveness. Nijman and Noll-
kaemper put it as follows:
Part of the answer [as to who or what validates non-positive law sources 
of international law] is found in the fact that deformalization is a paral-
lel development to the emergence of common values. International law 
does not (only) find its authority in binding rules and principles, i.e., in 
conformity with the positivist model, but is in a way more substantive 
since it is grounded on international norms as keepers of universal com-
mon values rather than as binding rules of positive international law. In 
this role, (binding or non-binding) international norms have authority 
because of the values they represent […].82
This reasoning allows us to justify unilateralism on the basis of a legalized 
form of Kantian, deontological ethics,83 as an international norm arguably 
provides the requisite substantive authority for unilateral action. From a 
constructivist international relations perspective, such unilateralism may, 
theoretically at least, be likely to gain acceptance by states, as the existence 
82 Janne Elisabeth Nijman and André Nollkaemper, “Beyond the Divide,” in New Perspectives on the Di-
vide between International and National Law, ed. Nijman and Nollkaemper (Oxford University Press, 
2007), 353.
83 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (Harper and Row Publishers, 1964).
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of the international norm may serve a socializing function and influence the 
perception of legitimate behavior.84
I admit that it may happen that no international norm can be discerned, 
namely where prisoners’ dilemmas have made any agreement on substan-
tive norms well-nigh impossible. Assume, for instance, that an international 
agreement on tackling climate change fails to materialize, even if all scien-
tific evidence shows that collective action should be taken to avert a catastro-
phe. If states take unilateral remedial action, such action may not be justified 
on the basis of codified internationally shared values, let alone on the basis 
of classic international law, as there is simply no substantive norm to be en-
forced. Such action could yet be legitimate, however, insofar as proof is ad-
duced that the consequences of such action may be globally beneficial. This 
view approaches legitimacy not from a deontological, rule-based perspective 
(codified shared values), but rather from a consequentialist or utilitarian ethi-
cal angle, which takes into account an action’s potential to enhance global 
welfare.85 It is submitted that, given the challenges which humanity faces in 
terms of supplying global public goods and providing global justice, value-
based consequentialism may in certain circumstances have to prevail over for-
mal rules.86 Such a position finds its conceptual roots in Max Weber’s “ethics 
of responsibility,”87 and in the legal processes emphasized by the New Haven 
policy-approach to international law.88 
84 Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, “International Law and International Relations: Introduc-
ing an Interdisciplinary Dialogue,” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and Interna-
tional Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Dunoff and Pollack (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 8–12. 
See for an exposition of the relationship between constructivism and international law in the 
same volume: Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, “Constructivism in International Law,” 119–45.
85 See notably the works of the 19th century British philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation (printed for publica-
tion 1780, published 1789) and John Stuart Mill, The Principles of Political Economy: With Some of 
Their Applications to Social Philosophy (1848).
86 Contra Koskenniemi, “What Use for Sovereignty Today?,” 65 (denouncing the anti-formalist na-
ture of contemporary global law, which in his view does no longer protect formal sovereignty, but 
replaces it by “global systems of management” that renders everything “negotiable, revisable in 
view of attaining the right outcome”).
87 Max Weber, “Politik als Beruf (1918/19),” in Gesammelte politische Schriften, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr, 1971), 550 (“You should resist evil with force, otherwise you are responsible for its getting 
out of hand.”)
88 See for the seminal work of the New Haven School, emphasizing processes over formal rules: 
Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, “The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems 
of Public Order,” in Studies in World Public Order 3, ed. M.S. McDougal et al. (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1960). Contra: Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 485 (decrying this instrumentalism that replaces formal law by a wider 
standard policy guideline and the “values of liberal democracy”).
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Admittedly, this position abandons explicit state consent in the strict 
positivist sense of the word. However, consequentialist action may find its le-
gitimation in states’ constructive consent, inferred from Rawls’s method of the 
“veil of ignorance.” Rawls’s moral theory puts agents in an “original position” 
where “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; 
nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abili-
ties, his intelligence and strength, and the like.”89 Personal tastes, self-interest, 
and power differentials disappear in this constellation, and genuine moral 
choices will be made. Just like individuals, ignorant of what position they 
will hold upon entering society, will not normally choose a slave-owning so-
ciety (where they could well end up on the receiving end), ignorant states are 
unlikely to want to enter a society characterized by environmental disaster, 
international crimes, rampant corruption, and corporate abuses. One can in-
stead presume that they would a priori give their consent to an international 
society that is based on some minimum rules of conduct. From this perspec-
tive, the empirical reality that states, for self-interested reasons, do not give 
their actual consent to the protection of a global value, nor of states’ right to 
extraterritorially protect the value, is not decisive. Key is that in the origi-
nal position, states, for reasons of rational morality, would have given their 
consent if their vision had not been clouded by particularist considerations. 
Consent is, like sovereignty, an enduring cognitive script that may require 
some reinterpretation in light of current governance challenges. The rein-
terpretation that I have propounded here, based on the urgency of the chal-
lenges and the method of the veil of ignorance, allows international law to 
progressively develop beyond its rudimentary state. In the Grotian tradition, 
as also espoused by Hersch Lauterpacht, reason, ethics, and the law of nature 
may demand that international legal action be taken beyond the express will 
of states.90 For our research object, this means that asserted hold-outs” resort 
to “reasons of state” so as to block the taking of necessary multilateral action 
in the common interest should not be rewarded. In order to respond to such 
multilateral blockage, the development of international law should arguably 
89 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1999), 118.
90 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law,” British Yearbook of International 
Law 23 (1946): 1, 21–22, relying on Grotius’s De Jure Belli ac Pacis (“The significance of the law of 
nature in the treatise is that it is the ever-present source for supplementing the voluntary law of 
nations, for judging its adequacy in the light of ethics and reason, and for making the reader aware 
of the fact that the will of states cannot be the exclusive or even, in the last resort, the decisive 
source of the law of nations.”)
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be geared toward relaxing the principles of non-intervention and territorial 
jurisdiction, so that unilateral action could more easily be taken. 
5. concluding observations
In this contribution I have supported the exercise of unilateral, extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction by states in the common interest, on the ground that cosmo-
politan consequentialism requires us to take substance rather than formality 
seriously. Therefore, classic international law notions such as “consent” and 
“sovereignty” are in need of reinterpretation so that they can facilitate and 
not inhibit the realization of global values and global public goods.
I am cognizant of the dangers of domination and abuse that go with an 
authorization to act unilaterally. But at the end of the day, allowing action 
in the common interest may surely be preferable to prohibiting altogether. 
States and regional organizations acting unilaterally in the common inter-
est, as benevolent hegemons, may thus have to be applauded rather than 
criticized. Practice shows that such applause may be forthcoming indeed. For 
instance, when in 2015 us prosecutors indicted fifa officials under us rack-
eteering laws for accepting foreign bribes, international opinion was largely 
supportive of, and grateful to the us for cleaning up international football.91 
That being said, to counter the abuse of unilateralism, techniques that miti-
gate the impact of extraterritorial action on the addressees — foreign states, 
individuals, and operators — may have to be explored. This exploration is 
beyond the scope of this article, but it is tentatively suggested that, in light of 
democratic theory, foreign addressees’ participation in the domestic design 
of such action may go quite some way to limit self-serving behavior,92 and 
eventually reinforce the legitimacy of cosmopolitan extraterritoriality.
91 Anon., “The World’s Lawyer: America’s Legal Reach,” The Economist, June 6, 2015; John Gapper, 
“America is the Best Referee to Discipline fifa,” Financial Times, May 27, 2015.
92 Eyal Benvenisti, “Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign 





born in the Jewish 
ghetto of Prague in 
1883 and died in a sanato-
rium near Vienna in 1924. His 
education was that of the upwardly 
mobile middle class, complete with Ger-
man rather than Czech language schooling 
and a bar mitzvah conducted in the style of the 
secularized German-speaking reform Jews, before he 
settled into professional life as an insurance underwriter. His 
literary work portrays the bureaucratic weight of his native city 
struggling with modernity, lost cultural identity, generational conflict, 
and a world in which everyone is a silent worker at an overburdened desk.
1. when the colony goes penal
It is common wisdom for international lawyers to consider the emergence 
of a political entity from colonial or dominion status to independence and 
sovereignty to connote full participation in the international legal system,1 
with all the rights and obligations that thereby attach.2 Thus, for example, 
while English colonies prior to independence could exercise substantial self-
government they did not possess international legal personality3 and could 
not exploit or regulate their resources and territory without some act of 
 Originally published as Ed Morgan, “Franz Kafka: Extraterritorial Criminal Law,” in The Aesthetics 
of International Law  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 73–95. © University of Toronto 
Press 2007. Reprinted with permission of University of Toronto Press. 
1 Island of Palmas Case [Netherlands v. United States], R.I.A.A. 2, 829 (P.CI.J. 1928) (“Sovereignty in the 
relations between States signifies independence). See also “European Community Guidelines on 
the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,” British Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law 62 (1991): 559. 
2 E.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, Appendix to Charter of the United Nations, art. 
34 (1) (“Only states may be parties in cases before the Court”); Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), art. 1 (“The present convention applies to treaties 
between States”).
3 Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1969] 1 A.C. 645 (P.C.) (Southern Rhodesia colony lacks external 
sovereignty). See generally J. Fawcett, The British Commonwealth in International Law (London: Lon-
don Institute of World Affairs, 1963), 144 et seq.






delegation from the imperial government.4 Likewise, provinces and states, 
as federal sub-units, typically lack the competence to legislate extraterritori-
ally5 or to exhibit other external badges of sovereignty.6
For Canada, the 1982 patriation of the constitution from the United 
Kingdom7 and the accompanying achievement of permanent constitutional 
independence,8 spoke not only to a new political stature but to a conform-
ance of the nation with the requirements of international law.9 For lawyers 
in particular, the changes had normative as well as formal significance, the 
amended constitution containing for the first time entrenched protections 
for individual rights broadly reflective of human rights standards.10 Thus, the 
Charter of Rights era began with enormous promise for the convergence of 
international norms with the country’s new constitutionalism. Indeed, the 
first several years of jurisprudence under the new constitution saw the Su-
preme Court of Canada reject the common law’s unlimited police powers in 
favor of a “purposive” reading of search and seizure rights in Fourth Amend-
ment terms.11 The Court also curtailed the historically unrestricted power 
of immigration officials by incorporating Canada’s international obligations 
under various United Nations refugee conventions.12 Several decades down 
the constitutional law road, however, lawyers and courts have more often 
4 North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, 11 R.I.A.A. 167 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910) (Great Britain responsible 
for territorial seas around Newfoundland colony).
5 Interprovincial Cooperatives v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477 (no extraprovincial legislative compe-
tence for Canadian provinces); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 29 (1948) (no extraterrito-
rial enforcement for U.S. states).
6 On extraterritorial legislative authority as a badge of international personality see B.C. Electric 
Railway v. R., [1046] A.C. 527 (Canadian federal government can impose income tax, if it wishes, 
on the entire world).
7 Canada Act, 1982, s. 2 (“No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982 comes into force shall extend to Canada as part of its law”). On the permanence 
of such a “patriating” enactment, see Ndlwana v. Hofnzeyr, [1937] AD. 229, 237 (“Freedom, once 
conferred, cannot be revoked”).
8 For the full legal history of Canadian independence from the United Kingdom, see Peter W. Hogg, 
“Patriation of the Canadian Constitution,” Queen’s Law Journal 8 (1983): 123 and “Supremacy of the 
Charter,” Canadian Bar Review 61 (1983): 69.
9  On the international law requirement that a sovereign be constitutionally uninhibited in its ex-
ercise of power see Austro-German Customs Union Case (Advisory Opinion), [1931] P.C.I.J. Ser. A /B, 
No. 41 (Austrian sovereignty depends on maintaining complete independence).
10  On the process of rights entrenchment, see Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 
2000), s. 33.2 (“Protection of Civil Liberties”), and Peter Russell, “The Political Purposes of the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” Canadian Bar Review 61 (1983): 30. The Charter of Rights 
portion of the amended constitution is Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 15.
11 Hunter v. Southam, Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
12 Re Singh and Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
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invoked the earlier “purposive” approach to rights interpretation to narrow 
rather than to expand the scope of constitutional rights.13
It is my ambition in this chapter to trace the ebb of constitutionalism 
against the flow of internationalism, focusing on those areas in which they 
have most starkly intersected. To that end, I undertake an assessment of two 
phenomena that sit at the confluence of criminal process and international 
norms: extradition in the face of domestic constitutional defenses, and do-
mestic criminal prosecution in the face of foreign violations of constitution-
al rights. The chapter focuses on Canada as the place where the confluence 
of factors — emerging constitutional stature and increasing international en-
gagement — is most stark. The goal of the exercise is to discern the force of an 
increasingly internationalist set of arguments on a simultaneously emerging 
constitutionalism, all in an effort to explain how these two thematic team-
mates have been transformed into apparent competitors.
This chapter also explores the most salient themes of Franz Kafka’s fa-
mous story of violence and punishment, “In the Penal Colony.”14 On its most 
superficial level, Kafka’s story presents a direct confrontation between crimi-
nal punishment, personified by the officer who administers with mathemati-
cal precision the penal outpost’s renowned execution apparatus,15 and con-
stitutional rights, personified by the explorer who brings the outside world’s 
critique to the cruel and unusual practice of the colony.16 On a slightly more 
abstract reading, the officer’s demonstrative lecture and impassioned justifi-
cation of his execution machine, which forms the central portion of the sto-
ry, parodies the logic of justice and the violence of punishment. Perhaps most 
importantly, Kafka’s story narrates a contest between the parochial officer 
and the international explorer, the archaic colony of the officer’s Old Com-
13 See, e.g., Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, para. 33.7(d) (“The effect of a purposive approach 
is normally going to be to narrow the scope of the right”), citing Law Society of Upper Canada v. 
Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357 (mobility rights do not guarantee a right to work); and Andrews v. 
Law Society of British Colombia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (equality rights only protect against discrimi-
nation on enumerated or analogous grounds). See also Baker v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (Immigration Act need not be interpreted consistently with international 
convention, but international law has some persuasive power in interpreting domestic statute).
14 Franz Kafka, “In the Penal Colony,” in The Penal Colony: Stories and Short Pieces, trans. Willa and 
Edwin Muir (New York: Schocken Books, 1948). The extended analogy with Kafka’s story of pain 
and violence is suggested for any number of reasons, not the least of which is that, as Robert Cover 
observed, “legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.” Robert Cover, “Violence 
and the Word,” Yale Law Journal (1986): 1601.
15  Kafka, In the Penal Colony, 192 (“the officer made the last adjustment with great zeal, whether be-
cause he was a devoted admirer of the aparatus or because of other reasons the work could be 
entrusted to no one else”).
16 Ibid., 191 (“The explorer did not much care about the apparatus…”).
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mandant and the progressive metropole of the explorer’s New Commandant; 
these identities of old/local and new/international correspond to competing 
portraits of an idealized past and a theatrical present nature of the law.
The operating theory presented here is that when constitutionalism 
meets internationalism, pivotal role reversals take place. These reversals gen-
erally parallel developments taking place in international law itself. Thus, 
for example, in international law there has been a movement back and forth 
on the nature of the fundamental normative debate. At times it is a contest 
between normative insularity and normative universality;17 at other times 
it is a contest between isolationism and cooperation among states.18 Do-
mestically, there has been a parallel movement transforming international 
law’s status from the soft, naturalist support for entrenched constitutional 
reform,19 to that of the hard-bitten, positivist counterweight to constitution-
al activism.20 These role reversals take on ideological qualities within legal 
debate. Thus, arguments styled as progressively internationalist have played 
the regressive constitutional law role, while those styled as parochially do-
mestic have played the role of expanded, universal constitutionalism.
Like the doctrinal positions revealed in the case law, the world of Franz 
Kafka is notoriously propelled by metamorphosis; indeed, his characters’ 
days begin with pivotal change: human to insect,21 freedom to captivity.22 
The reversals not only come as a surprise, but are themselves reversible: a 
performing artist stages his transformation to inanimate object of art, only to 
be replaced by a caged spectacle brimming with animal life.23 In the field of 
17 This debate is most graphically illustrated by the pair of 1943 Supreme Court of Canada judg-
ments: Reference re Foreign Legations, [1943] S.C.R. 208 (foreign sovereigns insulated from Canadian 
taxation by virtue of international law) and Reference re Members of the Military or Naval Forces of the 
United States, [1943] S.C.R. 487 (Canadian criminal law embodies universal norms, and, applies to 
armed forces of foreign sovereign).
18 This dichotomy is most succinctly set out in Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Venne, [1971] S.C.R. 997 (per Laskin, J., dissenting) (“Neither the independence nor the dignity of 
States, nor international comity require vindication through a doctrine of absolute immunity”).
19 This approach, which characterizes the early Canadian Charter cases, was historically evident as 
far back as Lord Mansfield. See Heathfield v. Chilton (1767), 4 Burrow 2015 (“The law of nations will 
be carried as far in England, as anywhere”).
20 It is this movement that is described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, below.
21 Kafka, “Metamorphosis,” in The Penal Colony, 67 (“As Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from un-
easy dreams he found himself transformed in his bed into a gigantic insect”).
22  Kafka, The Trial, trans. W. and E. Muir (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 1 (“Someone must have 
been telling lies about Joseph K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one 
fine morning”).
23 Kafka, “A Hunger Artist,” in The Penal Colony, 255 (“‘Well, clear this out now!’ said the overseer, and 
they buried the hunger artist, straw and all. Into the cage they put a panther”). For a discussion of 
the relationship between “In the Penal Colony” and its portrayal of punishment, and “A Hunger 
Artist” and its portrayal of the self-punishment, see Margot Norris, “Sadism and Masochism in “In 
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law — a field with which Kafka was much concerned24 but viewed as difficult 
to access25 — subject and object, judge and judged, pleasure and pain, reason 
and passion, justice and injustice, are all theatrically reversed. Thus, for ex-
ample, the interchangeable acts of violence and judgment are accomplished 
in the penal colony by means of the execution apparatus, which literally per-
forates the convict with the description of his offense, turning him into a 
living (dying) text of the law. It is this ultimate metamorphosis, whereby the 
law’s subject matter becomes nothing more than its own dramatic script that 
sheds understanding on an otherwise inscrutable process in which surpris-
ing role reversals are the norm.26 To achieve this understanding of the issues 
at hand one must therefore engage in one final reversal, looking through a 
lawyer’s eyes at Kafka’s story and its analytic insights, and through Kafka’s 
eyes at the law’s development and its storyline.
2. internationalism and constitutionalism
When it comes to criminal law in the Anglo-Canadian courts, the trend to-
wards internationalism can perhaps best be summed up by Kafka’s guiding 
rule: “Guilt is never to be doubted.”27 In areas as diverse as robbery,28 drug 
trafficking,29 and securities fraud,30 the courts have been unhesitant in their 
desire to expand the geographic bounds of prosecutions. In this line of cases 
national jurisdictions become, in Justice La Forest’s words, their “brothers’ 
keepers”31 to the misfortune of those globetrotting defendants collectively 
portrayed as “an unholy alliance organized in modern trappings.”32 The real 
test, however, is not so much in the issue of jurisdiction itself, but in the field 
of cross-border process rights. It is here that the expanding international rub-
the Penal Colony” and “A Hunger Artist”” in Reading Kafka: Prague, Politics and the Fin de Siècle, ed. 
Mark Anderson (New York: Schocken Books, 1989), 170–86.
24 Michael Muller, “Kafka, Casanova and The Trial,” in Reading Kafka, 189 (“This author who repeat-
edly thematizes the most diverse punishments — letting ‘judgments’ be passed, visiting ‘penal 
colonies,’ and populating his poetic world with judges, lawyers, and executioners - held in his 
hands the authentic account of a punishment that had been carried out”).
25 See, e.g., Kafka, “Before the Law,” in The Penal Colony, 148 (“Before the law stands a doorkeeper”).
26 Kafka, “In the Penal Colony,” 202 (“Of course the script can’t be a simple one […] So there have to be 
lots and lots of flourishes around the actual script; the script itself runs round the body only in a 
narrow girdle; the rest of the body is reserved for the embellishments”).
27 Ibid., 198.
28 Ecrement v. Cusson and Connolly (1919), 33 C.C.C. 135 (Que. S.C.).
29 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot, [1973] A.C. 807.
30 Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178.
31 Ibid.
32 Shulman v. The King (1946), 2 C.R. 153, 156.
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ber meets the travelling constitutional road. It is therefore to the Charter of 
Rights, and to its encounter with international crime and with international 
law, that this chapter turns.
2.1 Extradition: Growth of the International
From a constitutional law point of view, Canada’s international stature can 
be traced to a succession of enactments importing a progressive increase in 
sovereign capacity. Thus, while the provinces can be seen in pre-Confedera-
tion case law as engaging in international relations pertaining to matters of 
extradition and cross-border crime,33 they did so under the sovereign shelter 
of the British government’s treaty-making powers.34 With the confirmation 
of dominion status under the Statute of Westminster,35 the international pow-
ers denied those maintaining colonial status36 were affirmed for Canada, al-
lowing the country a youthful, exuberant measure of extraterritorial regula-
tion and offshore claims.37
The next stage in constitutional maturity, patriation from the imperial 
parent,38 was, like a sovereign’s coming of age, accompanied by a measure of 
previously unattained self-discipline in the form of the Charter’s restrictions 
on state action.39 And while the constitutional innovation did not eliminate 
the trappings of sovereignty,40 it did impose limits on government authority 
that had previously only been bolstered by international law.41 The country’s 
new rights oriented constitutionalism, therefore, engaged the country’s in-
33 E.g., Re Burley (1865), 60 B.F.S.P. 1241, 1261 (U.C.C.A.).
34 Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario (“The Labour Conventions Case”), [1937] 
A.C. 326 (P.C.) (“While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters […]”). 
See also Constitution Act; 1867, s. 132 (“All powers necessary or proper for performing the obliga-
tions of Canada, or of any Province thereof, as part of the British Empire, towards foreign coun-
tries, arising under treaties between the Empire and such foreign countries”).
35 1933 (U.K.), 22 Geo. V, c. 4.
36 For discussion of the territorially restricted criminal law powers of a British colony, see MacLeod 
v. Attorney General for New South Wales, [1891] A.C. 455 (P.C.) (“All crime is local”); as it pertained to 
British North America, see Re Bigamy (1897), 27 S.C.R. 461.
37 Reference Re Newfoundland Continental Shelf, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86 (offshore regulation); Reference Re 
Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 388 (offshore ownership).
38 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act; 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 
15. For the discussion of the partiation process, see Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution 
(the “Patriation Reference”), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.
39 Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (interpretation of rights must be “a generous 
rather than a legalistic one aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for indi-
viduals the full benefit of the Charter’s protection”).
40 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357 (constitutional mobility rights do not 
extend to cross-border mobility).
41 Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481, 491 (S.C.C.) (“I have no doubt that 
the executive branch of the Canadian Government is duty bound to act in accordance with the 
dictates of the Charter”).
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ternational stature at precisely the point of tension between muscle power 
and mind control, creating a hormonally charged contest between those who 
would subdue others and those who would themselves be subdued.
The applicant in Schmidt v. The Queen42 raised a challenge that, for appar-
ently the first time, pitted an extradition request against the constitutional 
guarantee against double jeopardy in the criminal process.43 The case arose 
as a result of the desire of the United States for the return of the fugitive from 
her place of refuge in Kirkland Lake, Ontario, for the purposes of conducting 
a second trial on a charge that was virtually identical to one on which she 
had already been acquitted.44 While there was some debate in the case over 
the precise definitions of the respective federal and state offenses for which 
extradition was sought,45 it was equally clear that the two charges arose from 
the identical incident, put in issue the identical allegations, and, had both 
been pursued in Canada, would in all probability, have led to a defense of 
autrefois acquit.46
Schmidt was accused in the United States of having abducted a two-year-
old girl from a sidewalk in Cleveland, Ohio, taking her to New York, and rais-
ing her as her own daughter for several years, all in the mistaken belief that 
the girl was the illegitimate child of her own son who had abandoned her 
as an infant.47 At her trial on us federal kidnapping charges Schmidt admit-
ted the factual allegations but was acquitted by a jury based on her defense 
of mistake of fact. Then, while a parallel state charge of “child stealing” was 
still pending, Schmidt escaped to Canada, where she was arrested a month 
later. Extradition proceedings were commenced almost immediately under 
the relevant statute and treaty provisions.48
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, it was understood that if ex-
tradited to face the State of Ohio prosecution, Schmidt would be unable to 
42 (1987), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
43 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11 (“Any person charged with an offence has the right 
(h) if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found guilty and 
punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again”).
44 The fugitive’s first trial had been for the us federal offense of “kidnapping” under the United States 
Code, § 18. The second charge, for which extradition was sought, was for the state offense of “child 
stealing” under the Revised Code of Ohio, s. 2905.04.
45 Schmidt, 202 (“The two charges have some similarities but they also have important differences”).
46 The lower court hearing the habeas corpus application at first instance reasoned that the fact that 
a defense can be raised in Canada is not in itself a valid reason for refusing extradition. Schmidt v. 
The Queen (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 409 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
47 The background facts are recounted in the judgment of Justice La Forest in Schmidt at 202–3.
48 Extradition Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-21; Extradition Treaty Between Canada and the United States of 
America, Canada Treaty Series 1976, No. 3.
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raise a plea of double jeopardy under the American constitution, notwith-
standing her acquittal on a substantially similar federal charge. While the 
us courts have found repetitive prosecutions at the state level to constitute 
harassment and a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due 
process,49 the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause itself applies only 
to federal prosecutions and therefore does not protect against subsequent 
exposure to state proceedings. Accordingly, the appeal went forward on the 
assumption that a constitutional defense in Canada, if permitted, would be 
her one and only opportunity to raise an issue that the English courts have 
placed at the core of the common law’s notions of procedural justice.50
The first problem encountered by the Supreme Court, therefor, was to 
identify which side of the United States–Canada border the constitutional 
right claimed by Schmidt could credibly call home. Since the Court had 
determined several years previously that the Charter does not apply to the 
actions of foreign government,51 it was necessary as a first step in the consti-
tutional logic to characterize the site of the asserted breach. This, however, 
was easier said then done. It was not difficult to find a site for the double jeop-
ardy: rather, the facts offered an embarrassment of riches. While the doctrine 
made it imperative to determine the location of the governmental wrong, 
there was no one perspective on this location question that truly objective 
observer could say identified the place of the right. 
By a way of illustration, for Justice Wilson in her separate opinion in 
Schmidt, recognizing Canadian Charter rights in the Canadian extradition 
hearing, and applying the Charter to the discretionary powers of the Cana-
dian executive branch, came as naturally as any other constitutional ruling. 
In her words, “the effect is right here in Canada, in the Canadian proceed-
ings, although it will, of course, have repercussions abroad. But there is noth-
ing wrong in this.”52 The issue for Justice Wilson, in other words, was not 
so much weather the Canadian constitutional ruling would give the Charter 
of Rights extraterritorial effect, but rather whether the extradition treaty on 
which the proceedings were founded could legally trump the constitutional 
restrains imposed on the very government that entered the treaty in the first 
49 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
50 See Atkinson v. United States of America, [1971] A.C. 197 (uk extradition court has jurisdiction to 
entertain plea of autrefois acquit).
51 Spencer v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278.
52 Schmidt, 199 (Wilson, J. differed from the majority on the constitutional issue, but concurred in 
the result based on separate grounds).
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place. Of paramount importance was not cooperation of the Canadian au-
thorities with their American counterparts in the bringing the fugitive to 
justice, but the cooperation of the Canadian courts with their own governing 
and supreme constitutional norms. “If the participation of a Canadian court 
or the Canadian government is required in order to facilitate extradition so 
that the suspected criminals may be brought to justice in other countries,” 
wrote Justice Wilson, “we must face up to the question whether such persons 
have the benefit of the Charter or not in the Canadian proceedings.”53 Geogra-
phy, it would seem, depends very much on point of view. 
By contrast, for Justice La Forest and the Supreme Court majority, the 
starting point of the analysis was that “a fugitive at an extradition hearing 
[is] not being charged with an offense, certainly not by the Government of 
Canada.”54 Mimicking the style adopted by Justice Wilson, the non-applica-
tion of the Canadian constitutional rights was portrayed by Justice La Forest 
as simply a natural consequences of the foreign site of the substantive pro-
ceedings to come. Thus, comparing his own ruling favorably with its Ameri-
can cognate, he stated matter-of-factly that, like section 11(h) of the Charter, 
the Fifth Amendment right “not to be twice put in jeopardy,” has been held 
to be available only in the United States.55 The opening words of section 11 
of the Charter — “any person charged with an offence” — in other words, 
the textual source of all of Canada’s constitutionalized criminal procedure 
rights, were interpreted as being applicable only to those charges under a 
Canadian-defined substantive offense. Again, location of the right is entirely 
contingent on the initial perspective that the viewer brings to bear. Under 
the circumstances, what the Court found could only accurately be called a 
double jeopardy.
Justice La Forest’s primary point, however, was that extradition, like 
all transnational legal process, requires respect for the foreign system even 
when measured against applicable domestic constitutional norms. Thus, he 
reasoned, “the judicial process in a foreign country must not be subjected 
to finicky evaluations against the rules governing the legal process in this 
country”56 — the demands of the Charter’s section 11 apparently being the 
finickiest of all. According to Justice La Forest and the Schmidt majority, such 
53 Ibid., 200 (emphasis in the original).
54 Ibid., 212 (Dickson, C.J.C. and Beetz, McIntyre, and LeDain, JJ. concurred with Justice La Forest).
55 Ibid., citing Re Ryan, 360 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
56  Schmidt, 214.
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minor nuances as “the presumption of innocence or, generally, [the] proce-
dural or evidentiary safeguards [of the Charter]”57 should not stand in the way 
of the Court’s accommodation of a foreign system whose workings may not 
exhibit the finer points of technical detail that we have come to expect at 
home. “Any other approach,” reasoned Justice La Forest, “would seriously im-
pair the effective functioning of a salutary system for preventing criminals 
from evading the demands of justice in one country by escaping to another.”58
Having reduced constitutional protections to technicalities for which 
there is no room in an environment of comity, effectively closing the coun-
try’s constitutional principles to the outside world, Justice La Forest then pro-
ceeded to characterize his own approach as one of liberal openness. Taking 
his lesson from nineteenth-century English legal history, and the near evis-
ceration of the extradition process through narrow judicial interpretation,59 
Justice La Forest contrasted what he viewed as the contemporary trend to-
wards opening up a legal process to the rest of the family of nations. Far from 
his historically narrow views espoused by extradition courts, contemporary 
tendencies were portrayed as giving the underlying treaties “a fair and lib-
eral interpretion.”60 Likewise, far from the avoidance of international duty 
implied by the nineteenth-century tendency to strictly “enforce the rights 
of the fugitives brought before the extradition courts, the contemporary ap-
proach is accomplished “with a view to fulfilling Canada’s obligations.”61 Ul-
timately, the Schmidt majority articulated the perceived need for “reducing 
the technicalities of criminal law to a minimum”62 as if the procedural rights 
of the accused were an obstacle to the progressive liberalism of contempo-
rary treaty interpretation, and advocated “trusting the courts in the foreign 
country to give the fugitive a fair trial […] including the dictates of due pro-
cess generally,”63 as if international cooperation in prosecutions replaces 
expansive constitutional rights in order to protect those very rights. Tak-
ing comfort in what were characterized as a parallel set of us constitutional 
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 215.
59 Ibid., citing Sir Edward Clarke, A Treatise Upon the Law of Extradition, 4th ed. (London: Stevens & 







rulings,64 Justice La Forest interpreted the Charter’s procedural protections 
away into nothing in the name of progressive liberalism in international law.
The theme of internationalism in the criminal process was repeated, with 
a slight doctrinal twist, in what has become the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
leading extradition case, U.S.A. v. Cotroni.65 Writing again for the majority and 
again taking on Justice Wilson in dissent, Justice La Forest this time cham-
pioned the force of extradition treaties over the right of Canadians, under 
section 6(1) of the Charter, to remain in the country at their own will. And 
what is more, he did so, he indicated, out of a fundamental respect for consti-
tutional values themselves. Thus, he opined, “extradition serves to promote a 
number of values that are central to a free and democratic society […] having 
in mind that crime should not go unpunished,”66 the idea apparently being 
that while criminal prosecutions are the stuff of constitutional jurispru-
dence, criminal defenses are not.
The facts of Cotroni started out promising enough for the defense, but ul-
timately clinched the victory for the requesting state. As recounted by Justice 
La Forest, Cotroni himself was a Canadian citizen, all of whose alleged crimi-
nal conduct took place in the confines of his Montreal home.67 As made clear 
in the parliamentary committee debates in which section 6(1) of the Charter 
was considered,68 and as can be discerned by comparison to other human 
rights instruments that provide for a more circumscribed right of mobility,69 
and as articulated in the relatively limited prior case law,70 the right to re-
main as an subset of mobility rights generally rests on “the intimate relation-
ship between a citizen and his country.”71 Indeed, it was this national bond 
that was stressed by Justice Wilson in her dissent; not only had the fugitive 
never voluntarily left his country of citizenship, but the very accusations at 
64 See Galling v. Fraser, 177 E Supp. 856 (2d Cir. 1960) (extradition to Italy granted despite contention 
that fugitive’s conviction in absentia contrary to due process); and Neely v. Henkel (No. 1), 180 U.S. 
109,122 (1901) (constitutional provisions relating to writ of habeas corpus, bills of attainder, ex 
post facto laws, trial by jury for crimes, and guarantee of life, liberty, and property “have no relation 
to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign 
country”).
65 (1989), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 193.
66 Ibid., 213–14, quoting Re Federal Republic of German and Rauca (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 385,406 (Ont. 
C.A.).
67 For a description of the background facts, see Cotroni, 209.
68 See Debates of the House of Commons, January 1981,41–118.
69 See European Convention on Human Rights, 4th Protocol, art. 3(1); International Covenant On 
Civil and Political Rights, art. 12; Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III, s. 2(a).




issue in the extradition hearing represented an exercise in extraterritorial 
law enforcement by the United States.72
On the other hand, the second sentence of Justice La Forest’s recitation of 
the facts seemed to go a long way towards ending the controversy over the as-
serted right to remain in Canada. Stressing the fact that Cotroni’s extradition 
was sought by the United States “on a charge in that country of conspiracy 
to possess and distribute heroin,”73 Justice La Forest placed the fugitive in a 
category of near statelessness. Since the early 1970s, with the House of Lords’ 
specific assertion that “crime is an international problem — perhaps not 
least crimes connected with the illicit drug traffic,”74 narcotics offenses have 
taken on a character that overrides most domestic legal concerns. While in 
the ordinary course criminal law might be a facet of legal process that is juris-
dictionally restricted to the society in which the alleged offense occurred,75 
and, indeed, is grounded in the local community vindicating itself through 
prosecution of the crime,76 drug trafficking has detached itself from any such 
local roots to become a universal legal problem. Cases that fall into this cat-
egory transcend any one society much as the search for truth itself does. The 
“interests of society,” reasoned Justice La Forest, are found in cases such as Co-
troni insofar as they aspire to nothing more and nothing less than “to discover 
the truth in respect of the charges brought against the accused.”77
For Justice Wilson in dissent, constitutionalism was the driving force, 
and the international aspects of the case rode behind. Accordingly, in the 
central passage of her dissenting reasons she first concluded that “[the citizen 
under s. 6(1) of the Charter] may come and go as he pleases. He may elect 
to remain.”78 Only after reaching that point did she allow herself to survey 
the international human rights law terrain, and when she did so she found it 
more restrictively expressed than section 6(1),79 confirming her view that the 
Charter’s guarantee of mobility rights was sufficiently expansive to preclude 
72 Ibid., 197.
73 Ibid., 209.
74 D.P.P. v. Doot at 834 (per Lord Salmon).
75 See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Owen, [1957] A.C. 602 (conspiracy in England to commit offense abroad 
is not subject to English prosecutorial jurisdiction).




79 Ibid., 200, citing European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol 4, art. 3(1): “No one shall be 
expelled, by means either of an individual or of a collective measure, from the territory of the State 
of which he is a national.”
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extradition. As in Schmidt, Justice Wilson focused on the national site of the 
constitutional right; here, however, there was an added measure tying the fu-
gitive to his country. “I believe,” she declared, “that the locus of the wrongdo-
ing is very relevant […] [to] a Canadian citizen’s right to remain in Canada.”80 
Extradition treaties, in her view, might attach to Cotroni going abroad, but 
they could not attach to him staying at home.
For Justice La Forest, the object of the Cotroni exercise appears to have 
been to send the citizen packing, but to do so in a kinder, gentler way than 
one might otherwise expect. He therefore paid considerable homage to prior 
Supreme Court pronouncements that Charter rights are to be subjected to 
“a generous rather than a legalistic” interpretation,81 and advocating inter-
pretive flexibility82 in order to overcome any perceived formulaic rigidity of 
Charter tests such as that set out in Regina v. Oakes.83 This interpretive ap-
proach, in turn, had an ideological gloss that took as its starting point the 
view expounded upon by Justice La Forest in Schmidt: international coop-
eration in law enforcement, of which extradition is the prime example, is 
the modern antidote to the historic problem of legal parochialism. In this 
rendition of international law, quite ironically, Charter protections are a ret-
rograde force, “confin[ing] [Canadian society] to parochial and nationalistic 
concepts of community,”84 in the face of “an emerging world community 
from which not only benefits but responsibilities flow.”85 Quoting approv-
ingly from those modern international law scholars most closely associated 
with this view, Justice La Forest indicated that “this attitude of lack of faith 
and actual distrust,”86 so typical of constitutional rights,87 “is not in keeping 
with the spirit behind extradition treaties.”88
The final irony of the Cotroni judgment is that its espousal of interna-
tional progressivism as a bulwark against the perceived regressivism of 
80 Cotroni, 203.
81 Ibid., citing the previous decision of La Forest, j. in Jones v. The Queen, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284.
82 Cotroni, 218, citing R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
83 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
84 Cotroni, 216.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 223, quoting J.G. Castel and Sharon A. Williams, “The Extradition of Canadian Citizens and 
Sections 1 and 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” Canadian Yearkbook of Inter-
national Law 25 (1987): 268–9.
87 Whether intentionally or coincidentally, this formulation of the attitude underlying constitu-
tional rights reflects a view expressed by constitutional theorists who come at constitutional law 
from the opposite ideological point of view from those expressed in Justice La Forest’s judgment 
or in the Castel and Williams piece from which he quotes. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Dis-
trust (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1984).
88 Cotroni, 223, quoting Castel & Williams, “Extradition,” 268–9.
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constitutional rights is itself premised on a view of the traditional place of 
extradition in the legal lexicon. “For well over 100 years,” Justice La Forest 
noted, “extradition has been a part of the fabric of our law.”89 This placing of 
the extradition issue, along with the Charter itself, in historical context had 
its own interesting spin.90 In effect, Justice La Forest succeeded in anchoring 
the unanchorable, and he did so by supporting change on tradition, erecting 
the imagined future on the discernible past. In one intricate set of reasons, 
Canada managed to look simultaneously forward and backward, ostensibly 
freeing itself from its nationalist past while realizing its time-honored inter-
nationalist traditions.
Perhaps the most difficult issue to confront the Supreme Court in post-
Charter extradition law has been the prospect of Canada, a country that has 
eschewed the death penalty,91 sending a fugitive through the extradition 
process to a potential execution in a foreign country. The full international 
jurisprudence on the death penalty is discussed in chapter 7 of The Aesthetics 
of International Law.92 For the present chapter, however, it is relevant to note 
that during the La Forest era the extradition question was raised in two com-
panion cases. The Court addressed arguments that sending an individual to 
Pennsylvania’s electric chair (Kindler v. Minister of Justice)93 or California’s gas 
chamber (Reference re Ng Extradition)94 would be contrary to the Charter’s sec-
tion 12 prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and/or its section 
7 guarantee of fundamental justice.95 Writing this time for a narrow major-
ity, Justice La Forest found his own prior reasoning in Schmidt and Cotroni to 
be dispositive of the constitutional challenges. While the specific constitu-
tional right might be different for each fugitive, Justice La Forest compared 
the various cases by musing that “it would be strange if Canada could expel 
lesser criminals but be obliged by the Charter to grant sanctuary to individu-
89 Cotroni, 219.
90 Ibid., quoting Rauca, 404: “the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum and the rights set out therein 
must be interpreted rationally having regard to the then existing laws and, in the instant case, to 
the position which Canada occupies in the world and the effective history of the multitude of 
extradition treaties it has had with other nations.”
91 The House of Commons, by a majority, supported the abolition of the death penalty in free votes 
held in 1976 and 1987. Prior to enactment of the Charter, the death penalty was upheld by the 
Supreme Court under the statutory Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 in cases of murder of a 
police officer or prison guard, R. v. Miller, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680.
92 [Ed Morgan, “Vladimir Nabokov: Extradition to the Death Penalty,” in The Aesthetics of International 
Law  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 104–115 — Ed.]
93 (1991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
94 (1991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 61 (S.C.C.).
95 For the Supreme Court’s later assessment of the question of extradition to the death penalty, see 
Burns and Rafay v. The Queen, [2001j 1 S.C.R. 283.
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als who were wanted for crimes so serious as to call for the death penalty in 
their country of origin.”96
Justice La Forest’s first move in the Kindler judgment was to dissociate 
Canadian public sentiment from the discretion of the minister of justice in 
acceding to a foreign country’s extradition request. Since Charter case law 
has in any case downplayed the importance of statistical data as a measure 
of community approval or disapproval of various punitive practices,97 he 
had little trouble shifting the focus from societal values to comity among 
nations. He therefore quickly pointed out that, “unlike the internal situ-
ation, the Minister’s decision in the present case […] takes place in a global 
setting where the vast majority of the nations of the world retain the death 
penalty.”98 Justice La Forest then went on to survey the field of international 
conventions on the subject, finding that while there is universal condemna-
tion of certain horrific practices (e.g., genocide, slavery, torture),99 other penal 
traditions (e.g., the death penalty), abhorrent perhaps to the Canadian ma-
jority, are nevertheless tolerated in all but the most sensitive human rights 
settings.100 International public opinion was therefore allowed to replace do-
mestic public opinion as a measure of the punishment and the right.
One of the footings on which Justice La Forest’s majority judgment 
propped the extraditions of Kindler and Ng was the relationship of Canada 
not so much with the rest of the international community, but with the ever-
present (to the Canadian psyche) United States. Specifically, he took note of 
the “long, relatively open border and similar cultures”101 of the two countries, 
and the consequent “temptation of an accused to escape to Canada.”102 On 
the other hand, the judgment stressed the fundamental dissimilarities be-
tween the perceived law-abiding society to the north, where “the interests of 
protecting the security of Canadians”103 is paramount, and the society to the 
96 Kindler, 11.
97 See R. u, Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 and R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309.
98 Kindler, 11.
99 Ibid., citing the International Covenant On Political and Civil Rights, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, arts. 
6,7.
100 Kindler, 11, citing the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, European Protocol No. 6,1985, Fur. T.S. No. 114. 
Article 6 of the Canada - United States Extradition Treaty, Can. T.S. 1976, No. 3, which gives each 
treaty the option of requesting assurances from the other regarding the death penalty was cited 
by La Forest, J. as additional proof that Canada itself has not accepted the abolition of the death 






south where, “since 1976, approximately 300,000 homicides have occurred 
[…] [and where] Canada [is seen] as a ‘safe haven’ for murder suspects.”104 In 
the context of these similarities and dissimilarities between the two socie-
ties, Justice La Forest reminded himself that “the party requesting extradition 
in this case is the United States — a country with a criminal justice system 
that is, in many ways, similar to our own, and which provides substantial 
protections to the criminal defendant.”105
It does not seem ungenerous to read the majority judgment as posing a 
choice between their homicidal constitutionalism and our protective inter-
nationalism; and, of course, if that were the choice, who could choose oth-
erwise? What seemed galling to Justice La Forest was that Americans have 
themselves rejected (at least in Pennsylvania and California, among other 
states) the very constitutional norm which the us fugitives advocate here. 
In the end, the normative contest is almost petulant in tone: if the foreign 
sovereign, so similar in character to our own, will not restrain its state power 
in the name of constitutional supremacy, why should we?
More importantly for international law, Justice La Forest identified the 
treaty commitment to extraditing fugitives from other nations’ justice sys-
tems as being an obligation that arises from, and is not a limit on, national 
sovereignty. Thus, while one might be tempted to view this international call 
to duty — the “global setting,” to use Justice La Forest’s term — as a curtail-
ment of otherwise applicable Canadian constitutional norms, it turned out 
that Canada was being asked to exercise nothing more than “the supreme 
power in every State […] to expel or deport from the State, at pleasure, even 
a friendly alien.”106 While the distinctions between the deportation and ex-
tradition processes were acknowledged, extradition was seen to be the less 
problematic of the two, “with its built-in protections geared to the criminal 
process.”107 The implication of this latter line of reasoning is that while the 
Charter, as a constitutional enactment, may represent the supreme law of Ca-
nadian sovereignty, its subordination, to the extradition process is equally a 
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid. Justice La Forest’s acceptance of the us criminal justice protections harks back to his own 
previous judgment in U.S.A. v. Allard, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564 (Charter section 7 defense to extradition 
request requires showing that fugitive “would face a situation that is simply unacceptable”).
106 Kindler, 11–12, citing Attorney General for Canada v. Cain, [1906] A.C. 542, 546 (PC.).
107 Kindler, 12. The deportation process has survived constitutional challenges on similar grounds. 
See Shepherd v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1989), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 386 (Ont. C.A.). For a 
discussion of the constitutionality of deportation in respect of Kindler himself see MacDonald v. 
Kindler, [1987] F.C. 34 (Fed. C.A.).
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manifestation of sovereign authority in the international sense. The ability 
to expel, deport, or extradite, is portrayed as a natural adjunct to sovereignty 
itself, much as the ability to control prosecutorial authoritarianism is other-
wise presented as a natural adjunct to constitutional supremacy. State power 
is therefore restrained by constitutional rights, which are in turn restrained 
by the exercise of an apparently inalienable state power. In Justice La Forest’s 
portrait of internationalism, no one, not even the constitutional law compe-
tition, is the loser.
2.2 Foreign Evidence Gathering: The Constitutionalists Arrest
If the post-Charter extradition cases display a reversal of roles from the 
primacy of constitutional rights to the submergence of those rights to the 
country’s international obligations, cases of foreign interrogations and sur-
veillance in aid of Canadian prosecutions pose the problem in precisely the 
reverse form. Instead of positioning the Supreme Court of Canada on the 
inside looking out, the constitutional issues arise from the outside looking 
in. Accordingly, with the reversed roles yet again reversed and constitutional 
arguments again assuming an international dimension,108 one might expect 
that the former allies will again walk in tandem.109 Like a syntactical double 
negative, we should be back to where we always expected to be. Nevertheless, 
having adopted the dramatic technique of the surprise reversal, the Supreme 
Court seems reluctant to let it go.
The first in the sequence of cases dealing with the plight of an accused 
arrested and interrogated by foreign police came at the end of the Supreme 
Court’s sequence of extradition cases; the latter group of cases also com-
menced at the end of Justice La Forest’s judicial career. In many respects, 
Justice La Forest’s majority judgment in Regina v. Harrer110 was his final sum-
mation on the internationalist theme. Taking as a starting point the notion 
that Charter rights pertain to the time of arrest or detention rather than to 
the time of the trial at which the evidence is admitted,111 Justice La Forest led 
108 This international dimension to constitutional law has been made most explicit by U.S. courts 
examining the scope of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in cases of foreign arrests and surveil-
lance. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 E 2d 1214, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 494 U.S. 259 
(1990) (“[Fourth Amendment term] People of the United States [includes] American citizens at 
home and abroad”) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
109 See, e.g., United States v. Barona, 56 F. 3d 1087, 1090–1 (9th Cir. 1995) (“When determining the valid-
ity of a foreign wiretap […] our analysis, then, is guided only the applicable principles of constitu-
tional law”).
110 (1995), 101 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
111 See Regina v. Shafie (1989), 47 C.C.C. (3d) 27 (Ont. C.A.).
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the majority of the Court on a journey to see how far into the international 
arena — how far towards a foreign arrest and interrogation — the Canadian 
constitution could travel. As it turned out, the Charter did not travel well at 
all, and was yanked back home by special Dolphin Delivery112 almost as soon 
as it threatened to take flight.
The accused in Harrer was the Canadian girlfriend of a prison escapee 
who had fled custody in Vancouver, where he was being held pending his 
extradition to the United States on drug charges.113 During the course of 
investigating the drug offenses, the us marshal’s office traced Harrer to her 
boyfriend’s mother’s house in Cleveland, where she was at first suspected 
of having established a residence contrary to us immigration laws. In con-
junction with immigration authorities, the us marshals arrested their Ca-
nadian suspect, recited to her the Miranda114 warning and then interrogated 
her about her immigration status; at some point, as recounted by the court, 
the interrogators’ questions turned away from immigration matters and to-
wards Harrer’s involvement as a possible accessory to the Vancouver prison 
escape.115 As it happens, the us marshals and their immigration colleagues, 
following the more limited Miranda requirements, did not repeat the warn-
ing when the investigation turned to the subject of a second crime, as would 
be required of Canadian police in a similar situation.116
Justice La Forest commenced his analysis by asserting that nothing he 
would say in the Harrer judgment would run counter to the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in the extradition cases. Thus he reminded us that he would not 
wish “to give credence to the view that the ambit of the charter is automati-
cally limited to Canadian territory,”117 but, within a page of that statement, 
he concluded that “the Charter simply has no direct application to the in-
terrogations in the United States.”118 Accordingly, although Justice La Forest 
acknowledged that the admissibility of Harrer’s statements made during her 
stay in American custody might do violence to the principles of fundamen-
tal justice,119 he equally conceded that “the application of the Charter could 
112 R.W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 573 (Charter applicable only to state 
action, not private action).
113 The background facts are set out in the Supreme Court judgment, Herrer at 197–9, and in the 
Court of Appeal judgment, R.v. Herrer (1987), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 1.
114 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
115 Herrer, 198.






only be triggered when the Canadian police began proceedings against the 
accused on her return to Canada”120 effectively putting fundamental justice 
a long way off.
Turning his attention to the question of international relations, Justice 
La Forest analyzed the problem of illegally obtained evidence by postulating 
that, whatever else we might want to do as a nation, Canada cannot impose 
its own procedural requirements on other states operating within their own 
territories. Such an insistence, he reasoned, would “frustrate the necessary 
cooperation between the police and prosecutorial authorities among the 
various states of the world.”121 Accordingly, the case of foreign arrest and in-
terrogation became the flip side of the extradition coin. Indeed, not only was 
Justice La Forest reluctant to impose domestic constitutional rules on foreign 
state parties, he borrowed his reasoning from the United States itself, as that 
country is similarly reluctant to extend its procedural constitutionalism 
abroad.122 Ironically, therefore, there is no reciprocal trade in fundamental 
norms. While our constitutional requirements are barred from export, their 
constitutional rulings are imported at will.
In a final rebuke of expanded constitutional law, Justice La Forest en-
gaged in some speculation about the alleged unfairness in the obtaining of 
evidence without a second warning by the interrogating officials. One must 
not jump to a hasty conclusion on this front, he admonished, as unfairness 
does not necessarily flow from the finding of a constitutional infirmity; in-
deed, since all such judgments were said to be subjective in nature, objective 
unfairness could not be presumed “simply because [the methods employed] 
would in this country violate a Charter guarantee.”123 Under the circumstanc-
es, the Charter was portrayed as an annoyance, imposing the small-minded 
rules of the constitutional Lilliput on Gulliver’s large-scale world of interna-
tional affairs. “I agree,” stated Justice La Forest, “that one should not be overly 
fastidious or adopt a chauvinistic attitude in assessing practices followed in 
other countries.” The Supreme Court therefore parried the contemporary cry 
of “taking rights seriously” by warning its constituents, at the very least, not 
to take them neurotically.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 202.
122 Ibid., 203, citing United States v. Toscamino, 559 F. 2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974) (evidence obtained 




The next case in the sequence, Regina v. Terry,124 featured Justice McLa-
chlin taking up the internationalist mantle laid down by Justice La Forest. 
The appellant, who had intervened in the Harrer case,125 found little success 
in raising a constitutional issue that was, if anything, seen as even narrower 
than the argument advanced by Harrer. Having been arrested in California 
and given the usual Miranda warning prior to being interrogated later that 
day, Terry complained that the Charter requirement that he be advised of his 
right to counsel forthwith upon arrest had been overlooked by the Califor-
nia police. The problem with the appellant’s argument, however, was not so 
much with the argument itself, but with the way the Court misread it. While 
Terry’s challenge sought to exclude the foreign evidence from the Canadian 
criminal proceedings, Justice McLachlin analyzed it as if it sought to apply 
Canadian Charter rights in foreign courts.
Justice McLachlan’s first move was to reaffirm — indeed, to cast as self-
evident — the principle of territoriality that had emerged from a number of 
recent Supreme Court of Canada judgments. A quick review of those cases, 
however, reveals that territoriality was not, in fact, a feature of any of them, at 
least not in the way that Justice McLachlin used the term. Thus, for example, 
while the Court was said to have limited the Charter to refugees inside the 
country in Singh,126 the very point of that ruling was to extend process rights 
to foreign claimants who had previously been excluded from Canadian pro-
cess altogether; while the Court was said to have confirmed state sovereignty 
over all persons and property within its territory in Finta,127 the essence of 
that ruling was that the federal Criminal Code had already incorporated 
international law into the domestic realm; and while the Court was said to 
have affirmed that the primary basis of criminal jurisdiction is territorial in 
Libman,128 that case upheld the extraterritorial reach of criminal law wher-
ever any factual link to Canada can be discerned.
As a final measure, Justice McLachlin reminded her readers that what was 
at stake in Terry was not even substantive criminal law itself, but rather its 
enforcement, and that the general proposition that criminal law applies only 
within the territory of the state is “particularly true of the legal procedures 
124 (1996), 106 C.C.C. (3d) 508 (S.C.C.).
125 See Harrer, 197; Terry, 511.
126 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
127 [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701.
128 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178.
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enacted to enforce it.”129 But, of course, to identify the foreign enforcement 
rule was to enforce a misreading of Terry’s issue. The question in the appeal 
was one of Charter rights in the context of an arrest and interrogation, lead-
ing to issues of admissibility of evidence and the constitutional exclusionary 
rule. Law enforcement, in the sense of the term raised by the case, had little 
visible connection with the conflicts of law doctrine about the enforcement 
of criminal judgments cited by Justice McLachlin. The territorially protective 
position was driven, in the Court’s reasoning, by a defective engine that was 
at least partially imported from another field of law.
The central themes of internationalism played out in the case in ways 
that seem to accomplish the impossible, in that they are both antagonistic 
and coordinated. Perhaps not surprisingly, given previous judgments in the 
extradition field, the Court embraced the primacy of international coopera-
tion, citing the proliferation of bilateral mutual assistance treaties negotiat-
ed by the federal government under statutory authority.130 Even under such 
conventions, however, the sovereignty of Canadian law was seen to begin 
and end with the sending of a request for assistance to a foreign state,131 and 
international cooperation and territorial insularity were seen to be on the 
same side of the law enforcement coin.132 Thus, while cooperation among 
states might characterize their interrelationship, self-containment within 
the states’ respective territories was the modus operandi of that cooperation. 
The progressivism of contemporary international cooperation was thereby 
placed firmly on an early-nineteenth-century footing, the source of this for-
ward-looking doctrine being identified as Chief Justice Marshall’s renowned 
statement that “a state is only competent to enforce its laws within its own 
territorial boundaries.”133
129 Terry, 515, citing D.P. O’Connell, International Law, 2nd ed. (London: Steven & Sons, 1970), vol. 2.
130 Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 30 (4th Supp.); and Treaty Between 
the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States on Mutual Legal Assistance, 
1990, Can. T.S. No. 19.
131 Regina v. Filinov (1993), 82 C.C.C. (3d) 516, 520 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (“[t]he sovereignty authority of 
Canada ends with the sending of the request”).
132 Terry, 516, citing S.A. Williams and J.-G. Castel, Canadian Criminal Law: International and Transna-
tional Aspects (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981). 
133 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). It is difficult to overlook the irony of 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s anti-constitutional, pro-convention invocation of Chief Justice 
Marshall, who is not only the author of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) and the father of 
constitutional review, but was the champion of popular sovereignty over the compact theory of 
constitutional law. On the relationship of this U.S. constitutional history to international legal 
thought, see E. Morgan, “Internalization of Customary International Law: An Historic Perspec-
tive,” Yale Journal International Law 12 (1987): 63.
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For the appellants in Terry and Harrer, the rights to counsel and against 
self-incrimination were located by the Court in surprising places — more 
specifically, in places other than their respective places of arrest and inter-
rogation. Likewise, the national obligation of cooperation with other states, 
much to the surprise of the appellants, was located by the Court not only in 
international police work and law enforcement, but in the trial courtroom. 
Constitutional rights were prohibited from traveling with their holders, 
lest they interfere with the interstate compact of which international law 
is made.
Since constitutional rights could not cross the interstate divide, the only 
question that remained was what the Court would do in the event that the 
government actually sent for a rights violation abroad. The issue finally 
arose nearly two years after the Terry appeal, in the wake of the government’s 
investigation of the international banking activities of a Canadian citizen. 
Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General),134 came on the heels of a Canadian re-
quest for information from the relevant Swiss banking authorities, and arose 
by way of a stated case posed by the Canadian owner of the subject account.135 
In considering whether the letter of request mechanism, bereft of judicial au-
thorization, amounted to a warrantless search contrary to section 8 of the 
Charter, the Supreme Court was again forced to ponder the location of the 
impugned process, this time from the perspective of the outward bound let-
ter rather than, as in Harrer and Terry, the inward bound accused.
In a short majority judgment by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, the now famil-
iar refrain of international law enforcement was the dominant tune. “The re-
ality of international criminal investigation and procedure,” asserted Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé, “is that it necessitates cooperation between states.”136 The 
“reality,” however, was clearly in the eyes of the beholder; Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé viewed the realistic aspect of the interstate request to have been sent to 
Switzerland, while Justice Iacobucd, in dissent, perceived the realistic loca-
tion of the appellant’s rights to have remained at home in Canada. None of 
this reasoning resolved the controversy at hand, but all of it went some way 
134 (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.).
135 The question was stated before the Federal Court, Trial Division, as follows: “Was the Canadian 
standard for the issuance of a search warrant required to be satisfied before the Minister of Justice 
and Attorney General of Canada submitted the Letter of Request asking Swiss authorities to search 




towards proving Nabokov’s renowned observation that “reality” is “one of 
the few words which mean nothing without quotes.”137
The other debate in the case was over the expectations of a Canadian in 
respect of the privacy of his or her financial affairs, which expectation was 
said by both the majority138 and the dissent139 to define the scope of the sec-
tion 8 Charter right. This view was voiced most stridently by Chief Justice 
Lamer in his separate concurrence, where the question of whether the gov-
ernment action violated the governing constitutional noun was said to turn 
on whether the respondent had the requisite reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his Swiss banking interests.140 Just asking the question, of course, in-
vites a cynical response, since Canadians could hardly be expected to do their 
everyday banking in Switzerland if they did not expect a degree of privacy 
that surpassed that of financial institutions in their own country.
The more perplexing point, however, and one which Justice Iacobucci 
in dissent equally failed to address, is why expectations should form such a 
central part of constitutional analysis at all. Chief Justice Lamer recounted 
a number of instances in which the scope of section 8 has been found to 
conform with the individuals’ expectations under the circumstances of the 
case — thus, the section 8 guarantee does not extend to the apartment of an 
accused’s friend,141 nor does it extend to a car where the accused is a passenger 
rather than the owner.142 On the other hand, it is apparent that expectations 
and the case law move hand in hand; indeed, one would be hard put to iden-
tify whether the judiciary is the chicken and the public’s expectations are 
the egg, or whether it is the other way around. In any event, the expectations 
technique effectively converted the issue of curbs on state power into a ques-
tion of individual desert — an assessment of state of mind143 — that would be 
beyond the “reasonable expectations” of most constitutionalists in the field.
137 Vladimir Nabokov, “On a Book Entitled Lolita,” in Lolita (London: Corgi, 1961 [1956]), 314.
138 Schreiber, 144 (per Lamer, C.J.C., concurring) (“Therefore, it cannot be said that his reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy was violated”).
139 Ibid., 154 (per Iacobucci, J., dissenting) (“s. 8 will apply to protect the respondent’s privacy inter-
ests if the respondent is able to establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to his Swiss bank accounts”).
140 Ibid., 140 (“It is clear that the Charter in general applies to such letters of request. The question to 
be decided in order to see if government actions comply with s. 8 is whether the respondent had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his banking records in Switzerland”).
141 Regina v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.R. 128.
142 Regina v. Belnavis, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341.
143 Compare, e.g., Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation, Research, Restrictive 
Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, 506 (“privacy […] may vary significantly depending 
upon the activity that brings him or her into contact with the state”); Regina v. McKinlay Transport 
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By depositing the crux of Schreiber’s Charter complaint alongside his 
money in Zurich, the Court managed to overcome the warrantless search in 
the most constitutionally feasible of ways. Although the international man-
tra of cooperation was carried forward, the more traditional international 
law impulse towards comity was equally expressed. According to Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé, the Court “is much more reluctant to measure the laws of 
foreign states against guarantees contained in the Canadian Constitution.”144 
Since the search was carried out there, and a request was merely made here, 
deference and a call to judicial passivity in the international realm were the 
order of the day. Far from an aggressive internationalism, the portrait drawn 
by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was an accommodating one, giving play to consti-
tutional guarantees even as they were swept like so many prisoners’ remains 
into the penal colony’s burial pit.
3. the law and its subjects
For Kafka, the characters’ switching of roles is a fundamental thematic tech-
nique. The central drama of “In the Penal Colony” finds the officer, the per-
sonification of the law,145 mounting the execution machine in place of the 
convict who is set free.146 The Old Commandant of the colony, whose time 
has passed, stands in the shoes of the New Commandant, who is himself a 
prisoner of the elaborate, unending administrative designs of the Old.147 The 
explorer, who sits passively through the officer’s lecture about the machine 
while pondering the fate of the person in its grip, comes to take an active 
interest in and restrict his interest to the machine’s mechanical functions 
once human blood starts to flow.148 Even the machine, whose flawless opera-
tions had delivered human beings to their ultimate redemption and burial, 
Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627 (privacy rights vary with “context”). See also Regina v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 
281 (contextual factors in privacy interest).
144 Schreiber at 144.
145 Kafka, “In the Penal Colony,” 198 (“This is how the matter stands. I have been appointed judge in 
this penal colony. Despite my youth”).
146 Ibid., 221 (“The condemned man especially seemed struck with the notion that some great change 
was impending. What had happened to him was now going to happen to the officer”).
147 Ibid., 193 (“We who were his friends knew even before he died that the organization of the colony 
was so perfect that his successor, even with a thousand new schemes in his head, would find it 
impossible to alter anything”).
148 Ibid., 223–4 (“The explorer, on the other hand, felt greatly troubled; the machine was obviously 
going to pieces; its silent working was a delusion; he had a feeling that he must now stand by the 
officer, since the officer was no longer able to look after himself”).
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in a final dramatic switch delivers nothing of value to its human cargo149 and 
lurches itself into the pit.150
The goal of the penal colony is to enforce, quite literally, the letter of the 
law, turning the law’s human subjects into the letters of which the law is 
composed. While the method is scientific in the extreme151 and its descrip-
tion as precise as it is graphic,152 the project is only truly instructive in its 
abject failure. The law is presented, and, indeed, presents itself, as mysteri-
ous and rationally unknowable,153 surpassing even Nietzsche’s skeptical 
assessment that “it is today impossible to say with certainty why there is 
punishment.”154 Yet the law’s promises — enlightenment for both indi-
vidual155 and society156 — are all seen to be false.157 In the idealized past, as 
recounted by the officer, the law’s human subjects changed roles with the 
law itself, becoming a perfectly scripted text.158 In the more sordid present, 
as demonstratively enacted by the officer, it is the lawmaker rather than the 
law itself that replaces the law’s subject, creating a defective text in which the 
lawmaker becomes the lawbreaker.159 The past precedent is mythologized to 
an extent that no rational person — least of all the explorer, with his human-
istic response to the gruesome procedure — could take seriously, while the 
present content of the law is utterly inscrutable.160
Ironically, for a piece that centres on an impenetrable version of the law, 
most of Kafka’s story is taken up by a detailed lecture by the officer on the 
149 Ibid., 225 (“It [the face of the corpse] was as it had been in life […]”).
150 Ibid., 224 (“The Harrow tried to move back to its old position, but as if it had itself noticed that it 
had not yet got rid of its burden it struck after all where it was, over the pit”).
151 Ibid., 202 (“It’s no calligraphy for school children. It needs to be studied closely”).
152 Ibid., 203 (“When it finishes the first draft of the inscription on the man’s back, the layer of cotton 
wool begins to roll and slowly turns the body over, to give the Harrow fresh space for writing. 
Meanwhile the raw part that has been written on lies on the cotton wool, which is specially pre-
pared to staunch the bleeding and so makes all ready for a new deepening of the script”).
153 Ibid., 197 (“Many questions were troubling the explorer “Does he know his sentence?” “No,” said 
the officer, eager to go on with his exposition […] “There would be no point in telling him. He’ll 
learn it on his body.”).
154 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 
1969), 80 (“All concepts in which an entire process is semi-otically concentrated elude definition; 
only that which has no history is definable”). For a discussion of the parallels between Kafka and 
Nietzsche on the position of suffering and punishment see Patrick Bridgwater, Kafka and Nietzsche 
(Bonn: Bouvier, 1974), 41–6.
155 Kafka, “In the Penal Colony,” 204 (“Enlightenment comes to the most dull-witted”).
156 Ibid., 209 (“They all knew: Now Justice is being done”).
157 Ibid., 225 (“No sign was visible of the promised redemption”).
158 Ibid., 197 (“‘Whatever commandment the prisoner has disobeyed is written upon his body by the 
Harrow. This prisoner, for instance’ — the officer indicated the man — ‘will have written on his 
body: honor thy superiors!’).
159 Ibid., 224 (“For this was no exquisite torture such as the officer desired, this was plain murder”).
160 Ibid., 219 (“The explorer made no remark, yet it was clear that he still could not decipher it”).
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workings of the penal system and its implementation via the execution 
machine. The officer’s discourse, with its mathematical precision and scien-
tific vocabulary, is so obsessive as to be a parody of professionalism,161 and, 
ultimately, of reason itself, defending at great length a tortuous death to no 
rational end. Law and violence thereby trade places along with their protago-
nists; as explained by the officer, the law requires punishment to give it its 
only meaning, and the punishment requires the law to rationalize its vio-
lence. In becoming interchangeable with its opposite, the “reason” employed 
by the officer in the name of the law becomes the very medium for the attack 
on the law.
As the officer expounds with scientific or pseudo-scientific detail on the 
workings of the machine, elaborating on a romantic view of the past as a prec-
edent for today’s enforcement of the law itself, becoming perfectly stripped 
text.162 In the more sordid present, as demonstratively enacted by the officer, 
it is the law maker rather then the law itself that replaces the law’s subject, 
creating a defective text in which the law maker becomes the lawbreaker.163 
it becomes apparent that what is being presented is neither reason nor jus-
tice, but theatrics. For the officer, and Kafka, it is the very formality of the 
occasion, and the aesthetics rather than the flawed logic of the process, that 
gives the inflicting of punishment its meaning. The officer’s demonstration 
is utterly divorced from the fate, or culpability, of the convict, who cannot 
even comprehend the explanation.164 From the very opening line of the story, 
the officer’s exposition is meant not to convince the explorer but to share 
with him the pleasures — indeed, the art form — of the machine. The farci-
cal quality of the lecture and demonstration upstages the macabre aspects of 
the narrative, so that the story is to stories of violence much as mimicry is to 
authenticity.165 Kafka’s message is not to advocate a ghastly punishment void 
161 Ibid., 193–4 (“All the more did he admire the officer, who in spite of his tight-fitting full-dress 
uniform coat, amply befrogged and weighed down by epaulettes, was pursuing his subject with 
such enthusiasm and, besides talking, was still tightening a screw here and there with a spanner”).
162 Ibid., 196–7 (“‘I am certainly the best person to explain our procedure, since I have here’ — he 
patted his breast pocket — ‘the relevant drawings made by our former Commandant.’ Then he in-
spected his hands critically; they did not seem clean enough to him for touching the drawings…”).
163 Ibid., 194 (“The officer was speaking French, and certainly neither the soldier nor the prisoner 
understood a word of French”).
164 Ibid., 191 (“‘It’s a remarkable piece of apparatus,’ said the officer to the explorer and surveyed with 
a certain air of admiration the apparatus which was after all quite familiar to him.”).
165 In this, Kafka has much in common with the writings of de Sade, which stress the fantasy of vio-
lence over violence itself. See Roland Barthes, Sade/Fourier/Loyola, trans. Richard Miller (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1976), 181 (“Throughout his life, the Marquis de Sade’s passion was not erotic 
[eroticism is very different from passion]; it was theatrical”).
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of meaningful purpose, but rather to accentuate the dramatic techniques en-
tailed in arriving at such a position. One is never meant to feel the convict’s 
or the officer’s pain; rather, by undermining realism and rationality through 
the devices of fantasy and parody, Kafka enables the reader to appreciate the 
aesthetics of its infliction.166
Since the law’s rationale is a mock rationale, and the tyrannical officer 
of the law is a mock tyrant, the subject of the law is nothing more than a 
mockery of itself. Not only can characters change places seemingly at will, 
but the apparent values of the story — law and crime, reason and violence, 
justice and torture, domination and submission, mathematical precision and 
aesthetics — all are equally prone to dramatic reversals revealing a parody 
of themselves. What the officer says is never important in its own right; in-
deed, it is ridiculous. The important thing is that in the dramatic finale, the 
upright, uniformed officer lies naked on the bed of the machine,167 as a part 
of his theatrical demonstration, or his “reasons” for “justice.” He is his own 
subject matter.
4. internationalism comes of age
Viewing Canada, as the Supreme Court does, as having come of post-Charter 
age by overcoming the parochial tendencies of domestic constitutionalism 
and proving itself a full adherent to international obligations, fills one with 
a sense of historical irony. After all, the enactment of the Charter and its 
entrenched guarantees is itself viewed as a process of national maturation, 
the 1982 patriation of the constitution being a form of worldly rights of pas-
sage. Moreover, the question of national stature was not exactly a novel, or 
even a contemporary one. The courts had determined that the nation had 
achieved its independent status in the international arena fifty years prior 
to the Charter, in a criminal law context that proved precisely the opposite 
point from that of the post-Charter international law cases — that is, one that 
demonstrated Canada’s constitutional sovereignty in the face of, rather than 
in obedience to, international obligations.
166 Ibid. (“What happens in a story by de Sade is strictly fantastic”).
167 Ibid., 220 (“In spite of the obvious haste with which he was discarding first his uniform jacket and 
then all his clothing, he handled each garment with loving care”).
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In Croft v. Dunphy,168 a constitutional question was posed as to the federal 
government’s jurisdiction under the Customs Act169 to seize a cargo of rum 
eleven miles off the Nova Scotia shore. Whereas international law recog-
nized a territorial sea jurisdiction of only three miles from the coast, Parlia-
ment had legislated itself a twelve-mile regulatory authority over the high 
seas. It was in this expanded enforcement zone that Canadian customs of-
ficials boarded the appellant’s ship and seized his dutiable goods. In response 
to the appellant’s challenge, the Privy Council found that Canada had by the 
1930s been granted “plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same 
nature, as those of [the Imperial] Parliament itself,”170 thereby confirming the 
constitutional sovereignty of Canada not by reference to its ability to comply 
with international law, but by reference to its capacity to breach it.171 The 
legislation was upheld as a result of the federal Parliament’s plenary ability 
to do as it pleased, regardless of the restraints imposed by international law.172
In another unexpected reversal, therefore, Canada’s ability to violate in-
ternational restrictions and Canada’s ability to adhere to international obli-
gations have become the two sides of the identical constitutional law coin. In 
this, the relationship between pre-Charter and post-Charter Canada is much 
like that between the Old Commandant’s and the New Commandant’s penal 
colony.173 The new constitutional regime imports norms from the outside 
world — the explorer’s ostensible human rights sensitivities174 — only to find 
the law inflicting violence on itself with the machinery of state designed by 
the ancien régime. Since compliance with international law and breach of in-
ternational law, like the officer and the convict, can be reversed with consti-
tutional ease, the legal system’s normative transformation becomes just one 
more adjustment in the elaborate penal apparatus. Plus ça change…
168 [1932] 59 C.C.C. 141 (RC.).
169 The then current version of the statute was the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 42, At issue were ss. 131 
and 207.
170 Croft v. Dunphy, 144.
171 For a discussion of the place of the Privy Council’s decision in the history of Anglo-Canadian ex-
traterritorial criminal jurisdiction, see E. Morgan, “Criminal Process, International Law and Extra-
territorial Crime,” University of Toronto Law Journal 38 (1988): 245.
172 On this point, see also British Columbia Electric Railway Co. v. The King, [1946] 4 D.L.R. 82 (P.C.) (Ca-
nadian Parliament’s unrestricted capacity to impose income tax on residents of foreign countries).
173 The Commandant is personified as the entire socio-legal order. Kafka, “In the Penal Colony,” 196 
(“Did he combine everything in himself, then? Was he soldier, judge, mechanic, chemist and 
draughtsman?”).




The interchangeable nature of old and new likewise corresponds with 
the local and international influences on the penal quality of the colony’s 
norms. Thus, the normative world of the Old Commandant is an isolated one, 
much as the old world of sovereigns is a jurisdictionally insular one in which 
the substantive offense must occur within the country in order for judicial 
authority to attach.175 On the other hand, the normative world of the New 
Commandant, who imported the explorer, is an imperialistic one, much as 
modern pronouncements of criminal jurisdiction tie the penal outpost into 
the international scene as a protector of what is right.176 The two approaches 
survive in the same story only insofar as they happen to coincide,177 failing 
which one buries the other in obscurity.178
When, true to the Kafka form, the local and the international trade 
places, the Old Commandant’s officer destroys the execution machine with 
a self-inflicted universal message,179 while the New Commandant’s explorer 
observes with indifference as the colony engages in one final torture.180 In 
much the same way, when the normative insularity of sovereign jurisdiction 
gives way to international rules of cooperation,181 the expanded constitution-
alism of universal rights shrinks to become the parochial enforcement of do-
mestic procedures.182 Thus, in coming of age as a legal system, the humani-
tarian or constitutionalist impulse of the Supreme Court is submerged and 
domesticated by the authoritarian or internationalist impulse; moreover, the 
175 Board of Trade v. Owen, [1957] A.C. 602 (conspiracy to commit offense abroad is not subject to 
English prosecution); R. a. Brixton Prison Governor, ex parte Rush, [1969] 1 All ER, 316 (C.A.) (multi-
jurisdictional fraudulent scheme not subject to English criminal jurisdiction).
176 Treacy v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537, 562 (“Indeed, where the prohibited acts are 
of a kind calculated to cause harm to private individuals it would savour of chauvinism rather 
than comity to treat them as excusable merely on the ground that the victim was not in the United 
Kingdom itself but in some other state”).
177 International law and constitutional jurisdiction coexisted, because they perfectly coincided, in 
nineteenth-century common law. See, e.g., Regina v. Keyn (1876), 2 Ex.. D. 63 (Cr. Cas. Res.) (County 
Court jurisdiction up to high water mark, admiralty jurisdiction beyond high water mark to ex-
tent of territorial sea, parliamentary jurisdiction beyond British territory interacting with family 
of nations).
178 Kafka, “In the Penal Colony,” 226 (“They pushed one of the tables aside and under it there was re-
ally a gravestone […] There was an inscription on it in very small letters, the explorer had to kneel 
down to read it […] ‘Here rests the old Commandant. His adherents, who now must be nameless, 
have dug this grave […].’”).
179 Ibid., 218–19 (Now the officer began to spell it, letter by letter, and then read out the words, “be 
just!”).
180 Ibid., 220–1 (“The explorer bit his lips and said nothing. He knew very well what was going to 
happen, but he had no right to obstruct the officer in anything”).
181 See Section 2.1, and the discussion of the Supreme. Court’s extradition cases from Schmidt to Kin-
dler.
182 See Section 2.2 of this chapter, and the discussion of the Supreme Court’s cases dealing with con-
stitutional rights and foreign evidence gathering, from Herrer to Schreiber.
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dominant impulse replaces the old, regressive one by putting on a new, pro-
gressive face. In this way, the new universalist constitution becomes a passé 
form of parochial technicality, while the old local Crown authority becomes 
a modernist form of international cooperation. The role reversals engineered 
by the Court are as complete as those Kafka would stage.
Internationalism has become, in the Supreme Court’s hands, a medium 
for inflicting punishment, while constitutionalism has become a medium 
for enduring it. It is little wonder, therefore, that they chafe where they join 
issue. While the Court has attempted to cauterize the wounds through the 
devices of mutual cooperation and international duties, the fact remains that 
one can either operate the execution machine or be operated upon. As in Kaf-
ka’s story, the officer as prosecutor and the convict as rights holder may both 
be scripted as the law, and indeed they may be perfectly interchangeable, but 
they cannot together be made whole. In the age of Canadian constitutional-
ism, international law has matured to an Oedipal degree,183 dominating and 
punishing the very constitution that gave it its stature.
183 For a discussion of Kafka’s writings about the law and legal authorities from the perspective of his 
own difficult relationship with his father see Gerhard Neumann, “‘The Judgment,’ ‘Letter to His 
Father,’ and the Bourgeois Family,” in Reading Kafka, 215–28.







Kracauer was born in 
Frankfurt am Main, the 
son of a businessman, Adolf 
K. Kracauer and his wife, the for-
mer Rosette Oppenheim; he died sev-
enty-seven years later in New York City on 
November 26, 1966. For any normal biography, 
this bracketing of a life between two chronological 
points is a natural and unexamined beginning. For a 
biography of Kracauer, however, it constitutes a betrayal 
of the strongest taboo of his later life, a taboo he expressed in a 
series of letters deliberately set aside in his well-organized Nachlaß1 
to give any future biographer pause. These letters, written in the 1960s
when Kracauer was consumed by his final project on the philosophy of his-
tory, were filed under the heading of “extra-territoriality.” In all of them, Kra-
cauer vehemently opposed any effort to disclose his correct age, a campaign, 
as he surely must have known, which could only meet with temporary suc-
cess.2 His reason for waging it, despite the certainty of ultimate failure, tran-
scended the petty vanity of those who refuse to age gracefully. As he wrote to 
his friend Theodor W. Adorno in 1963: “It is not as if there is something for 
me in appearing young or younger; it is simply the horror of losing chrono-
 Originally published as Martin Jay, “The Extraterritorial Life of Siegfried Kracauer”, Salmagundi 
31–32 (Fall 1975–Winter 1976): 49–106. Reprinted with permission of the author.
1 Siegfried Kracauer’s Nachlaß was deposited in 1973 in the Schiller National Museum in Marbach 
am Neckar. All letters quoted in the text can be found there, although I consulted the correspond-
ence with Leo Löwenthal in Professor Löwenthal’s own collection in Berkeley, California. I am 
deeply indebted to Dr. Werner Volcke and the staff of the Schiller National Museum for their cour-
tesy and helpfulness during my stay in Marbach. I also must thank former friends of Kracauer 
for granting me illuminating interviews: Rudolf Arnheim, Bernard Karpel, Paul Oskar Kristeller, 
Leo Löwenthal, Hans Mayer, Sheldon Meyer, Henry Pachter, Meyer Schapiro, and the editor of his 
collected works, Karsten Witte. Leo Löwenthal, Karsten Witte, and my wife, Cathy Gallagher, who 
made helpful comments on the manuscript’s first draft.
2 The only instance of “success” that I have found is in the article by Hans G. Helms, entitled “Der 
wunderliche Kracauer,” Neues Forum (June/July, 1971): 27, where Kracauer’s age in 1964 is said to 
be 70, when it was in fact 75.
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logical anonymity through the fixating of a date and the unavoidable con-
notations of such a fixation.”3
The “chronological anonymity” he so insistently guarded serves two func-
tions. First, it helped to discourage efforts to place Kracauer in the context of 
any one period, such as those that would define him as a “Weimar intellec-
tual” with all the resonances that label has acquired over the years. By avoid-
ing such a placement, he hoped to thwart the compartmentalization of his 
own work that he had sought to resist in the work of those he studied. But 
secondly, and perhaps more significantly, on a psychological level, it served 
to ward off thoughts of the approaching death that would signify the closure 
of his work and give his life whatever final meaning it might have. When he 
finally did die, Adorno wrote in his obituary that Kracauer’s utter refusal to 
confront death or aging had a heroic dimension to it, consonant with his long-
standing concern for the redemption of the living.4 To Kracauer, final mean-
ings were anathema, whether in cultural phenomena or the record of a man’s 
life. Wholeness and death were inextricably intertwined in his thinking, an 
association that energized much of his thought, and set him apart from the 
Weimar intellectuals who, in Peter Gay’s phrase, “hungered for wholeness.”5
Kracauer’s concern for “chronological anonymity” grew out of a more 
general fascination with the condition that he chose to call, “extra-territori-
ality.” Marginality, alienation, and outsiderness have been among the stock 
obsessions of intellectuals ever since the time of Rousseau. Few, however, fo-
cused as consistently on the manifestations of the malaise throughout their 
entire careers as did Kracauer. Fewer still found ways to fashion their own 
marginality into a positive good in quite the manner he did. As we shall see, 
Kracauer’s life’s work can be read as a series of seemingly disparate projects, 
almost all with the common goal of redeeming contingency from oblivion. 
In important, if not fully transparent ways, this effort paralleled Kracauer’s 
personal struggle with the “extra-territorial” nature of his own life.
Kracauer’s sense of marginality must have begun almost at birth. Physi-
cally, he was set apart from his peers by two characteristics. The first was 
a speech defect, a stammer which would preclude, among other things, 
a teaching career at any time in his life. The second was his physiognomy, 
3 Kracauer to Adorno, November 8, 1963. The other correspondents with whom he discussed his 
“chronological anonymity” were Erika Lorenz, Michel Ciment, and Hans Kohn. Unless otherwise 
indicated, the letters were written in German and translated by me.
4 Theodor W. Adorno, “Siegfried Kracauer Tot,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 1, 1966, 2.
5 Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), chapter 4.
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whose peculiarity struck with all who knew him. To Adorno, who actually 
used the word “extra-territorial” in describing his face, he looked as if he were 
from the Far East.6 Asja Lacis, the Latvian Marxist director who met him in 
the late 1920s, said he looked like an “African.”7 To Hans Mayer, the Marx-
ist literary, he was “Japanese painted by an Expressionist.”8 And Rudolf Arn-
heim, the aesthetic theoretician, remembers him as having a squashed nose 
that made his face “almost grotesque, but somehow beautiful.”9
Added to whatever stress may have been caused by these physical pe-
culiarities was the trauma of his father’s death when Kracauer was still a 
young child. He moved shortly thereafter to the house of his uncle, Isidor K. 
Kracauer, a distinguished historian of Frankfurt’s Jewish community.10 The 
atmosphere of the home was apparently religious, but the young Kracauer, 
like so many of his generation, sought assimilation rather than ethnic iden-
tification. Later, in the 1920s, he became friendly with the circle around the 
powerfully attractive Rabbi Nehemiah Nobel, which included Ernst Simon, 
Martin Buber, and Franz Rosenzweig. He even contributed a piece to the 
Rabbi’s Festchrift in 1921,11 but seems to have played no role in the creation 
of the Frankfurt Lehrhaus, which emerged from Nobel’s circle. By 1926, how-
ever, what interest he may have had in the Jewish revival stimulated by the 
Lehrhaus group was clearly dead. In that year, he published a stinging criti-
cism of the Buber-Rosenzweig translation of the Bible, which he damned as 
neo-völkisch in inspiration.12 Thereafter, Jewish issues played no overt role in 
any of his writings, although certain residues can perhaps be said to have 
remained, if the religious element in his interest in redemption is stressed. 
Still, what his upbringing in a religious household whose tenets he rejected 
6 Ibid.
7 Asja Lacis, Revolutionär im Beruf; Berichte über proletarischer Theater, über Meyerhold, Brecht, Benjamin, 
und Piscator, ed. Hildegard Brenner (Munich: Rogner & Bernhard, 1971), 62.
8 Conversation with Professor Mayer, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, November 30, 1973.
9 Conversation with Professor Arnheim, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 21, 1973.
10 His most notable work was a two volume “Geschichte der Juden in Frankfurt a. M. (1150–1824)” 
published post-humously in 1925 and 1927 with the editorial help of his widow, Hedwig. He was 
supported by the Jewish Community of Frankfurt in this endeavor.
11 Siegfried Kracauer, “Gedanken über die Freudschaft,” in Gabe Herrn Rabbiner Dr. Nobel zum 50. 
Geburtstag (Frankfurt, J. Kauffmann, 1921). This was the second part of an essay, whose first part 
appeared as “Über die Freund schaft,” Logos 7, no. 2 (Tübingen: 1917/18). Both parts were published 
by Suhrkamp in 1972.
12 Siegfried Kracauer, “Die Bibel auf Deutsch,” in Frankfurter Zeitung (henceforth fz), April 27 and 28, 
1926; reprinted in Das Ornament der Masse (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1963). Buber and Rosen-
zweig answered the attack in the fz on May 18, 1926; their essay is reprinted in Die Schrift und 
ihre Verdeutschung (Berlin: Schocken, 1936), 276ff. Kracauer also attacked Zionism in a 1922 article 
entitled, “Die Wartenden,” reprinted in Das Ornament der Masse, 112.
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meant was a strengthening of that marginality which characterized his life. 
After 1933, the myth of assimilation was exploded in a way that could only 
have reinforced his sense of outsiderness. Although Kracauer never directly 
dealt with the consequences of his Jewish background, there can be little 
doubt that it played a serious role in the development of his sensibility and 
intellectual concerns.
Kracauer’s career pattern shows equal signs of deviation from the norm 
of intellectual maturation, if indeed such a norm can be said to exist. Before 
the First World War, he studied at the Klinger-Oberrealschule in Frankfurt 
and then at universities and technical colleges in Darmstadt, Berlin, and 
Munich. Although he prepared fields were in philosophy and sociology, his 
main interest was in architecture, which he hoped to make his career. In 
1915, he earned a doctorate in engineering at the technical college of Ber-
lin-Charlottenburg with a dissertation on the development of wrought iron 
decorations in Prussia from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.13 
During the war, he seems to have avoided serious military service, if his semi-
autobiographical novel, Ginster,14 is any indication. Instead, he served as an 
apprentice architect in Hannover, Osnabruck, Frankfurt, and Munich.
Although architecture was only to be a temporary career, it left its mark 
on Kracauer’s subsequent development. His heightened visual sensitivity, 
“the primacy of the optical” in Adorno’s phrase,15 led to a series of articles 
on urban space, both interior and exterior, in the 1920s.16 It also, of course, 
underlies Kracauer’s lifelong fascination with the film, for which he is best 
known in the English-speaking world. In addition, the constructive impulse 
nurtured by his architectural experience reappeared in the technique Kra-
cauer called “construction in the material,” which he developed in the Wei-
mar period, as well as in the highly structured way he organized his books 
and articles.
But for reasons that are not entirely clear, architecture failed to engage 
his total personality and he gave it up in 1920. Encouraged by the eminent 
philosophers, Georg Simmel and Max Scheler, with whom he was person-
13 Siegfried Kracauer, Die Entwicklung der Schmiedekunst in Berlin, Potsdam und einigen Stadten der Mark 
vom 17, Jahrhundert bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts (Worms: Wormser Verlag, 1915).
14 Siegfried Kracauer, Ginster, Von ihm selbst geschrieben (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1928); 2nd ed. Ginster (with-
out final chapter), (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1963); 3rd ed. (with final chapter), (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1973), published as vol. 7 of Schriften with his other novel, Georg.
15 Theodor W. Adorno, “Der wunderliche Realist”, Noten zur Literatur III (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 
1965), 87.
16 These have been collected as Straßen in Berlin und anderswo (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1964).
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ally acquainted, Kracauer turned to philosophical and sociological analysis 
as a new career. The first fruits of his shift were studies of Simmel, published 
only in part in 1920, and of sociology as a science, which appeared in 1922.17 
In both, the marks of Kracauer’s interests in phenomenology as an antidote 
to neo-Kantianism were evident, but a phenomenology closer to Scheler’s 
“material eidectics” than to Husserl’s intuitionist search for essences beneath 
the flux of history. Central to Kracauer’s vision of sociology was an anti-psy-
chological, anti-subjectivist perspective. That is, he claimed that the attempt 
by the phenomenologists to counter psychologism in philosophy was ap-
propriate to sociology as well. The reason for this parallel, Kracauer argued, 
could be found in the nature of his age. In characterizing it, Kracauer explic-
itly borrowed from Georg Lukács’s recently published Theory of the Novel,18 
specifically, his distinction between meaningful, fulfilled periods of history 
and empty, barren ones. Like Lukács, Kracauer put his own era in the second 
category. A phenomenological sociology without psychological subjectivity 
was appropriate because the age was one in which meaning, community, 
and purpose were absent. The reality of the social world, he wrote, is a “bad 
infinity”19 without material totality. The integrated personality so valued by 
generations of German philosophers was also an ideological illusion. Ideal-
ism, with its implicit assumptions of an immanently meaningful world, was 
thus a misleading metaphysics. The only alternative was a scientific sociol-
ogy that would investigate the structural regularities of de-individualized 
social realms without worrying about the need to integrate the subject and 
object into a larger whole. Sociology, however, should not be expected to pro-
vide answers to the present cultural crisis, when the source was in society 
itself. Although Kracauer was soon to lose his enthusiasm for Scheler’s mate-
rialist phenomenology, especially when Scheler began searching for eternal 
verities,20 his underlying premise about the meaninglessness of the present 
period was a life-long conviction. Unlike Lukács, however, he never came to 
see a solution to the dilemma it presented.
17 Siegfried Kracauer, “Georg Simmel,” Logos 9, no. 3, (1920); reprinted in Das Ornament der Masse; 
Soziologie als Wissenschaft. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung (Dresden: Sibyllen-Verlag, 1922); 
reprinted in vol. 1 of Schriften (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1971).
18 George Lukács, Die Theorie des Romans (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1920), cited on page 13 of Soziologie 
als Wissenschaft (1971 ed.). Kracauer reviewed this book twice, in Die Weltbuhne 17, no. 35 (Sept. 1, 
1921) and Neue Blatter für Kunst und Literatur 4, no. 1 (October 4, 1921).
19 Lukács, Die Theorie des Romans , 29.
20 He attacked Scheler’s turn to Catholicism in “Katholizismus und Relativismus,” in fz, November 




Although Kracauer was now seriously devoted to intellectual work, his 
speech defect and lack of advanced training in academic areas meant the im-
possibility of a university career. Following phenomenology’s injunction to 
return to the Lebenswelt from the heights of philosophical speculation, and 
taking advantage of the increased prestige of journalism in the Weimar pe-
riod, Kracauer took a position with the Frankfurter Zeitung in 1920. The fz, 
founded in 1856 by Leopold Sonnemann, was one of the most prestigious of 
Germany’s newspapers and a pillar of the democratic left-wing of bourgeois 
liberalism. Although its circulation after the war never exceeded 70,000, it 
retained a large measure of political and cultural influence among the mid-
dle-classes, especially the educated Jewish bourgeoisie from which Kracauer 
himself had come. It was, of course, not without its detractors. As a recent 
student of its history has written:
In Mein Kampf Hitler devoted more space and invective to the fz than to 
any other newspaper, considering it as the Gorgon of the Judenpresse, the 
sophisticated and highly effective organ of the Jewish world conspiracy, 
and an important contributor to Germany’s defeat in the war.21
Although its liberal fervor began to slip by the late twenties, when its own-
ership changed hands, it continued to be a leading voice of middle-class 
opinion until the end of the Republic. Kracauer remained in its employ until 
1933, when the Nazis decapitated “the Gorgon of the Judenpresse” with scarce-
ly any resistance. He survived the purge of left-leaning staff after the change 
of owners, because he was not directly concerned with political reporting. 
Kracauer was assigned instead to its feuilleton section, where the emphasis 
was on cultural affairs.
Throughout the Weimar period, Kracauer and his colleague Benno Reif-
enberg22 made the feuilleton page of the fz, the most brilliant in the German-
speaking world. Here, he carried out an extensive and penetrating critique 
21 Modris Eksteins, “The Frankfurter Zeitung: Mirror of Weimar Democracy,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 4, no. 4 (1971): 5. Kracauer himself wrote an article on Leopold Sonnemann for the Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 14 (London: Macmillan, 1934).
22 Benno Reifenberg (1892–1970) was trained as an art historian. He joined the fz in 1919 and became 
its feuilleton director in 1924. 1930–32, he was the head of its Paris bureau. After the war, he was a 
founder and leading writer for Die Gegenwart.
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of everyday life, reminiscent of Simmel’s, with the goal of stimulating his 
readers’ critical faculties rather than merely diverting them. Among his more 
important substantive contributions was the systematic investigation of the 
cinema in social terms, which culminated in his widely read series “The 
Small Shopgirls Go to the Movies,”23 written in 1927. Except for an isolated 
article by the Expressionist Kurt Pinthus in 1913,24 Kracauer’s pieces were the 
first in Germany to analyze the film from a social perspective. From a stylistic 
point of view, Kracauer’s innovation was equally significant, reversing as it 
did one of the central weaknesses of the feuilleton as a genre. The feuilleton had 
its origins in the July Monarchy in Paris, when advertising had expanded the 
market for newspapers by lowering prices.25 It served as a lure for new sub-
scribers by printing gossip, intrigues, and serialized novels. By the turn of the 
century, especially in Vienna where it reached its greatest popularity under 
Theodor Herzl in the Neue Freie Presse, the feuilleton had become an occasion 
for the self-indulgence of personal impressions. As a recent historian has ob-
served, “the subjective response of the reporter or critic to an experience, his 
feeling-tone, acquired clear primacy over the matter of his discourse. To ren-
der a state of feeling became the mode of formulating a judgement. Accord-
ingly, in the feuilleton writer’s style, the adjectives engulfed the nouns, the 
personal tint virtually obliterated the contours of the object of discourse.”26 
This was the style, it might be noted in passing, that had aroused the ire of 
that scourge of Viennese decadence Karl Kraus, who denounced its narcis-
sism and duplicity. Although there is no evidence of Kraus’s scorn having 
had a direct effect on him, Kracauer filled the feuilleton page with pieces of a 
very different kind. Instead of drawing attention to his own quivering sensi-
bility, he assumed a tone of ironic naiveté that allowed the material to speak 
for itself. Somewhat in the manner of the Neue Sachlichkeit (New Objectivity) 
style, which grew to prominence in Weimar’s post-expressionist middle pe-
riod, he maintained a cool, if clearly ironic, detachment towards his subject 
matter. From Simmel and the phenomenologists, he gained an attentiveness 
23 “Die kleinen Ladenmachen gehen ins Kino,” reprinted in Das Ornament der Masse. 1927.
24 Kurt Pinthus, “Quo Vaids — Kino?” cited in Karsten Witte’s excellent Nachwort to Kracauer’s Kino 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1974), 266.
25 Walter Benjamin treated the early years of the feuilleton in Paris in his unfinished Passagenarbeit; 
see the selection in his Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, trans. Harry 
Zohn (London: New Left Books, 1973), 27–34.
26 Carl Schorske, “Politics and the Psyche in fin-de-siècle Vienna; Schnitzler and Hofmannstahl,” 
American Historical Review 116, no. 4 (July 1961): 935. For a more recent appraisal of the role of the 




to the things themselves, which reinforced his architect’s sensitivity to the 
visual world. But underlying his distance from the material he described 
was a subterranean fury at the irrationalities of Weimar life, which he saw 
embodied in such diverse phenomena, as the waiting room of an employ-
ment office or the reception given to the Tiller girls, those “ornaments of the 
masses” whose precision dancing reflected the disenchantment of the mod-
ern world.27 Kracauer’s attitude towards this trend was ambivalent; although 
he applauded its progressive, de-mythologizing side, he recognized the costs 
of social standardization and atomization. Moreover, as we shall see shortly, 
he identified many of its worst aspects with capitalism.
Throughout the twenties, Kracauer’s reputation and influence steadily 
increased. For example, his advocacy in 1929 of the Soviet documentaries of 
Dziga Vertov and Esther Schub led to their popularity in Germany and ul-
timately in the ussr as well.28 In retrospect, 1930 appears as the year of his 
greatest success. The fz offered him directorship of the cultural section of its 
Berlin office, and anxious to be at the center of Weimar life, he accepted. In 
the same year, his study of the harried lower-middle classes, which had been 
serialized in the fz the year before, was published in book form to generally 
favourable reviews.29 Die Angestellten: Aus dem neuesten Deutschland dealt with 
more than 3,500,000 members of the recently enlarged white-collar sector 
of the working population, the group whose vulnerabilities the Nazis were 
to exploit with such fervor. Caught between the inexorable rationalization 
of industrial production, which rendered their positions precarious, and the 
fear of lowering their status through an identification with blue-collar prole-
tarians, the Angestellten were fair game for political manipulation. Kracauer’s 
most trenchant passages dealt with the weaknesses of Angestelltenkultur, 
which made this manipulation possible. Here, an earlier diatribe against the 
Tat circle’s völkisch ideology gained new urgency because of the clear evidence 
of its widespread success. Protesting against vulgar Marxist assumption that 
the unemployed Angestellten would soon join their working-class brethren, 
Kracauer pointed out that lacking an ideological faith, they were spiritu-
27 Siegfried Kracauer, “Über Arbeitsnachweise,” reprinted in Straßen in Berlin und Anderswo, and “Das 
Ornament der Masse,” reprinted in the collection with the same title.
28 Lacis, Revolutionär im Beruf, 63. The crucial article was “Der Mann mit dem Kinoapparat,” fz, May 
19, 1929, reprinted in Kino.
29 Siegfried Kracauer, Die Angestellten: Aus dem neuesten Deutschland, 1st and 2nd ed. (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Frankfurter Societäts-Druckerei, 1930); 3rd ed. (Bonn and Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 
1959), with an introduction by Erich Peter Neumann; 4th ed. (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1970); 5th ed. in 
vol. 1 of Schriften, and as separate book with review by Walter Benjamin appended.
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ally, as well as often materially, homeless. The condition he had described 
in general terms in Sociologie als Wissenschaft, that Lukácsian “transcendental 
homelessness”30 expressed in the modern novel, was now understood to be 
especially apparent in the lower-middle class, or new Mittelstand.
Apart from its substantive value, which helped inspire a widely read novel 
dealing with the same theme — Hans Fallada’s What Now, Little Man?31 —  Die 
Angestellten broke new methodological ground. Based on the qualitative eval-
uation and reconstruction of a number of interviews with Berlin white-collar 
workers, the book pioneered a technique the Lynds were developing in Amer-
ica at approximately the same time in their study of Middletown,32 a technique 
known as participant observation. Kracauer made no pretense of polling the 
average mentality of the people whose values he was investigating. “Reality,” 
he argued “is construction,”33 consisting of a mosaic of different observations. 
In a letter to Adorno, he spelled out the significance of his approach:
I consider the work methodologically very important in so far as it consti-
tutes a new form of presentation, one which does not juggle between the 
general theory and special practice. However, it presents its own special 
way of observation. It is, if you will, an example of materialist dialectics. 
Analogous cases are the analyses of situations by Marx and Lenin, which 
are excluded by Marxism as we know it today.34
Although difficult to emulate, Kracauer’s method did produce a striking evo-
cation of the Angestellten dilemma, which repays reading today, despite the 
large amount of subsequent work on the same subject.35
If 1930 saw Kracauer at the height of his public fame, it was also the 
year of perhaps his most important personal decision. On March 5th, at the 
age of 41, he ended his long bachelorhood and married Anna Elisbeth (Lili) 
Ehrenreich, then a librarian at the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt. 
Before his marriage, Kracauer’s strongest personal attachment seems to have 
30 One of the chapters in Die Angestellten is called as “Asyl fur Obdachlose,” which echoes the phrase 
“transcendentale Obdachlosigkeit,” a frequent refrain in Die Theorie des Romans.
31 Hans Fallada, What Now, Little Man?, trans. E. Sutton (London: Simon and Schuster, 1933).
32 R.S. and H.M. Lynd, Middletown...Contemporary American Culture (London: Harcourt Brace, 1929).
33 Die Angestellten, 216 in Schriften 1.
34 Kracauer to Adorno, May 25, 1930.




been a platonically erotic bond with Adorno, fourteen years his junior.36 Lili 
Kracauer was almost 37 at the time of her marriage, born a Catholic in Stras-
bourg when it was part of the Second German Reich. She studied art history 
and philology in Strasbourg and Leipzig before the war and was beginning to 
study music at the Leipzig conservatory when the post-war inflation forced 
her to take the Institut job. From all indications, it was an extraordinarily 
successful match with Lili Kracauer sharing her husband’s intellectual in-
terests and helping with his work until her death in 1971. To Kracauer, she 
was “the greatest happiness of my existence.”37 They remained inseparable 
for thirty-six years, except for the short period when Kracauer was interned 
in France in 1940.
And yet, despite the personal and professional success Kracauer enjoyed 
in 1930, he still remained very much the “extraterritorial” intellectual. As 
already noted, spiritual homelessness was a theme which ran throughout 
his writings in the Weimar period, mocking the myth of the “Golden Twen-
ties.” When attempts were made to transcend the meaninglessness of mod-
ern life — whether religious, in the case of Buber of Scheler, or political, in 
the case of the völkisch Tat circle38 or Lukács — Kracauer treated them with 
scorn. Similarly, the then current Wissenschaftskrise, that collapse of histori-
cism into relativism which Troeltsch and Weber had confronted but not 
resolved, was impervious to correction through solely mythological means. 
Kracauer reasoned:
Not from science itself or with the help of philosophical speculation may 
the […] crisis of science be resolved; its overcoming demands instead a real 
departure from the entire spiritual situation […] Annihilation of relativis-
tic thinking, blocking of vision against the infinite without bounds: that 
is all tied to a complete change in the entire essence of reality — and perhaps 
not only in it alone.39
36 Leo Löwenthal has remarked on this aspect of the Adorno–Kracauer friendship. In a letter to Ador-
no on December 10, 1962, Kracauer speaks of “reawaking the old Platonic eros” in connection 
with the writer Alexander Kluge. Before the war, Kracauer’s closest friend was Otto Heinebach, 
who was the model for the character named Otto in Ginster. He died in the fighting (Letter from 
Lili Kracauer to Hans G. Helms, March 10, 1970).
37 Kracauer to Löwenthal, January 3, 1964.
38 “Aufruhr der Mittelschichten,” in fz, December 10 and 11, 1931; reprinted in Das Ornament der 
Masse.
39 “Die Wissenschaftskrise,” in fz, March 8 and 22, 1923; reprinted in Das Ornament der Masse, 208.
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In fact, what gave Kracauer much of his success in the Weimar period was his 
willingness to face the dilemmas besetting Germany without illusions. Suc-
cess did not signify an end to his “extra-territoriality” so much as his ability 
to speak for others with similar situations.
No better expression of Kracauer’s continuing personal estrangement 
can be found than Ginster, the semi-autobiographical novel that he published 
without affixing his name in 1928. Although, it would be hazardous to draw 
overly precise parallels between Kracauer and his main character, it is clear 
that he exploited many of his own experiences and attitudes in writing the 
novel. Set in the vacuous world of the petit-bourgeoise, Ginster traces the at-
tempts of one of its inhabitants to confront the idiocy of the First World War. 
Its hero, if the name is really applicable, is known simply by his nickname, 
Ginster, which means a type of shrub that grows by the side of railroad tracks. 
He is shown as a somewhat naive and passive victim of forces he cannot un-
derstand, although he musters the cunning to survive them. Trained, like his 
creator, as an architect, his uneventful and aimless life is interrupted by the 
war and the threat of conscription. He avoids the army for two years, but is fi-
nally drafted only to be released a few weeks later after starving himself into 
collapse. After he returns to civilian life, his existence resumes its meaning-
less ramble without Ginster having learned a great deal from his experience. 
His opposition to the war had been more visceral than ideological at the start 
and remains so at the end. No Bildungsroman, Ginster is written in a restrained, 
bittersweet, laconic style, that would place it as a product of the Neue Sachli-
chkeit, if not for the frequent flashes of surrealistic energy that indicate Kra-
cauer’s impatience with pure objectivity. Ginster reacts, but when he does so 
it is without any real introspective growth. Unlike Kracauer himself, he fails 
to transcend the world of the architect to become a writer with the power 
to give his life at least aesthetic order. An aura of melancholy pervades the 
novel, although its final chapter, which was unaccountably dropped from 
the 1963 re-edition, can be read in a somewhat optimistic way.40
Kracauer manages, however, to maintain a consistently critical tension 
in the work by juxtaposing Ginster’s obviously underplayed reactions and 
the horrors of bourgeois life and the war which demand a more vigorous re-
sponse. Included among his targets is his uncle, who had died in 1924. Kra-
cauer gently, although pointedly, satirizes him as an archivist incapable of 
40 Helms has stressed this in his essay on Kracauer.
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connecting his fascination with the past to the problems of the present. In 
contrast to Ginster, his attitude towards the war is that of a superpatriot, who 
would “give up his entire Middle Ages for the occupied piece of land, and 
become the Fatherland in person.”41
Although never achieving the notoriety of Erich Maria Remarque’s All 
Quiet on the Western Front, Ginster ranks as one of Weimar’s most effective 
fictional exposés of the insanity of the war and the society that spawned it. 
That Kracauer chose to publish it anonymously reveals much about the sta-
tus of anti-war writing in the last years of the republic. Publicly lauded by 
Thomas Mann, Joseph Roth, Hermann Kesten, and Hermann Hesse, Kracauer 
was proudest of the private praise he received from Alban Berg, whose letter 
of December 12, 1928, he cherished throughout his life. To Berg, Ginster was 
“not only a literary masterpiece, but also, in the truest sense of the word, a hu-
man document […]. Something appears that always seems to me as the ideal 
condition of a work of art, which I have found only in the most infrequent 
cases.” Many years later, Adorno would concur with this judgment, calling 
the book Kracauer’s “most meaningful achievement.”42
With all the critical energies underlying Kracauer’s work in the last half-
decade of the Weimar period, it is not surprising that he was drawn into the 
orbit of the leftist opposition to the Republic. But here too, he remained an 
extraterritorial man, isolated from the dominant currents of radicalism. 
Judging from a biting satire of the post-war revolution in Osnabruck near 
the end of Ginster, Kracauer had not been caught up in the utopian climate of 
the early 1920s. And he consistently avoided any flirtation with the various 
parties of the left that survived those years. Nor did he regularly contribute to 
leftist publications, choosing instead to remain with the staunchly bourgeois 
fz, even during its swing to the right. His attitude towards the Soviet experi-
ment seems to have turned sour at an early point in its history. In short, he 
remained very much on the margins of Weimar’s left-wing life. As an intel-
lectual, he had no illusions about his qualifications as a potential proletarian. 
In the introduction to Die Angestellten, he wrote: “The intellectuals are either 
themselves employees, or they are free, and then the employees are uninter-
esting to them because of their routineness (Alltäglichkeit). The radical intel-
lectuals also do not easily come behind the exotica of the everyday.”43 Kra-
41 Kracauer, Ginster, 2nd ed., 48.
42 Theodor W. Adorno, “Der wunderliche Realist,” 98.
43 Kracauer, Die Angestellten, 212 in Schriften 1.
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cauer’s hope in that work was to awaken the consciousness of intellectuals to 
the condition of the white-collar workers. His target was the glib assumption 
of certain vulgar Marxists that this potentially dangerous stratum of society 
would join the working class. Just as he warned against the subsumption of 
the Angestellten under a simplified bipolar class rubric, Kracauer resisted the 
integration of the critical intellectual into any one movement or party.
This general stance was shared by the men who formed his closest friend-
ships during the Weimar period: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, 
Ernst Bloch, and Leo Löwenthal. Like Kracauer they were all unaffiliated 
and experimental leftists who could have merited Benjamin’s description of 
Kracauer’s “consistent outsiderness.”44 All were fascinated by cultural ques-
tions more than economic ones and had little patience with the mechanistic 
economism of the Second International orthodoxy. Kracauer was less inter-
ested in high art than Adorno or Löwenthal, less drawn to religious questions 
than Banjamin or Bloch, but he shared with them a common vocabulary and 
general outlook. As friends, they avidly read each other’s work, often review-
ing them with an appreciative, if not always uncritical eye.45 On certain occa-
sions, one would complain about the appearance of his ideas in the writings 
of another,46 and in fact, it is difficult to establish whose claim to originality 
in many cases.
Stylistically, they were also relatively similar, although Bloch’s Expres-
sionist prose was all his own. The similarity rested in their frequent reliance 
on short, aphoristic evocations to make a philosophically laden point. Ben-
jamin’s Einbahnstrasse, Bloch’s Spuren, and Adorno’s Minima Moralia all bear 
comparison with Kracauer’s feuilleton pieces in the fz.
44 Walter Benjamin, “Politisierung der Intelligenz,” reprinted in Die Angestellten, 5th ed. not in Schrif-
ten, 118.
45 Among the reviews are the following: Kracauer review of Bloch’s Thomas Munzer als Theologe der 
Revolution in fz, August 2, 1922; Kracauer of Benjamin’s Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels and Ein-
bahnstrasse in fz, July 15, 1928, reprinted in Das Ornament der Masse; Kracauer of Adorno’s Kierkeg-
aard: Konstruktion des Aesthetischen, written for fz, but not printed because of the Nazi takeover; 
Bloch of Kracauer’s Die Angestellten in Neue Rundschau 41, no. 12 (December, 1930) and in Erbschaft 
dieser Zeit (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1962); Benjamin of Kracauer’s Die Angestellten (see above 
footnote); Benjamin of Adorno’s Kierkegaard in Vossische Zeitung (April 2, 1933; and Adorno of Kra-
cauer’s Jacques Offenbach und das Paris seiner Zeit in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 6, no. 3 (1937).
46 See, for example, Benjamin’s complaint to Gershom Scholem that many of the ideas in Kracauer’s 
critique of the Buber–Rosenzweig translation of the Bible were his. Letter to Scholem, March 29, 
1926, in Walter Benjamin, Briefe, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno, 2 vols. (Frank-
furt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1966), p. 429. Many of the same ideas were later to play a prominent role in 
Adorno’s attack on Heidegger in Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Kurt Tarnowski and Frederic Will (Ev-




Where they perhaps most strikingly differed was in their attitude towards 
the revolution in Marxist theory signalled by the appearance of Lukács’s His-
tory and Class Consciousness and Karl Korsch’s Marxism and Philosophy in 1923. 
Bloch and Adorno, although not entirely in agreement with the Hegelianized 
Marxism posited by those works, were far more favourable than Benjamin, 
Löwenthal, or Kracauer. Kracauer’s interest in Simmel and Scheler had re-
inforced his strong distrust of the idealism so prevalent in the neo-Kantian 
prewar period. In fact, his general attitude towards metaphysical specula-
tion was such that Benjamin could call him an “enemy of philosophy”47 in 
1923. If he did have a philosophical interest in the early 1920s, it was in the 
work of the master anti-Hegelian, Søren Kierkegaard, whose impact is clear 
on Kracauer’s ambitious investigation of the detective novel, which has only 
recently been published.48
Although Kracauer had endorsed Lukács’s diagnosis of the meaningless-
ness of the modern world in Theory of the Novel, he was far less willing to ac-
cept the solution implicit in Lukács conversion to Communism. An unpub-
lished manuscript on “the Concept of Man in Marx,” directed against Lukács, 
was lost during the emigration, but his argument has largely survived in a 
series of letters to Bloch during the mid-twenties. On May 27, 1926, he wrote:
It seems to me that [Lukács] has attacked empty and worn out idealism, 
but instead of transcending it, has fallen into it again. His concept of to-
tality, if despairing of its own formality, has more similarity to Lask than 
Marx. Instead of penetrating Marx with realities, he returns to the Spirit 
(Geist) and metaphysics of exhausted idealism and allows the materialist 
categories to fall on the way. […] Rudas and Deborin [the Soviet philoso-
phers who attacked Lukács], however disgustingly shallow they may be, 
unconsciously are correct against Lukács in many things. […] He is philo-
sophically — a reactionary; please think of his concept of personality.
After a return letter from Bloch, in which Lukács’s materialist credentials 
were defended and the characterization of him as a reactionary was found 
wanting,49 Kracauer replied on June 29:
47 Quoted in Adorno, “Der Wunderliche Realist,” 86.
48 Siegfried Kracauer, Der Detektiv-Roman: Ein philosphischer Traktat in Schriften 1. For references to 
Kierkegaard, see 107–109.
49 Bloch to Kracauer, June 6, 1926. I am indebted to Karsten Witte for drawing my attention to the 
lost manuscript underlying the Lukács debate.
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I spoke with [Korsch] in the Reichstag in January [1926] about Lukács. He 
approved of my arguments in general and explained that only out of very 
weighty tactical reasons did he intend to remain silent[…] . Through his 
reception of Hegel, Lukács covers the actual source of Marx’s fundamen-
tal concepts in a fateful way. Marx comes, more decisively than Lukács 
presents and perhaps knows, from the French Enlightenment and, to be 
sure, from one branch of the Enlightenment that goes back to Locke and 
is represented by the names Helvetius and Holbach; that is, decisive cat-
egories of Marxism, such as the concept of “Man” or “Morality” can be un-
derstood only if one builds a tunnel under the massive mountain of Hegel 
to Marx and Helvetius. […] Had Lukács seen clearer, it would have not been 
possible in the final chapter of his book, which dealt with organization, 
to introduce a bad concept of personality. […] I would really like to know 
where, according to your conviction, Lukács’ materialist intention can be 
placed. There is no room in the progress of this formal dialectic, which so 
smoothly leads to an empty totality. I can name many sentences in Marx 
which judge this dialectic. It means a regression behind Marx.
Although finishing with a positive appraisal of the brilliance of some of 
Lukács’s passages on reification, Kracauer clearly rejected the basic burden 
of Lukács’s argument. His distrust of totality, concern for the integrity of the 
individual personality, and adherence to the Enlightenment view of materi-
alism informed all of his later work as well. In Die Angestellten, for example, 
he was to write of a “hunger for immediacy that without a doubt is the con-
sequence of the undernourishment produced by German idealism.”50 Politi-
cally, his critique of History and Class Consciousness, especially of its advocacy 
of personal realization through submission to the will of the party led in 
one direction: “I am in the last analysis,” he wrote Bloch, “an anarchist, to be 
sure sceptical enough to consider anarchism as it exists as a distorter of its 
intentions.”51 As Lili Kracauer would acknowledge after her husband’s death, 
all forms of conformity, including solidarity with the working class move-
ment and its parties, were anathema to him.52
What is, however, also significant in this correspondence is Kracauer’s 
appeal to Marx, as he interpreted him, against Lukács. His self-image as a de-
50 Kracauer, Die Angestellten, 216.
51 Kracauer to Bloch, June 29, 1926.
52 Lili Kracauer to Hans G. Helms, June 19, 1970.
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fender of Marxism during the late Weimar period is apparent in an exchange 
he had with Bloch in 1932, after he published a critical review of Brecht’s film 
Kuhle Wampe.53 Bloch was outraged by the review and its placement in the 
bourgeois fz; he claimed Kracauer has a personal bias against Brecht (which 
was true, as several of his letters reveal)54 and argued that he had abandoned 
his militancy of only a short time before. There were no classless intellectu-
als, Bloch warned. Kracauer responded with equal indignation, arguing that 
whatever his personal feelings towards Brecht, he had never allowed them 
to interfere with his critical judgment. As for writing for the fz, he remarked 
that his reputation as an “enemy of the bourgeoisie” was known to all and 
that writing in a non-Marxist paper gave his words greater public impact. 
The accusation that he had repudiated his militancy was also nonsense: “I 
have advocated Marxism visibly enough and more than others and will con-
tinue to advocate it in a way that corresponds to my talents and energies and 
with growing influence on the general development.”
This view of Kracauer as militant was also expressed in Benjamin’s review 
of Die Angestellten,55 which Kracauer always praised. The book, Benjamin ar-
gued, was a “signpost on the road to the politicization of the intellectuals 
[…]. This indirect influence is the only one that a revolutionary writer from 
the bourgeoisie can have today. Direct effectiveness can only come from 
praxis.” Kracauer was a “rag-picker” in the “dawn of a revolutionary day.” The 
characterization of rag-picker was one Kracauer always liked,56 but unlike 
Benjamin, his faith in the dawning of a revolutionary day soon wavered. In 
more recent years, the nature of his radicalism has been debated by Adorno 
and Hans G. Helms, the former concerned about a growing conformity in his 
work, the latter anxious to maintain its radical impetus as long as possible.57 
53 Bloch to Kracauer, April 29, 1931; Kracauer to Bloch, May 29, 1932. The review appeared in the fz 
on April 5, 1932.
54 In a letter to Adorno, written on December 21, 1930, Kracauer wrote of a meeting with Brecht: 
“Once the conversation turned to theoretical matters, one had the feeling of talking with a school 
boy (Obertertianer). The craziest is that some people are taken in by this inverted Romanticism, 
whose brutality is possible only in a national socialist country. For Benjamin I have explanations, 
for others I don’t.” In a letter to Bloch on July 5, 1934, he made sarcastic remarks about Benjamin’s 
trip to his “God” in Denmark (where Brecht was in exile) and said that Kafka would be astonished 
to learn that his work was so close to Brecht’s and Communism (as Benjamin had asserted).
55 See fn. 44. Kracauer’s appreciation is expressed in a letter to Erika Lorenz, October 22, 1961.
56 Ibid., 122. Benjamin did not choose the phrase “rag-picker” idly. It was a key concept in the under-
standing of nineteenth-century Paris and Baudelaire, who wrote a prose-poem about the figure. 
See Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire, 19–20 and 79–80.
57 See fns. 2 and 15. Helms demonstrates how the recent publication history of Kracauer’s works, 
especially the first German translation of From Caligari to Hitler and the second edition of Ginster, 
helped mute his earlier radicalism.
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Although Adorno’s perception has been borne out by Kracauer’s most recent 
work, Helms has successfully drawn attention to the extent of Kracauer’s rad-
icalism during the Weimar period. The correspondence with Bloch quoted 
above, which could not be examined when Helms wrote, confirms his case. 
So too does a remark Kracauer’s friend and colleague on the fz, the Austrian 
novelist Joseph Roth made to Stefan Zweig in 1930; Kracauer, he wrote, “is 
one of those Jehovah-Jews, Marxism is his bible; the eastern Jews have a name 
for these people: God’s policemen.”58
For all his Marxist rhetoric and intentions, however, it is clear that Kra-
cauer was more a member of Weimar’s celebrated “homeless left” than any 
established Marxist movement. Die Angestellten candidly admits that “the 
work is a diagnosis and as such consciously refuses to make suggestions for 
improvements.”59 Although Kracauer ends the text with the ringing words, 
“It does not depend on the institutions being changed, it depends on men 
changing the institutions,”60 how this is to be accomplished is never deter-
mined. Thus, one might say that despite his increasing celebrity during the 
waning Weimar years, he remained very much an extraterritorial figure in 
political terms.
In yet another way, Kracauer remained an insecure and marginal intel-
lectual. During the twenties, the lion’s share of Kracauer’s energies was spent 
in preparing his feuilleton columns, which were usually thrown out with the 
next day’s trash. To a man of his philosophical and cultural ambitions, the 
ephemeral nature of his writings was a source of considerable chagrin, which 
he expressed in a letter to Adorno in 1930.61 Other journalists such as Tuchol-
sky and Ossietsky of the Weltbühne praised his work and tried to entice him 
into their circle, but he refused.62 In later years, he would reject comparisons 
with them, just as he would bristle at the label of journalist.63 But without 
a proper academic connection, Kracauer was never really accepted in the 
scholarly world either. In the twenties, several manuscripts, including his 
highly speculative study of the detective novel, went unpublished because 
58 Joseph Roth, Briefe, 1911–39, ed. Hermann Kesten, (Cologne and Berlin: Kiepenheuer Witsch, 
1970), 175.
59 Kracauer, Die Angestellten, 207.
60 Ibid., 304.
61 Kracauer to Adorno, July 22, 1930.
62 Letters from Tucholsky to Kracauer, March 4, 1927, and Ossietsky to Kracauer, July 7, 1929. Tu-
cholsky, who lived in Paris, was very enthusiastic about Kracauer’s descriptions of Parisian life. 
Ossietsky wrote positively about Ginster.
63 Kracauer to Erika Lorenz, March 31, 1962.
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they fell between two stools. Philosophers were uninterested in his subject 
matter and readers of detective novels had no patience with his method.
Ultimately, however, Kracauer’s fears were to prove unfounded as collec-
tions of his early work appeared in German.64 And now thanks to the efforts 
of Siegfried Unseld of the Suhrkamp Verlag and Karsten Witte, who is pre-
paring a major biography of Kracauer, his collected works are in the process 
of being published. Included in the seven volume series is Kracauer’s second 
novel, Georg, written in 1934, but prevented from publication because of Kra-
cauer’s emigration from Germany. A social critique of the waning years of the 
Republic cantering around a newspaper editor, Georg was warmly praised by 
no less a figure than Thomas Mann while still in manuscript,65 but attempts to 
place it with a Dutch publishing house were unsuccessful. Unlike some of his 
other manuscripts, however, it survived his sudden departure from Germany 
in March of 1933, after the burning of the Reichstag and shortly before some 
of Kracauer’s own books were burned in the famous conflagration of May 10.
Kracauer was already in Paris when a letter came from the Frankfurter-So-
cietats-Druckerei on August 25 informing him that his tenure with the fz was 
at an end. The pretext was an article he had written for the left-wing Das Neue 
Tage-buch,66 but it is clear that Kracauer had no place in the fz’s future, which 
reached its nadir in 1939, when Max Amann presented it to Hitler as a birth-
day present. Still, Kracauer did not relish the exile that awaited him; in Sep-
tember, Benjamin reported to Brecht that he was still very depressed by the 
change.67 From a position of power and prestige, he was reduced to freelance 
writing in a hostile environment. In his last work on history, when much of 
the pain had passed, Kracauer remarked on the condition of the emigré, who 
was like a palimpsest composed of different cultural superimpositions. Here, 
the ambivalence of his attitude towards extraterritoriality was clear:
As he settles elsewhere, all those loyalties, expectations, and aspirations 
that comprise so large a part of his being are automatically cut off from 
their roots. His life history is disrupted, his “natural” self relegated to the 
64 See fns. 12 and 16.
65 On December 8, 1934, Mann wrote to Kracauer that “the high literary qualities of your grand pic-
ture of society have not failed to make their impression on me.” See Karsten Witte, Nachwort to 
Schriften, 7, 505.
66 The article, a review of an American film, was called “The Charlatan as President.” It has been 
reprinted in Kino, 221–3.
67 Benjamin, Briefe, vol. 2, 62.
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background of his mind […] since the self he was continues to smolder 
beneath the person he is about to become, his identity is bound to be in a 
state of flux; and the odds are that he will never fully belong to the com-
munity to which he now in a way belongs. […] Where then does he live? 
In the near-vacuum of extra-territoriality. The exile’s true mode of exis-
tence is that of a stranger.68
In Paris, Kracauer supported himself by writing film criticism and book re-
views for Swiss newspapers, such as the Basler National-Zeitung and the Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, and for French journals like the Revue du Cinéma, Mercure 
de France, La Vie Intellectuelle, and Figaro. Ginster was translated into French 
by Clara Malraux, at that time the wife of the novelist. Although gaining 
him a reputation in Parisian intellectual circles, the translation brought in 
very little income. Most of his efforts were directed towards the publication 
of a book that would help him stay above water. His subject was a German 
Jew of an earlier era who had also lived in exile, albeit voluntarily, in Paris, 
Jacques Offenbach.
In 1937, Jacques Offenbach and His Time was published in German, French, 
and English editions.69 Rather than the conventional life and works study, 
Kracauer attempted a “Social Biography” that paid as much attention to Sec-
ond Empire Paris as to Offenbach himself. Continuing his interest in margin-
al cultural phenomena, he probed the world of the operetta and the related 
milieus of boulevard and journalistic society, where the deracinated modern 
man ruled supreme. The operetta, he argued, had “originated in an epoch in 
which social reality had been banished by the Emperor’s orders”;70 its phan-
tasmagorical quality mirrored the illusory nature of Napoleon’s reign, where 
class conflict was only apparently overcome. But for all its escapist tenden-
cies, it fulfilled a critical function during the Empire’s most repressive period: 
“At a time when the bourgeoisie were politically stagnant and the Left was 
68 Siegfried Kracauer, History: The Last Things Before the Last (New York: Markus Wiener, 1969), 83.
69 Siegfried Kracauer, Jacques Offenbach und das Paris seiner Zeit (Amsterdam: Allert de Lange, 1937); 
2nd ed. as Pariser Leben: Jacques Offenbach und seine Zeit (Munich: List, 1962); Jacques Offenbach ou 
le secret du Second Empire, with a preface by Daniel Halevy, (Paris: Le promeneur, 1937); Orpheus 
in Paris: Offenbach and the Paris of his Time, trans. Gwenda David and Eric Mosbacher (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1939). The English edition dropped Kracauer’s foreword without ex-
planation.
70 Kracauer, Orpheus in Paris, 289.
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impotent, Offenbach’s operettas had been the most definite form of revolu-
tionary protest.”71
Although a massively researched and fluidly written study, which suc-
cessfully conveys the flavor of the period it examined, Offenbach was a less 
penetrating work than Walter Benjamin’s Passagenarbeit, the unfinished 
project that dealt with much the same subject matter.72 It lacked Benjamin’s 
conceptual daring and breadth of vision and broke no new ground in prob-
ing the commodity form in bourgeois society, as had the Passagenarbeit. Al-
though clearly indebted to Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire, Offenbach was no real 
landmark in Marxist cultural criticism, as Benjamin’s work has come to be 
seen. Perhaps its greatest weakness, as Adorno predictably pointed out in a 
mixed review,73 was its failure to deal directly with Offenbach’s music, focus-
ing instead on the libretti of Halévy and the general atmosphere surrounding 
the operetta world. Among Kracauer’s major works, it is perhaps the least 
likely to justify our current interest in him.
Although the appearance of Offenbach lessened his financial burden some-
what, it was clear by 1938 that continued life in Paris was intolerable. With 
the growing threat of war and the lack of real opportunities to get a foothold 
in French society, emigration to America seemed the only solution. Although 
certain friends, such as Benjamin and Joseph Roth, remained in Paris, others, 
including Bloch, Adorno, and Löwenthal, were already in America or about 
to depart. The next three years were spent in a grim and frantic struggle to 
obtain the proper papers for the emigration. Reading his correspondence of 
those years is a painful experience, revealing as it does the desperation that 
Kracauer and doubtless many others felt in their desire to leave. In the light 
of his later disdain for filming historical dramas, it is a mark of his plight that 
on April 5, 1939, he wrote to the Hollywood producer Max Leammle to ask 
about the possibility of filming his Offenbach.
In 1939, some aid was given by the American Guild for German Cultural 
Freedom, but only for three months. Kracauer’s best hope at that time was 
the Institut für Sozialforschung, which had resettled in New York in 1934. 
In 1937–8, he had worked on a commissioned study of “Totalitarian Propa-
ganda: A Political Treatise” for the Institut’s Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, but 
Adorno’s editorial emendations were of such magnitude that he withdrew 
71 Ibid.
72 See fn. 25.
73 See fn. 45.
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it in disgust. Nonetheless, Kracauer continued to hope that his friendships 
with Löwenthal and Adorno would lead to Institut support, even though he 
had never had very cordial relations with Max Horkheimer, the Institut’s di-
rector. In the late thirties, however, the Institut suffered serious financial re-
versals that severely curtailed its ability to help other refugees. Still, Kracauer 
maintained his hopes even as he sailed for America and his disappointment 
was proportionately keen.74
Institut members, in particular Leo Löwenthal, were instrumental, how-
ever, in obtaining the necessary affidavits which allowed Kracauer to emi-
grate. Also helpful in this regard were Meyer Schapiro, the distinguished art 
historian, Iris Barry of the Museum of Modern Art’s Film Library, and Varian 
Fry, who helped secure his release from the Centre de Rassemblement into 
which he had been put at the war’s outbreak. In March of 1941, he left Paris 
for Lisbon and then on April 15, he and his wife set sail for New York on the 
Niassa; they arrived ten days later. His state of mind at this time can be seen 
in the letters he continued to send to Institut figures for help. To Adorno, he 
wrote that his time in Paris had been “eight years of an existence that doesn’t 
deserve that name. I have grown older, also inside me. Now is the last station, 
the last chance that I don’t dare misplay or else everything is lost.”75 To Frie-
drich Pollock, the Institut’s Associate Director, he wrote of his anxiety, “anxi-
ety at beginning with nothing that I can call my own and perhaps without a 
chance at the start.”76 Kracauer’s situation was certainly not enviable, but at 
least, unlike Walter Benjamin and many others, he was alive to try to make 
a new start in America. At the age 52, Kracauer still had his most influential 
work ahead of him.
×
Although disappointed by the Institut, Kracauer was fortunate to have found 
a sponsor with the Museum of Modern Art, where Alfred Barr and Iris Barry 
were making the serious study of film respectable. In subsequent years, grants 
from the Rockefeller, Guggenheim, Bollingen, and Mellon Foundations made 
his financial survival possible. Lili Kracauer continued to do research for her 
74 Conversation with Henry Pachter, New York, September 4, 1973; Pachter was on the same ship as 
Kracauer.
75 Kracauer to Adorno, March 28, 1941.
76 Kracauer to Pollock, March 28, 1941.
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husband, but also worked for the Central Location Index, which helped in 
the search for displaced persons in Europe. Their combined income, in addi-
tion to a compensatory stipend paid by the German government in the 1950s, 
prevented a repetition of the last years in Paris.
Kracauer’s first project with the museum was a study of Nazi war propa-
ganda. Bernard Karpel, the museum’s film librarian, remembers him camped 
in the projection room watching films over and over again, smoking foul 
cigars, and bemoaning his diminished status.77 The result was “Propaganda 
and the Nazi War Film,” published in 1942.78 Analysing both the form and 
content of the Nazi films, with a long and penetrating look at Leni Riefen-
stahl’s Triumph of the Will, Kracauer came to a conclusion about the con-
trived nature of pseudo-documentaries that anticipated his later argument 
in Theory of Film: “Most films of fact affect audiences not so much through the 
organization of their material as through the material itself. […] The two Nazi 
campaign films differ from them in that they not only excel in solid composi-
tion of their elements, but also exploit all propagandistic effects which may 
be produced by the very structure.”79 Kracauer was especially interested in 
the Nazis’ perverse use of the montage techniques developed by the Russian 
directors of the 1920s to a fine art. Another argument foreshadowing his later 
position concerned the relative absence of anti-Jewish activities in the films 
he viewed, which suggested the Nazis feared a reaction produced by the di-
rect presentation of their atrocities; “The image,” he wrote, “seems to be the 
last refuge of violated human dignity.”80
For the next five years, Kracauer was occupied with the first book that 
brought his name to prominence in the American film world, From Caligari 
to Hitler; A Psychological History of the German Film. In 1932, Kracauer had de-
fined the task of the film critic in politically charged terms:
The film in the capitalist economy is a commodity like other commodi-
ties. Apart from a few outsiders, they are produced not in the interest of 
art or the enlightenment of the masses, but for the sake of the profits they 
77 Conversation with Bernard Karpel, New York, September 7, 1973.
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promise to yield […] They exercise extraordinarily important social func-
tions that no film critic, who earns the name, can leave unobserved.81
“The film,” he wrote six years earlier, “is the mirror of the existing society.”82 
These presuppositions still underlay From Caligari to Hitler, despite its sub-
title’s stress on psychology; for Kracauer, the psychic states worth probing 
were “those deep layers of collective mentality which extend more or less 
below the dimension of consciousness.”83
To uncover this subconscious dimension of the collective psyche, Kra-
cauer qualitatively analyzed hundreds of German films, whose immanent 
development he tried to link to the changing fortunes of the Weimar Repub-
lic. Qualitative analysis of German cultural phenomena was in fact a popular 
occupation in the America of the 1940s, and Kracauer was in the company 
of other emigré scholars like Ernst Kris.84 While paying some attention to 
technical development, such as the increasing use of studio interiors and 
new lighting techniques, Kracauer focused primarily on plots and signifi-
cant motifs. His basic conclusion was that the cinema mirrored the shifts in 
the Republic’s history with extraordinary fidelity. Among his most notable 
discussions was critique of the Expressionist classic, The Cabinet of Dr. Calig-
ari, which revealed, for the first time, a reversal of its originally radical script 
by the director, Robert Wiene. No less significant was his devastating attack 
on Fritz Lang, then in Hollywood, in whose films Kracauer saw many of the 
marks of proto-fascism. Even The Testament of Dr. Marbuse, which Goebbels 
banned in 1933, “betrays the power of Nazi spirit over minds insufficiently 
equipped to counter its peculiar fascination.”85 The result, so a later defender 
of Lang claimed, was unfortunate: “No one has done more damage to Lang’s 
reputation. […] Kracauer gives the impression of carrying on a personal 
feud.”86
81 Siegfried Kracauer, “Über die Aufgabe des Filmkritikers,” in fz, May 23, 1932; reprinted in Kino, 9.
82 “Die kleinen Ladenmadchen gehen ins Kino,” in Das Ornament der Masse, 279.
83 From Caligari to Hitler, 6. This position marked his approach as early as “Die Kleinen Ladenmad-
chen gehen ins Kino,” where he wrote: “the idiotic and unreal film fantasies are the day dreams of 
society...” (280, italics in original).
84 Ernst Kris, German Radio Propaganda (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944). Kracauer’s social 
psychological approach to fascist behaviour also links him to the work done by his friends at the 
Institute for Social Research that led to Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1950).
85 From Caligari to Hitler, 250.
86 Eric Rohde, Tower of Babel: Speculations on the Cinema (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1966), 86.
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In general, Kracauer’s verdict on the German cinema was strongly nega-
tive. As in his Offenbach study, he found a parallel between a mystifying cul-
tural phenomenon and the general prevalence of false consciousness. Even 
the films of the middle years of the Republic, the “stabilized era” dominated 
by the Neue Sachlichkeit, came under fire. Following a critical reference to the 
Neue Sachlichkeit in Die Angestellten,87 which demonstrated a certain uneasi-
ness about his own “hunger for immediacy,” Kracauer argued that “New Ob-
jectivity marks a state of paralysis. Cynicism, resignation, disillusionment; 
these tendencies point to a mentality disinclined to commit itself in any 
direction.”88 Even G.W. Pabst, whose fidelity to the photographic essence of 
film Kracauer found laudable, undercut the critical implications of his film 
through a weakness for melodrama and desire to remain a neutral observer. 
Here, in other words, was a realistic cinema with problematic political im-
plications, implications which Kracauer was to minimize when he wrote 
his next major film book. From Caligari to Hitler bitterly condemned the Ger-
man people as a whole with little effort spent on determining which film ap-
pealed to which audience: “Irretrievably sunk into retrogression, the bulk of 
the German people could not help submitting to Hitler. Since Germany thus 
carried out what had been anticipated by her cinema from its very beginning, 
conspicuous screen characters now came true in life itself.”89
As might be expected, the book stirred an enormous critical storm.90 Its 
obvious leftist political slant was denounced in a vicious anti-communist 
review by Seymour Stern, which appeared in several places. Kracauer’s 
method, especially his reliance on “collective soul” was attacked by Frank-
lin Fearing, Hans Sahl, and Eric Bentley, who called the book a “refugee’s re-
venge” in The New York Times Book Review. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. approved of 
87 Die Angestellten, 287. For a Marxist discussion of Kracauer’s critique of the Neue Sachlichkeit, see 
Helmut Lethen, Die Neue Sachlichkeit (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), esp. 102–5. He attacks Kra-
cauer for remaining a “free-floating intellectual” despite himself. Kracauer’s distrust of groups 
is in fact clearly evident as early as his 1922 essay “Die Gruppe als Ideenträger,” reprinted in Das 
Ornament der Masse.
88 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, 165.
89 Ibid., 272.
90 Among the reviews were Seymour Stern in the Los Angeles Daily News (May 10, 1947) and The 
New Leader (June 28, 1947); Eric Bentley in The New York Times Book Review (May 18, 1947); Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. in The Nation (July 26, 1947); Richard Griffith in New Movies 22, no. 4 (Summer 
1947); Franklin Fearing in Hollywood Quarterly 2, no. 4 (July 1947); David T. Bazelon in Commentary 
4, no. 2 (August 1947); Iris Barry in The New Republic 116, no. 20 (May 19, 1947); Hans Sahl in The 
Modern Review (August, 1947); Herman G. Weinberg in Sight and Sound (Summer 1947); Karl W. 
Hinckle in Etc., A Review of General Semantics 5, no. 2 (Winter 1948); and L.M. Hanks, Jr. in The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 6, no. 2 (December 1947). Robert Warshow wrote a letter to 
The New Leader on August 9, 1947, defending Kracauer against Stern’s attack.
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Kracauer’s conclusions, but argued “that the main trouble, of course, is that 
Dr. Kracauer knows in advance which dreams panned out.” Others worried 
about the possibility of tracing a similar proto-fascist lineage in non-German 
cinema, a thought that continued to trouble Adorno as late as the 1960s, 
when he wrote that King Kong could be taken as an allegory of comparable 
regression in America.91
Kracauer was not, however, without his defenders. David T. Bazelon 
praised his method in Commentary ; Iris Barry did the same from not a totally 
disinterested point of view in The New Republic, and Richard Griffith called 
it “the best book on the movies I have ever read” in New Movies. Robert War-
show was moved to answer Stern’s Red-baiting attack in the New Leader’s let-
ter columns and Herman Weinberg did the same in Sight and Sound, where 
he called it “perhaps the greatest book on the film ever written.” The contro-
versy has yet to be stilled as the different appreciations of the book in recent 
works by Peter Gay, I.C. Jarvie, Dieter Prokop, David Stewart Hull, and Mi-
chael Schroter illustrate.92 And devotees of a non-social interpretation of the 
Weimar cinema still continue to draw sustenance from Lotte H. Eisner’s The 
Haunted Screen,93 originally written in French five years after From Caligari 
to Hitler. 
With some distance between us and the book’s publication, it seems safe 
to say that Kracauer’s method, as flawed as it surely was, did uncover some 
remarkable tendencies in the cultural life of the Weimar years that make the 
collapse of the Republic more plausible. If disputable on certain films and oc-
casionally doctrinaire in tone, From Caligari to Hitler nevertheless represents 
a milestone in the application of a sociological-psychological approach to a 
mass medium that can scarcely resist it. Although Kracauer’s own later work 
contained certain implicit criticisms of the book, which will be examined 
shortly, it still deservedly commands the attention of students of both film 
and fascism.
91 Adorno, “Der Wunderliche Realist,” 105.
92 Peter Gay’s Weimar Culture follows Kracauer’s judgments closely, but David Stewart Hull’s Film in 
the Third Reich: A Study of the German Cinema, 1933–1945 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1968), is far more critical, calling Kracauer’s major thesis “preposterous” (3); I.C. 
Jarvie, Towards a Sociology of the Cinema (London: Routledge, 1970), and Dieter Prokop, Materialen 
zur Theorie des Films, Aesthetik, Sociologie, Politik (Munich: Hanser, 1971) are equally hostile. For a 
detailed and wide-ranging defense of Kracauer, see Michael Schröter, Über Siegfried Kracauers Film 
theorie: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Angewandte Psychoanalysis (unpub. Diplomarbeit, Free University of 
Berlin, 1972).
93 Lotte H. Eisner, The Haunted Screen: Expressionism in the German Cinema and the Influence of Max 




Thirteen years passed before Kracauer’s next major analysis of the film. In 
that period, he continued to write film criticism and book reviews, now for 
American journals like Harper’s, Theater Arts, and Partisan Review. He also 
helped support the efforts of others connected to the film in his new capacity 
as consultant to the Guggenheim Foundation. Project proposals by Arthur 
Knight, Robert Warshow, Shirley Clarke, Parker Tyler, Hans Richter, Gregory 
Markopolous, and others all received Kracauer’s endorsement.
But financial considerations compelled Kracauer to direct his energies in 
less interesting areas. In 1950, Leo Löwenthal, then director of research at the 
Voice of America, offered his old friend a post as research analyst. Two years 
later, Kracauer began an association with Columbia University’s Bureau of 
Applied Social Research, founded by Paul Lazarsfeld and headed at the time 
by Charles Y. Glock. The fruit of these two connections was an empirical 
study of the thinking of recent refugees from Eastern Europe, prepared in col-
laboration with Paul L.Berkman. Based on more than 300 interviews conduct-
ed in 1951–2 with exiles from Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, Satellite 
Mentality was published in 1956 under the auspices of the Bureau.94 When 
first entering the Bureau, a stronghold of quantitative methods, Kracauer had 
published a paper defending the virtues of qualitative techniques.95 Satellite 
Mentality was based on such a methodology, but it lacked the imaginative 
“construction in the material” that gave Die Angestellten its unique power. 
The conclusions reached by the authors, occasionally couched in Cold War 
rhetoric, were not very startling, and in later years, Kracauer would regard 
the book somewhat as an embarrassment.96
During the 1950s, the Kracauers had the opportunity to make several 
trips to Europe for the first time since their departure in 1941. Old friends 
like Adorno and Bloch had already returned; others like Benno Reifenberg, 
who helped found and edit the postwar periodical Die Gegenwart, were in-
volved in re-establishing the continuities of German culture severed by the 
Nazis. Although Kracauer was encouraged to join them, like the majority 
of emigrés to America, he chose to remain in his adopted land where life, 
94 Kracauer and Paul L. Berkman, Satellite Mentality: Political Attitudes and Propaganda Susceptibilities of 
Non-Communists in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1956).
95 “The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 16, no. 4 (Winter 
1952–53).
96 Kracauer to Erika Lorenz, October 22, 1961.
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however “extra-territorial,” was preferable to starting anew in Germany. Un-
like Adorno, whose disparagement of the undialectical qualities of English is 
well-known, Kracauer took to his new language with total acceptance. His 
repudiation of Adorno’s position was in fact a sore point between them.97 In 
the early forties, he insisted on writing only in English and engaged friends 
like Bernard Karpel of the Museum of Modern Art to help him. When the 
editorial corrections of his works in the new language were minor, he was 
overjoyed, but he must have been equally chagrined when Pauline Kael belit-
tled his English in a long critique of Theory of Film in 1962.98
If the Kracauers ever considered returning to Germany, their trips quickly 
disabused them of the notion. The Europeans, he wrote Löwenthal after a 
three month stay in 1956, “have lost the power of assimilating the new. Some-
how it is suffocating over there.”99 “We would die if we had to live again in 
Germany for good,” he wrote two years later; it is a country “frightening in its 
prosperity, politeness, sham depth and, complete formlessness.”100 And again 
in 1960: Germany “is no country but a place lying somewhere in a vacuum.”101 
Kracauer enjoyed seeing old friends like the publisher, Peter Suhrkamp, the 
Blochs, the Adornos, and the Malraux’s, and welcomed meeting new ones like 
the philosopher Karl Heinz Haag; but now over sixty, he was clearly loathe to 
break once again with a relatively comfortable environment.
The environment became more comfortable still when the Bollingen 
and Chapelbrook Foundations and later the American Philosophical Society 
awarded him the grants to work on his long planned second book on the cin-
ema. Once again, the Museum of Modern Art put its film library and view-
ing room at his disposal; additional assistance came from Henri Langlois’ 
Cinémathèque Française in Paris and the British Film Institute in London. 
In 1960, Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality was published by 
Oxford University Press.
The book represented the culmination of Kracauer’s lifelong fascina-
tion with film, which began, so he recalled in his preface, as a child when 
97 Kracauer to Leo Löwenthal, October 26, 1955; Adorno, “Der Wunderliche Realist,” 100. For an im-
plicit endorsement of Kracauer’s position, see George Steiner’s essay on Nabokov significantly en-
titled “Extraterritorial,” in Extraterritorial: Papers on Literature and the Language Revolution (London: 
Macmillan, 1972).
98 Pauline Kael, “Is There a Cure for Film Criticism? Or, Some Unhappy Thoughts on Siegfried Kra-
cauer’s Theory of Film; The Redemption of Physical Reality,” reprinted in I Lost It at the Movies (Bos-
ton: MW Books, 1965), 260.
99 Kracauer to Leo Löwenthal, October 20, 1956. (Original in English.)
100 Kracauer to Leo Löwenthal, August 16, 1958. (Original in English.)
101 Kracauer to Leo Löwenthal, October 29, 1960.
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he devoted his first critical effort to “Film as the Discoverer of the Marvels of 
Everyday Life.” Issues treated in the book — the primacy of photography, the 
non-filmic nature of historical or artistic subject matter, the virtues of the 
documentary, to mention a few — had all been treated in earlier essays.102 His 
stress on the “redemptive” power of film, which meant its ability to make us 
attend to realities that were usually ignored, echoed his earlier concern for 
the neglected regions of cultural life: detective novels, the operetta, urban 
landscapes, troops of dancing girls, popular biographies, and the like. His re-
liance on what he called a “material” rather than formal aesthetic continued 
his quasi-phenomenological concern for the Lebenswelt, which had informed 
his work as early as Soziologie als Wissenschaft. And the motif of extraterritori-
ality strongly underlay his interpretation of the filmmaker’s vision.
But what had disappeared in the years between Caligari and Theory of Film 
was Kracauer’s earlier stress on the specifically social content of the reality 
film redeemed. In his 1927 essay on photography, Kracauer had discussed 
inter alia the function of illustrated newspapers as enemies of true conscious-
ness through their meaningless juxtaposition of unrelated phenomena. In 
the same article, he developed the relationships between photography, the 
domination of nature, and capitalism that would be taken up by Benjamin 
and Adorno in later years. In his series on “The Small Shopgirls Go to the 
Movies,” he probed the function of the film in the cultural desert of petit-
bourgeois life. In his 1928 discussion of abstract films, he chastised Expres-
sionism in the cinema for becoming “Kunstgewerbe”103 (art commodities), 
not for being non-filmic. “The film,” as we have already noted he said, “is the 
mirror of the existing society,” not of physical reality per se. In fact, his en-
tire critique of formalism, whether in sociological theory or daily life, was 
tied to a more basic attack on capitalist reification.104 All of this was absent 
from Theory of Film. As Adorno and other radical critics were to complain,105 
102 “Die Photographie,” in fz, October 28, 1927, reprinted in Das Ornament der Masse; “Der Historische 
Film,” National-Zeitung Basel, May 9, 1940, reprinted in Kino; “Abstrakter Film,” in fz, March 13, 
1928, reprinted in Kino.
103 “Abstrakter Film,” 47. Still, it would be erroneous to deny that Kracauer also criticised The Cabinet 
of Doctor Caligari for what Paul Rotha called its “studio constructivism,” that is, a violation of film’s 
inherently realistic character. (From Caligari to Hitler, 76).
104 See, for example, his remarks on the relationship between the capitalist production process, the 
rationalization of the world, and the Tiller Girls precision dancing act in Das Ornament der Masse, 
53–5.
105 Adorno to Kracauer, February 5, 1965; Kracauer responded on March 3, 1965, arguing that film 
did have an imminent development apart from its social function. For a vigorous defense of the 
essential unity of the two books, see Michael Schröter’s Diplomarbeit.
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redemption seemed to imply affirmation as well. Kracauer protested vehe-
mently against this charge, but it was clear that the critical impetus of his 
previous work had been blunted. Although it would be mistaken to say it had 
disappeared entirely, the crucial absence of any analyses of capitalism meant 
an undeniable shift had occurred.
Within the world of film criticism as such, however, the issues Theory of 
Film provoked were very different.106 The major impulse behind most seri-
ous film theory during the early years of the medium had been a desire to 
elevate movies into films, that is, to lift them from entertainment into an 
art form. Theoreticians like Rudolf Arnheim, who drew upon Gestaltist psy-
chology for his argument, Paul Rotha, Vachel Lindsay, and even the Marxist 
Béla Balázs were all anxious to stress the disparity between the event pho-
tographed and the artistic end product that was the film.107 Directors like 
Georges Méliès and Abel Gance in France and Pudovkin and Eisenstein in 
the Soviet Union were equally interested in exploiting the artistic potential 
of film, although of course the Russians had an ultimately political purpose. 
Techniques, especially the creative use of editing known as montage and the 
expressive employment of camera angles to produce dramatic images, were 
given primary attention by these critics and directors. When sound was in-
troduced, Arnheim and some of the others bemoaned its injurious effect on 
the artfulness of film; true cinematic language was visual, not verbal.
In opposition to this position, which gained sufficient prominence to 
be called the “orthodoxy” by one recent observer,108 two voices were raised, 
those of André Bazin,109 the major theoretician of the Cahiers du Cinéma in 
the 1940s and 1950s, and Siegfried Kracauer. Although neither ever acknowl-
edged the existence of the other, it is clear with hindsight that they were 
fighting a common battle. Whereas the artistic theorists had chosen Méliès 
as their model, Bazin and Kracauer picked the Lumière brothers, whose docu-
mentary realism and rejection of illusory effects prefigured a very different 
cinematic tradition. What the Lumières had called, in a frequently quoted 
106 My discussion of the history of film criticism relies in large measure on V.F. Perkins, Film as Film: 
Understanding and Judging Movies (London: Penguin Books, 1972) and Andrew Tudor, Theories of 
Film (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1974).
107 Rudolf Arnheim, Film as Art (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957); Paul 
Rotha, The Film Till Now (New York: 1950); Vachel Lindsay, The Art of the Moving Picture (New York: 
Liveright, 1970); and Béla Balázs, Theory of the Film (London: Denis Dobson, 1952).
108 Perkins, Film as Film, 11.
109 André Bazin, Qu’est-ce que le cinéma?, 4 vols. (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1958, 1959, 1961, and 1962); 
English trans, of vols. I and II as What is Cinema? (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1967 and 1971).
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phrase, “the ripple of the leaves,” only the film could capture and preserve. 
Both Bazin and Kracauer agreed on the priority of what was photographed 
over how it was photographed and spliced together. “Photography and the 
camera,” Bazin wrote in a phrase that Kracauer could have seconded, “are 
discoveries that satisfy, once and for all and in its very essence, our obsession 
with realism.”110 The artistic theoreticians’ stress on montage and the expres-
sive image were no more than misplaced fetishes. The great film comedians 
like Chaplin and Keaton, whose unimaginative use of the camera had earned 
them bad marks from the “orthodox” establishment, were now admitted 
to the company of successful filmmakers. Conversely, previous heroes like 
Eisenstein suffered, rightly or wrongly,111 a fall from grace because of their 
excessive formalism. 
Although Bazin was not as extreme in his insistence on non-artistic real-
ism as Kracauer — compare, for example, their attitudes towards mixed cin-
ema112 — together they helped reorient the critical discussion about cinema 
in a radical way. The wave of Italian neo-realist films in the forties and fifties 
seemed a confirmation of their position. In more recent years, the rise of ciné-
ma vérité provided yet another blow to the artistic orthodoxy of the medium’s 
infancy. What perhaps served most to aid their cause was the very success 
of the orthodox campaign; by the time of the realistic counter-reformation, 
movies had indeed become films, and it was no longer necessary to defend 
their artistic credentials.
Kracauer’s version of the anti-orthodox position is, of course, what con-
cerns us here. Most commentators have found it to be more vulnerable than 
Bazin’s, partly because Kracauer lacked the Frenchman’s remarkable feel for 
individual films, partly because Theory of Film was far more doctrinaire than 
anything that Bazin wrote. According to Rudolf Arnheim,113 Kracauer was a 
dogged conversationalist, who would worry an idea until all of its implica-
tions had been exposed; the argument in Theory of Film shows the effects of 
this character trait. Its basic premise is that there exists in film, as in all me-
dia, an essential characteristic that sets it apart from all others. This charac-
teristic, which is derived from a phenomenological probe into its nature, is 
more than a descriptive term; it has normative value as well and can be used 
110 Bazin, What is Cinema?, vol. 1, 12.
111 Tudor argues that Eisenstein should not be seen as the high priest of formalism, although this has 
frequently been the case.
112 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 215–231; Bazin, What is Cinema?, vol. 1, 76–124.
113 See fn. 9.
305
the extraterritorial life of siegfried kracauer
to separate “cinematic” from “non-cinematic” films. According to Kracauer, 
what makes a film conform to this norm is its fidelity to the photograph, 
which captures its subject matter, its “raw material,” in a realistic way. The 
opposite genre is painting, where a “formative” tendency holds sway and 
the artist’s subjective intervention is paramount. Without banishing the 
filmmaker’s creative side entirely, Kracauer clearly believed that in the mix 
between realistic and formative tendencies, the former must be dominant. 
On a continuum between documentaries and cartoons, the truly “cinematic” 
is at the documentary end. But, to be fair to his position, a balance must be 
struck which admits both impulses, even if one is more heavily weighted 
than the other.
In using the term “realism,” however, Kracauer was anxious to avoid 
sounding like a positivist with a belief in the pristinely mimetic character of 
the photographic image. The photograph, he acknowledged at one point in 
his argument, is not a mirror:
Photographs do not just copy nature but metamorphose it by transferring 
three-dimensional phenomena to the plane, severing their ties with the 
surroundings, and substituting black, gray, and white for the given color 
schemes. Yet if anything defies the idea of a mirror, it is not so much these 
unavoidable transformations — which may be discounted because in 
spite of them photographs still preserve the character of compulsory re-
productions — as the way in which we take cognizance of visible reality.114
What is striking in this paragraph is the ease with which he dismisses the 
“unavoidable transformations” that had been at the heart of the artistic theo-
reticians’ argument. The fact that photographs are “compulsory reproduc-
tions” is enough to justify his insistence that the objects of perception are 
preserved, indeed “redeemed” by the camera. Later in his argument, Kracauer 
goes so far as to forget his admission that photographs are not mimetic re-
productions of the physical world: “Now of all the existing media the cinema 
alone holds up a mirror to nature. Hence our dependence on it for the reflec-
tion of happenings which would petrify us were we to encounter them in 
114 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 15.
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real life.”115 Unfortunately, he failed to draw the obvious distinction between 
realism and naturalism, which might have helped him out of this dilemma.
But what is equally important in this paragraph is Kracauer’s shift at its 
end away from the object of perception to the subject, to “the way in which 
we take cognizance of visible reality.” To Kracauer, the subjective vision 
necessarily entailed by photography is an alienated one. The selectivity ex-
ercised by the photographer is relatively passive in comparison with that of 
the painter; it is more empathetic than spontaneous. Significantly, Kracauer 
identifies this vision with a melancholic, elegiac reaction to the world:
Now, melancholy as an inner disposition not only makes elegiac objects 
seem attractive but carries still another, more important implication: it 
favors self-estrangement, which on its part entails identification with 
all kinds of objects. The dejected individual is likely to lose himself in 
the incidental configurations of his environment, absorbing them with a 
disinterested intensity no longer determined by his previous preferences. 
His is a kind of receptivity which resembles Proust’s photographer cast in 
the role of a stranger.116
Here we have all the elements of the Neue Sachlichkeit, disillusioned estrange-
ment and unflinching objectivity, reproduced in an aesthetic of film. But, 
whereas in his earlier comments on the Neue Sachlichkeit Kracauer had shown 
some critical distance from its implications, here he succumbs to them en-
tirely. The motif of extraterritoriality, which we have seen so evident in his 
life and much of his work, is transformed into a prescriptive norm by which 
the “cinematic” nature of films is to be judged.
Having postulated this normative realism, Kracauer then proceeded to 
spell out the “affinities” photography has for certain types of reality, which 
also draw upon his earlier attitudes. These affinities are for “unstaged reality,” 
“the fortuitous,” “endlessness,” “the indeterminate” and “the flow of life.”117 
All of these are clearly related to his lifelong concern for the flux of the Leb-
enswelt, which resists formalized categorization. The film “redeems” these 
aspects of reality, which it alone can capture and preserve. In the present age, 
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stressed two characteristics of the age as crucial: “the declining hold of com-
mon beliefs on the mind and the steadily increasing prestige of science.”118 
The former confronts us with a normative void; ideology (understood in the 
non-Marxist sense of a unifying belief system) is on the wane. The latter in-
terferes with our capacity to experience the physical world directly without 
the filter of formal abstractions.
Films cannot help us by restoring the lost sense of community and mean-
ing for “the cooling process is irreversible.”119 This is in fact the major reason, 
so Kracauer argued, that prevents films from being seen as works of art: “Art 
in film is reactionary because it symbolizes wholeness and thus pretends to 
the continued existence of beliefs which ‘cover’ physical reality in both sens-
es of the word.”120 Tragedy is especially inappropriate to the cinema because 
it presupposes an ordered cosmos, which the film relentlessly denies.121
If film is worthless in helping us recapture our sense of a meaningful 
universe, it is nonetheless useful in overcoming the other tendency of the 
modern world, scientific over-abstractness. Films help reawaken our open-
ness to the concrete by making us confront unpleasant realities. As a “mate-
rialistically” minded medium, it proceeds from “below” to “above.”122 (Here, 
one hears a dim echo of his argument in the letter to Bloch in 1926 whereby 
Lukács had badly underestimated the influence of the Enlightenment mate-
rialists on Marx.) But anything beyond this “redemption of physical reality” 
was beyond the power of the film:
Béla Balázs’s thesis that the cinema comes into its own only if it serves 
revolutionary ends is an untenable one as are the kindred views of those 
schools of thought, neorealistic and otherwise, which postulate an inti-
mate relationship between the medium and socialism or collectivism.123
Implicitly, this debunking of Balázs also contains a criticism of Walter 
Benjamin’s celebrated essay “The Work of Art in the Era of Mechanical 
118 Ibid., 286.
119 Ibid., 295.
120 Ibid., 301. For a similar argument, see the 1926 essay “Kult der Zerstreuung,” reprinted in Das Orna-
ment der Masse, 315–16.
121 Ibid., 265–270.
122 Ibid., 309.
123 Ibid., 309. Schröter makes the interesting point that the implications of Kracauer’s film theory are 
anarchistic (44). This jibes with Kracauer’s self-description in his letter to Bloch of June 29, 1926, 
which Schröter could not have seen.
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Reproduction,”124 which followed Brecht in seeing a revolutionary potential 
in the mass distraction of the cinema. Although it may appear as if Kracauer 
was attributing to the film something akin to Brecht’s celebrated Verfrem-
dungseffect, it is clear that he had no confidence in the cognitive and ulti-
mately political benefits of this estrangement. Kracauer may have still been 
a “rag-pick,” but the “revolutionary day” had clearly failed to dawn.
Theory of Film created even more of a critical furor than From Caligari to 
Hitler. Positive voices were not absent, among them Herbert Read’s, and sur-
prisingly, Rudolf Arnheim’s.125 A friend of Kracauer’s since the 1940s who had 
helped him choose the subtitle of the book,126 Arnheim generously acknowl-
edged the place of both his and Kracauer’s approaches in understanding the 
cinema. Theory of Film, he wrote, “is probably the most intelligent book ever 
written on film;”127 although needing “correction and clarification,” “the core 
of his thesis is surely valid and important.”128 Arnheim endorsed Kracauer’s 
stress on the realistic tendency in the cinema, a remarkable reversal of his 
own Film as Art, but unlike Kracauer, he connected it to a cultural decline 
rather than a return to our senses: “a concern with unshaped matter is a mel-
ancholy surrender rather than the recovery of man’s grip on reality. Perhaps, 
then, we are witnessing the last twitches of an exhausted civilization, whose 
rarefied concepts no longer reach the world of the senses.”129
Most of the critical reception of Theory of Film was, however, essentially 
hostile. The least charitable of his accusers was Pauline Kael, who wrote a 
lengthy and vitriolic attack in Sight and Sound in 1962.130 Miss Kael’s deroga-
tory and sexist ire was aroused by the very attempt to theorize about film in 
the grand manner:
What do movies [N.B. not “films”] have to do with the “redemption” of 
“physical reality”? Our physical reality — what we experience around 
us — is what we can’t redeem: if it’s good, marvelous; if it isn’t, we can 
weep or booze, or try to change it. Redemption, like sublimation, is a dear 
124 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. with intro. by Hannah Arendt, trans. 
Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968).
125 Herbert Read in British Journal of Aesthetics 2, no. 2 (April, 1962); Rudolf Arnheim, in Journal of Aes-
thetics and Art Criticism 21 (1963); republished as “Melancholy Unshaped” in Toward a Psychology of 
Art (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972).
126 See fn. 9.
127 Arnheim, “Melancholy Unshaped,” 180.
128 Ibid., 186.
129 Ibid., 191.
130 See fn. 97.
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sweet thought. And Kracauer’s theory of film is a theory imposed on mo-
tion pictures.131
In elaborating her attack, she scored her most telling points in demonstrat-
ing the lengths to which Kracauer went to include cinematic phenomenon 
he liked, such as Fred Astaire’s dance routines, under the rubric of realism. 
She was somewhat less persuasive when hearing a German accent and not-
ing a speculative mind, she compared Kracauer to Hegel, the philosopher he 
spent much of his adult life opposing.132 Equally questionable was her call 
for movies to be “judged by the same kind of standards that are used in other 
arts,”133 as if there was such a thing as “art” with one set of standards for all 
its subdivisions.
Other critical appraisals by Tyler, Linden, Engels, Jarvie, Perkins, and 
Tudor,134 to mention the most prominent, were less bilious than Miss Kael’s, 
but scarcely less disparaging. As a whole, the points they made, embellished 
by some of my own, are as follows:
1. The search for the essence of a medium (which Miss Kael called “the great 
lunatic tradition”135) is itself a highly questionable endeavor. There is no 
“nature” of film with prescriptive value by which good films can be sepa-
rated from bad. Nor are there immanent laws of the cinema that can be 
abstracted from the social context in which films are made.
2. Film is particularly difficult to see in essentialist terms because the as-
sumption that photography is its primary source is erroneous. One might 
equally stress the opposition between the static photograph and the dy-
namic motion picture. In a technical sense, such nineteenth-century phe-
nomena as the magic lantern and other optical toys simulating motion 
are equally important. In a substantive sense, the traditions of the theatre 
and the novel cannot be discounted. In short, Méliès as well as the Lumi-
ère brothers must be given his due.
3. The distinction Kracauer makes between reality and “camera reality,” 




134 Parker Tyler, Sex Psyche Etcetera in the Film (New York: Penguin, 1969); George W. Linden, Reflections 
on the Screen (Belmont, ca: Wadsworth, 1970); Gunther Engels, “In der Zwangsjacke der Theorie,” 
in Saarbrücken Zeitung (January 30/31, 1965): for Perkins and Tudor, see. fn. 105.
135 Kael, “Is There a Cure for Film Criticism?” 245.
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is poorly developed and inconsistently used. Although anxious to avoid 
a positivist copy-theory of reality, he frequently sounds as if he believes 
films “mirrored” the material world. At times, Kracauer calls films cin-
ematic solely because of the techniques used, a stress on movement, for 
example, rather than because of their content. He sometimes justifies 
illusions that are convincing to the audience because of their fidelity 
to “camera reality,” but in what way do they then redeem the physical 
world? Once technique is admitted as a criterion of realism, then the em-
phasis is once again shifted away from the object photographed to the 
subjective photographer and Kracauer is back on “orthodox” grounds.
4. In establishing his prescriptive aesthetic, Kracauer has posited norms 
that are far too exclusive. Not only do they rule out cartoons, fantasies 
(such as those of Cocteau, one of Kracauer’s bêtes noires), filmed operas 
and plays, almost all avant-garde films including expressionist classics 
like Caligari, history films, and movies made from novels, but they also 
deny a priori the significance of the most widely admired directors of the 
post-neo-realist 1960s; Fellini, Antonioni, Resnais, Buñuel, Godard, and 
Bergman.136 Any theory of film that lacks the room for these types of mov-
ies is intrinsically inadequate.
5. Finally, the more general cultural tasks Kracauer sets the cinema are 
grounded in questionable assumptions. Is it true that all normative sys-
tems have been shipwrecked, or is Kracauer merely succumbing to the 
myth of the 1950s: the end of ideology? Moreover, even if one were to 
grant Kracauer’s assumption about the impoverishment of our percep-
tual apparatus caused by scientific abstraction, can one then say that 
films really return us to the sensuous, non-reified flow of “life?”137 In fact, 
doesn’t the very mediation of the film suggest an experience that is still 
passive and estranged? That melancholic alienation Kracauer sees as the 
essence of the camera eye is a poor candidate for the means to bring us 
back to our senses. Is there, in fact, any evidence that film-watching really 
136 In Theory of Film, Kracauer does talk about some of Fellini’s earlier films, especially The Nights of 
Cabiria and La Strada, but he sees them in the context of neo-realism. He also speaks highly of 
Buñuel, but it is the post-surrealist Buñuel of Land Without Bread and Los Olvidados. Bergman is 
mentioned only in passing, but Kracauer tries to save him for his thesis by saying that the “down-
to-earth attitude” of certain characters in The Seventh Seal “in a measure acclimatize(s) the film to 
the medium” (308). Resnais, Godard, and Antonioni had not yet made enough of a mark to be con-
sidered in the book. But we do know from his later correspondence that he considered Resnais’s 
Last Year at Marienbad a pretentious bore. (Kracauer to Michel Ciment, May 23, 1965).
137 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 169–170.
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leads to renewed participation in “life,” rather than compensating for its 
absence? Indeed, the very notion of “life,” which Kracauer once criticized 
in Simmel,138 but now accepts wholeheartedly, is highly suspect. To iden-
tify the real solely with process and flux is itself a Romantic assumption 
of dubious merit, as even Arnheim in his favourable review noted.139 Fi-
nally, the desire to redeem physical reality suggests a kind of indiscrimi-
nate yea-saying that fails to separate what needs to be saved from what 
doesn’t. The implications of this are apparent in Kracauer’s reaction to 
films that force us to see the monstrosities of the world:
 
The mirror reflections of horror are an end in themselves. As such they 
beckon the spectator to take them in and thus incorporate into his mem-
ory the real face of things too dreadful to be held in reality. In experienc-
ing the rows of calves’ heads or the litter of tortured human bodies in the 
films made of the Nazi concentration camps, we redeem horror from its 
invisibility behind the veils of panic and imagination. And this experi-
ence is liberating in as much as it removes a most powerful taboo.140
What Kracauer fails to consider here is the extent to which films numb us 
to horror through overexposure. The increasing tolerance for and even de-
light in graphic horror has been one of the most unsettling tendencies of the 
last decade. Removing taboos, especially if it entails the loss of our capacity 
for panic (or at least disgust) and imagination, may not always be liberating 
after all.
With the rough treatment that it received at the hands of most commen-
tators, Theory of Film marked the end rather than the beginning of an era in 
film criticism. It helped lay to rest the old debate over the artfulness of film, 
but in turn, its failures made the extreme realist position clearly untenable. 
Attempts to judge films as “cinematic” or not according to a prescriptive 
aesthetic soon seemed highly dubious. Instead, film criticism turned to the 
so-called “auteur theory,” which emerged from the pages of the Cahiers du 
Cinéma and was propagated in America by Andrew Sarris,141 or it focused on 
the more modest task of investigating the nature of specific genres within 
138 Kracauer, “Die Wartenden,” in fz, March 12, 1922; reprinted in Das Ornament der Masse, 108–9.
139 Arnheim, “Melancholy Unshaped,” 183.
140 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 306.
141 Andrew Sarris, “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962,” in Film Culture 27 (1962–63). Pauline Kael 
also ridiculed Sarris in “Circles and Squares; Joyes and Sarris” in I Lost It at the Movies.
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the larger corpus of films. Most recently, a structuralist method has been ap-
plied to the language of film by Christian Metz in France and Peter Wollen 
in Britain.142 Theory of Film remains a monument in the history of thinking 
about movies, but it also serves as a warning against building other monu-
ments of its kind.
×
In the 1960s, Kracauer’s career took a relatively new turn. These last several 
years before his death appear to be among the happiest of his life. Within the 
academic world, he finally received a measure of the recognition that had 
eluded him previously; he became an associate member of the Seminar on In-
terpretation at Columbia University and was invited on several occasions to 
Germany for colloquia on poetry and hermeneutics at Cologne and Lindau. 
His early fz writings were rediscovered by an appreciative German audience, 
which began to see his relationship to the more celebrated trio of Bloch, Ben-
jamin, and Adorno. Ginster was republished in 1963 with its author’s name af-
fixed; the critical acclaim was almost universal. There was talk of a Kracauer 
renaissance143 as some of his English works were translated into German for 
the first time. In Frankfurt, a student of Adorno’s named Erika Lorenz pre-
pared a Diplomarbeit on his career, which would have been expanded into a 
doctoral dissertation if not for her return to East Germany for personal rea-
sons.144 Although Kracauer was not completely won over by her interpreta-
tion — he objected to her attempt to assimilate him to the Frankfurt School’s 
Critical Theory and to her calling him a journalist — he glowed in the recog-
nition that such a project signified.
In 1964, Adorno himself wrote a piece on Kracauer for his 75th birth-
day, entitled “The Whimsical Realist.”145 Although he was initially flattered, 
Kracauer’s opinion changed drastically when he read between the lines to 
see a number of implied criticisms. In a series of heated letters, he defended 
himself and struck back at Adorno. Although it would be impossible here to 
142 Christian Metz, Language et Cinema (Paris: Editions Albatros, 1971); Peter Wollen, Signs and Mean-
ing in the Cinema (Bloomington, in: Indiana University Press, 1972).
143 Helmut Günther, review of Ginster in Welt und Wort 3 (1964).
144 Erika Lorenz, Siegfried Kracauer als Soziologe (Frankfurt a.M.: Diplomarbeit, Johnann Wolfgang 
Goethe Universität, 1962). Adorno informed Kracauer of her decision to leave West Germany in a 
letter of January 10, 1964.
145 See fn. 15.
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detail the issues between them, which I hope to do elsewhere at a later date, 
suffice it to say that their friendship of over forty years was severely strained 
by Adorno’s “tribute.”
Kracauer’s increased concern for his place in history was matched by a 
new fascination with the philosophy of history itself. After a long period of 
wandering, he returned, at least intellectually, to his boyhood home with his 
uncle Isidor. From the completion of Theory of Film until his death, he worked 
with almost total absorption in an area he had never really explored with any 
rigor before. Although he was losing valuable time in preparing the German 
translation of the film book, Kracauer completed the lion’s share of his manu-
script by the time of his relatively sudden death from pneumonia in Novem-
ber, 1966. His architect’s habit of constructing the manuscript in meticulous 
fashion before writing the final draft made its posthumous publication possi-
ble. In 1969, History: The Last Things Before the Last was brought out by Oxford 
University Press, but not without serious difficulties in the interim.
Sheldon Meyer of oup had wanted Lili Kracauer to edit and organize her 
husband’s manuscript, but lacking the self-confidence, she refused. Instead, a 
former acquaintance of Kracauer’s, a German living in New York named Rein-
hard Koehne, was hired to put the book in order. The decision proved an un-
happy one as Koehne and Lili Kracauer quickly developed a mutual distrust; 
her fidelity to the letter of Kracauer’s drafts was not shared by Koehne, who 
finally withdrew in anger. A lawsuit followed, but was ultimately dropped, 
and the book was eventually published without any mention of Koehne’s 
name. A very generous foreword was provided by Paul Oskar Kristeller, the 
distinguished historian of Renaissance philosophy with whom Kracauer had 
become close during his final years.
If History was ill-starred in its preparation, its fate after publication was 
scarcely more fortunate. The pre-publication review by the Virginia Kirkus 
Service was unsympathetic, and despite a very positive reaction by Georg Ig-
gers in the American Historical Review, the book sank with scarcely a ripple.146 
By the early 1970s, it was remaindered and taken out of circulation. Kracauer 
was widely known in the film world, but he was neither a professional phi-
losopher nor a historian and thus lacked a real constituency in those fields. 
146 The unsigned Kirkus review of February 15, 1969, called the book “passé and muddled,” ill-in-
formed on contemporary writings in the philosophy of history, and in need of “a dose of analytic 
rigor.” Iggers’s review was in the American Historical Review 75, no. 3 (February, 1970); he called the 
book “a real gem,” although he took issue with its interpretation of Marc Bloch.
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The private expressions of enthusiasm by such celebrated historians as J.J. 
Hexter and Werner Kaegi were of little help.147 Kracauer had had extraordi-
narily high expectations for what he considered his master work, but these 
were to be disappointed, at least in the short run.
And yet, in many ways, History is one of Kracauer’s most compelling 
and original works, which deserves to be “redeemed,” if one may borrow his 
own word, from an unmerited oblivion. In concluding this appreciation of 
Kracauer’s career, it would be useful to linger a while with his final book, 
not merely because it has been denied the critical examination it deserves, 
but also because it ties together many of the themes of his previous work. 
Without an understanding of the perspective expressed in History, Kracauer’s 
varied interests and conflicting approaches make little coherent sense. With 
that understanding, they begin to knit together.
In the book itself, he makes some astute observations about Proust’s Re-
membrance of Things Past, which raise crucial questions about Kracauer him-
self. Discussing Proust’s attempt to reconcile the antinomy between objec-
tive, chronological time and subjective, recapturable time, he remarks:
The story of his (or Marcel’s) fragmentized life must have reached its ter-
minus before it can reveal itself to him as a unified process. And the rec-
onciliation he effects between the antithetic propositions at stake — his 
denial of the flow of time and his (belated) endorsement of it — hinge on 
his retreat into a dimension of art. But nothing of the sort applies to histo-
ry. Neither has history an end or is it amenable to aesthetic redemption.148
Before Proust, Dilthey had also argued that meaning was only perceivable 
at the end of a life, when its constituent moments could be seen as parts in a 
completed whole:
One would have to wait for the end of a life and, in the hour of death, sur-
vey the whole to ascertain the relation between the whole and its parts. 
147 J.H. Hexter to Sheldon Meyer, April 26, 1967; Werner Kaegi’s praise was quoted in a letter from 
Lili Kracauer to Sheldon Meyer, December 11, 1969. Other letters favorable to Kracauer’s essay on 
“Time and History” came from Karl Lowith (January 20, 1964), H.I. Marrou (April 20, 1964), Arnold 
Hauser (February 2, 1964), and Erwin Panofsky (March 16, 1964).
148 Kracauer, History, 163. Proust’s work also played a crucial role in Theory of Film; Micheal Schröter 
has a number of illuminating observations on its significance (pp. 59f).
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One would have to wait for the end of history to have all the material 
necessary to determine its meaning.149
But unlike Proust, Dilthey did not believe that an artificial, premature end 
could be achieved through an aesthetic recapitulation of a life still in pro-
gress, even though one might withdraw into a cork-lined room to prevent the 
future from having any meaning. Kracauer clearly shared Dilthey’s qualms 
about this solution, as he did his argument about full meaning coming at 
the end of history, an end that would never come. Whereas, it seems to me 
he was somewhat ambivalent was in his attitude towards the closure of an 
individual life signified by death. That desperate insistence on chronological 
anonymity we have noted before can be read not merely in a psychological 
sense; it also suggests a desire to thwart the attribution of final meaning to 
his life which would follow its end. Kracauer was both driven by the need 
to order his life retrospectively, which was perhaps responsible for his early 
semi-autobiographical novels, and repelled by the thought that this meant 
the exhaustion of its open-ended potential. This ambivalence clearly paral-
leled his attitude towards extraterritoriality, which we have noted earlier.
The question then that must be asked is whether or not his death does give 
us an insight into the whole meaning of his life. In other words, do we now 
have a vantage point like the spire of Proust’s Combray Church from which 
the landscape before us (or more correctly, behind us) becomes coherent? Fail-
ing this, can we say that History: The Last Things Before the Last provides a sub-
stitute reconciliation, very much like Marcel’s “retreat into the dimensions of 
art,” which was the only redemption Kracauer himself could achieve?
To answer the first part of the question, there is little in Kracauer’s bi-
ography to suggest that the extraterritoriality that marked it from an early 
age was ever really overcome. Although Adorno worried that his friend had 
decided to seek “happiness”150 after emigrating to America, thus becoming a 
conformist of sorts, Lili Kracauer’s word that her husband had resisted con-
formity to the end must be given at least equal weight.151 Despite his continu-
ing marginality, however, there is little to indicate that Kracauer fashioned 
his life in such a way that made non-conformity itself a positive lifestyle. 
149 Wilhelm Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History: Thoughts on History and Society, ed. with introduc-
tion by H.P. Rickman (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 106.
150 Adorno, “Der Wunderliche Realist,” 100. This accusation infuriated Kracauer.
151 Lili Kracauer to Hans G. Helms, June 19, 1970.
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There is no hint of a Rimbaud or Jarry here, seeking to make his life into an 
artistic whole through the acting out of an alternative vision. Nor is there 
any suggestion of a Lukács or T.S. Eliot, finding wholeness in obedience to an 
external authority. Kracauer remained an outsider to the end, sceptical of all 
belief systems, false reconciliations, and communitarian solutions to aliena-
tion. As the economist Adolph Lowe, who spoke at his funeral, remarked: 
“I remember him wearing the mask he liked best: as Sancho Panza trotting 
on his ass behind the frantic visionaries in his bunte Nuchternheit [gay, many-
colored sobriety], as his friend Ernst Bloch so well defined him.”152 In short, 
aside from whatever personal vision may have been granted him “in the hour 
of death,” it is impossible for the historian to say that Kracauer’s life achieved 
any really unified meaning at its end. Indeed, as Kracauer himself recognized 
in his discussion of Proust, personal histories cannot be set apart from the 
larger context of historical change, which admits of no real redemption.
What, then, of History: The Last Things Before the Last? Does it function 
the way Marcel’s novel did to render his life a whole through a surrogate 
aesthetic (or in this case, intellectual) reconciliation? Does it succeed where 
earlier fictional attempts like Ginster and Georg were only partially successful 
largely because of their prematurity? The answer, it seems to me, is a guarded 
yes, even though Kracauer’s substantive argument throughout is directed 
against reconciliation. At first glance, the book seems an improbable candi-
date for this task. Less than a month before his death, in his last letter to Leo 
Löwenthal, he wrote: “I am not yet out of the tunnel, but in the distance there 
is already something like a dim light.”153 His final illness prevented him from 
reaching the light in its full brightness, but even if he had lived to complete 
the book, its final form would not have suggested wholeness. As he planned 
it, History was to appear as a series of relatively autonomous mediations on 
aspects of history and historical craftsmanship.154 It is not a sustained and 
rigorously developed argument, and indeed, many of its conclusions are 
directed against reconciliation. And yet, paradoxically, it does have certain 
unifying themes and more importantly from our point of view, it resurrects 
152 Adolph Lowe, “Thoughts on Siegfried Kracauer,” delivered at his funeral in New York, November 
27, 1966, now in the Nachlaß.
153 Kracauer to Leo Löwenthal, October 29, 1966.
154 The chapters are as follows: “Nature,” “The Historical Approach,” “Present Interest,” “The Histo-
rian’s Journey,” “The Structure of the Historical Universe,” “Ahasuerus, or the Riddle of Time,” 
“General History and the Aesthetic Approach,” and “The Anteroom.”
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all of the major concerns of his previous work, casting them in a new and 
revealing light.
Shortly after starting the work, Kracauer wrote to Löwenthal that he had 
suddenly realized that the new book “is a direct continuation of my theory 
of film: the historian has traits of the photographer, and historical reality 
resembles camera-reality. The similarities are really startling: I had done on 
this route complete unconsciously.”155 He then asked Erika Lorenz to compile 
a list of his early essays in which history played a role. She wrote back that 
she had found six: “Die Wissenschaftskrise,” “Der verbotene Blick,” “Die Reise 
und die Tanz,” “Das Ornament der Masse,” “Zu den Schriften Walter Benja-
mins,” and perhaps most importantly, “Die Photographie,” the first time in 
which Kracauer explored the link between history and photography.156 In his 
introduction to History, which he completed in February, 1962, he spelled out 
the connections revealed when he saw the link between the film book and 
his current interest, Theory of Film :
Now appears to me in its true light: as another attempt of mine to bring 
out the significance of areas whose claim to be acknowledged in their 
own right has not yet been recognized. I say “another attempt” because 
this was what I had tried to do throughout my life — in Die Angestellten, 
perhaps in Ginster, and certainly in the Offenbach. So at long last all my 
main efforts, so incoherent on the surface, fall into line — they have all 
been served and continue to serve, a single purpose: the rehabilitation 
of objectives and modes of being which still lack a name and hence are 
overlooked or misjudged. Perhaps this is less true of history than photog-
raphy; yet history too marks a bent of the mind and defines a region of 
reality which despite all that has been written about them are still largely 
terra incognita.157
The analogy between history and photography turned out to be a central 
prop of his argument, and not merely because of their shared redemptive 
role, to which I will return shortly. They resemble each other in a number 
155 Kracauer to Leo Löwenthal, February 16, 1961.
156 All of these are collected in Das Ornament der Masse, with the exception of “Der Verbotene Blick,” 
which appeared in the fz, April 9, 1925 and is reprinted in Strassen in Berlin und anderswo (Letter 
From Erika Lorenz to Kracauer, Febrauary 2, 1962).
157 Kracauer, History, 4.
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of ways. Both are “a means of alienation,”158 which for reasons he never fully 
developed is a healthy condition to foster in the modern world. Both investi-
gate and reveal the realities of the Lebenswelt in all its contingent, indetermi-
nate open-endedness. Both are produced by a balance between “realistic” and 
“formative” tendencies, with an emphasis on the former. Both underwent 
a period when simple mimesis was assumed to be its special genius (the 
positivist historicism associated with Ranke’s wie es eigentlich gewesen and 
the early years of nineteenth-century danguerrotypy). Although this period 
was marked by naiveté, both are still more heavily weighted on the realis-
tic side, which separates history from historical fiction as it does film from 
painting. Both use close-ups and establishing shots, which in the historians’ 
vocabulary are known as micro-history and macro-history. Finally, both are 
“anteroom areas,” which elude over-systematization, ultimate answers, and 
the holistic shaping of art.
In drawing these parallels, Kracauer exhibited a far lighter touch than 
in Theory of Film. Whereas in the earlier book, overly artistic films were ban-
ished as “uncinematic,” historical writing that fell on the formative side of 
the scale was now admitted as legitimate. In dealing with the structure of the 
historical universe, Kracauer arrived at a conclusion that had eluded him in 
his analysis of the film universe: that its structure was “non-homogeneous.” 
Although suspicious of overly ambitious attempts to discern secular or cycli-
cal patterns in history, he granted validity to macro-historical efforts on the 
scale of Burckhardt’s study of the Renaissance, where the interpretive genius 
of the historian was allowed almost free rein. Arguing against advocates of 
what has been called “historical pointillism” such as Sir Lewis Namier and 
Tolstoy, he rejected the notion that the ultimate subject matter of history 
is the smallest possible detail, everything else being an inductive generali-
zation from these fundamental “facts.” Instead, he invoked two “laws” that 
govern historical understanding: the “law of perspective,” which posits that
[i]n the micro dimension a more or less dense fabric of given data cana-
lizes the historian’s imagination, his interpretative designs. As the distance 
from the data increases, they become scattered, thin out. The evidence thus 
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and the “law of levels,” which parallels the cinematic distinction between 
close-ups and establishing shots, and means that
contexts established at each level are valid for that level but do not apply 
to findings at other levels; which is to say that there is no way of deriv-
ing the regularities of macro-history, as Toynbee does, from the facts and 
interpretations provided by micro-history.160
In stressing the non-homogeneous structure of the historical universe, Kra-
cauer was reinterpreting in historical terms what sociologists as far back as 
Comte and Durkheim had been advocating: social facts were in some sense 
generic and thus irreducible to psychological facts. Although not denying 
the traffic between the various levels, he was stern in warning against the 
belief in an effortless passage from one to another. In holding that no one 
level was primary, he contested the views of both psychohistorians and so-
cial historians who claim their level is the bedrock of historical analysis. Yet, 
still very much a champion of the realistic rather than formative tendency, 
he was anxious to warn against the dangers of an overly abstract and gen-
eral history. An opponent of unrestrained methodological individualism, he 
nonetheless warned against the dangers of holism as well. The broadened 
intelligibility of macro-history did not, in fact, mean greater significance for 
its findings. In history, abstraction ought not to be equated with superior 
insight. Indeed, “one of the underlying assumptions of the present study” 
was that “the traditional identification of the extreme abstractions — say, 
the idea of the ‘good’ or that of ‘justice’ — as the most inclusive and essen-
tial statements about the nature of things does not apply to history.”161 Yet, 
it is equally mistaken to expect the accumulated data of micro-historical re-
search eventually to translate into a full and adequate understanding of the 
past as a whole. Indeed, “the belief in the progress of historiography is largely 
in the nature of an illusion.”162
Why then continue to do the monographic research that Carlyle, Ni-
etzsche, Huizinga, Marc Bloch, and so many others have condemned as “dry-







There is only one single argument in its support which I believe to be 
conclusive. It is a theological argument, though. According to it, the 
“complete assemblage of the smallest facts” is required for the reason that 
nothing shall go lost. It is as if the fact-oriented accounts breathed pity 
with the dead. This vindicates the figure of the collector.163
Here, the redemption Kracauer sought in so many secular ways was finally 
allowed an explicitly religious moment.
The non-homogeneity of the historical universe had still further implica-
tions, which Kracauer explored in other chapters in the book. In his discus-
sion of the relationship between history and nature and their correspond-
ing methodologies, he admitted the Marxian point that “society is a second 
nature,”164 which implies that scientific methods may well be applicable to 
history. But he also argued that there is an irreducibly contingent element in 
history which defies schematization. Thus, narrative description is equally 
as valid as social history with its stress on morphological regularities. Simi-
larly, Dilthey’s celebrated notion of Verstehen still had a place in the histo-
rian’s methodological arsenal, but it was only one of several approaches that 
depended on the historical level that was being investigated.
The argument for the present-mindedness of the historian’s vision, most 
notably advanced by Croce and Collingwood, also foundered in the face of 
the non-homogeneity of the historical universe. Kracauer contended that the 
historian cannot himself be understood as so embedded in his own period 
that all of his perceptions of the past are filtered through his current situa-
tion. The reason is simply that there is no present “period” to determine the 
historian’s vantage point:
If the historian’s “historical and social environment” is not a fairly self-
contained whole but a fragile compound of frequently inconsistent en-
deavours in flux, the assumption that it moulds his mind makes little 
sense. It does make sense only in the contexts of a philosophy which, like 
Croce’s, hypostatizes a period spirit, claims our dependence on it, and 
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and without. Seen from within, the relations between the mind and its 
environment are indeterminate.165
The best counterexample is the maverick historian who defies his Zeitgeist; 
Kracauer defines him in now familiar terms:
Vico is an outstanding instance of chronological extra-territoriality; and 
it would be extremely difficult to derive Burckhardt’s complex and am-
bivalent physiognomy as a historian from the conditions under which 
he lived and worked. Like great artists or thinkers, great historians are 
biological freaks: they father the time that has fathered them.166
Instead of present-mindedness, Kracauer called for an effort of self-transcend-
ence not unlike Proust’s ability to succumb to involuntary memory. The his-
torian must “bracket” himself — note the phenomenological term — and 
prepare his mind through a kind of surrender, an “active passivity,”167 which 
allows the material to reveal itself to him. Although the morphological pat-
terns of history have to be more aggressively pursued, narrative accounts 
must arise from an expectant openness to the material.
Yet another implication of the heterogeneity of the historical universe 
was the inadequacy of induction as the sole method of historical inquiry. 
Following Benjamin’s discussion in his Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels,168 
Kracauer distinguished between generalizations and what he called “ideas.” 
The latter are “genuine universals” arising out of a leap from the cumulative 
data of empirical research. They transcend the simple distinction between 
right and wrong because of their extraordinary power to illuminate the his-
torical landscape:
They are nodal points — points at which the concrete and abstract really 
meet and become one. Whenever this happens, the flow of indeterminate 




168 Walter Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels in Schriften, 1 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 
1955). In a review of Kurt Breysig’s Vom geschichtlichen Werden, vol. 2, Die Macht des Gedankens in 
der Geschichte, which is contained in the Kracauer Nachlaß under the category “Old German Manu-
scripts.” Kracauer made a similar critique of induction as the sole mode of historical knowledge. 
Although no date is affixed, the review appears to be from the Weimar period.
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is seen in the light of an image or conception which takes it out of the 
transient flow to relate it to one or other of the momentous problems and 
questions that are forever staring at us.169
Burckhardt’s image of the Renaissance, Marx’s distinction between substruc-
ture and superstructure, Weber’s Protestant Ethic are examples of “ideas,” 
which later historians have been able to refute in particular cases, but not 
really lay to rest. Beyond these “ideas” there is a realm — that “last” region 
referred to in Kracauer’s title — that historians dare not enter. Here, Kracauer 
conflated the truths of metaphysics (last in an ontological sense) with the 
end of history (last in a chronological sense). Because the end of history was 
unthinkable, it was wrong to expect the historian to posses the vantage point 
from which metaphysical truth was attainable. Not even universal history, if 
it can be said to exist, could encompass that ultimate region.
As in film, an overly harmonious rendering of the material is an aesthetic 
distortion of the open-ended nature of history. Robert Merton’s reading of 
Sterne’s Tristram Shandy170 captured the impossibility of the task; like Tris-
tram Shandy, the historian has too much to relate before he can get to the end 
of his tale. If he tries to short-circuit the process by arbitrarily calling a halt, 
he makes the mistake Proust made by withdrawing into his cork-lined room. 
The result may be artistically successful, but it carries inevitable violence to 
the past as it opens into the future.
Of all the implications of the non-homogeneity of the historical universe, 
one stands out as central: the nature of historical time. Kracauer, the architect 
trained more in spatial than temporal terms, had become increasingly preoc-
cupied by the mysteries of time, as we have seen with his insistence on his 
own chronological anonymity. The first section of History to be published, 
appearing in German, Italian, and English while Kracauer was still alive,171 
was entitled “Time and History.” With minor emendations, it appeared in the 
book as “Ahaseurus, or the Riddle of Time.”
169 Kracauer, History, 101.
170 Robert K. Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript (New York: The Free Press, 1965). 
Kracauer communicated his admiration to Merton in a letter, which Merton deeply appreciated. 
(Letter from Merton to Lili Kracauer, June 28, 1968).
171 In German in Zeugnisse: Theodor W. Adorno zum sechzigsten Geburtstag, ed. Hermann Schweppen-
häuser and Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1963); in English in History and Theory, 
Beiheft 6 (Middletown, ct: Wesleyan University Press, 1966); in Italian in Tempo Presente (1965).
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Although he did not work out all the implications of his title, Kracauer 
did devote one very interesting paragraph to Ahaseurus, the Wandering Jew. 
After remarking that only this legendary figure might know at firsthand the 
continuity of history, he described the cost of this knowledge:
How unspeakably terrible he must look! To be sure, his face cannot have 
suffered from aging, but I imagine it to be many faces, each reflecting 
one of the periods which he traversed and all of them combining into 
new patterns, as he restlessly, and vainly, tries on his wanderings to re-
construct out of the times that shaped him the one time he is doomed to 
incarnate.172
The pain distorting the Wandering Jew’s face is thus a result of his trying to 
integrate the different experiences of his life into one coherent pattern. What 
is also implicit in the story, although Kracauer neglected to develop it, is the 
fact that Ahaseurus is condemned to eternal life because of his rejection of 
Jesus. In other words, he is denied the redemption that only death can make 
possible. He cannot step out of history to touch the eternal. His life will never 
have any meaning because it will lack an end. To Kracauer, he is thus an am-
bivalent figure, eternally extraterritorial, and yet possessed of an immortality 
that most men would envy.
Whatever the implications of his title, which might also be developed 
in an autobiographical direction, the content of the chapter is crucial for an 
understanding of Kracauer’s position. Among other things, it demonstrates 
how far Kracauer himself had wandered from the assumptions of German 
historicism, which were still dominant during his youth. Historicism, either 
in its Rankean or Hegelian guises, had posited a continuous, developmental 
flow of chronological time in only one irreversible direction. Homogeneous 
chronicity was the solvent in which all historical events were immersed. 
This notion of time was similar to the spatialized, quantitatively ordered 
temporarily of the natural sciences, at least to the extent that both jettisoned 
the transcendental intervention into time preserved in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition. Even the dialectical process of Hegelian time presupposed a homo-
geneous, unidirectional medium in which the Absolute manifested itself, 
172 Kracauer, History, 157.
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although dialectics meant that progress came through contradictions rather 
than the smooth working out of an evolutionary scheme.
In Germany, this view of time (or rather, the several views which shared 
a common belief in the homogeneity of the temporal process) had a strong 
hold on historical thinking well into the twentieth century, despite the crisis 
in values which befell historicism. Elsewhere, however, especially in mod-
ernist aesthetic circles, simultaneity and mythic recurrence were resurrected 
as legitimate alternatives. Nietzsche and Bergson were, of course, the proph-
ets of the new sense of time, although they were not in perfect agreement on 
its characteristics.
Within the artistic realm, the most sustained exploration of non-his-
toricist time was carried out by Proust in his Remembrance of Things Past, 
although other writers like Thomas Mann, Virginia Woolf, and James Joyce 
were also concerned with similar questions. Aesthetic realism, best exempli-
fied by the nineteenth-century novel, was on the defensive, but historical 
writing, which retained many of the characteristics of the novel (narrative 
form, omniscient narrator, stress on the public world, etc.), continued to rely 
on traditional notions of time.
Kracauer saw three implications following from this state of affairs. First, 
dates within a chronological sequence were value-laden; that is, simultaneous 
occurrences were implicitly assumed to relate to each other in certain ways, 
usually parallel, where successive events were more often understood as relat-
ing to each other in casual ways. Second, large-scale units were often traced 
over a period of time as if they constituted discrete entities with lives of their 
own (the classic example being the historicist belief in the state as the true 
“individual” of history, which implied the neglect of internal social contradic-
tions). And third, the formal property of an inexorable flow was often invested 
with substantive characteristics, as in Hegel’s construction of the world pro-
cess as the realization of rationality, or the less ambitious, but equally ques-
tionable notion of history as progress. All of these assumptions were under-
mined by a different, more subtle understanding of historical time.
Significantly, in making his case for this alternative view of temporality, 
Kracauer drew upon the work of art historians like Erwin Panofsky, George 
Kubier, and Henri Focillon,173 with the figure of Burckhardt, the isolated anti-
173 Erwin Panofsky, Renaissance and Renascences in Western Art (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1960); 
George Kubier, The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1962); Henri Focillon, The Life of Forms in Art (New York: Zone Books, 1963). Dur-
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historicist in nineteenth-century German historiography, looming in the 
background. Of perhaps equal importance was his reading of Proust, which 
benefitted from Hans Robert Jauss’s interpretation of The Remembrance.174 
Even more interesting in the context of recent intellectual debates, he found 
another ally among the anthropologists in the person of Claude Lévi-Strauss. 
In December, 1963, Kracauer sent him a copy of “Time and History,” adding 
the comment that he had just read La pensée sauvage :
[A]nd to my most pleasant surprise discovered that in the wonderful sec-
tion against Sartre you tackle the issue of historical time in terms similar 
to mine. To the best of my knowledge, no philosopher or historian has 
ever discussed the antinomy at the core of chronological time this way. 
[…] I have well taken note of your hints regarding the problem of the re-
lationships between histories at different levels of generality: I shall dis-
cuss this problem in my forthcoming book. One more remark: it will take 
people a long time to understand your thought in all its consequences.175
Lévi-Strauss read the article and wrote back that he “was of course impressed 
with the many points of contact between your thinking and my own.”176
What Kracauer liked in Lévi-Strauss’s attack on Sartre was his insistence 
that chronology was itself an arbitrary code that men imposed on the world, 
rather than an intrinsic part of its essential nature. But in the final version 
of his chapter on this problem, he moved slightly away from the complete 
denigration of unilinear flow in the structuralist attack on historicism. As he 
wrote to the French historian Henri I. Marrou in the spring of 1964: 
[M]y agreement with [Lévi-Strauss] and Kubler is only partial. Actually, I 
am going beyond them and coming closer to your own position with its 
emphasis on the uniform flow of time. As against Kubler–Focillon–Lévi-
Strauss, I too affirm the validity of such a flow; but it is true, I also up-
hold the notion of (Kubler’s) “shaped times,” assigning to them the same 
ing the writing of History, Kracauer corresponded on several occasions with Panofsky and Kubier, 
who had been Focillon’s students.
174 Hans Robert Jauss, Zeit und Erinnerung in Marcel Proust’s “A la recherche du temps perdu,” (Heidelberg: 
Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1955). See also Jauss’s Literaturgeschichte als Provokation (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), 195–6, for positive remarks on Kracauer.
175 Kracauer to Lévi-Strauss, December 18, 1963 (original in English).
176 Lévi-Strauss to Kracauer, December 23, 1963 (original in English).
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reality character as to that continuous, linear flow, which results in my 
basic assumptions of the antinomy at the core of Time. Indeed, even as 
an individual I believe we live in a veritable cataract of times. […] Since 
you also speak of the “polyphonic structure” of time, the difference, if 
any, between our approaches may lie only in the fact that you seem to 
emphasize more than I do the share of homogeneous chronological time 
in the historical process, whereas I also stress the significance of the vari-
ous existing peculiar time sequences and therefore hesitate to identify 
history as a process.177
In the final version of the chapter, the phrases “antinomy at the core of time” 
and “cataract of times” reappear, as does Kracauer’s criticism of the Kubler–
Focillon–Lévi-Strauss’s dismissal of all homogeneous time. Walter Benjamin, 
who dealt with the same issue in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,”178 
up braided for the same failing:
Benjamin on his part indulges in an undialectical approach; he drives 
home the nonentity of chronological time without manifesting the 
slightest concern over the other side of the picture. That there are two 
sides to it has rarely been recognized.179
Proust comes off a bit better, for even while blurring chronology, he was 
“at pains to keep it intact.”180 But, as we have already noted, Kracauer saw 
Proust’s attempt to reconcile chronological and shaped, subjective time 
through an aesthetic, a posteriori synthesis as illegitimate. The antinomy 
between chronological flow and the multitude of shaped times which cut 
across it is insoluble, or if it can be solved, then only at the very last moment 
of Time itself. Short of this utopian apocalypse, the temporal visions of the 
historicists and the modernists are eternally at war.
In his final chapter, entitled “The Anteroom,” Kracauer drew certain 
highly speculative conclusions from his investigation, many of which in 
177 Kracauer to Marrou, May 18, 1966; (original in English). Kracauer was indebted to Marrou’s De 
la connaissance historique (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962) and to several of his articles on historical 
method.
178 Bejamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations.
179 Kracauer, History, 155.
180 Ibid., 162. Kracauer’s point is repeated in Roger Shattuck’s recent Modern Masters Series study, 
Proust (London: 1974), 119.
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fact were implicit in his earlier work.181 As we have previously mentioned, 
he used the metaphor of the anteroom to characterize both and photogra-
phy history, neither dealing with the “last things” of human concern. Just as 
there is an insoluble antinomy between and chronological shaped time, so 
one exists between the anteroom and what for want of a better term we may 
call the inner sanctum into which it may lead. The particular, contingent 
truths of history, which relate to the Lebenswelt, are different in kind from the 
universal truths sought by philosophy. Attempts to historicize philosophy 
in a radical way, whether in Hegelian, Diltheyan, or Heideggerean terms, fail 
to observe the boundary between the two spheres. Such immanentist abso-
lutizations of the historical, which culminate in Hans-Georg Gadamer and 
the so-called hermeneutics movement182 lead to a theodicy in which history 
becomes a success story. But the alternative of situating philosophical truths 
completely outside of history as transcendental and eternal verities is equal-
ly erroneous. Both the immanentists and the transcendentalists fail to meet 
the challenge of relativism raised by historical consciousness because of 
their outmoded views of time. Because of the antinomous character of time, 
[t]here are “pockets” and voids amidst these temporal currents, vaguely 
reminiscent of interference phenomena. This leads me to speak, in a provi-
sional way, of the “limited” relativity of certain ideas emerging from such 
pockets. […] Philosophical truths have a double aspect. Neither can the 
timeless be stripped of the vestiges of temporality, nor does the temporal 
wholly engulf the timeless. Rather, we are forced to assume that the two 
aspects of truths exist side by side, relating to each other in ways which I 
believe to be theoretically undefinable. Something like an analogy may 
be found in the “complementarity principle” of the quantum physicists.183 
This insight, Kracauer believed, was best exemplified in the work of Burck-
hardt, who sought absolutes, but was sensitive to their ambiguities amidst 
the flux of historical change.
In getting us past the anteroom, however, Kracauer was no real help. The 
“side” he was concerned with in his “side-by-side” principle was clearly that 
181 The essay in which many of these ideas are most clearly adumbrated is “Die Wartenden,” in fz, 
March 12, 1922; reprinted in Das Ornament der Masse.
182 Hans-George Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen: Akademie Verlag, 1960).
183 Kracauer, History, 199–200.
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of the Lebenswelt, for it was the anteroom “in which we breathe, move and 
live.”184 In trying to redeem this contingent and ephemeral world, the histo-
rian approaches the state Kafka attributed to Sancho Panza as that of a “free 
man” who dwells in a “utopia of the in-between — a terra incognita in the 
hollows between the lands we know.”185 To Kracauer, the best model for this 
type of intellectual stance was Erasmus, who followed the “middle way” as 
the “direct road to Utopia — the way of the humane.”186
As an epilogue to History, Kracauer’s editors appended a quotation from 
Kierkegaard that Kafka had cited and Kracauer had especially liked. In es-
sence, it praises the simple man who defies the conventions of the world to 
remain true to his personal vision. The quotation is prefaced by an injunc-
tion that Kracauer himself had followed throughout his long and uneven 
career: “Focus on the ‘genuine’ hidden in the interstices between dogmatized 
beliefs of the world, thus establishing tradition of lost causes; giving names 
to the hitherto unnamed.”187
The book’s epilogue is a just epilogue to Kracauer’s own life’s work. 
History, despite its stress on non-homogeneity and fragmentation, or more 
correctly through its justification for that stress, gives a meaning to the 
checkered corpus of Kracauer’s writings. In Sartrean terms, it “totalizes” the 
disparate elements of his work by revealing their inherent relatedness, with-
out, however, reducing them to a single common denominator. It does this 
not merely by spelling out the implicit vision behind them, but also by plac-
ing certain of his books in a juxtaposition that turns their individual weak-
nesses into a composite strength. Thus From Caligari to Hitler and Jacques Of-
fenbach and his Time, if looked at solely on their own terms, can be faulted 
for ignoring what Kracauer called the non-homogeneous structure of the 
historical universe. That is, both of them assume a somewhat simplistic and 
unmediated correspondence between social and cultural phenomena. The 
“shaped time” of the cinema and operetta are not differentiated to any real 
extent from the “shaped time” of Weimar and Second Empire society. Within 
the works, this is surely a shortcoming, as many critics were quick to notice. 
But set side by side with Theory of Film, where the immanent development of 
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gari to Hitler seems less one-dimensional. Although no comparable book was 
written by Kracauer dealing with Offenbach’s music in a solely musical con-
text, the argument of History suggests that he would have recognized its va-
lidity alongside of his “Gesellschaftsbiographie.” Similarly, History puts into 
greater balance his concern for flux and process in forming inter alia Theory of 
Film (criticized by commentators like Parker Tyler for its overly Heraclitean 
bias)188 with his somewhat more muted desire for stable values and order, 
which is apparent in his constant lament over the emptiness of modern life. 
It also allows us to view his earlier difficulties defining realism in Theory of 
Film with some understanding, for his several usages correspond to a reality 
which is itself multidimensional.
History also helps make sense of his strangely ambivalent attitude to-
wards Marxism, which has continued to be a source of debate among his in-
terpreters. Like so many of his contemporaries, Kracauer underwent a clear 
movement to the right during his exile in America. By the 1960s, so Kristeller 
remembers,189 he was strongly hostile to the New Left and all it represented. 
In 1932, he could write that he was an advocate of Marxism and would con-
tinue to be one, but in History, Marxism came in for a large share of criticism. 
His basic complaint was that Marx, like Hegel before him, had succumbed 
to the magic of linear chronology. (Ironically, this charge was levelled at the 
same time that Louis Althusser in France was discovering a sensitivity to 
shaped times in the later Marx.)190 To Kracauer, the humanist, even existen-
tialist Marx championed by Sartre and others was far less important than the 
naturalist Marx who tried to apply scientific method to history and failed.
And yet, despite his clear shift to a kind of disillusioned liberalism, many 
of these same attitudes can be seen even during the Weimar period. In dis-
trusting the idealistic Marxism of Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness, 
Kracauer expressed his doubts about the Hegelian legacy in Marx’s own writ-
ings, although he preferred to minimize it. In the 1960s, he still disapproved 
of Hegelianizing Marx, but now he admitted that both thinkers shared a fal-
lacious view of time. What went along with this disapproval was a caution 
188 Tyler, Sex Psyche Etcetera in the Film, 122.
189 Conversation with Professor Kristeller, New York, September 5, 1973.
190 Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Allen Lane, 1969), 134–137. Althusser’s 
discussion is not specifically on Marx here, but on the dialectical notion of time in a play by Ber-
talozzi. In Reading Capital, written with Etienne Balibar, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Verso, 




about the role of praxis in reshaping the world; the elegiac lethargy of Ginster 
went hand in hand with a view of Marx as a naturalist. It was not surprising 
that he would take Lévi-Strauss’s side in his dispute with Sartre.
History is also illuminating in this regard because it helps us situate him 
more precisely in the context of his friendships with Benjamin, Bloch, and 
Adorno. As we have seen, Benjamin’s distinction between “ideas” and general-
ities, his justification for the “collector,” and his critique of unilinear time are 
all cited with approval by Kracauer, although the last is criticized for ignoring 
the place of chronological time as one stream in the cataract. But what is ab-
sent is Benjamin’s guarded optimism about achieving fulfilled, utopian time 
(what Benjamin called Jetztzeit).191 The side of Benjamin that had responded 
positively to Brecht was completely closed to Kracauer, who endorsed Ger-
shom Scholem’s appraisal of the pathological character of that relationship.192 
In a letter to Rolf Tiedemann, who had just written a study of Benjamin, Kra-
cauer wrote that he shared certain of Benjamin’s ideas about history:
That nothing should be lost, that history must be shattered in order to find 
its actual content in details, and so forth. Other thoughts — such as his 
emphasis on surrealism — I considered bizarre. And I have always regret-
ted that he hadn’t seen the dialectic between the reality, in which we live, 
and the messianic end reality (which only plays a negative role for me).193
This negative attitude towards a utopian future also colored Kracauer’s in-
tellectual relationship to Bloch. Personally, the two men were on the best of 
terms in the years before Kracauer’s death. The earlier friction over Kracau-
er’s late Weimar politics had long since been forgotten. In fact, a still older 
dispute between them, which broke out in 1922, when Kracauer criticized 
Bloch’s Thomas Münzerals Theologe der Revolution and Bloch answered in his 
Durch die Wüste, was also patched over, so much so that Bloch removed his 
rebuttal from the new edition of the book in 1964.194 When Bloch’s Tübinger 
Einleitung in die Philosophie I had appeared in the previous year, Kracauer had 
191 Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, 263.
192 Gershom Scholem, “Walter Benjamin,” in The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1965). On May 23, 1965, Kracauer wrote to Scholem that he shared his view on Ben-
jamin’s Marxism, adding “I once had a very heated argument with him in Berlin over Benjamin’s 
slavish masochistic attitude (Haltung) towards Brecht.”
193 Kracauer to Tiedemann, February 21, 1966. To Löwenthal, he had complained years before of Ben-
jamin’s tendency towards “messianic dogmatism.” (Letter of January 6, 1957.)
194 Siegfried Kracauer, Durch die Wüste (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1964).
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approvingly written: “You are to my knowledge the only one who presents 
the problem of time. And what you say about it strongly touches my own ide-
as on the antinomy at the center of the chronological concept of time.”195 Fur-
ther evidence of their mutual affection appeared in Kracauer’s contribution 
to a volume of tributes to Bloch in 1965.196 In his essay, which took the form 
of a letter to Bloch, Kracauer stressed the side of Bloch’s utopianism that was 
most amenable to him: its conservative, redemptive dimension. Bloch’s love 
of narrative, which Benjamin had also shared, meant an awareness of conti-
nuities, even amidst the most radical changes. Bloch was thus superior to con-
ceptual utopians who want to impose a rational form on the future, which 
severs it completely from the past. Bloch also possessed a laudable sensitivity 
to the concrete, material realities of the sensuous world; “you preserve some-
thing of the magic of things,” Kracauer wrote, “which you disenchant.”197
And yet, behind the expression of solidarity was a clear acknowledg-
ment of the distance between them. Kracauer identified himself with Sancho 
Panza, who was short of breath trying to keep up with Bloch’s Quixotic race 
towards utopia. Significantly, he appended the section on Erasmus later pub-
lished in his introduction to History as a “gift” to Bloch. Erasmus’s utopia, that 
of the middle way, the way of the humane, was not, however, Bloch’s, which 
called for a far more radical transformation of man and society. Without any 
actual filiation, Kracauer’s reading of Erasmus came close to that of an old 
enemy, Stefan Zweig, whose Triumph und Tragik des Erasmus von Rotterdam 
(1934)198 also praised Erasmus’s anti-extremism and moderation. In 1937, 
Georg Lukács had taken Zweig to task in The Historical Novel for advocating 
Erasmian non-revolutionary, pseudo-humanism.199
Erasmus’s position was suspect, Lukács argued, because it was grounded 
in an elitist condemnation of the masses as irrational. Although Bloch had 
his own quarrels with Lukács, it seems likely that the champion of Thomas 
Münzer would have shared some of his qualms about the adequacy of Eras-
mian utopianism.
195 Kracauer to Bloch, June 17, 1963.
196 Siegfried Kracauer, “Zwei Deutungen in Zwei Sprachen,” in Ernst Bloch zu Ehren; Beiträge zu seinem 
Werk, ed. Siegfried Unseld (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1965).
197 Ibid., 146.
198 Stefan Zweig, Triumph und Tragik des Erasmus von Rotterdam (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1934). Kra-
cauer’s distaste for Zweig’s type of biography was expressed in his 1930 piece “Die Biographie als 
Neubürgerliche Kunstform,” reprinted in Das Ornament des Masse.
199 Georg Lukács, The Historical Novel, trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1963), 266–69. For a discussion of the Zweig–Lukács dispute, see Albert William Levi, Humanism 
and Politics (Bloomington, in: Indiana University Press, 1969).
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If Kracauer’s disillusionment about Marxist utopianism distanced him 
from Benjamin and Bloch, the opposite complaint was partly responsible for 
his growing estrangement from Adorno in the last years of his life. Although 
I hope to give a detailed account of the complicated course of their friend-
ship elsewhere, certain points can be derived from a reading of History alone, 
which should be made here. In his anteroom chapter, Kracauer devoted half 
a paragraph to Adorno’s recently published Negative Dialektik,200 which ad-
vocated a radically anti-ontological position without any first principles or 
fixed points of reference. To Kracauer, this was an “unfettered dialectic” with 
unfortunate consequences:
His rejection of any ontological stipulation in favor of an infinite dialec-
tics which penetrates all concrete things and entities seems inseparable 
from a certain arbitrariness, an absence of content and direction in these 
series of material evaluations. The concept of Utopia is then necessarily 
used by him in a purely formal way, as a borderline concept which at 
the end invariably emerges like a deus ex machina. But Utopian thought 
makes sense only if it assumes the form of a vision or intuition with a 
definite content of a sort. Therefore the radical immanence of the dialec-
tical process will not do; some ontological fixations are needed to imbue 
it with significance and direction.201
In other words, whereas Kracauer faulted Bloch and Benjamin for their hopes 
of realizing utopia in history, he attacked Adorno for eliminating ontology 
and utopia entirely. In his own thinking, history and ontology exist side by 
side, but still separately. Their coexistence, like that of the general and the 
particular, can only be defined by what he called “tact”202 in each specific case. 
Although raising an interesting objection to Adorno’s negative dialectics, 
which has left many readers suspended in a conceptual whirl, Kracauer’s al-
ternative failed to answer a number of questions. Although chastising Ador-
no for lacking a utopia “that assumes the form of a vision or intuition with a 
definite content of a sort,” he never really offered one himself. Without any 
of that belief in dealienation or the reconciliation of man and nature that 
animated Marxist Humanism, Kracauer fell back on a vague and general en-
200 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Bloomsbury, 1973).
201 Kracauer, History, 201.
202 Ibid., 200 and 206.
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dorsement of Erasmian tolerance and flexibility. This may well be a posture 
worthy of emulation, but it is scarcely a utopian vision. Similarly, his advoca-
cy of “tact” as a means to regulate the relationship between history and ontol-
ogy, the general and the particular, is not very instructive. Kracauer assumed 
that speculations on the total nature of the universe are called for, or in-
deed indispensable, as gambles in Kafka’s sense. They meaningfully en-
ter the scene on (unpredictable) occasions and then presumably fulfil a 
vital function.203
But what the occasions were, which speculations are superior to others, and 
what functions they fulfilled, Kracauer could not say. There is, in short, a 
phenomenon here which might be called “metaphysical fellow-travelling”: 
a belief in ontology and utopia without any specific content, a recognition 
of the legitimacy of ultimate thoughts without the daring to think them out 
loud, a belief that relativism can be overcome by the “pockets” of the absolute 
that exist in the interstices of chronological time, without speculating on the 
contents of the pockets.
Kracauer was surely right to point to the antinomies of time and the 
non-homogeneity of the historical universe. His efforts throughout his ca-
reer to reawaken our sensitivity to the phenomenal Lebenswelt often lost 
amidst a welter of conceptual generalizations were equally laudable. His 
sober defiance of ideological panaceas, although uncomfortably close to the 
end-of-ideology fantasy of the 1950s, also merits respect. But despite these 
achievements, what leaves the observer of Kracauer’s career uneasy is his 
tendency to freeze the posture of extraterritoriality and chronological ano-
nymity, which he had made a personal virtue, into a universal condition in-
capable of change. What Arnheim called the “melancholy surrender”204 in 
Kracauer’s championing of cinematic realism was a leitmotif of his entire 
career, despite the utopian intentions of History. Adorno certainly exagger-
ated when he wrote that “in the treasure of motives in his thought one would 
have looked in vain for outrage against reification,”205 but there was a grain 
of truth in the charge. Ginsterism may be a sensible reaction to certain cir-
cumstances, but it need not be made a model for all times. Nor is the mask 
203 Ibid., 200.
204 Arnheim, “Melancholy Unshaped,” 191.
205 Adorno, “Der Wunderliche Realist,” 107.
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of Sancho Panza the only one man can use if they are to avoid the follies of 
Don Quixote. In short, Kracauer’s “side-by-side” principle may accurately 
represent the best hope in an era without integral meaning and real human 






is as multivalent as 
the space it describes. It 
is a legal coinage signifying 
personal immunity from local 
laws, the borderless space of the free 
seas, and a state’s power to extend jurisdic-
tion across borders; recently, it has also become 
a key concept in philosophical debates about what 
Giorgio Agamben calls the “state of exception as a para-
digm of government.”1 More broadly, extraterritoriality has 
begun to figure as the object of cultural meditations on the rela-
tion between subjection and autonomy, stasis and movement, and 
exile and belonging — a discourse that has implications for intellectuals 
in many fields but has so far been most prominent in architectural studies.2 
Yet with few exceptions, literary critics have not engaged with it — and when 
they have, extraterritoriality has generally been mistaken as synonymous 
with a state of multilingual plenitude and postnational migrancy.
This essay explores how extraterritoriality figures within the prose writ-
ings of the late W.G. Sebald (1944–2001). Sebald’s use of the Latinate German 
 Originally published as Matthew Hart and Tania Lown-Hecht. “The Extraterritorial Poetics of W.G. 
Sebald,” Modern Fiction Studies 58, no. 2 (2012): 214–38. © 2012 Purdue Research Foundation. Re-
printed with permission of Johns Hopkins University Press.
1 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 2003), 
1. For legal definitions see “Extraterritoriality,” West’s Encyclopedia of American Law (St. Paul, mn: 
West Group, 1998). For Agamben, the state of exception is epitomized in concentration camps, 
which create an “extraterritorial threshold in which the human body is separated from its normal 
political status and abandoned, in a state of exception” (Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998], 159).
2 See, for example, Keller Easterling, Enduring Innocence: Global Architecture and its Political Masquer-
ades (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 2005); Anselm Franke and Eyal Weizman, “Islands: The Geogra-
phy of Extraterritoriality,” Volume 6 (2003), http://volumeproject.org/islands-the-geography-of-
extraterritoriality/ (accessec Jan. 18, 2016); Anselm Franke, Rafi Segal, and Eyal Weizman (eds), 
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cessed Jan. 18, 2016).
The Extraterritorial 
Poetics of W.G. 
Sebald




compound extraterritorial might at first seem unworthy of comment, given 
his acknowledged appetite for obscure stories and histories. The significance 
of the word lies, then, in the way Sebald reaches for it at moments that are 
emblematic of his most characteristic themes. It occurs in The Emigrants (Die 
Ausgewanderten) when Max Ferber, a German-Jewish refugee, calls the coun-
try of his birth “a curiously extraterritorial place, inhabited by people whose 
faces are both lovely and dreadful.” 3 It returns in Austerlitz in a description of 
the Nazi camp at Theresienstadt.4 And in Rings of Saturn (Die Ringe des Saturn), 
it describes the site of a disused military base, which appears like “our own 
civilization after its extinction in some future catastrophe.”5 Mark Anderson 
has even adopted extraterritorial as the keyword for the ethical dilemma at 
the heart of Sebald’s writing, asking: “How does one signal solidarity with 
the victims of Nazi genocide without denying one’s own German origins?”6 
The answer: “To live for thirty years in extraterritorial limbo.”7 Although we 
do not claim that extraterritoriality is the Sebaldian Rosetta Stone, without 
which any interpretation of his work is incoherent, the centrality of extrater-
ritorial themes to Sebald’s oeuvre implies that his work can be read through 
this lens even when the word itself is not invoked. In fleshing out an aspect of 
his writing that several critics have noticed but none have explored at length, 
we feel justified in referring to Sebald’s extraterritorial poetics.8 
3 W.G. Sebald, Die Ausgewanderten: vier lange Erzählungen (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn Verlag, 
1992), 181. We quote from the English translations of Sebald’s work, then referring to the Ger-
man for emphasis or clarification. Although Sebald did not translate his own prose, he vetted 
and revised the English translations with an eye to his Anglophone audience (Mark McCulloh, 
“Introduction: Two Languages, Two Audiences: The Tandem Literary Œuvres of W.G. Sebald,” in 
W.G. Sebald: History, Memory, Trauma, ed. Scott Denham and Mark McCulloh [Berlin: de Gruyter, 
2006], 7–18). We therefore treat Sebald’s English editions as neither autonomous from German, 
nor subordinate to it. McCulloh concludes that, “as befits Sebald [the translations] are works of 
literature in their own right” (18). 
4 W.G. Sebald, Austerlitz, trans. Anthea Bell (New York: Random House, 2001), 335. Originally pub-
lished as Austerlitz (Munich: Hanser Verlag, 2001), 236.
5 W.G. Sebald, The Rings of Saturn, trans. Michael Hulse (New York: New Directions, 1998), 282. Origi-
nally published as Die Ringe des Saturn: Eine englische Wallfahrt (Frankfurt a.M.: Eichborn Verlag, 
1995), 237.
6 Mark M. Anderson, “The Edge of Darkness: On W.G. Sebald,” October 106 (2003): 105.
7 Ibid., 106.
8 See, for example, Stephen Clingman, The Grammar of Identity: Transnational Fiction and the Nature of 
the Boundary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 189; Jan Ceuppens, “Das belgische Grabmal: 
Sebalds 19. Jahrhundert,” in W.G. Sebald: Intertextualität und Topographie, ed. Irene Heidelberger-
Leonard (Berlin: lit Verlag, 2008), 94; Cynthia Ozick, “The Posthumous Sublime,” New Republic 
(Dec. 16, 1996): 34; Gunther Pakendorf, “Als Deutscher in der Fremde: Heimat, Geschichte und Na-
tur bei W.G. Sebald,” in W.G. Sebald: Expatriate Writing, ed. Gerhard Fischer (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2009), 91; here, “exterritorial”; Judith Ryan, “‘Lines of Flight’: History and Territory in The Rings 
of Saturn,” in Ibid., 48–50; and Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 132, n. 47. None of these critics pursue the subject at length. By 
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This leads us to the broader stakes of our essay. Sebald is a major pres-
ence in a critical discourse centering on questions of cultural translation and 
the limits of nationalism. Michael Dirda captures this growing consensus 
when he says Sebald “exemplified the best kind of cosmopolitan literary 
intelligence.”9 A recent work describes Sebald’s narratives as undoing the 
presumed connection between the “geographies, cultures, and languages 
that [would] allow us to place his novels within specific national traditions.”10 
Such insights are accurate, but we still cannot locate Sebald’s writings whol-
ly beyond the nation-state. Extraterritoriality comes to English and German 
from juridical Latin and although it is commonly described as involving 
the abrogation of national authority, it is just as often used to expand the 
power of the nation-state. Take, for example, the period between June 2002 
and January 2006 when José Padilla was declared an “enemy combatant” and 
held without the right to a habeas corpus hearing on the Naval Consolidated 
Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. Despite being a us citizen, imprisoned 
on a us ship in us waters, Padilla was, as a matter of law, marooned within 
an extraterritorial zone in which, by virtue of his identification as an “enemy 
combatant,” he lay beyond us jurisdiction.
Such fissures within national territory don’t necessarily imply the weak-
ening of the state; in the case of Padilla, they were instruments of a strongly 
nationalist governing executive. Moreover, the Padilla case points toward a 
politics that depends, Agamben has argued, on the logic of the inclusive ex-
clusion, in which pieces of territory are “placed outside the normal juridical 
order” but do not constitute “an external place.” Agamben explains that the 
very places (and people) that are so excluded are “captured outside, that is, in-
cluded by virtue of [their] very exclusion.”11 “Being-outside, and yet belonging”: 
this is the paradoxical logic of the extraterritorial.12 
As Keller Easterling has shown, the contemporary world is full of less 
spectacular extraterritorial sites, from ports and business parks to the zones 
d’attente that dot the margins of our societies.13 Sebald critics have already 
“poetics” we do not mean that Sebald has a fully developed theory of literary extraterritoriality, 
simply that this concept has significance across the range of his interests. 
9 Michael Dirda, “Campo Santo.” Washington Post Book World (Mar. 13, 2005): BW15.
10 Rebecca Walkowitz, Cosmopolitan Style: Modernism Beyond the Nation (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2006), 160.
11 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 40. 
12 Id., State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 35.
13 Keller Easterling, Enduring Innocence: Global Architecture and its Political Masquerades (Cambridge: 
mit Press, 2005), 3.
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noticed that his narratives are full of such spaces. For instance, Michael Nie-
haus has explored how we might locate the alienation of Sebald’s emigrants 
on the “topological level.”14 In thinking through Sebald’s topology of exile, 
Niehaus adapts Marc Augé’s distinction between “anthropological places” 
(such as homes, which are overlaid with “the concrete and symbolic”) and 
“non-places” (uniform and transitory locations such as airports, in which the 
social and historical richness of spatial experience is abolished).15 It is not 
only that Sebald’s prose is rich with non-places, but also that “the characters 
in Sebald’s narratives […] transform the places they cross into non-places.”16 
In its focus on space and exile, Niehaus’s essay has something in common 
with ours. We believe, however, that the concept of extraterritoriality is both 
more useful and more suitable — that is, more Sebaldian — than that of the 
non-space. This is partly because extraterritorial is Sebald’s own word, partly 
because historically encrusted sites such as Theresienstadt are not easily de-
scribed as super-modern non-places. Extraterritorial spaces possess a political 
weight that speaks directly to Sebald’s signature themes, from the difference 
between forts and camps to the relation between languages and homelands. 
Together they figuratively shatter the ideological relation between sover-
eignty, territory, and population — an isomorphism that was crucial to the 
development of modern nationalism and is now waning even as we witness 
the growth “of the sovereign state to increase forces of centralization.”17 This 
is the paradoxical logic of an “extrastatecraft,” to use Easterling’s term, which 
is predicated on the interruption of national territory (“Petrodollars”). This 
paradox is, among other things, what explains Sebald’s interest, not just in 
the racial laws of Nazi Germany, but also in Britain’s imperialism in China, 
when a combination of gunboat diplomacy and extraterritorial law spread 
the bastard gospel of “free trade, which was held to be precondition of all 
civilized progress.”18 
Reading Sebald this way brings some political and historical clarity to 
his famously circuitous writings. For all their melancholy, Sebald’s narra-
tives never totalize state power: even a Holocaust narrative such as Austerlitz 
14 Michael Niehaus, “No Foothold: Institutions and Buildings in W.G. Sebald’s Prose,” in W.G. Sebald: 
History, Memory, Trauma, ed. Denham & McCulloh, 322.
15 Marc Augé, Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity, trans. John Howe (London: 
Verso, 1995), 51.
16 Niehaus, “No Foothold,” 327.
17 Robert P. Marzec, “Militariality,” The Global South 3, no. 1 (2009): 142.
18 Sebald, The Rings of Saturn, 141–2 [178].
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demonstrates the presence of islands of maneuver within the landscape of 
sovereignty. Thus, Sebald’s extraterritorial sovereignty is not a universal or 
inescapable force. It does not amount to a metaphysical defeatism. Our per-
spective therefore runs parallel to J.J. Long’s compelling analysis of Sebald as 
an ambivalent critic of a biopolitical modernity that intrudes “into the very 
fabric” of works that otherwise resist it.19 
Extraterritorial reading has a double payoff: it helps us understand Se-
bald’s literary politics with greater clarity and complicates influential the-
ories, such as Agamben’s, that assert the singular and indivisible nature of 
political sovereignty. As we shall show, when one generalizes from Sebal-
dian extraterritoriality, one begins to understand that islands of exception 
can, in Eyal Weizman’s words, also be “fissures and lacunae […] beyond the 
reach of the mechanisms of state power.”20 When deployed by resistant nar-
rators in difficult texts — texts that cross borders and genres as a matter of 
course — extraterritoriality comes to signify something different than it 
does for a Commander in Chief. It expresses the fraught relation between the 
undeniable power and the obvious limits of the nation-state as a cultural or 
linguistic container, political community, and psychic home. 
Although our argument has interdisciplinary implications, it is not an 
essay in political theory. Our analyses are based in literary close reading and 
the critical discourse of psychogeography, which Guy Debord defined as the 
study of how space influences human psychology. Recent theorists have 
modified Debord’s approach by noting the reverse movement, from psychol-
ogy to geography; and, indeed, Sebald’s extraterritorial poetics work in both 
directions: an empty coastline may be mapped onto a narrator’s psychology, 
for example, but the narrator’s sense of himself also becomes part of the land-
scape.21 Finally, we suggest that there is an analogical relation between the 
logic of extraterritoriality and certain formal patterns within Sebald’s prose, 
especially his vertiginous oscillation between macroscopic and microscopic 
points-of-view. Because of the over-determined qualities of Sebald’s extrater-
ritorial poetics, we have structured this essay around close readings of what 
we call Sebaldian topoi. As its root from the Greek topos (place) suggests, 
19 J. J. Long, W.G. Sebald: Image, Archive, Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 20.
20 Anselm Franke, Eyal Weizman, and Ines Weizman, “‘Islands’: The Geography of Extraterritorial-
ity,” this volume, 120.
21 For a psychogeographic interpretation of Sebald, see Christopher C. Gregory-Guider, “The ‘Sixth 




these topoi are both spatial and thematic. Through repeated motifs like the 
country house and the camp, Sebald imagines a world stuck somewhere be-
tween the desire to get lost and the inability to ever break from home. We 
begin, therefore, with the dilemma of the unhomely home.22
unheimliche heimat
Relatively few literary scholars have explored the poetics of extraterritorial-
ity. In “Our Homeland, the Text,” George Steiner makes a case for the inher-
ent textuality of exilic Judaism, in which the “transcendent mobility” of the 
Torah exists in dialectical relation with the “territorial mystery of the native 
ground.”23 The real Zion, Steiner argues, is the text itself, which, in its con-
stant interpretive migrations, is as much an exile as the Jew.24 In “Englishness 
and Extraterritoriality,” Bryan Cheyette also considers the relation between 
homeland and diaspora in Jewish letters. For Cheyette, English Jews remain 
perpetually extraterritorial because it is impossible to absorb “the Jewish 
past into a territorial Englishness.”25 As a result, a literature has developed 
that, despite the “Americanization of the diaspora and the nationalization 
of history in Israel,” remains “neither English nor Jewish.”26 For both critics, 
extraterritoriality signifies an irrevocable breach within what Steiner calls 
“the natural bonds which unite a human person to his ancestors and their 
places of burial.”27 
Sebald also deals in such breaches. The difference is that, like the frag-
ments of rock and ice that orbit Saturn, Sebald’s extraterritorial condition 
never escapes a certain gravitational pull. This distinction can be clarified by 
reference to Steiner’s book, Extraterritorial, which begins by invoking a lan-
guage ideology in which great poets incarnate “the genius, Geist, [or] quiddity 
22 For this theme, see esp. John Zilcosky, “Lost and Found: Disorientation, Nostalgia, and Holocaust 
Melodrama in Sebald’s Austerlitz,” Modern Language Notes 121, no. 3 (2006): 679–98; also, J.J. Long, 
“Intercultural Identities in W.G. Sebald’s The Emigrants and Norbert Gstrein’s Die englischen 
Jahre,” Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 25, no. 5–6 (2004): 512–28, esp. 514–15; 
J.J. Long and Anne Whitehead, “Introduction,” in W.G. Sebald: A Critical Companion, ed. Long & 
Whitehead, 7; Michael Niehaus, “No Foothold,” 315; Gunther Pakendorf, “Als Deutscher in der 
Fremde,” 91–6.
23 George Steiner, “Our Homeland, the Text,” Salmagundi 66 (1985): 5.
24 Ibid., 8.
25 Brian Cheyette, “Englishness and Extraterritoriality: British-Jewish Writing and Diaspora Cul-
ture,” in Literary Strategies: Jewish Texts and Contexts, ed. Ezra Mendelson (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1996), 22.
26 Ibid., 37.
27 George Steiner, Extraterritorial: Papers on Literature and the Language Revolution (New York: Ath-
enaeum, 1971), 5.
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of [their] native speech.” This Herderian current of thought grew so influen-
tial, Steiner claims, that the very “idea of a writer linguistically ‘unhoused’” 
came to seem inherently odd.28 Steiner writes to bury this cultural-nation-
alist orthodoxy. His true poets of the twentieth century are “new ‘esperan-
tists’” and his extraterritorial aesthetic reaches its apotheosis in the “transla-
tions, re-translations, pastiches, [and] cross-linguistic imitations” of Vladimir 
Nabokov.29 Steiner connects the “polylinguistic matrix” of Nabokov’s art to 
the violence that made him a refugee from both his country and language.30 
This combination of linguistic playfulness and subjection to national chau-
vinism lends Nabokov a totemic status: “A great writer driven from language 
to language by social upheaval and war is an apt symbol for the age of the 
refugee. […] Nabokov remains, by virtue of his extraterritoriality, profoundly 
of our time, and one of its spokesmen.”31 
This homage seems, at first sight, to accord with Sebald’s own tribute 
to Nabokov in which the “young emigrants of [Nabokov’s] early novels” are 
described as “living a quasi-extraterritorial, somehow unlawful afterlife in 
rented rooms and boardinghouses.”32 Most importantly, there is Nabokov’s 
role as a leitmotif in The Emigrants, where, as the unnamed “butterfly man,” 
the story of his life runs like a gossamer thread strung through the book — a 
figure who speaks, with hardly a word, about memories of home and the im-
possibility of ever going back.33 For all this, Steiner ultimately celebrates the 
accomplishment of the wanderer across countries and languages: “no exile 
is more radical, no feat of adaptation is more demanding.”34 Sebald, however, 
never offers a similarly affirmative vision. Sebaldian exile is incomplete and 





32 W.G. Sebald, Campo Santo, trans. Anthea Bell (New York: Random House, 2005), 143. Originally 
published as Campo Santo (Munich: Hanser Verlag, 2003), 186. Sebald’s remarks create an unmis-
takable echo of Steiner. However, the Sebald Archive at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach 
contains no record that Sebald possessed a copy of Steiner’s Extraterritorial.
33 Because this topic has been discussed at length, we do not discuss it here. See, for example, Jan 
Ceuppens, “Seeing Things: Spectres and Angels in W.G. Sebald’s Prose Fiction,” in W.G. Sebald: A 
Critical Companion, ed. Long & Whitehead, 192–5; Russell Kilbourn, “Kafka, Nabokov […] Sebald: 
Intertextuality and Narratives of Redemption in Vertigo and The Emigrants,” in W.G. Sebald: His-
tory, Memory, Trauma, ed. Denham & McCulloh, 53–63; Martin Klebes, “Infinite Journey: From 
Kafka to Sebald,” in W.G. Sebald: A Critical Companion, ed. Long & Whitehead, 135–6; W.G. Sebald, 
“Ghost Hunter (Interview with Eleanor Wachtel),” in The Emergence of Memory: Conversations with 
W.G. Sebald, ed. Lynne Sharon Schwartz (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2007).
34 Steiner, Extraterritorial, 11.
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opposite — that is, a happily rooted citizen — then this only verifies the con-
sistently melancholic tenor of his Weltanschauung. 
This melancholy is most evident in the realm of language, a major sub-
ject of Sebald’s essay on Jean Améry.35 Like Max Ferber, Améry becomes 
conscious of “the crumbling away and dwindling of his mother tongue.”36 
These thoughts lead Sebald to a satisfying aphorism: “For those whose busi-
ness is language, it is only in language that the unhappiness of exile can be 
overcome.”37 The terrible irony, however, is that in Sebald’s stories, the at-
tempt to reterritorialize language from within is both irresistible and inad-
equate. For instance, Ferber is neither without German, nor happily stationed 
at the crossroads between two tongues; he is rather haunted by the “echo” of 
a “muted and incomprehensible” language, which persists as the symptom 
of a trauma he can neither face nor wholly repress.38 Just as he never wholly 
escapes the specter of his Muttersprache, so does he never achieve an unalien-
ated relation to his adopted language. Linguistically speaking, Ferber is like a 
refugee always one step away from gaining papers of naturalization: English 
is the only language he speaks fluently and yet he speaks in a simulacrum 
of “turn of the century stage English,” a synthetic dialect as obsolete as the 
music halls in which it was once heard.39 
To adapt his remark about Améry, Sebald describes what it’s like to feel 
“mal de pays” when one “wants nothing to do with [a] particular pays.”40 This 
is the condition that defines the quasi-autobiographical narrator of “Il ritor-
no in patria,” irresistibly drawn to a childhood home that is nothing more 
than rented accommodation in an inn.41 Such passages underwrite John Zil-
cosky’s argument that, “instead of providing accounts of nomadism, Sebald’s 
35 Although “Against the Irreversible: On Jean Améry,” is collected in On the Natural History of De-
struction, the German original was collected in the 2003 Hanser Campo Santo. Page references re-
flect this anomaly.
36 Sebald, “Against the Irreversible” 162 [165].
37 Ibid., 161 [164–5]. 
38 W.G. Sebald, The Emigrants, trans. Michael Hulse (New York: New Directions, 1996), 182. Origi-
nally publishe as Die Ausgewanderten: vier lange Erzählungen (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn Verlag, 
1992), 271.
39 Sebald, The Emigrants, 190 [284].
40 W.G. Sebald, On the Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (New York: Random House, 
2003), 164. Sebald explained his continued identification with “my country” in terms of ethical 
obligation: “I have inherited that backpack and I have to carry it whether I like it or not” (“Sebald, 
Ghost Hunter (Interview with Eleanor Wachtel),” 51. On Sebald’s Germanness and expatriatism, 
see Pakendorf, “Als Deutscher in der Fremde.”
41 W.G. Sebald, Vertigo, trans. Michael Hulse (New York: New Directions, 1999), 192. Originally pub-
lished as Schwindel. Gefühle (Frankfurt a.M.: Eichborn Verlag, 1990), 218. 
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stories [present] subjects who could never become sufficiently uprooted.”42 If Se-
bald’s home is a hotel, it is also a place to which he returns. Zilcosky finds the 
germ of this paradox in the title of Sebald’s book, Unheimliche Heimat (1995), 
which “discusses writers […] who all find it impossible to escape their Aus-
trian Heimat.”43 
For Steiner, this interstitial state is the great creative boon of otherwise 
terrible violence. In Long’s account, however, Sebald’s wanderers experience 
their “intercultural identity” not as a gift but “as crisis.”44 We agree. It is pre-
cisely this problem that, in our view, characterizes Sebald’s use of extraterri-
toriality as a metaphor for the relation between belonging and exile: it names 
a condition in which individuals both choose and are compelled to adapt 
themselves to new places and languages but in which these choices and com-
pulsions are never total, and never occur without loss. What’s more, because 
it is a political limit concept — predicated on sovereign decision but signi-
fying the fracturing or divisibility of sovereignty itself — extraterritoriality 
is also uniquely attuned to the paradoxes that shape that aspect of Sebald’s 
oeuvre. To build on this claim, we now turn more directly to politics and law. 
the palace of justice
When Steiner uses the word extraterritorial, he describes how literature 
moves between places and languages — a process that might begin with the 
violence of governments and armies but which, for him, finally transcends 
the political. As we have already suggested, this is a one-sided approach. In 
places like Theresienstadt, extraterritoriality does not signify the individu-
al’s transcendence of nationality or state power. In this section, we read one 
Sebaldian topos — the Palace of Justice in Austerlitz — as an allegory for an 
extraterritorial state of exception. But we also show how the allegory inverts 
itself, how the Palace of Justice is riddled with fissures that allow limited 
room for creative adaptation and tactical maneuver. In this way, extraterrito-
rial sovereignty is inescapable but hardly complete. 
42 John Zilcosky, “Lost and Found: Disorientation, Nostalgia, and Holocaust Melodrama in Sebald’s 
Austerlitz,” Modern Language Notes 121, no. 3 (2006): 680–681.
43 Ibid., 681. Sebald alludes to Sigmund Freud’s “The Uncanny” (1919) in which the etymology of 
unheimlich is excavated to show how the logic of repression binds together the language of the 
frightening and the familiar (heimisch). 
44 Long, “Intercultural Identities,” 517.
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Weizman captures the paradoxical nature of extraterritoriality when he 
describes it as “rooted in the concept of sovereignty, although it is usually 
considered as its violation.”45 As Weizman explains, in creating such “archi-
pelagoes of exception” from the normative operation of the law, states do not 
seek to violate their own sovereignty but “expand” it. This insight is one that 
Sebald clearly shared, as we see in the following passage from Austerlitz, de-
scribing the Palace of Justice in Brussels:
The building of this singular architectural monstrosity […] began in the 
1880s at the urging of the bourgeoisie of Brussels, over-hastily and before 
the details of the grandiose scheme submitted by a certain Joséph Poe-
laert had been properly worked out, as a result of which, said Austerlitz, 
this huge pile of over seven hundred thousand cubic meters contains 
corridors and stairways leading nowhere, and doorless rooms and halls 
where no one would ever set foot, empty spaces surrounded by walls and 
representing the innermost secret of all sanctioned authority.46 
The key image comes at the end. Here is a space both vacant and impenetra-
ble: an absurd but potent zone of law at the center of the administrative heart 
of the new Europe.47 Oddly enough, the authority of this space does not stem 
from its public visibility, but from its occulted emptiness. As Eric Santner 
notes, it is an image that practically begs to be read in terms of Agamben’s 
political theory.48 The blind rooms in the Palace of Justice are not literally ex-
traterritorial, not consular offices or International Zones. Still, their doorless 
vacancy speaks to the way that Sebald appears to locate the secret of political 
power in “a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude 
each other but rather blur with each other.”49 For Agamben, the paradigmatic 
instantiation of exceptional power is not the courthouse but the concentra-
tion camp; but if the state of exception is perfected at places like Auschwitz, 
its juridical logic is symbolized by Sebald’s impenetrable chambers of law. 
45 Franke, Weizman & Weizman, “‘Islands,’” 120.
46 Sebald, Austerlitz, 29 [43].
47 Ceuppens refers to a radio interview in which Sebald described all Belgium as peculiarly extra-
territorial (Ceuppens, “Das belgische Grabmal,” 93–94). For Ceuppens, this quality explains Bel-
gium’s centrality to texts like Austerlitz and Rings.
48 Santner, On Creaturely Life, 132. Santner also connects Sebald’s description of spaces like There-
sienstadt as extraterritorial to Agamben’s political theory (132). In making this argument, he also 
refers to the Palace of Justice passage.
49 Agamben, State of Exception, 23.
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The German text appears to confirm this feeling with its use of sanktionierten 
Gewalt rather than Authorität — a wording that avoids the near tautology of 
“sanctioned authority” and embroiders the language of legality with that of 
coercion.50 In the Palace of Justice, the unity of law, territory, and citizenry 
gives way to a political topology in which sovereignty fills in “empty spaces 
surrounded by walls.” 
This reading does not, however, exhaust the meanings of the Palace of Jus-
tice. As Weizman notes, extraterritoriality is also at stake “when a state fails 
to exercise its sovereignty over all its territory.” He calls this “the ambiguity 
of exception” and it occurs when loopholes within the geography of power 
take on “aspects of self-governing enclaves.” Oddly enough, we see this same 
ambiguity in the Palace of Justice story, which in fact contains two antitheti-
cal elements. There is no doubt that the Palace’s secret chambers symbolize 
the dark side of the legal order; but Sebald also characterizes the law as in-
volving a compromise between an occulted sovereignty and the mix of good 
intentions and proud incompetence that is bourgeois civil society. Thus, in 
the Palace of Justice, the dislocating localization of the law also creates hid-
den alleys of human movement amid the dark cells of bare life. The Palace is 
full of “creaking wooden stairs which gave the impression of being tempo-
rary structures,” of obscure corners and empty rooms that the entrepreneuri-
al citizens of Brussels have converted from public halls into spaces of private 
enterprise: “tobacconists, a bookie’s, a bar, and […] a gentleman’s lavatory.”51 
Its jury-rigged and semiprivatized hallways are not just spaces of exceptional 
power but also islands of tactical resistance. For if the space of exception ex-
ists in the sphere of extraterritoriality, so does the space of tactical maneuver. 
“A tactic is a calculated action,” writes Michel de Certeau, “determined by the 
absence of a proper locus. […] The space of a tactic is the space of the other. 
Thus it must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the 
law of a foreign power.”52 Subject to the law, yet never wholly determined 
by it, the political geography of Austerlitz is epitomized by these “dark cul-
de-sacs,” dead end corridors piled with unwanted furniture, “as if someone 
had been obliged to hold out there in a state of siege.”53 Why was someone 
so obliged? Did he manage to hold out? We aren’t told. Rather than provid-
50 Sebald, Austerlitz, 29 [43].
51 Ibid., 30 [44–5].
52 Michel De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Stephen Rendall (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), 36–7.
53 Sebald, Austerlitz, 30 [44].
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ing us with a clear image of unlikely liberty or predictable subjection, Sebald 
maintains the ironic tension between these poles. 
trains and waiting rooms 
For Sebald, travel is a distinctly extraterritorial experience. Travel can take 
us out of ourselves; but no journey is long enough, quick enough, or mazy 
enough, to outrun the catastrophe that is modernity. Train travel is pecu-
liarly important to Sebald. Trains belong neither to the city from which they 
depart nor to the city to which they travel, while stations are transitional 
spaces where travelers are neither home nor away. In the Ladies’ Waiting 
Room in Liverpool Street Station, Austerlitz hallucinates an image of himself 
as a child with his Welsh foster parents, seeing reflected on the walls “memo-
ries behind and within which many things further back in the past seemed 
to lie, all interlocking like the labyrinthine vaults […] all the hours of [his] 
past life, all the suppressed and extinguished fears and wishes [he] had ever 
entertained.”54 The walls of the station’s waiting room are also the spaces of 
Austerlitz’s mind: fragments of memories “interlocking” in an enigmatic laby-
rinth. Because he has spent so much of his life waiting — waiting to remem-
ber, waiting to belong, waiting to return to a place that is gone — the waiting 
room captures “all the hours” of his past. 
In the first travelogue section of Rings, landscape, train, and passengers 
prove mutually constitutive. During the narrator’s train journey to Somer-
leyton, the passengers sit “as far away from each other as they could be, and 
so silent, that not a word might have passed their lips in the whole of their 
lives.”55 The landscape is similarly isolated: “save for the odd solitary cottage 
there is nothing to be seen but the grass and the rippling reeds.”56 When the 
narrator arrives, he finds that “there was no station at the stop.”57 This ex-
ample indicates the psychogeographic relationship among spaces, modes of 
transport, and people, all of whom are figured here as isolated or uninhabita-
ble. The osmosis between space and inhabitants in Sebald’s work means that 
train stations almost always evoke memories of displacement. When the nar-
rator of Austerlitz first meets the title character in a waiting room, the room 
54 Ibid., 136 [193].
55 Sebald, The Rings of Saturn, 29 [41].
56 Ibid., 30 [42].
57 Ibid., 31 [43].
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is cast in twilight (an extraterritorial time, if there is one, between night and 
day), making its inhabitants seem like “the last members of a diminutive race 
which had perished or had been expelled from its homeland.”58 In Austerlitz, 
the reference to a race of people “expelled from its homeland” inevitably 
evokes the displacement of Jews in World War II; for, as Peter Fritzsche writes, 
the railways of the Third Reich “connect[ed] people to the camps and to the 
front, and the point of arrival and departure for thousands. […] The German 
Reichsbahn hauled over three million Jews to their deaths. Trains represent-
ed the point of departure from the familiar to the unknown.”59 
For Austerlitz in particular, trains and train stations reproduce the pro-
gression from “the familiar to the unknown.” In the Wilsonova train station, 
Austerlitz notes that the hall is “crowded with throngs of people who had 
spent the night there among piles of luggage, huddled together in groups 
of various sizes, most of them still asleep.”60 The groups of people evoke the 
scenes of Jewish displacement — including that of Austerlitz’s own mother, 
whose journey from Prague to Theresienstadt represents the culmination of 
the process through which she is reduced from a Czech citizen to a racial 
object with no country. Train stations are also central to Austerlitz’s own dis-
placement: in 1939, he was exiled to England via Kindertransport, leaving 
behind his parents and shattering his knowledge of home. Austerlitz remains 
caught in these in-between spaces, as if he spent his life aboard the train that 
displaced him from one home without providing another, or wholly sever-
ing his connection to his homeland. His attraction to trains, then, is twofold: 
trains represent the moment of exile he endeavors to recover; and Austerlitz, 
like the train, is perpetually traveling. 
the pedestrian and the bomber
Sebald’s characters and narrators also travel on foot, where freedom and mo-
bility are inextricable from vulnerability to fatigue, exposure, and the night-
ly search for shelter. In Rings, walking provides a loose narrative scaffolding 
for Sebald’s multigenre mélange. But walking also allows Sebald to explore 
the reciprocity between movement and feeling. Returning to his childhood 
58 Sebald, Austerlitz, 7 [10].
59 Peter Fritzsche, Life and Death in the Third Reich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 227.
60 Sebald, Austerlitz, 217–18 [310].
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neighborhood in Prague, for instance, Austerlitz is haunted by his lost memo-
ries, which manifest themselves as a spectral presence:
At some time in the past, I thought, I must have made a mistake and now 
I am living the wrong life. Later, on a walk through the deserted town 
and up to the fountain colonnade, I kept feeling as if someone else were 
walking beside me, or as if something had brushed against me. Every new 
view that opened out before us as we turned a corner, every façade, every 
flight or steps looked to me both familiar and utterly alien. I felt that the 
decrepit state of these once magnificent buildings […] precisely reflected 
my own state of mind.61 
Austerlitz is lost in two senses: psychologically, he is “living the wrong life” 
and geographically, he is without direction. His walk through the “deserted 
town” amplifies his feeling of being adrift, with the desertion of the streets 
echoing his loneliness. His feelings of recognition and misrecognition — epit-
omized by the way everything looks “both familiar and utterly alien” — are 
the emotional mark of the unheimliche Heimat.62 In such an extraterritorial 
state, walking reinforces what is familiar while at the same time revealing 
the familiar as utterly alien. Put simply, Austerlitz is not disoriented simply 
because he is lost; he is disoriented because of loss. Geography and emotion 
here create and invert one another, so that Austerlitz experiences the outer 
territories of Prague as the inner territory of his emotional life. 
Never wholly bound by territorial or imaginative homelands, Sebald’s 
characters are nevertheless tied to the earth by their inability to recover from 
loss. Their peripatetic movements are not, however, only mournful. Merlin 
Coverley explains that the aimless walker is subversive precisely because he 
“challenge[s] the official representation of the city by cutting across estab-
lished routes and exploring those marginal and forgotten areas often over-
looked by the city’s inhabitants.” 63 In their wanderings, Sebald’s characters 
frequently find themselves in abandoned or marginal spaces with political 
resonances. When the narrator of Rings explores destroyed ghettos, or Aus-
61 Ibid., 212 [302].
62 On the relation between pedestrian wandering and the problem of the German Heimat, see Long, 
W.G. Sebald, 6.
63 Merlin Coverley, Psychogeography (Harpenden: Pocket Essentials, 2006), 12. For an interpretation 
of walking in Rings as resistance to a modernity that prizes ends over means, see Long, W.G. Sebald, 
137.
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terlitz ponders the mass graves underneath a “warren of putrid streets and 
houses” 64 in London, Sebald assaults the tendency to marginalize (geographi-
cally and literarily) the memory of history’s victims. In his essay “Air War and 
Literature,” he laments the inadequacy of historical representation, calling 
one record of an air raid a mere “gesture sketched to banish memory […] to 
cover up and neutralize experiences beyond our ability to comprehend.” 65 
Sebald condemns these records as incomplete because they refuse to recog-
nize their own incompleteness. 
This psychogeographic view from the street seems to explain the disori-
ented-but-never-entirely-lost condition of Sebald’s exilic walker. But, as other 
critics have noted, this narrative point of view frequently alternates with a 
quasi-cartographic perspective, so that the view from the ground alternates 
with the view from the air, in which (as Sebald writes of Thomas Browne) the 
capaciousness of the narrator’s vision means that “the reader is overcome by 
a sense of levitation.”66 The irony of Sebald’s style is that these points of view 
often overlap. Thus, to continue Sebald’s reflection on Browne, the experi-
ence of reading his work comes to feel like “looking through a reversed op-
era glass and through a microscope at the same time.” Initially, the airborne 
view seems to be the necessary complement to the up-close perspective; as 
he says of Browne, “the greater the distance, the clearer the view.” 67 Yet the 
idea that the view from above could substitute for the view from the ground 
is exploded in the very first line of “Air War and Literature,” where Sebald 
writes: “Today it is hard to form an even partly adequate idea of the extent 
of the devastation suffered by the cities of Germany.” 68 In that essay, Sebald 
64 Sebald, Austerlitz. 130 [190]. 
65 Sebald, “Air War and Literature,” 25 [34]. Citations for “Air War and Literature” refer, first, to On the 
Natural History of Destruction and, second, to the German volume in which it was first collected, 
Luftkrieg und Literatur.
66 See, for example,Anderson, “The Edge of Darknes,” 116 and Simon Ward, “Ruins and Poetics in the 
Works of W.G. Sebald,” in W.G. Sebald: A Critical Companion, ed. Long & Whitehead, 59.
67 Sebald, The Rings of Saturn, 19 [28].
68 Sebald, “Air War and Literature,” 3 [11]. Sebald often returns to the impossible task of describing 
destruction, calling the attempt to “take an objective view of the totally unreal kind of reality” a 
“remarkable” but futile task (Campo Santo, 67 [71]). Beck links this problem to the way Sebald’s 
texts adopt an “imaginary position some distance above the earth” (The Rings of Saturn, 83 [103]) 
that they simultaneously criticize (John Beck, “Reading Room: Erosion and Sedimentation in Se-
bald’s Suffolk,” in W.G. Sebald: A Critical Companion, ed. Long & Whitehead, 87–8). Presner like-
wise argues that “Air War and Literature” “enacts an extraordinarily realistic ‘view’” that “upon 
close inspection” is “impossible” (Todd Samuel Presner, “‘What a Synoptic and Artificial View 
Reveals’: Extreme History and the Modernism of W.G. Sebald’s Realism,” Criticism 46, no. 3 (2004): 
345). For analysis of how Sebald’s representations of destruction are formed by a tension between 
“a realist mode” and an “aesthetics of transience,” see Julia Hell, “The Angel’s Enigmatic Eyes, or 
The Gothic Beauty of Catastrophic History in W.G. Sebald’s ‘Air War and Literature,’” Criticism 46 
no. 3 (2004): esp. 367–8, 374. 
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exposes the complementary inadequacy of both perspectives, even for those 
who think that the view from on high grants the insight of “some superior 
viewpoint.”69 Describing a bbc report of a raid on Berlin, he quotes the pilot’s 
staccato descriptions: “a wall of searchlights, in hundreds, in cones and clus-
ters […] over that pool myriads of flares hanging in the sky. That’s the city it-
self!” and then the words of “a third voice” saying “Look at that fire! Oh boy!”70 
Even while the airborne spectator can better see the extent of destruction, his 
reference to the burning city as “a fiery speck” reduces the conflagration to a 
distant generality. 
We suggest, then, that Sebald’s formal oscillation between large and small 
points of view reflects his sense that an artistic response to violence should 
also be poised — necessarily, if impossibly — between collective responsibil-
ity and the ineffability of individual experience. We suggest further that this 
formal balancing act ought to be understood through analogy with Sebald’s 
extraterritorial thematics. The analogy is surely inexact. All analogies are. 
It becomes clearer, however, when we consider Sebald’s representations of 
maps. Although they offer an apparently objective perspective on a territory, 
the map is an imaginative construction not so different from the walker’s ex-
perience on the ground.71 David Darby notes that, while Sebald’s geographi-
cal representations might appear “topographically transparent,” they are 
finally not “traceable on a map, and certainly not on the poorly reproduced 
and utterly unhelpful” maps Sebald includes in his works.72 Instead, maps 
provide a symbolic link between many aspects of Sebald’s oeuvre, connect-
ing slum clearances in England to the expansion of the railways to the “total 
and exhaustive knowledge of bodies in space”73 that is writ large on Auster-
litz’s reproduced map of Theresienstadt. In the period of the World Wars, 
moreover, the map of Europe was hardly stable. In these circumstances, even 
a recent map could quickly become a fiction from the past. 
These themes come together in Rings when William Hazel, gardener at 
the English country house Somerleyton, tells the narrator:
69 Sebald, “Air War and Literature,” 20 [29].
70 Ibid., 21–2 [30–1].
71 Sebald makes this point explicit when he recalls his fascination with a map of Germany in which 
he saw Stuttgart and thought: “compared with the other German cities it was not too far from us. 
But I could not imagine a journey to it” (Sebald, Campo Santo, 198–9 [241–2]).
72 David Darby, “Landscape and Memory: Sebald’s Redemption of History,” in W.G. Sebald: History, 
Memory, Trauma, ed. Denham & McCulloh, 270. For maps as a form of power/knowledge in Sebald, 
see Long, W.G. Sebald, 75–83.
73 Long, W.G. Sebald, 81.
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[Lord Somerleyton] brought me a big relief map of Germany. All the place 
names I had heard on the news were marked in strange letters alongside 
symbolic pictures of the towns. […] Those tiny images of towns, about the 
size of postage stamps, looked like romantic castles, and I pictured the 
German Reich as a medieval and vastly enigmatic land. […] I got to know 
the whole country by heart; you might even say it was burnt into me. 74 
Sebald’s dark humor (“burnt into me”) exposes the inadequacy of the bird’s-
eye view, which merely transforms the multifarious cities into “enigmatic” 
symbols. This map sutures a “romantic” picture of the nation to the rational-
ized space-time of modernity. Neither register can capture the war’s violence, 
as Hazel appears to acknowledge soon after, when he says that his quest to 
learn about the bombings proves “fruitless.”75 
Thus, the walker, needing a map to make sense of his surroundings, feels 
lost; the pilot or cartographer, feeling the absence of news from the ground, 
finds his view to be inadequate and distorting. In this way, the formal struc-
ture of Sebald’s narratives stands in analogical relation to the political impli-
cations of his extraterritorial poetics. 
the country house, adrift
Mark Girouard has described the decline of English country house living in 
the early twentieth century due to a fall in the value of rural real estate and 
the social prestige of owning a “permanent stake in the country.”76 In this 
context, the ideological “mystique of the land had been exploded” and yet 
country living limped on for another few decades: “Nothing, it might seem, 
had changed,” writes Girouard, “[b]ut in fact a great deal had changed.”77 In 
Sebald’s representations of country houses, the conditions of being out of 
time and out of place are reciprocal. Isolated and “forgotten” parts of the Eng-
lish and Irish countryside are comparable to “undiscovered” lands outside of 
sovereignty. Their extra-temporality operates as the vertical axis of Sebald’s 
horizontal representation of extraterritorial space. 
74 Sebald, The Rings of Saturn, 39 [53].
75 Ibid., 39 [54].
76 Mark Girouard, Life in the English Country House: A Social and Architectural History (New Haven: Yale 




Consider, for example, the episode in Austerlitz about Iver Grove. Al-
though this house appears intact, Austerlitz learns from the owner that it 
“had been requisitioned for use as a convalescent home during the war years 
[and] the expense of putting it back into any kind of order, however make-
shift, had been far beyond his means.”78 Iver Grove’s distance from blitzes and 
blitzkriegs affords it no sanctuary; instead, it deteriorates — so much so that 
when Austerlitz visits, its great hall is being used as a potato barn. This di-
lapidation is made only more obvious once Austerlitz discovers a walled-off 
zone of nurseries and billiards rooms, shuttered so long that it “seemed like 
a self-contained universe. It was as if time, which usually runs so irrevocably 
away, had stood still here, as if the years behind us were still to come.”79 The 
rooms appear to be somehow “outside” the catastrophe of modernity, a pre-
cious zone of intimacy and play. Austerlitz himself comments that “it is still 
possible to be outside time, a state of affairs which until recently was almost 
as common in backward and forgotten areas of our own country as it used 
to be in the undiscovered continents overseas.”80 And yet even these rooms 
do not foster some sense of living in a wholly alternative modernity; rather, 
their very isolation reminds us that they participate in a similar extraterrito-
rial space-time as the Palace of Justice. Austerlitz’s experience at Iver Grove 
sparks his recognition of “the years behind” him81 — the unacknowledged 
past of the Judeocide, around which his entire narrative circulates. 
The extraterritorial quality of Sebald’s houses is amplified by his fre-
quent recourse to metaphors of the sea, a literary strategy with good legal 
precedents. The United Nations Convention on the Law on the Sea limits the 
territorial authority states have over the oceans to the twelve miles beyond 
their shores.82 The sea is thus the largest extraterritorial space on earth. In 
Rings, the narrator describes Somerleyton as producing a feeling of psychoge-
ographic disorientation, akin to the experience of pelagic wandering, “when 
one is not quite sure whether one is in a country house in Suffolk or some 
kind of no-man’s-land, on the shores of the Arctic Ocean or in the heart of 
the dark continent.”83 (The German original for “no-man’s-land” is even more 
78 Sebald, Austerlitz, 104 [152].
79 Ibid., 108 [156].
80 Ibid., 101 [147]. For Sebald’s use of atemporality, see McCulloh, “Destruction and Transcendence,” 
400–4.
81 Ibid., 108 [156].
82 James C.F. Wang, Handbook on Ocean Politics and Law (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992), 97.
83 Sebald, The Rings of Saturn, 36 [49].
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explicit: “quasi-extraterritorialen Ort.”) This experience has a counterpart in 
Austerlitz. To reach the Grande Bibliothèque in Paris, Austerlitz complains 
that “you have to travel through a desolate no-man’s-land [Niemandsland] in 
one of those robot-driven Metro trains steered by a ghostly voice, or alterna-
tively you have to […] walk along the wind-swept riverbank.”84 The library’s 
position beside the water creates the illusion of being aboard a ship, where 
visiting, you might think
that by some mistake you had found your way to the deck of the Beren-
garia or one of the other oceangoing giants, and you would be not in the 
least surprised if, to the sound of a wailing foghorn, the horizon of the 
city of Paris suddenly began rising and falling against the gauge of the 
towers as the great steamer pounded onwards through mountainous 
waves, or if one of the tiny figures, having unwisely ventured on deck, 
were swept over the rail by a gust of wind and carried far out into the 
wastes of the Atlantic waters.85 
The extraterritorial quality of this description is reinforced by Sebald’s allu-
sion to the rms Berengaria, a transatlantic liner built in Hamburg in 1912 as 
the ss Imperator, seized by the us Navy in 1919 in order to repatriate American 
troops, and finally given to the British Cunard Line company as a reparation 
for the German sinking of the rms Lusitania — the very incident often cred-
ited with bringing America into the war. With a history that moves between 
rival sovereignties, but never escapes their machinations, the Berengaria is a 
potent allegory for the ironies of Sebaldian extraterritoriality. 
These political and psychogeographic implications come together in 
Rings, where the narrator visits another country house. The Anglo-Irish Ash-
burys, whom the narrator describes as “like refugees who have come through 
dreadful ordeals and do not now dare to settle in the place where they have 
ended up,”86 live in one of the few estates that survived the arson attacks of 
the Irish civil wars. The Ashburys are nomadic even at home, camping out 
amid their scant belongings, transferring their sense of psychic displacement 
onto their house and environs. The son and heir spends his time “working 
84 Sebald, Austerlitz, 275 [388].
85 Ibid., 277 [288].
86 Sebald, The Rings of Saturn, 210 [262].
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on a fat-bellied boat”87 that will never see the water. Mrs. Ashbury describes 
her first nights in the house as feeling “adrift on a sea of quicksilver”88 and 
later describes the inhabitants of a burned mansion as “paralysed with horror 
like shipwrecked survivors on a raft.”89 Refugees in their own country, adrift 
on land they own but cannot settle on, caught between sovereignties and 
eras, the Ashburys are extraterritoriality incarnate. Sebald’s narrator comes 
dangerously close to dissolving himself in their vagaries: he remarks that 
the house makes his “consciousness […] dissolve at the edges, so that at times 
[he] could hardly have said how [he] had got there or indeed where [he] was,” 
while the walls of his room remind him “of one of those maps of the far north 
on which next to nothing is marked.”90 The arctic, of course, is frozen ocean, 
conjured by the cold into a deadly facsimile of land: no-man’s-land, changing 
with every thaw, every freeze.
the fortress and the camp
Founded in 1780, the walled town of Theresienstadt was initially a fortress 
and later operated as a jail for the prisoners of the Hapsburg Empire. It be-
came a concentration camp in 1941 on the orders of Reinhard Heydrich, 
Stellvertretender Reichsprotektor of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Mora-
via — the Nazi-dominated statelet that had replaced independent Czechoslo-
vakia. This protectorate had an unusual political character, for although it 
retained “attributes of sovereignty” it had to exercise power “in conformity 
with the political, military and economic rights of the Reich.”91 One symp-
tom of this combination of autonomy and dependence was the emergence 
of a multitiered system of citizenship law, in which Czechs of German eth-
nicity could appeal to the “parallel extraterritorial jurisdiction”92 of German 
law, whereas ethnic Slavs could make no such claim, and Jews were nakedly 
exposed to the Nazi reign of terror. Theresienstadt was the materialization, 
in brick and iron, of this racist jurisprudence, which enshrined the Reich’s 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the German Volksgemeinschaft (people’s com-
munity) even as it stripped Jews of the most basic protections of citizenship. 
87 Ibid., 211 [263].
88 Ibid., 214 [267].
89 Ibid., 216 [269].
90 Ibid., 210 [261–2].
91 Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin, 2008), 59.
92 Ibid.
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For Agamben, as we have stated, the concentration camp exemplifies 
the extraterritorial logic of exception in which camp inmates can be “killed 
without the commission of homicide” because they have been forced into 
“an extraterritorial threshold in which the human body is separated from its 
normal political status.”93 Still, Theresienstadt was never an extermination 
camp. Although death was a permanent fact of life, Theresienstadt oper-
ated primarily as a settlement and assembly camp in which Jews were in-
terned before transportation to Auschwitz.94 But Theresienstadt also had a 
third function: “to camouflage the ongoing annihilation process before the 
eyes of the free world.”95 In this sham tertiary role, the camp was variously 
described as an “old-age Ghetto,”96 a “closed Jewish settlement under Jew-
ish management,” a “model ghetto” for artists and intellectuals, and even a 
“Judenstaat.”97 Such labels were designed to obscure Theresienstadt’s func-
tion as “the stable that supplied the slaughterhouse.”98 Still, they also point 
to unique features such as its internal government under a Jewish Council of 
Elders, local currency, and postage stamps, and Jewish militia.99 The chimera 
of a Jewish enclave in Nazi Europe adds another dimension to Sebald’s de-
scription of Theresienstadt as “that extraterritorial place.”100 
Austerlitz has no illusions, describing Theresienstadt as directed “solely 
at the extinction of life.”101 This phrase comes in a sentence packed with 
information from H. G. Adler’s Theresienstadt, 1941–1945, a sentence which 
goes on for an astonishing nine pages and is all the more terrifying for being 
perfectly hypotactic — as if, by the rigorous subordination of clauses, Aus-
terlitz can somehow control his growing feelings of anger and grief. The sen-
tence begins with an admission of the unpardonable guilt he feels for having 
neglected his mother’s history; it ends with the story of a film, shot during a 
Red Cross visit to this “Potemkin village,” in which he vainly hopes to catch 
93 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 159.
94 Barkai calculates that over 84,500 prisoners were processed through Theresienstadt on the way to 
Auschwitz, while “some 33,500 died in the camp itself” (Avraham Barkai and Paul Mendes-Flohr, 
German–Jewish History in Modern Times, vol. 4: Renewal and Destruction, 1918–1945, ed. Michael A. 
Meyer [New York: Columbia University Press, 1998], 371–2).
95 Livia Rothkirchen, The Jews of Bohemia and Moravia: Facing the Holocaust (Lincoln: University of Ne-
braska Press, 2005), 233. See also Barkai & Mendes-Flohr, German–Jewish History in Modern Times, 
370–8; Fritzsche, Life and Death in the Third Reich, 207–08; Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 388–9.
96 Barkai & Mendes-Flohr, German–Jewish History in Modern Times, 365. 
97 Rothkirchen, The Jews of Bohemia and Moravia, 234.
98 Fritzsche, Life and Death in the Third Reich, 208.
99 Barkai & Mendes-Flohr, German–Jewish History in Modern Times, 373–4; Rothkirchen, The Jews of 
Bohemia and Moravia, 236–9.
100 Sebald, Austerlitz, 236 [335].
101 Ibid., 241 [341].
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a glimpse of her face.102 Austerlitz’s appalling litany of facts and plans finally 
gives way to the admission that he cannot “cast [his] mind back to the ghetto 
and picture [his] mother.”103 
Why Theresienstadt? It is the most likely destination for a socially promi-
nent Czech Jew like Agáta following her detention in 1942. However, there 
is also the curious fact that, unlike the death camps carved out of the Polish 
forests, it is an architectural relic of Austro-Hungary connected to a long his-
tory of military violence. Neither a rawly industrial killing zone, nor an aban-
doned ruin from an abstractly catastrophic past, Theresienstadt points to the 
ambivalence within Sebald’s attitude toward the events of the war, which he 
depicts as singular in their brutality but connected through a complex web 
of causes and symbolic relations to a history of violence and exploitation al-
most geological in its persistence and depth.104
In Austerlitz, Sebald forges a sustained analogy between the topoi of the 
fortress and the camp. His description of Theresienstadt, for instance, is pre-
ceded by a map of the city taken from Adler.105 The star shaped architecture 
of the walls creates an unmistakable echo of the early section in which Aus-
terlitz’s remarks about military architecture are accompanied by a similar il-
lustration of the fortress at Saarlouis.106 Austerlitz meditates on the way forts 
epitomize an opposition between movement and stasis and he concludes 
that “it is often our mightiest [architectural] projects that most obviously be-
tray the degree of our insecurity.”107 When it comes to the forts of Belgium 
he tells a story of futile obsolescence: “the largest fortifications will naturally 
attract the largest enemy forces, and that the more you entrench yourself the 
more you must remain on the defensive, so that in the end you might find 
yourself in a place fortified in every possible way, watching helplessly while 
the enemy troops, moving on to their own choice of terrain elsewhere, sim-
ply ignored their adversaries’ fortresses.”108 This insight seems most palpable 
102 Ibid., 243 [344].
103 Ibid., 244 [346]. For the history of this film, see Brad Prager, “On the Liberation of Perpetrator Pho-
tographs in Holocaust Narratives,” in Visualizing the Holocaust: Documents, Aesthetics, Memory, ed. 
David Bathrick, Brad Prager, and Michael D. Richardson, Rochester: Camden House, 2008), 27–9. 
Austerlitz desires to “gain comfort through imagined entry” into the film (30). He later fastens on 
an image, “both strange and familiar,” of a woman who might be his mother (Sebald, Austerlitz, 
251 [355]).
104 See Fritzsche, “W.G. Sebald’s Twentieth Century Histories,” in W.G. Sebald: History, Memory, Trau-
ma, ed. Denham & McCulloh, 292.
105 Sebald, Austerlitz, 234–5 [332–3].
106 Ibid., 15 [22].
107 Ibid., 14 [21].
108 Ibid., 16 [24].
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in the fortress at Breendonk, which the narrator visits shortly afterward: “a 
fort completed just before the outbreak of the First World War” that “proved 
completely useless.”109 For Austerlitz, the urge to build ever stronger defenses 
is betrayed by the realization that “everything [is] decided in movement.”110 
His meditation therefore returns to the dialectic between the monumental 
force of state violence and the irresistible momentum of human movement, 
within which the poetics of extraterritoriality operates. Yet, as before, this 
opposition is never finally resolved. Austerlitz does not get the last word on 
Breendonk; for whereas he ends his story with its 1914 surrender, the narra-
tor later tells us how, after a second defeat in 1940, the Nazis turned this “use-
less” fort into the notorious penal camp in which, among others, Jean Améry 
was tortured before transportation to Auschwitz.111 At this point in its nar-
rative, Austerlitz owns a historical perspective denied to its protagonist, who 
has yet to learn the story of his mother’s internment and so assumes that the 
fort’s obsolescence is an established fact, immanent within the limitations of 
their architectural form.
And so it goes on. In Rings, the narrator walks to Orford Castle, for cen-
turies “the foremost bastion against [a] constant threat of invasion.”112 The 
castle only lost that status with the construction of new defenses during the 
Napoleonic wars, although they were never used and soon became “homes 
for the owls that make their soundless flights at dusk.”113 Finally, the narrator 
shifts perspective to the real subject of this episode, an abandoned military 
installation on the Orfordness promontory: 
The inhabitants of Orford […] could only speculate about what went on 
at the Orfordness site, which, though perfectly visible from the town, was 
effectively no easier to reach than the Nevada desert or an atoll in the 
South Seas. For my part, I well recall standing down by the harbour when 
I first visited Orford in 1972 and looking across to what the locals sim-
ply called “the island,” which resembled a penal colony in the Far East. I 
had been studying the curious coastal formations at Orford on the map, 
and was interested in the promontory of Orfordness, which seemed to 
have an extraterritorial quality about it. Stone by stone, over a period of 
109 Ibid., 18 [27].
110 Ibid., 16 [24].
111 Ibid., 19–26 [28–38].
112 Sebald, The Rings of Saturn, 229–30 [286].
113 Ibid., 230 [287].
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millennia, it had shifted down from the north across the mouth of the 
River Alde, in such a way that the tidal lower reaches, known as the Ore, 
run from some twelve miles just inside the present coastline before flow-
ing into the sea. When I was first in Orford, it was forbidden to approach 
“the island,” but now there was no longer any obstacle to going there, 
since, some years before, the Ministry of Defence had abandoned secret 
research at that site.114 
At Orfordness, the juridical extraterritoriality of the camp overlaps most 
fully with the thematic tension between belonging and exile. The people of 
Orford are separated from the base by a river, kept ignorant by a doctrine of 
official secrets, and kept out by fences and guards — even while their coun-
try’s most urgent business goes on behind its gates. Sebald compares the base, 
moreover, to spaces that couldn’t be more different from the sceptered isle of 
English memory: the Nevada desert, a Pacific atoll (sites rendered uninhabit-
able by nuclear testing), and an Asian penal colony. Here is another island of 
extraterritorial exception in which the power of the nation-state is enhanced 
by pockets of alien space. What this reading obscures, however, is that Sebald 
does not apply the word extraterritorial to the base’s legal or political charac-
ter but to its natural geography. In the passage quoted above, extraterritorial 
rather describes the peninsula’s unusual geology. And the adjective is just: 
the Orfordness peninsula is formed out of shale deposits that flow from the 
north, so that its shifting stones are both of the territory and apart from it, 
very much there but geologically allochthonous. 
Whether we read extraterritorial as modifying geology or state power, its 
meanings for the narrator are much the same. He asks a “ferryman” to take 
him across the river to the promontory, with the implication that, like a pas-
senger of Charon, he is crossing the border between worlds.115 In this “undis-
covered country,” he feels “utterly liberated and deeply despondent.”116 Stuck 
somewhere between headlong movement and the backward glance, the nar-
114 Ibid., 233 [289–90]. 
115 Ibid., 234 [291].
116 Ibid. Shakespeare’s metaphor of death as an “undiscover’d country” provides Sebald with the title 
of his essay on the death motif in Kafka’s The Castle, which he reads as poised between a “yearning 
for peace which in K.’s world only death itself can provide, and the fear of being unable to die […], 
the fear of a perpetual habitation in the no-man’s land between man and thing” (W.G. Sebald, 
“The Undiscover’d Country: The Death Motif in Kafka’s Castle,” Journal of European Studies 2, no. 
22 [1972]: 34). Rings here develops an implicit comparison between its narrator and Kafka, with 
the difference that the no man’s land of Orfordness is both the (extra)territory of death and a place 
from which he can return.
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rator begins to feel out of time and place, describing himself as a witness to 
“some future catastrophe.”117 Again, the extraterritorial functions as a gateway 
for the extratemporal, so that, as his memories shift from his experiences on 
the peninsula to his decision to return to the mainland, the narrator reflects: 
“Where and in what time I truly was that day at Orfordness I cannot say.”118 
It is at Orfordness that the parts of this essay finally come together. Here, 
the opposition between stasis and movement, native and foreign, is embodied 
in the paradox of an “island” connected to the mainland by a constantly shift-
ing ribbon of shale from upstream. Here, on a shore once threatened by Ger-
man invasion, the narrator is suspended somewhere between the land and 
the sea, between an England that is never home and a lost homeland he can 
never leave. Here, sovereign violence is rendered petty by wind and waves; 
but here, the “inclusive exclusion” of the camp persists in a timeless present. 
The incredibly rich combination of extraterritorial topoi in this section of 
Rings demonstrates the flexibility and sophistication of this aspect of Sebald’s 
poetics. Reading Sebald as the poet of the extraterritorial attunes us to the 
breadth of his engagement with the paradoxes of culture and history in the 
twentieth century; it also gives us a critical vocabulary both rich and specific 
enough to explain those paradoxes. In the Orfordness passage’s final media-
tion on the question of home, questions of national belonging wholly merge 
with a landscape that is at once political and psychic, timeless and contin-
gent. The narrator sits on the breakwater, waiting for his Charon, watching 
the eternal movements of the tide and sun. He sees the rooftops of Orford 
almost close enough to touch: “There, I thought, I was once at home.”119 In its 
apparent nostalgia for home, this is one of the most surprising statements in 
Rings. But the hint of grief contained in the phrase “was once” soon bursts to 
the surface of the narrator’s consciousness, as his sense of ecstatic connection 
to the mainland — his dream of a fully heimlich identity, beyond the state of 
exception and the loneliness of exile — is revealed to be nothing more (or 
less) than a ghost: “And then, through the growing dazzle of the light in my 
eyes, I suddenly saw, amidst the darkening colours, the sails of the long-van-
ished windmills, turning heavily in the wind.”120 If there is no going home, 
there is no escape from it either. Such is the extraterritorial condition.
117 Sebald, The Rings of Saturn, 237 [294].







Fiction you can 
hear, today, the deep 
stirring of the “unhome-
ly.” You must permit me this 
awkward word — the unhome-
ly — because it captures something 
of the estranging sense of the relocation 
of the home and the world in an unhallowed 
place. To be unhomed is not to be homeless, nor 
can the “unhomely” be easily accommodated in that 
familiar division of social life into private and the public 
spheres. The unhomely moment creeps up on you stealthily 
as your own shadow and suddenly you find yourself with Henry 
James’s Isabel Archer “taking the measure of your dwelling” in a state of 
“incredulous terror.”1 And it is at this point that the world first shrinks for 
Isabel and then expands enormously. As she struggles to survive the fathom-
less waters, the rushing torrents, James introduces us to the “unhomeliness” 
inherent in that rite of “extra-territorial” initiation — the relations between 
the innocent American, the deep, dissembling European, the masked emi-
gré — that a generation of critics have named his “international theme.” In 
a feverish stillness, the intimate recesses of the domestic space become sites 
for history’s most intricate invasions. In that displacement the border be- 
tween home and world becomes confused; and, uncannily, the private and 
the public become part of each other, forcing upon us a vision that is as di-
vided as it is disorienting. 
In the stirrings of the unhomely, another world becomes visible. It has 
less to do with forcible eviction and more to do with the uncanny literary and 
social effects of enforced social accommodation, or historical migrations and 
cultural relocations. The home does not remain the domain of domestic life, 
nor does the world simply become its social or historical counterpart. The 
 Originally published as Homi K. Bhabha: “The World and the Home,” Social Text 31/32: Third 
World Post Colonial Issues (1992): 141–53. Reprinted with permission of Duke University Press.
1 Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady (New York: Norton, 1975), 360.






unhomely is the shock of recognition of the world-in-the-home, the home-in-
the-world. In a song called “Whose House is This?” Toni Morrison gives this 
problem of “unhomely” dwelling a lyric clarity: 
Whose house is this? Whose night keeps out the light in here? Say who 
owns this house? It is not mine. I had another sweeter.... The House is 
strange. Its shadows lie. Say, tell me, why does its lock fit my key?2
My earliest sense of the unhomely occurred in a prosaic house in Oxford, in 
a narrow street reserved for college servants and research fellows. It was a 
noisy red-brick terraced house haunted by the hydraulic regurgitations of 
the Victorian plumbing system, yet strangely appropriate to the task at hand, 
a thesis on V.S. Naipaul. I was writing about a small-time Trinidadian jour-
nalist, the son of an Indian indentured laborer, a devotee of Samuel Smiles 
and Charles Dickens, who was afflicted with the most noisy and public bouts 
of nervous dyspepsia. As I contemplated his tragic-comic failure to create a 
dwelling place, to ever find A House for Mr. Biswas, I wrestled with the wis-
dom of Iris Murdoch’s laudable pronouncement, “A novel must be a house 
for free people to live in.” Must the novel be a house? What kind of narrative 
can house unfree people? Is the novel also a house where the unhomely can 
live? I was straining nervously at the edges of Iris Murdoch’s combination 
of liberalism and “catholic” existentialism, while Mr. Biswas’s gastric juices 
ran amok. The cistern churned and burped, and I thought of some of the 
great homes of English Literature — Mansfield Park, Thrushcross Grange, 
Gardencourt, Brideshead, Howard’s End, Fawlty Towers. Suddenly, I knew I 
had found, in the ruins of the Biswas bungalows and their unlikely, unsettled 
lives, my small corner of the world of letters — a postcolonial place. 
Working on A House for Mr. Biswas, I found that I couldn’t fit the politi-
cal, cultural or chronological experience of that text into the traditions of 
Anglo-American liberal novel criticism. The sovereignty of the concept of 
character, grounded as it is in the aesthetic discourse of cultural authentic-
ity and the practical ethics of individual freedom, bore little resemblance 
to the overdetermined, unaccommodated postcolonial figure of Mr. Biswas. 
The image of the house has always been used to talk about the expansive, 
2 Toni Morrison, “Honey and Rue,” from a song-cycle for Kathleen Battle, Carnegie Hall Stagebill 
(January 1992), 12c.
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mimetic nature of the novel; but in Biswas you have a form of realism that is 
unable to contain the anguish of cultural displacement and diasporic move-
ment. Although the “unhomely” is a paradigmatic post-colonial experience, 
it has a resonance that can be heard distinctly, if erratically, in fictions that 
negotiate the powers of cultural difference in a range of historical conditions 
and social contradictions. 
You can hear the shrill alarm of the unhomely at the moment when Isa-
bel Archer, in The Portrait of A Lady, realizes that her world has been reduced 
to one, high mean window, as her house of fiction becomes “the house of 
darkness, the house of dumbness, the house of suffocation.”3 If you hear it 
thus at the Palazzo Roccanera in the late-1870s, then a little earlier in 1873 
on the outskirts of Cincinnati, in mumbling houses like 124 Bluestone Road 
you hear the undecipherable language of the black and angry dead; the voice 
of Toni Morrison’s Beloved, “the thoughts of the women of 124, unspeakable 
thoughts, unspoken.”4 More than a quarter century later, in 1905, Bengal is 
ablaze with the Swadeshi or Home Rule movement when “home-made Bi-
mala, the product of the confined space,” as Tagore describes her in The Home 
and the World, is aroused by “a running undertone of melody, low down in 
the bass... the true manly note, the note of power.”5 Bimala is possessed and 
drawn forever from the zenana, the secluded women’s quarters, as she crosses 
that fated verandah into the world of public affairs… “over to another shore 
and the ferry had ceased to ply.”6 Much closer to our own times in contempo-
rary South Africa, Nadine Gordimer’s latest heroine, Aila, emanates a stilling 
atmosphere as she makes her diminished domesticity into the perfect cover 
for gun-running: suddenly the home turns into another world, and the narra-
tor notices that “it was as if everyone found that he had unnoticingly entered 
a strange house, and it was hers.”7 
Gordimer’s awkward sentence, with its rapid shift of genders and sub-
jects — everyone, he, hers — provides the estranging syntax of the unhomely 
experience. Gordimer’s sign of the woman’s sense of possession and self-pos-
session (“it was hers”), her ethical or historical transformation of the world, 
emerges retroactively, belatedly, at the end of the sentence, towards the end of the 
book. The historical or fictional subject is conscious of the “meaning” or in-
3 Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady, 360.
4 Toni Morrison, Beloved (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), 198–9.
5 Rabindranath Tagore, The Home and the World (London: Penguin, 1985).
6 Ibid., 70–71.
7 Nadine Gordimer, My Son’s Story (London: Bloomsbury, 1990).
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tention of the act; but its transformation into a “public” symbolic or ethical 
realm demands a narrative agency that emerges after the event, often alienat-
ing “intent,” and disturbing “causal” determinism. In The Human Condition, 
Hannah Arendt meditates on just such a perplexity in signifying the social 
sphere as a narrative process. “In any series of events that together form a 
story with a unique meaning,” she writes, “we can at best isolate the agent 
who set the whole process into motion; and although this agent frequently 
remains the subject, the hero of the story, we can never point unequivocally to 
[the agent] as the author of the outcome.”8 
In order to appear as material or empirical reality, the historical or social 
process must pass through an “aesthetic” alienation, or “privatization” of its 
public visibility. The discourse of “the social” then finds its means of repre-
sentation in a kind of unconsciousness that obscures the immediacy of mean-
ing, darkens the public event with an “unhomely” glow. There is, I want to 
hazard, an incommunicability that shapes the public moment; a psychic ob-
scurity that is formative for public memory. Then the house of fiction speaks 
in tongues; in those undecipherable mumbling enunciations that emanate 
from Beloved ’s “124,” or the strange still silence that surrounds Nadine Gor-
dimer’s Aila whether she inhabits a house in the colored ghetto of Benoni 
(son of sorrow), or in a “grey area” of the Cape. And suddenly, literature asks 
questions at the very borders of its historical and disciplinary being: Can 
historical time be thought outside fictional space, or do they lie uncannily 
beside each other? Does the passage of power turn the agent of history into a 
stranger, a double-agent living between the lines? 
The process of the aesthetic that I am proposing for the grounds of his-
torical “re-cognition,” and as a reckoning with the historical event, must be 
clarified. The aesthetic as the “obscuring” of the historical event that refig-
ures it through a temporal distancing or “lag,” as I’ve described it, must be 
distinguished from two familiar genealogies of the aesthetic. It must not 
be confused with the Kantian aesthetic, which is a mediatory process that 
brings existence to its fullest being in a revelation of self-reflection. Nor do 
I subscribe to that tradition of a materialist aesthetic that sees art as the 
displaced or overdetermined symptom of social reification — a fetishism 
of phenomenal forms that conceals “real” ideological contradictions. Both 
these approaches to the aesthetic involve transcendent schemes of thought 
8 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 185.
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and art where the progressive movement of the dialectic at once poses the 
problem of difference, alienation, negation — at the ontological or epistemo-
logical level — and sublates or disavows it in the process of representation. 
For instance, although Louis Althusser is fully aware of the differential sites 
of the social formation, and the displaced or overdetermined nature of ideol-
ogy more generally, the “subject” of cultural discourse is caught within the 
relatively homogenous, totalizing confines of the Lacanian Imaginary. 
In contrast to this homogenous or transcendent temporality of the 
“aesthetic,” I want to suggest that the aesthetic process introduces into our 
reading of social reality not another reified form of mediation — the art ob-
ject — but another temporality in which to signify the “event” of history. I 
take my lead from what Walter Benjamin describes as the “constructive prin-
ciple” of materialist historiography, where the “historical materialist cannot 
do without the present which is not a transition, but in which time stands 
still and has to come to a stop. For this notion defines the present in which he 
himself is writing history.”9 I locate the aesthetic in this time of inscription 
whose stillness is not stasis but a shock that Benjamin goes on to describe 
as “blasting a specific era out of the homogeneous course of history.”10 The 
present that informs the aesthetic process is not a transcendental passage 
but a moment of “transit,” a form of temporality that is open to disjunction 
and discontinuity and sees the process of history engaged, rather like art, in 
a negotiation of the framing and naming of social reality — not what lies in-
side or outside reality, but where to draw (or inscribe) the “meaningful” line 
between them. 
The unhomely moment relates the traumatic ambivalences of a personal, 
psychic history to the wider disjunctions of political existence. Beloved, the 
child murdered by her own mother, Sethe, is a daemonic, belated repetition 
of the violent history of black infant deaths, during slavery, in many parts of 
the South, less than a decade after the haunting of 124 Bluestone Road. (Be-
tween 1882 and 1895 from one-third to one-half of the annual black mortal-
ity rate was accounted for by children under five.) But the memory of Sethe’s 
act of infanticide emerges through “the holes — the things the fugitives did 
not say; the questions they did not ask […] the unnamed, the unmentioned.”11 
As we reconstruct the narrative of child murder through Sethe, the slave 
9 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (New York: Shocken Books, 1969), 262.
10 Ibid.
11 Morrison, Beloved, 92.
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mother, who is herself the victim of social death, the very historical basis of 
our ethical judgments undergoes a radical revision. 
In the denouement of her novel Gordimer provides another example of 
the complexity of the “unhomely” when she describes what she calls “the 
freak displacement” that has afflicted the world of her characters:
The biological drive of Sonny’s life which belonged to his wife was divert-
ed to his white lover [Hannah]…. He and Hannah had begot no child…. The 
revolutionary movement was to be their survivor.... But Aila, his wife, was 
the revolutionary now.12 
In the freak displacements of these novels, the profound divisions of an 
enslaved or apartheid society — negrification, denigration, classification, 
violence, incarceration — are relocated in the midst of the ambivalence of 
psychic identification — that space where love and hate can be projected or 
inverted; where the relation of “object” to identity is always split and doubled. 
Such forms of social and psychic existence can best be represented in that 
tenuous survival of literary language itself which allows memory to speak: 
while knowing Speech can (be) at best, a shadow echoing 
the silent light, bear witness 
To the truth, it is not….
Auden wrote those lines on the powers of poesis, in The Cave of Making, aspir-
ing to be as he put it “a minor Atlantic Goethe.” And it is to an intriguing 
suggestion in Goethe’s final “Note on World Literature” (1830) that I now 
turn to find a comparative method that would speak to the “unhomely” con-
dition of the modern world. Goethe suggests that the possibility of a world 
literature arises from the cultural confusion wrought by terrible wars and 
mutual conflicts. Nations “could not return to their settled and independ-
ent life again without noticing that they had learned many foreign ideas 
and ways, which they had unconsciously adopted, and come to feel here and 
there previously unrecognized spiritual and intellectual needs.”13 Goethe’s 
immediate reference is, of course, to the Napoleonic wars and his concept of 
12 Gordimer, My Son’s Story, 241–2.
13 J.E. Spingarn (ed.), Goethe’s Literary Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1921), 98–9.
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“the feeling of neighborly relations”14 is profoundly Eurocentric, extending 
as far as England and France. However, as an Orientalist who read Shakun-
tala at seventeen, and who writes in his autobiography of the “unformed and 
overformed”15 monkey God Hanuman, Goethe’s speculations are open to an-
other line of thought. 
What of the more complex cultural situation where “previously unrec-
ognized spiritual and intellectual needs” emerge from the imposition of “for-
eign” ideas, cultural representations, and structures of power? Goethe sug-
gests that the “inner nature of the whole nation as well as the individual man 
works all “unconsciously.” When this is placed alongside his idea that the 
cultural life of the nation is “unconsciously” lived, then there may be a sense 
in which world literature could be an emergent, prefigurative category that is 
concerned with a form of cultural dissensus and alterity, where non-consen-
sual terms of affiliation and articulation may be established on the grounds 
of historical trauma. The study of world literature might be the study of the 
way in which cultures recognize themselves through their projections of 
“otherness.” Where the transmission of “national” traditions was once the 
major theme of a world literature, perhaps we can now suggest that trans-
national histories of migrants, the colonized, or political refugees — these 
border and frontier conditions — may be the terrains of World Literature. 
The center of such a study would neither be the “sovereignty” of national 
cultures, nor the “universalism” of human culture, but a focus on those “freak 
displacements” — such as Morrison and Gordimer display — that have been 
caused within cultural lives of postcolonial societies. If these were consid-
ered the paradigm cases of a world literature based on the trauma of history 
and the conflict of nations, then Walter Benjamin’s homeless modern novel-
ist would be the representative figure of an “unhomely” world literature. For 
he “carries the incommensurable to extremes in the representation of hu-
man life and in the midst of life’s fullness, gives evidence of the perplexity of 
living.”16 Which leads us to ask: Can the perplexity of the unhomely, intra-
personal world lead to an international theme? 
Gordimer places this very question at the center of literary narrative: 
“Love, love/hate are the most common and universal of experiences. But no 
two are alike, each is a fingerprint of life. That’s the miracle that makes litera-
14 Ibid.
15 John Oxenford (ed.), The Autobiography of Goethe (London: Henry G.Bohn, 1948), 467.
16 Benjamin, Illuminations, 86.
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ture and links it with creation in the biological sense.”17 To put Gordimer’s 
point another way: the fingerprint of literature — its imagistic impulse, its 
tropic topos, its metaphoric medium, its allegorical voice — these forms of 
narrative created from contingency and indeterminacy — may provide his-
torical discourse with its powers of narrative “beginning.” For it was Michel 
de Certeau who suggested, in The Writing of History, that “beginnings” require 
an “originary non-place,” something “unspoken” which then produces a 
chronology of events.18 Beginnings can, in this sense, be the narrative lim-
its of the knowable, the margins of the meaningful. In what she calls her 
“in medias res” openings, Morrison stages such a narrative “non-space” and 
turns it into the performative time of the experience of slavery — no native 
informant, she writes, “the reader snatched as the slaves were from one place 
to another...without preparation or defense.”19 Her opening sign — “124 was 
spiteful” — offers no respite, no immediate meaning, because the house of 
slave-memory is not a resting place, not a Wordsworthian “spot of time.” 
“124” is the unhomely, haunted site of the circulation of an event not as fact 
or fiction but as an “enunciation,” a discourse of “unspeakable thoughts un-
spoken” — a phrase that circulates in the work and comes closest to defining 
its mode of utterance, the uncanny voice of memory. 
To “un”-speak is both to release from erasure and repression, and to recon-
struct, reinscribe the elements of the known. “In this case too,” we may say 
with Freud, “the unheimlich is what was once heimisch, home-like, familiar; the 
pre-fix ‘un’ is the token of repression.”20 Morrison turns her narrative to just 
such an “affect” of distancing, obscuring the “referent,” repeating and revis-
ing the “un-spoken” in order to make the act of narration an ethical act.
A few words have to be read before it is clear that 124 refers to a house… a 
few more…, to discover why it is spiteful…. By then it is clear that something 
is beyond control, but it is not beyond understanding since it is not beyond accom-
modation by both the women and the children…. The fully realized haunting… 
is a sleight of hand. One of its purposes is to keep the reader preoccupied 
17 Gordimer, My Son’s Story, 275.
18 Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 90–1. 
19 Morrison, “Unspeakable Thoughts Unspoken,” Michigan Quarterly Review (Fall 1990), 32.
20 [Sigmund Freud, “The ‘Uncanny’,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sig-
mund Freud, vol. 17 (1917–1919): On Infantile Neurosis and Other Works (London: The Hogarth Press 
and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955), 245 — Ed.]
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with the nature of the incredible spirit world while being supplied a con-
trolled diet of the incredible political world.21 
If we are seeking a “worlding” of literature, then perhaps it lies in a critical 
act that attempts to grasp the sleight of hand with which literature conjures 
with historical specificity, using the medium of psychic uncertainty, aesthetic 
distancing, or the obscure signs of the spirit-world, the sublime and the subliminal. As 
literary creatures and political animals we ought to concern ourselves with 
the understanding of human action and the social world as a moment when 
something is beyond control, but it is not beyond accommodation. This act of writ-
ing the world, of taking the measure of its dwelling, is magically caught in 
Morrison’s description of her house of fiction — art as “the fully realized pres-
ence of a haunting”22 of history. Read as an image that describes the relation 
of art to social reality, my translation of Morrison’s phrase becomes a state-
ment on the political responsibility of the critic. For the critic must attempt 
to fully realize, and take responsibility for, the un-spoken, unrepresented 
pasts that haunt the historical present. 
Our task remains, however, to show how historical understanding is 
transformed through the signifying process, represented in a language that is 
somehow beyond control. This is in keeping with Hannah Arendt’s suggestion 
that the author of social action may be the initiator of its unique meaning, 
but as agent he or she cannot control its outcome. 
It is not simply what the house of fiction contains or “controls” as con-
tent. What is just as important is the metaphoricity of the houses of racial 
memory that both Morrison and Gordimer construct, those subjects of the 
narrative that mutter or mumble like 124, or keep a still silence in a “grey” 
Cape Town suburb. Each of the houses in Gordimer’s My Son’s Story is invest-
ed with a specific secret or a conspiracy, an unhomely stirring. The house in 
the ghetto is the house of “colored” collusion; the lying house is the house of 
Sonny’s adultery; then there is the silent house of Aila’s revolutionary cam-
ouflage; there is also the nocturnal house of Will’s, the narrator’s, writing of 
the narrative that charts the phoenix rising in his home, while the words 
must turn to ashes in his mouth. But each house marks a deeper historical 
displacement. And that is the condition of being colored in South Africa, or 
21 Morrison, “Unspeakable Thoughts Unspoken,” 32.
22 Toni Morrison, “Honey and Rue,” 12c.
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as Will describes it, “halfway between... being not defined — and it was this 
lack of definition in itself that was never to be questioned, but observed like 
a taboo, something which no-one, while following, could ever admit to.”23
This half-way house of racial and cultural origins bridges the “in-between” 
diasporic origins of the colored South African and turns it into the symbol 
for the disjunctive, displaced everyday life of the liberation struggle: “like so 
many others of this kind, whose families are fragmented in the diaspora of 
exile, code names, underground activity, people for whom a real home and at-
tachments are something for others who will come after.” Private and public, 
past and present, the psyche and the social develop an interstial intimacy. It 
is an intimacy that questions binary divisions through which such spheres of 
social experience are often spatially opposed. These spheres of life are linked 
through an “in-between” temporality that takes the measure of dwelling at 
home, while producing an image of the world of history. This is the moment 
of aesthetic distance that provides the narrative with a double-edge which 
like the colored South-African subject represents a hybridity, a difference 
“within,” a subject that inhabits the rim of an “in-between” reality. And the 
inscription of this border existence inhabits a stillness of time and a strange-
ness of framing that creates the discursive “image” at the crossroads of his-
tory and literature, bridging the home and the world. 
Such a strange stillness is visible in the portrait of Aila. Her husband 
Sonny, now past his political prime, his affair with his white “revolutionary 
lover” in abeyance, makes his first prison visit to see his wife. The wardress 
stands back, the policeman fades, and Aila emerges as an un-homely pres-
ence, on the opposite side from her husband and son:
but through the familiar beauty there was a vivid strangeness ....It was as 
if some chosen experience had seen in her, as a painter will in his subject, 
what she was, what was there to be discovered. In Lusaka, in secret, in 
prison — who knows where? — she had sat for her hidden face. They had 
to recognise her.24 
Through this painterly distance a vivid strangeness emerges; a partial or dou-
ble “self”’ is framed in a climactic political moment that is also a contingent 
23 Gordimer, My Son’s Story, 21–2. 
24 Ibid., 230.
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historical event — “some chosen experience… who knows where?… or what 
there was to be discovered.”25 They had to recognize her, but what do they 
recognize in her? 
The history of Aila’s hidden face emerges at the moment of her framing. 
She begins to speak, “like someone telling a story,” but soon we find it “dif-
ficult to follow.... You leave so much out.” In her inability to articulate her in-
tention, to demonstrate a clear causality of commitment, or even a rational, 
responsible political ideology we are confronted with the novel’s poignant 
and ambivalent interrogation of agency: “Aila, Aila a revolutionary responsible 
for her acts.”26 There is no giddy suggestion that Aila’s revolution is instinc-
tive, part of her gendered “jouissance”; nor that it is the displaced symptom 
of her domestic oppression; or some fatal return of the repressed knowledge 
of Sonny’s adultery. The political lesson Aila has to teach speaks through her 
narrative refusal to “name” her choice. With a certain obduracy and greater 
obscurity, she herself becomes the “image” of historical agency that the nar-
rative is trying to wrench from her as an intention for her actions, an origin 
for her events, a “cause” for her consciousness. Literature, through its “dis-
tancing” act, frames this stillness, this enigmatic historical event. 
The necessity for what I’ve done — She placed the outer edge of each 
hand, fingers extended and close together, as a frame on either sides of 
the sheets of testimony in front of her. And she placed herself before him, 
to be judged by him.27 
Words will not speak and the silence freezes into the images of apartheid: 
identity cards, police frame-ups, prison mugshots, the grainy press pictures 
of terrorists. Of course, Aila is not judged, nor is she judgmental. Her revenge 
is much wiser and more complete. In her silence she becomes the un-spo-
ken “totem” of the taboo of the colored South African. She displays the un-
homely world, “the halfway between, not defined” world of the colored as the 
“distorted place and time in which they — all of them — Sonny, Aila, Han-







into an image of the “interstices,” the in-between hybridity of the history of 
sexuality and race. 
Aila’s hidden face, the outer edge of each hand, these small gestures 
through which she speaks describe another dimension of “dwelling” in the 
social world. Aila, as colored woman, defines a boundary that is at once inside 
and outside, the insiders-outsideness. The stillness that surrounds her, the 
gaps in her story, her hesitation and passion that speak between the self and 
its acts — these are moments where the private and public touch in contin-
gency. They do not simply transform the content of political ideas; the very 
“place” from which the political is spoken — the “public sphere” itself, be-
comes an experience of liminality which questions, in Sonny’s words, what 
it means to speak “from the center of life.” 
The central political preoccupation of the novel — till Aila’s emer-
gence — focuses on the “loss of absolutes,” the meltdown of the cold war, the 
fear “that if we can’t offer the old socialist paradise in exchange for the capi-
talist hell here, we’ll have turned traitor to our brothers.”29 The lesson Aila 
teaches, requires a movement away from a world conceived in binary terms, 
away from a notion of the peoples’ aspirations sketched in simple black and 
white. It also requires a shift of attention from the political as a theory to 
politics as the activity of everyday life. Aila leads us to the homely world 
where, Gordimer writes, the banalities are enacted — “the fuss over births, 
marriages, family affairs with their survival rituals of food and clothing.”30 
But it is precisely in these banalities that the unhomely stirs, as the violence 
of a racialized society falls most enduringly on the details of life: where you 
can sit, or not; how you can live, or not; what you can learn, or not; who you 
can love, or not. Between the banal act of freedom and its historic denial rises 
the silence: 
Aila emanated a stilling atmosphere; the parting jabber stopped. It was 
as if everyone found he had unnoticingly entered a strange house, and it 
was hers; she stood there. 
In Aila’s stillness, its obscure necessity, we have glimpsed what Emmanuel 
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image — art’s image as “the very event of obscuring, a descent into night, an 
invasion of the shadow.”31 The “completion” of the aesthetic, the distancing 
of the world in the “image,” is precisely not a transcendental activity. The im-
age — or the metaphoric, “fictional” activity of language — makes visible “an 
interruption of time by a movement going on the hither side of time, in its 
interstices.”32 The complexity of this statement will become clearer when I 
remind you of the “stillness” of time through which Aila surreptitiously and 
subversively interrupts the ongoing presence of political activity, using her 
interstitial role in the domestic world to both “obscure” her political role and 
to articulate it the better. 
The continual eruption of “undecipherable languages” of slave-memory 
in Beloved obscures the historical narrative of infanticide only to articulate 
the “unspoken” — that ghostly discourse which enters the world of 124 
“from the outside” in order to reveal the profound temporal liminality of the 
transitional world of the aftermath of slavery in the 1870s — its private and 
public faces, its historical past and its narrative present. The aesthetic im-
age discloses an ethical time of narration because, Levinas writes, “the real 
world appears in the image as it were between parenthesis.”33 Like the outer 
edges of Aila’s hands holding her enigmatic testimony; like 124, which is a 
fully realized presence haunted by undecipherable languages, Levinas’s par-
enthetical perspective is also an ethical view. It effects an “externality of the 
inward” as the very enunciative position of the historical and narrative sub-
ject, “introducing into the heart of subjectivity a radical and an-archical refer-
ence to the other which in fact constitutes the inwardness of the subject.”34 
Is it not uncanny that Levinas’s metaphors for this unique “obscurity” of the 
image should come from those unhomely places in Dickens — those dusty 
boarding schools, the pale light of London offices, the dark, dank second-
hand clothes shops? 
For Levinas the “art-magic” of the contemporary novel lies in its way of 
“seeing inwardness from the outside,”35 and for us, it is this ethical-aesthetic 
positioning that returns us, finally, to the community of the unhomely: 




34 Robert Bernasconi, “Levinas’s Ethical Discourse, Between Individuation and Universality,” in Re-




124 was spiteful […]. The house on the veld was silent. 
The women in the house knew it and so did the children. 
Why, in particular, the women? Carole Pateman argues that the continual 
“forgetting” of domestic life in the definition of the private/public distinction 
introduces a negation at the very center of social contract theory.36 Domes-
tic life becomes, by virtue of its disavowal, a problematic boundary of civil 
society. It can be reoccupied by those who have taken up the position of the 
“inwardness from the outside.” Which has indeed happened in the work of 
black American theorists like Patricia Hill Collins, who names the experi-
ence “the outsider-within status,”37 and Patricia Williams, who sees the pos-
sibility of deploying this status to describe an ambivalent, transgressive, fluid 
positioning — of herself and her work — “that moves back and forth across a 
boundary which acknowledges that I can be black and good and black and 
bad and that I can also be black and white….”38 
It is Toni Morrison, however, who takes this ethical and aesthetic pro-
ject of “seeing inwardness from the outside” furthest or deepest — right into 
Beloved’s naming of her desire for identity: “I want you to touch me on my 
inside part and call me my name.”39 There is an obvious reason why a ghost 
should want to be so realized. What is more obscure — and to the point — is 
how such an inward and intimate desire would provide an “inscape” of the 
memory of slavery. For Morrison, it is precisely the historical and discursive 
boundaries of slavery that are the issue. Racial violence is invoked by histori-
cal dates — 1876, for instance — but Morrison is just a little hasty with the 
events in themselves: “the true meaning of the Fugitive Bill, the Settlement 
Fee, God’s Ways, anti- slavery, manumission, skin voting […] .” What has to be 
endured is the knowledge of doubt that comes from Sethe’s eighteen years 
of disapproval and a solitary life in the unhomely world of 124 Bluestone 
Road. What finally causes the thoughts of the women of 124, “unspeakable 
thoughts to be unspoken,”40 is the understanding that the victims of violence 
are themselves “signified upon”: they are the victims of projected fears, anxie-
36 [Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 1989),. 132 — Ed.]
37 [Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black 
Feminist Thought, Social Problems 33, no. 6 (1986): S14–S32 — Ed.]
38 [Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 
1991), 130 — Ed.]
39 Morrison, Beloved, 116.
40 Ibid., 199.
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ties and dominations that do not originate within the oppressed and will not 
fix them in the circle of pain. The stirring of emancipation comes with the 
knowledge that the belief “that under every dark skin there was a jungle”41 
was a belief that grew, spread, touched every perpetrator of the racist myth, 
and was then expelled from 124. 
With this knowledge comes a kind of self-love that is also the love of the 
“other.” Eros and Agape together. This knowledge is visible in those intrigu-
ing “interstitial” chapters which lay over each other, where Sethe, Beloved 
and Denver perform a ceremony of claiming and naming: “Beloved, she my 
daughter”; “Beloved is my sister”; “I am beloved and she is mine.”42 The wom-
en speak in tongues, from a space “in-between each other” which is a com-
munal space. They explore an “inter-personal” reality: a social reality that 
appears within the poetic image as if it were in parenthesis. It is difficult to 
convey the rhythm and the improvisation of those chapters, but it is impos-
sible not to see in them, the healing of history, a community reclaimed in the 
making of a name: 
Who is Beloved? 
Now we understand: She is the daughter that returns to Sethe so that her 
mind will be homeless no more. 
Who is Beloved? 
Now we may say: She is the sister that returns to Denver, and brings hope of 
her father’s return, the fugitive who died in his escape. 
Who is Beloved? 
Now we know: She is the daughter made of murderous love who returns to 
love and hate and free herself. Her words are broken, like the lynched people 
with broken necks; disembodied, like the dead children who lost their rib-
bons. But there is no mistaking what her live words say as they rise from the 
dead despite their lost syntax and their fragmented presence. 
my face is coming I have to have it I am looking for the join I am 
loving my face so much my dark face is close to me I want to join.43 
My subject today has been the nest of the phoenix, not its pyre. I have at-
tempted to show you the world forcibly entering the house of fiction in or-
41 Ibid., 198.




der to invade, alarm, divide, dispossess. But I have also tried to show how 
literature haunts history’s more public face, forcing it to reflect on itself 
in the displacing, even distorting image of Art. When the publicity of the 
“event,” or the certainty of “intention” encounters the silence of the Word 
or the stillness of art, it may lose control and coherence, but it provides a 
profound understanding of what constitutes human necessity and agency. 
I have focused this argument on the woman framed — Gordimer’s Aila; and 
the woman, renamed — Morrison’s Beloved. In both their houses great world 
events erupted — Apartheid and Slavery — and their coming was turned into 
that particular obscurity of Art. In that unhomely second coming, both Aila 
and Beloved embody the “freak displacements” of their times. It could be said 
of these moments that they are of the world but not fully in it; that they rep-
resent the outsideness of the inside that is too painful to remember. “This is 
not a story to pass on,”44 Morrison insistently repeats at the end of Beloved in 
order to engrave the event in the deepest resources of our amnesia, of our un-
consciousness. When historical visibility has faded, when the present tense 
of testimony loses its power to arrest, then the distortions of memory offer 
us the image of our solidarity and survival. This is a story to pass on; to pass 
through the world of literature on its thither side and discover those who live 
in the unhomely house of Fiction. In the House of Fiction, there is a stirring 





in the wall for us to 
escape and the improb-
able to slip in. 
— Siegfried Kracauer, History
From this shore, yes, from this shore or this 
common drift, all expatriation remains singular.
— Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other
If it has a home at all, the proper home of the image, and 
even the thought-image or Denkbild, is homelessness. Never fully 
itself, the image remains at odds both with itself and with the referen-
tial burden that it is expected to carry. In its iterability, the image, which 
threatens to be divorced from referential functions such as time and space, 
tells of distance, absence, and loss, of exile and diasporic dispersal. It tells, in 
other words, of the states that make the image what it is and that relates it 
to all other images. The demand that an image can be of something and that 
it faithfully and reliably represent that something, on the one hand, and the 
inevitably unpredictable ways in which an image fails to comply with that 
demand, on the other hand, sponsor a melancholia that is shared by all im-
ages, even as it cannot travel through the structural and historical specificity 
of a singular image. The image records a historical moment at the same time 
that it interrupts history, perpetuating the very thinkability of history even 
as it breaks with the logic of historical unfolding. As the site of multiple dis-
placements, the image is historical when it tells us of its own departure from 
history, capturing time most fully when it removes itself from time, the way 
in which, for instance, a snapshot memorializes time by stepping outside the 
temporal flow. Because an image can never fully represent, that is, present 
once again in exactly the same way, the vast network of traces and meanings 
that it first sets out to arrest, it performs an Aufhebung that simultaneously 
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preserves and cancels the event that was once its subject. In this double ges-
ture, the image both forestalls and commemorates loss by recording a mo-
ment, documenting its constitutive inevitability, and making it visible as the 
loss that it always already was. That is to say, the image reveals the ways in 
which an assumed presence already was a fiction at the time when it was be-
lieved to be present. We even could say that rather than simply representing 
its subject, the image retroactively makes visible the absence that already lay 
at the core of the event it set out to record.
It is the traces of these multiple displacements that connect the image 
with philosophical thinking — the nomadic search for a space of belonging 
and a sense of community where no community remains to be experienced, 
in short, a means of dwelling within homelessness itself — that images and 
philosophical thoughts share. Our task then becomes to articulate the state 
of homeless dwelling that occurs when the syntactical relations among 
building, dwelling, and thinking are caught in a perpetual Aufbau and Ab-
bau, building and unbuilding, that shakes them to their very foundations, 
a fundamental ontological experience whose story Martin Heidegger nar-
rates.1 From this perspective, “philosophy,” the Romantic Novalis tells us, “is 
actually homesickness, the desire to be at home everywhere.” Georg Lukács 
cites Novalis’s lines in 1920 in order to set the stage for his own well-known 
formulation of modernity’s “transcendental homelessness [transzendentalen 
Obdachlosigkeit],” which he sees as the principal driving force of the novel 
since Romanticism and which, in turn, gives rise to a Marxian attempt at eas-
ing the suffering of this transcendental homelessness.2 But what Novalis also 
gives us to think is the idea that when homelessness in and of philosophical 
thought manifests itself as the desire to be at home everywhere (überall zu 
Hause zu sein), it paradoxically enforces and undoes the idea of dwelling at 
home. After all, if one’s home is everywhere, then it can be nowhere. This is to 
say that philosophical thought, not unlike the image, posits and dismantles 
its home, dismantling it by positing it and positing it only by dismantling it. 
But to say that, if one’s home is everywhere, then it can be nowhere, does not 
erase traces of longing that motivates philosophy and the making and read-
1 See Martin Heidegger’s reading of the existential nature of building, dwelling, and thinking in 
his essay “Bauen Wohen Denken” and his discussion of Hölderlin’s poetic mode of dwelling, “…
dichterisch wohnet der Mensch…,” Both in Vorträge und Aufsätze (Stuttgart: Neske, 1954), 139–56 
and 181–98, respectively. 
2 Georg Lukács, Die Theorie des Romans: Ein geschichtsphilosophischer Versuch über die Formen der großen 
Epik (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1971), 21–32.
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ing of images. Because “nowhere” also is the name of u-topia, the non-place, 
a “no-where” that may at any time enter, not into presence, but perhaps into 
legibility as the “now-here.” Thus, the shared homelessness that binds the im-
age to philosophical thought in a common hope that will not relinquish the 
idea that an absence, rather than being absolute, could remain thinkable as a 
distant and fractured presence — of and with a community that never can be 
thought or experienced now but always remains yet to come, in and as an infi-
nite promise of unpredictable proportions and incalculable responsibilities.
Perhaps few modern writers are as sensitive to this imbrication of the im-
age and of philosophical thinking in homelessness as Siegfried Kracauer and 
Jacques Derrida. If in these pages I place Kracauer’s reflections on homeless-
ness and its images into conceptual dialogue with those of Derrida, I wish to 
suggest a subterranean affinity that often is neglected. Kracauer and Derri-
da — one a displaced German Jew persecuted by Hitler, the other an Algerian 
Jew uneasily acculturated to “Frenchness” — for all their differences and sin-
gularities share a common set of concerns. Among many other things, they 
both are significant interpreters of Walter Benjamin, Franz Kafka, Marcel 
Proust, and Franz Rosenzweig; and both share a sustained theoretical interest 
in themes such as waiting, writing, media technology, photography, the self-
portrait, ghosts, architecture (and the philosophy of friendship). Both Kra-
cauer and Derrida also are inclined at times to write in languages not their 
“own,” and to reflect on the relation between homelessness and language, 
cultural identity and displacement, community and dispersal, the politics of 
inclusion and exclusion and a writing of, from, and in the margins. For Kra-
cauer, the “homeless image” names a central aspect common to the projects 
of both philosophers, a spectral aspect that manifests itself in the cracks and 
fissures of officially sanctioned cultural discourses. From both a theoretical 
and a personal perspective, these ghostly homeless images sometimes are 
given the difficult name “extraterritoriality” (Kracauer), and other times the 
name “monolingualism of the other” (Derrida).
homeless images, arcades, and the terror of territory
In a sense, the entire corpus of Kracauer’s work, from the Weimar essays to 
his philosophy of history, speaks, implicitly or explicitly, to the problemat-
ics of homelessness, exile, and the image. That he would be so receptive to 
Lukács’s figure of transcendental homelessness is not surprising, given the 
380
extraterritorial poetics
fact that his work as a whole is saturated with reflections on space, spatial 
relations, territoriality, and topography. Having first completed a doctorate 
in architecture, he discusses space, spatial relations, city streets, and other 
geo-topographical issues in many of his Weimar writings, including the 
novels Ginster and Georg and his essays in cultural criticism. Indeed, his very 
language is often constructed around an intricate geometry of space-specific 
metaphors.3 Many of these spatial performances are microcosmically con-
densed in Kracauer’s 1930 “Farewell to the Linden Arcade [Abschied von der 
Lindenpassage],” one of the Denkbilder from the 1920s and 30s that he later 
included in the book Streets in Berlin and Elsewhere [Straßen in Berlin und an-
derswo]. There, Kracauer speaks of the land — and cityscapes that concern 
him as “homeless images [obdachlose Bilder].” As Kracauer puts it, what he 
observes all around him are “homeless images, illustrations of passage-like 
movements, that, here and there, shimmer through the cracks of the fence 
that surround us.”4 Echoing Lukács’s language of ten years prior, Kracauer 
inscribes himself into a genealogy of homelessness by aligning his gaze with 
that of the homeless image.5
Like the photographic image, which assumes spectral dimensions in his 
reflections on photography, and like the workers who seek “Asylum for the 
Homeless [Asyl für Obdachlose],” a chapter title in his 1930 book The Salaried 
Masses (Die Angestellten)6 — the images that circulate through the streets of 
Kracauer’s Weimar Germany are fleeting and elusive signifiers, divorced 
from any proper origin, inhabiting no permanent space. These homeless im-
ages radicalize the meaning that Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari later give 
to the concept of nomadism. Although this theoretical conceptualization of 
3 I am grateful to Dirk Oschmann for reminding me of this point.
4 When in 1963 Kracauer selected thirty-three of his Weimar thought-images, which had originally 
appeared in the 1920s and 1930s in the Frankfurter Zeitung, for a collection with the title Straßen in 
Berlin und anderswo (Streets in Berlin and Elsewhere), he divided them into four sections: “Straßen” 
(Streets), “Lokale” (Sites), “Dinge” (Things), and “Leute” (People). The thought-image “Farewell to 
the Linden Arcade” appears in the first section and also was chosen by Kracauer to be included 
in a 1963 collection of longer essays of his Weimar period (1920–31), Das Ornament der Masse 
(The Mass Ornament). I cite Kracauer’s texts from his collected works, whose three-book volume 5 
contains many of his essays, albeit in strictly chronological order, an order that disrupts Kracau-
er’s own constellation of texts and thought-images. I quote the English translation of Kracauer’s 
thought-image from the English version of Das Ornament der Masse. Siegfried Kracauer, “Farewell 
to the Linden Arcade,” in The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays, ed. and trans. Thomas Y. Levin (Cam-
bridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1995), 337–42, at 340–41; “Abschied von der Lindenpassage,” 
in Schrifien, vol. 5 book 2, ed. Inka Mülder-Bach (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1990), 260–5, at 263.
5 For a general discussion of Kracauer’s reception of Lukács, see Dirk Oschmann, Auszug aus der 
Innerlichkeit: Das literarische Werk Siegfried Kracauers (Heidelberg: Winter, 1999), 81–9.
6 A title that Adorno takes verbatim from Kracauer’s thought-images for his own in Minima Moralia.
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homelessness is shared by fellow members of the Frankfurt School, such as 
Adorno, Benjamin, and Horkheimer, Kracauer’s work deepens this conceptu-
alization with a force that mitigates against the reduction of his work to any 
single paradigm, even as it exhibits elective affinities with several.7
The image of homelessness that permeates Kracauer’s thinking bespeaks 
a displacement that is shared by every image which one may wish to read, 
including Kracauer’s own self-portrait, which encodes homelessness with-
out which, the signature that signs his sentences would hardly be legible. 
This homelessness, felt even at home, haunted Kracauer’s empirical life from 
the beginning: born in 1889 to a middle-class Jewish family, his childhood 
was marred by a pronounced speech impediment that marked his mother 
tongue, German, as “other,” even within the German context. Kracauer spoke 
his proper native language only as something improper and alien. Living in 
the schism between a disabling stutter and the refined ear that made him one 
of the most gifted stylists of the German language during the Weimar period, 
between the worlds of Jewish and non-Jewish Germans in Frankfurt, Berlin, 
and beyond, between what was perceived by his contemporaries as a bizarre 
personal appearance and the highly developed aesthetic and philosophical 
sense that propelled him to study architecture, philosophy, and sociology, 
prompted Kracauer to describe his life as “extraterritorial.” The Frankfurt 
School’s historian, Martin Jay, reminds us that although “marginality, aliena-
tion, outsiderness have been among the stock obsessions of intellectuals ever 
since the time of Rousseau,” Kracauer’s insistence on launching his thoughts 
and sentences from a position of extraterritoriality makes a singular demand 
of his readers. “Kracauer’s sense of marginality,” Jay continues, 
must have begun almost at birth. Physically, he was set apart from his 
peers by two characteristics. The first was a speech defect, a stammer 
which would preclude, among other things, a teaching career at any time 
in his life. The second was his physiognomy, whose peculiarity struck all 
7 That the trope of homelessness, in its Lukácsian inflection and beyond, was privileged among 
Kracauer and his friends is confirmed in the reflections of another Frankfurt School colleague, Leo 
Löwenthal. As he recalls, Kracauer “called himself homeless in a way. In October 1923 […] on the 
occasion of my wedding to my first wife, I received a letter of congratulations in an envelope deco-
rated by Kracauer and with the return address: ‘General Headquarters of the Welfare Bureau for 
the Transcendentally Homeless’; and below, again in Teddie’s [Wiesengrund Adorno’s] handwrit-
ing: ‘Kracauer and Wiesengrund. Agents of the Transcendentally Homeless. General Management 
in Frankfurt Oberrat.’ That, of course, was an allusion to Lukács’s Theory of the Novel. But ‘transcen-
dentally homeless’ is the true category for Siegfried Kracauer.” Leo Löwenthal, “As I Remember 
Friedel,” New German Critique 54 (Fall 1991): 5–17, at 12–13.
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who knew him. To Adorno, who actually used the word “extraterritorial” 
in describing his face, he looked as if he were from the Far East. Asja Lacis, 
the Latvian Marxist director who met him in the late 1900s, said that he 
looked like an “African.” To Hans Mayer, the Marxist literary critic, he was 
a “Japanese painted by an Expressionist.” And Rudolf Arnheim, the aes-
thetic theoretician, remembers him as having a squashed nose that made 
his face “almost grotesque, but somehow beautiful.”8
We might add that other contemporaries were more drastic and even mean-
spirited. For instance, Joseph Roth spoke in a letter of Kracauer’s “un-Euro-
pean face” and of the alleged “patience” required “to wait for half an hour 
before he finally stutters up his wisdom,” while Harry Graf Kessler evoked 
a “Kracauer, to whose monstrous ugliness that I cannot get accustomed.”9 
For Kracauer, the marginality imposed by this extraterritoriality is not to 
be read as a postlapsarian state, as a fall from an original wholeness and a 
primordial stability of meaning from which his trajectory unfortunately has 
deviated. On the contrary, his otherness, inscribed by his extraterritoriality, 
is the very condition of possibility that makes him who he is: the one who is 
extraterritorial, the one who belongs to what does not belong, the one who 
is conjoined only by what is out of joint. For Kracauer, as for his friend Ben-
jamin, the Ursprung is not merely an origin or a home, but also, always, an 
Ur-sprung, a primal leap or crack.
This homeless image portrays the nomadic extraterritoriality that trav-
erses all of his Denkbilder, and, in fact, every one of his sentences.10 Kracauer 
8 Martin Jay, “The Extraterritorial Life of Siegfried Kracauer,” this volume, 277.
9 These remarks by Roth and Kessler, respectively made in letters and diaries, are cited in Momme 
Brodersen, Siegfried Kracauer (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2001), 150. Further reflections on 
Kracauer’s status as cultural outsider and his meditations on the dislocations of identity can be 
found in Ingrid Beike, “Identitätsprobleme Siegfried Kracauers (1889–1966),” in Deutsch-Jüdisches 
Exil: Das Ende der Assimilation? Identitätsprobleme deutscher Juden in der Emigration, ed. Wolfgang 
Benz and Marion Neiss (Berlin: Metropol, 1994), 45–65. Finally, for an analysis of how Kracauer’s 
status as an outsider inflected his practice of philosophical journalism of the Weimar period, see 
Helmut Stalder, Siegfried Kracauer: Das journalistische Werk in der “Frankfurter Zeitung,” 1921–1933 
(Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2003).
10 The overall sense that Kracauer’s prose snapshots and philosophical miniatures from his Wei-
mar years are best understood as belonging to the genre of the Denkbild, the form of the philo-
sophically charged literary thought-image that also plays such a central role in the writings of 
his friends and colleagues Adorno, Benjamin, Bloch, Horkheimer, and others, is generally shared 
by Kracauer’s readers. Several commentators suggest the term Denkbild for Kracauer’s Weimar 
texts Heinz Schlaffer, “Denkbilder: Eine kleine Prosaform zwischen Dichtung und Gesellschaft-
stheorie,” in Poesie und Politik: Zur Situation der Literatur in Deutschland, ed. Wolfgang Kuttenkeuler 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1973), 137–54; Inka Mülder, Siegfried Kracauer: Grenzgänger zwischen The-
orie und Literatur; Sein frühen Schriften, 1913–1933 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1985), 103–6; Gerwin Zohlen 
“Notizen zur Ausgabe und zum Autor,” in Siegfried Kracauer, Straßen in Berlin und anderswo, with 
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refers, directly or indirectly, to his (and others’) extraterritoriality as early as 
his Weimar Denkbilder, and the reference continues through his last work, 
on the theory of history. Even his wife, Lili Kracauer, records in a letter her 
husband’s preoccupation with extraterritoriality as a word and as a con-
cept.11 For Kracauer, the fact that home is not a home derives not from the 
state of exile from his native Germany, but from the sense that its legibility 
as a home is fundamentally predicated upon its internal division and self-
differentiation, the internal otherness that reenacts, refracts, and multiplies 
its external otherness to the point at which the very binarism of the internal 
and external dissolves. Writing in October 1958 to his similarly displaced 
Frankfurt School friend, Leo Löwenthal in Berkeley, Kracauer registers the 
trauma of returning to his “home” from an extended European trip. “When 
we,” Kracauer writes, “after a smooth flight returned to our apartment, I had 
a fit of claustrophobia. It is really unnatural to have a permanent residence, 
a so-called home; the existence as a vagabond is the only true thing. The fol-
lowing day I was reconciled with my life here. It is good for working and 
I here feel, as if it were, extraterritorial.”12 The only reconciliation, for Kra-
cauer, is the absence of reconciliation that the condition of extraterritoriality 
furnishes. Like Adorno, for whom erpreßte Versöhnung, or forced reconcilia-
tion, named the worst instincts, Kracauer can imagine reconciliation only as 
what refuses to be reconciled, a refusal that carries the name and signature 
of the extraterritorial.
Extraterritoriality: the condition of existing in a territory beyond terri-
tory, belonging to a territory while at the same time, being “extra” or super-
fluous to it, being outside or other to one’s own or to another’s territory. For 
someone or something to exist in a state of extraterritoriality means to de-
part from territory as a space and as an idea while still remaining deeply at-
tached to it, that is, attached to it precisely in the act of departing from it. Ex-
traterritoriality names the experience of radical insecurity in which the self 
an essay by Gerwin Zohlen (Berlin: Das Arsenal, 1987), 120–28; Helmut Stalder, “Hieroglyphen-
Entzifferung und Traumdeutung der Großstadt: Zur Darstellungsmethode in den ‘Städtebildern’ 
Siegfried Kracauers,” in Siegfried Kracauer: Zum Werk des Rornanciers; Feuilletonisten, Architekten, 
Filmwissenschaftlers und Soziologen, ed. Andreas Volk (Zurich: Seismo, 1996), 131–55; and Tom 
Levin, introduction to Kracauer’s The Mass Ornament, 1–30.
11 Lili Kracauer’s unpublished letter to Leo Löwenthal, in which she speaks of Kracauer’s “extraterri-
toriality of chronological time,” is cited in Dagmar Barnouw’s Critical Realism: History Photography, 
and the Work of Siegfried Kracauer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 323, n 45.
12 Kracauer’s letter to Löwenthal dated October 27, 1958 is now available in In steter Freundschaft: 
Leo Löwenthal–Siegfried Kracauer, Briefwechsel, 1921–1966, ed. Peter-Erwin Jansen and Christian 
Schmidt (Springe: zu Klampen, 2003), 211–13, at 212.
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encounters itself as another. But precisely this encounter of the self with it-
self as another also names the promise of possibility. As Deleuze reminds us, 
“The Other, as structure, is the expression of a possible world: it is the expressed, 
grasped as not yet existing outside of that which expresses it.”13 Kracauer’s 
extraterritoriality becomes readable not simply as the trace of displacement, 
but also as the anticipatory expression of a possible world that is still to come 
and to be thought of as that which is not yet, as that whose territory, if it is 
anywhere, is always elsewhere.
Kracauer’s emphasis on this experience of territoriality as extraterritorial-
ity returns us to the very core of “territory.” A territory designates that which 
is settled, circumscribed, defined, articulated, and distinguished — whether 
in geographical, political, disciplinary, juridical, national, ethno-ontological, 
or even anatomical terms. Territory is what underwrites the very idea of hav-
ing something settled, of having established something for good. It can even 
carry the connotation of property and propriety, of ownership, of possessing 
and living in one’s territory — in short, a way of being at home.
But while territory signifies a certain settlement, and the ex-perience (lit-
erally, the moving through) of that settlement, a strange tension haunts the 
ground of territory that suggests that the settlement of the territory also is 
deeply unsettling and unsettled. Indeed, the very etymology of the word ter-
ritory is unsettling. While territory, as the Oxford English Dictionary tells us, 
derives from the Latin formation territorium, that is, “the land around a town, 
a domain, district,” the derivation of that formation in turn is “unsettled”: 
Etymology unsettled: usually taken as a deriv. of terra earth, land (to 
which it was certainly referred in popular L. when altered to terratorium); 
but the original form has suggested derivation from terrere to frighten, 
whence *territor frightener, territorium? “a place from which people are 
warned off” (Roby Lat. Gr. §943). So F. territoire (1278 in Godef. Compl.): 
see also terroir.
Etymology unsettled: the history of territory also is the history of terror and 
fright. What is settled as territory is unsettled, that is, settled only as the dis-
simulation of what is unsettled, heimlich and unheimlich all at once. In this 
13 Gilles Deleuze, “A Theory of the Other,” in The Deleuze Reader, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 59–68, at 60.
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unsettling trajectory, that which delimits a domain or a space also de-limits 
it, circumscribing its limits while simultaneously abolishing them. What 
shelters is also what expels (“people are warned off”), and what settles is 
also what terrorizes. The home that the territory provides cannot be thought 
apart from terror itself, the terror sponsored by the threat of expulsion is 
much as the terror of remaining, unsettled, in the settlement. As an unset-
tled settlement, territory is not entirely distinguishable from what could be 
called a “terror-tory.” What makes one feel at home also frightens one, fright-
ens one when one feels at home and makes one feel at home only, perhaps, 
when one is frightened. That the homey comforts of territory cannot be dis-
tinguished from the terror that resides within it names the condition of a 
certain Unheimlichkeit that remains unsettling in any settlement.
Kracauer’s emphasis on extraterritoriality now can be read as a form of 
experience that not only conscious of the unsettlingly indecisive imbrica-
tions of territory and terror, but that also enacts this undecidability in the 
form of a meta-commentary. If territory, and the condition of territoriality 
that corresponds to it, work to erase any clearly delimited borders between 
territory and terror-tory, settlement and unsettlement, then extraterritorial-
ity, in its “extra”-ness, its beyondness or otherness to territoriality, enacts the 
very distance that resists territoriality, as a word and as a concept, collapsing 
competing and contradictory forces that traverse it and that will not allow it 
to come into its own as a legible self-identity. Extraterritoriality, then, is the 
condition or experience that allows for articulation and mobilization of the 
ways in which territoriality is at odds with itself, a liberation of the terror 
that always already was hauntingly at work in territoriality, if only as a form 
of dissimulation. In other words, territoriality itself cannot exist without the 
extraterritoriality that is at work when settling and unsettling; territory and 
terror can no longer be distinguished reliably. Both as a condition and as a 
form of experience, extraterritoriality constitutes a displaced proper name 
for its alleged other, territoriality — but a potentially nonblinded experience 
that no longer takes readability of itself and its others simply for granted. On 
the contrary, it invites this unreadability as a promise to be fulfilled through 
textual encounters — cultural, national, personal, or otherwise — whose out-
come cannot be scripted in advance.
It is hardly an accident, then, that in “Farewell to the Linden Arcade,” the 
Denkbild that mobilizes the trope of the “homeless image,” Kracauer focuses 
on the haunted passageways (Passagen) of a Berlin arcade (Passage), placing 
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himself into dialogue with “my friend Walter Benjamin, whose work has been 
focused for years on the arcades of Paris” and to whose “book One-Way Street,” 
the collection of Denkbilder published two years prior, Kracauer’s own Denk-
bilder respond.14 Like Benjamin’s Denkbilder of One-Way Street and like the frag-
ments of his Arcades Project, Kracauer’s Denkbild is obsessed with the arcades 
as a ghostly space that creates the feeling of dwelling inside and outside at the 
same time, a constellation in which nothing is what it appears to be:
In the arcades, and precisely because they were arcades, the most recently 
created things separated themselves from living beings earlier than else-
where, and died still warm (that is why Castan’s panopticon was located 
in the arcade). What we had inherited and unhesitatingly called our own 
lay on display in the passageways as if in a morgue, exposing its extin-
guished grimace. In this arcade, we ourselves encountered ourselves as 
deceased. But we also wrested from it what belongs to us today and for-
ever, that which glimmered there unrecognized and distorted. 
Now, under a new glass roof and adorned in marble, the former arcade 
recalls the vestibule of a department store. To be sure, the shops are still 
there, but its postcards are mass-produced commodities, its World Pan-
orama has been superseded by a cinema, and its Anatomical Museum has 
long ceased to cause a sensation. All things have been struck dumb [Alle 
Gegenstände sind mit Stummheit geschlagen]. They huddle timidly behind 
the empty architecture, which, for the time being, acts completely neu-
tral, and will later on breed who knows what — perhaps fascism, perhaps 
nothing at all. What would be the point of an arcade [Passage] in a society 
that is itself only a passageway? [Was sollte noch eine Passage in einer Gesell-
schaft, die selber nur eine Passage ist?]15
In Kracauer’s reading, the passageways of the arcades delimit a space in 
which extraterritoriality is experienced, a no-man’s-land in which trajecto-
ries of history criss-cross and distort one another, and objects become unreli-
able traces because the signs of the object world have ceased to speak — “alle 
Gegenstände sind mit Stummheit geschlagen.” In fact, it is here, in the pas-
sageways of the arcades, that we encounter ourselves as another — a dead 
14 Kracauer, “Farewell,” 342 [263].
15 Ibid., 342 [264–5].
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other. In this way, the arcade becomes an extraterritorial site of our encoun-
ter with ourselves as the finite other, that is, with finitude itself. But the 
arcade, with its homeless images, remains a hauntingly unreadable extra-
territorial site. Because of the impossibility of reducing its conflicting signi-
fications in advance to this or that political program — it retreats as an illeg-
ible text — the arcades may or may not become a pretext for fascism, may or 
may not authorize a sociopolitical program. As a form of undecidability, its 
meaning is always yet to come. Coming to terms with this undecidability by 
facing its threat in light of the requirements that a properly political stance 
would demand: these are the ethical stakes of Kracauer’s extraterritoriality 
and the homeless images in which it manifests itself. It is hardly an accident 
that in a 1930 review Benjamin describes Kracauer as a relentless outsider, a 
marginal yet revolutionary ragpicker of history, a designation of which Kra-
cauer always remained proud. “And if we wish to gain a clear picture of him 
in the isolation of his trade,” Benjamin writes there, 
what we will see is a ragpicker, at daybreak, picking up rags of speech and 
verbal scraps with his stick and tossing them, grumbling and growling, a 
little drunk, into his cart, not without letting one or another of those fad-
ed cotton remnants — “humanity,” “inwardness,” or “absorption” — flut-
ter derisively in the wind. A ragpicker, early on — at the dawn of the day 
of the revolution.”16
The spatial dimension of Kracauer’s extraterritoriality, as it figures in the 
language of the ghostly arcades passageways, is extended by a temporal com-
ponent. In two 1963 letters to Adorno — missives that Kracauer, according to 
the literary critic Inka Mülder-Bach, privately designated as “Letters on Ex-
traterritoriality” — Kracauer expresses his desire for “chronological anonym-
ity”: “My mode of existence literally would be put on the line if dates were 
roused and assaulted me from the outside.” As Kracauer emphasizes, it “is not 
as if I were trying to appear young or younger; it is solely my fear of losing 
chronological anonymity by the fixation of dates and the unavoidable con-
16 Walter Benjamin, “An Outsider Makes His Mark,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, Selected Writings: 
Volume 2, 1927–1934, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith (Cambridge, ma: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 305–10, at 310; “Ein Außenseiter macht sich bemerkbar: Zu S. 
Kracauer, ‘Die Angestellten,’” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, ed. Hella Tiedemann-Bartes (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1972), 219–25, at 225.
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notations of such a fixation.”17 What precisely would chronological anonym-
ity mean, and just what might the “unavoidable connotations of such a fixa-
tion” be? It certainly is reasonable to suggest, with Jay, that Kracauer, on the 
one hand, is reflecting on his own finitude and, on the other, wishes to reject 
the easy compartmentalization of his work as that of yet another “Weimar 
intellectual,” a periodization that, like all periodizations, seeks to program 
in advance all subsequent readings and thus to police the meanings that can 
be liberated from a text that ultimately will refuse to be arrested for good.18
But more is at stake here. Kracauer’s insistence on chronological ano-
nymity stages his own theoretical conviction that historical phenomena can-
not be assimilated, without the mediation that language itself demands, to 
an allegedly stable and unchangeable historical context. This does not mean 
that Kracauer opposes the historical contextualization of phenomena — on 
the contrary, his preoccupation with, for instance, the historicity of everyday 
objects and quotidian life in the cultural text of Weimar Germany (collected 
in the Denkbilder of The Mass Ornament), his interest in the psychosocial di-
mension of German film (developed in his 1947 From Caligari to Hitler), and, 
indeed, his major posthumous work on the theory of history (History: The 
Last Things before the Last), all speak to his attention to genealogical issues in 
the reading of concepts and phenomena. But these historical contexts, for 
Kracauer, are never simply given or self-identical — as con-texts, they are also 
textual events whose elusiveness and ever-changing modes of resisting the 
historian demand to be read on their own terms.19
From this perspective, Kracauer shares a textual model of the historical 
with Benjamin. Kracauer insists on destabilizing the notion that, as he puts it 
in History, “people actually ‘belong’ to their period. This must not be so. Vico 
is an outstanding example of chronological exterritoriality; and it would be 
extremely difficult to derive Burckhardt’s complex and ambivalent physiog-
nomy as a historian from the conditions under which he lived and worked.” 
17 Kracauer’s two “Briefe zur Extraterritorialität” to Adorno, dated October 25 and November 8, 1963, 
are located among his papers at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach. They are quoted in 
Mülder-Bach, “History as Autobiography: The Last Things before the Last,” trans. Gail Finney, New 
German Critique 54 (Fall 1991): 139–57, at 154–5.
18 Jay, “The Extraterritorial Life of Siegfreid Kracauer,” 276. It is doubtful, however, that Kracauer’s 
extraterritorial investment can be reduced to a “heightened expression for escape,” as Mülder-
Bach suggests. “History as Autobiography,” 155.
19 As Gertrud Koch puts it, emphasizing the figural character of all of Kracauer’s texts: “His philo-
sophical treatises, just as much as his essays and short feuilletons, are connected by a literary style 
that turns them into an infinite simultaneous texture,” even into a “rhetoric of metaphors.” Kra-
cauer zur Einführung (Hamburg: Junius, 1996), 8.
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Kracauer continues by arguing that like “great artists or thinkers, great his-
torians are biological freaks: they father the time that has fathered them.”20 
Here, he implicitly convenes with Benjamin, who explains in his early essay 
“Trauerspiel and Tragedy”: “The time of history is infinite in every direction 
and unfulfilled at every moment. This means that no single empirical event 
is thinkable that would stand in a necessary relationship to the particular 
historical situation in which it was produced.” Benjamin therefore argues 
that “the determining force of historical time cannot be fully grasped by, or 
wholly concentrated in, any empirical process.”21 For Benjamin, as for Kra-
cauer, the promise of historical thinking finally is lodged in our willingness 
to begin to read the ways in which a historical phenomenon registers the ele-
ments of its Foucauldian episteme while at the same time breaking with that 
episteme. The genuinely historical event both confirms and undoes its time, 
confirms it by undoing it and undoes it by confirming it, in a gesture that de-
mands our thinking of the event’s singularity and materiality. Viewed in this 
light, Kracauer’s insistence on chronological anonymity also can be read as a 
desire to avoid the “unavoidable connotations” of a historical “fixation” that 
seeks once and for all to foreclose the reading of history. From this perspec-
tive, then, the temporality of Kracauer’s life, while empirical, to be sure, is 
empirical only among other things and, as such, remains open to the plurality 
of what always will have been other, and more, than one.
european, among other things
Kracauer’s concern with extraterritoriality and all that it implies, both as a 
mode of being and as a concept, is shared by Derrida in his meditations on 
the relations among language, cultural particularity, and national identity. 
In his Le monolinguisme de l’autre: Ou la prothèse d’origine (1996), translated as 
20 Siegfried Kracauer, History: The Last Things before the Last, ed. Paul Kris-teller (Princeton: Wiener, 
1995), 68–9. For a discussion of this passage in the context of Kracauer’s effort to transform the self 
into an other by “disappearing” into his own texts, see Mülder-Bach, “History as Autobiography,” 
155–6. Given the subterranean affinity between Kracauer’s project and Derrida’s, it is perhaps no 
accident that Geoffrey Bennington makes a similar point regarding Derrida when he writes that 
“we have absorbed Derrida, his singularity and his signature, the event we were so keen to tell you 
about, into a textuality in which he may well have quite simply disappeared.” Geoffrey Bennington, 
“Derridabase,” in Jacques Derrida, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993), 316.
21 Walter Benjamin, “Trauerspiel and Tragedy,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, vol. 
1, 1913–1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), 55–8, here 55; in German: “Trauerspiel und Tragödie,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2., 
ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1974), 134.
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Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin, Derrida’s reflections on 
the readability of linguistic, cultural, and national identity are inseparable 
from the many specters, conceptual and personal, that traverse his far-rang-
ing oeuvre from the 1960s to the present — from such early texts as Writing 
and Difference, Of Grammatology, and Margins of Philosophy, via his “middle” 
phase and such works as The Post Card, Glas, and Psyché, to the later, more 
overtly ethico-political works of the 1990s and the new millennium, such as 
Specters of Marx, On the Name, The Other Heading, The Politics of Friendship, and 
Cosmopolitanism. His reflections in Monolingualism of the Other are prefigured 
and supplemented by earlier passages in which he, as a Jew born in El Biar, 
near Algiers, the capital of French-occupied Algeria, meditates on the ways 
in which his experience as a non-European European Jew inflects his philo-
sophical trajectory. In a passage that echoes Kracauer’s notion of “extrater-
ritoriality,” Derrida emphasizes the “exteriority” of his experience. In “There 
Is No One Narcissism (Autobiophotographies),” a conversation in which Der-
rida reflects on aspects of his Judaism, his relation to the French language 
and France, and his life growing up in the language of the “other” that also 
is that of the self (French) along the war-torn southern Mediterranean coast, 
we read:
There is certainly (and here I am describing naively a naive experience) 
a feeling of exteriority with regard to European, French, German, Greek 
culture. But when, as you know I do, I close myself up with it because I 
teach and write all the time about things that are German, Greek, French, 
even then it is true that I have the feeling I am doing it from another place 
that I do not know: an exteriority based on a place that I do not inhabit 
in a certain way, or that I do not identify. That is why I hesitate to call 
it Judaic. There is an exteriority! Some might say to me: But it’s always 
like that, even when a German philosopher writes about the German 
tradition, the fact that he is questioning, writing, interrogating inscribes 
him in a certain outside. One always has to have a certain exteriority in 
order to interrogate, question, write. But perhaps beyond this exteriority, 
which is common to all those who philosophize and write, ask questions 
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[…] beyond this exterioriry there is perhaps something else, the feeling of 
another exteriority.22
What Derrida names his exteriority travels through a number of interlaced 
discourses: that of canonical “Western” thought (one thinks of his extensive 
writings and teachings on a vast number of central European writers, from 
Plato via Hegel to Husserl and Heidegger, from Kant and Rousseau to Kafka 
and Celan, from St. Augustine to Joyce and Benjamin, among so many oth-
ers); that of a Judaism that is not quite Judaic, or rather, that brings to light 
the ways in which there never has been a single Judaism alone, in a gesture 
that opens up Judaism, along with the very question of “religiosity” itself, 
to the ways in which it differs from and with itself; and that of the critical 
writer who joins the community of exteriority of all those who think, write, 
and call into question. If, at the same time, Derrida speaks of another exterior-
ity, an exteriority that is not encompassed by a prior exteriority, we can infer 
that this “other” exteriority is another, perhaps, not only to the rhetoric of 
any interiority, but also to the very notion of exteriority as a function or even 
an invention of the binary code of the internal and the external. This more 
radical exteriority cannot be reduced to the logic of interiority and exterior-
ity — it remains exterior to that logic. The exteriority of this “other” exterior-
ity manifests itself, if it manifests itself at all, as the exteriority that has no 
interior or exterior other: it is an exteriority without and beyond exteriority. 
We thus could say that beyond exteriority lies exteriority, but it could only 
be an exteriority that already has been altered by its beyondness. It is this 
elusive movement of alteration of which the thought of exteriority will not 
cease to think.
Such a thinking of the “beyond” of exteriority is performed not for its 
own sake, but always in the name of something else, a something else that 
remains exterior and, in its radical exteriority, still to come. This is its spec-
tral desire and its haunted promise. Derrida, in Monolingualism of the Other, 
implicitly reformulates the logic of exteriority and the desires and promises 
that its thinking presupposes. He imagines a desire and a promise that would 
unfold beyond “memory and time lost,” a desire and promise inseparable 
from the questions that lie, in multiple formulations, at the intersection of 
22 Jacques Derrida, “There Is No One Narcissism (Autobiophotographies),” in Points… Interviews, 
1974–1994, ed. Elisabeth Weber, trans. Peggy Kamuf et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1995), 196–215, at 206.
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all his work — a desire and promise, in short, that struggles to come to terms 
with the ethical, political, and personal implications of engaging the vexed 
moment in which an unveiling becomes indistinguishable from a veiling, 
in which every encounter with a self becomes infinitely conditioned by the 
specters of a non-self, another that is another both to the self and to itself, to 
itself as other, and that makes the self visible, in the other, as the other that it 
always already was. As Derrida writes:
This desire and promise let all my specters loose. A desire without ho-
rizon, for that is its luck or its condition. And a promise that no longer 
expects what it waits for: there where, striving for what is given to come, I 
finally know how not to have to distinguish any longer between promise 
and terror.23
Derrida gestures toward a desire that acknowledges it is horizonless, that is, 
without a delimiting force of expectation that could condition in advance 
the telos and the unfolding of the desire and that could, by the same token, be 
employed as a measurement of the extent to which this or that expression of 
a desire has led to its fulfillment in a particular form. That this desire does not 
possess the comforts of a delimited space, telos, and horizon (not even, pre-
sumably, that of a Gadamerian interpretive Erwartungshorizont, or horizon of 
expectation) and that its fulfillment not only cannot be guaranteed, but also 
would threaten to remain unreadable even if it were to materialize — this, 
for Derrida, names both its “condition” (which is to say, philosophically, the 
condition of its possibility, but also, more negatively, the difficult condition 
it is in, as though it had a medical condition of sorts) and simultaneously its 
“luck,” the accident and fortunate coincidence that bestow upon it its desir-
able features. Likewise, Derrida’s promise is a promise that will not content 
itself with expecting simply what it expects; it has given up waiting for what 
it expects without having given up the task of expecting. This is an expecta-
tion without expectation, an expecting without expecting, in which expect-
ing can survive only as an intransitive verb, that is, as something that takes 
no object and that perpetuates itself as a promise precisely in its refusal or 
inability to take an object, even if it can hardly be thought outside of a logic 
23 Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, or, The Prosthesis of Origin, trans. Patrick Mensah (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 73.
393
homeless images
in which, if the very movement of expecting is not to be erased, one expects 
to expect something rather than nothing. This desire and this promise name 
the very possibility of a thinking of what is to come, of what as yet has no 
name but imposes itself in and as an expectation — “what is given to come.” 
What this desire and promise occasion is itself a desire and a promise: to 
have learned, even as that having-learned is always in the process of being 
forgotten, in a formulation that echoes the imbrication of territory and ter-
ror in Kracauer, “not to have to distinguish any longer between promise and 
terror.” It is worth noting that Derrida’s desire is directed not at a learning 
that does “not distinguish any longer,” but at one that does not “have to dis-
tinguish any longer.” This gesture implies an envisioned liberation from a 
power of agency that would pass judgment upon, enforce, and administer 
matters of distinguishing and questions of distinction. Thus, what Derrida 
envisions is the formulation of a more radical promise, one that, rather than 
merely departing from the model of distinguishing once and for all between 
this and that, or even from the act of distinguishing itself, actually departs 
from the very logic — tied to narrowly conceived notions of reason and self 
contained identity — of a system of thinking that seeks to police the horizon 
and the space in which the activities of distinguishing, and even the distin-
guishing among various distinctions, first can be performed.
These multiple movements away from the moment of distinguishing are 
not to be thought as a call for the abandonment of a thinking that is invested 
in making distinctions or of the notion of distinction itself. On the contrary, 
Derrida would seem to call for a new form of distinguishing, a distinguish-
ing that distinguishes among various forms and unspoken assumptions that 
underlie the very idea of making distinctions and the ethico-political con-
sequences of such acts. What his writing moves toward is the thinking of 
an ethics that cannot be considered in isolation from the ways in which it 
finds itself on unstable ground. The blind triumphalism that believes itself to 
have performed once and for all a stable, binding, and normative distinction 
between promise and terror, good and evil — and thus to be protected from 
it, ideologically and epistemologically — is the greatest danger of all. Der-
rida’s writing suggests that only when we open ourselves up to the possible 
reversal of the one into the other, to the threat of opposing and contradictory 
meanings emerging within the “same” phenomenon, to the haunting pros-
pect that a concept or phenomenon may carry its own opposite within itself, 
to the unsettling possibility of having to build one’s house on a defective cor-
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nerstone: it is only in these aporetic moments that the promise of an ethical 
impulse is first articulated, because it is only here that the making of distinc-
tions becomes an aporetic — and therefore rigorously ethical — experience.
That there can be no theory of this ethical mode that does not attend to its 
own blind spots and internal alterities also means that any ethical response 
to this mode must be equal to its abyssal aberrations, to the ways in which 
selves perpetually are made and unmade in language, even the language of 
the other. Derrida’s imagined position, in which he “finally know [s] how not 
to have to distinguish any longer between promise and terror,” exhibits il-
luminating intertextual relays to Paul de Man’s project. Attempting to articu-
late the stakes of a certain “resistance” to theory, de Man writes:
Nothing can overcome the resistance to theory since theory is itself this 
resistance. The loftier the aims and the better the methods of literary 
theory, the less possible it becomes. Yet literary theory is not in danger 
of going under; it cannot help but flourish, and the more it is resisted, 
the more it flourishes, since the language it speaks is the language of self-
resistance. What remains impossible to decide is whether this flourish-
ing is a triumph or a fall.24
Just as presumably nothing could permanently stabilize the difference be-
tween promise and terror in Derrida, so nothing could overcome the resist-
ance to theory in de Man: theory’s very condition of possibility cannot be 
occasioned without that which, within it, works both with and against it, en-
abling it and resisting it at the same time. The resistance to theory therefore 
would be a resistance only to resistance itself, a movement of resistance to 
resistance that would not work to resist resistance at all but rather to expand 
and to solidify it as resistance. If it remains impossible to decide whether 
this “flourishing” that the resistance to theory as resistance occasions is to 
be applauded or mourned, invited or resisted, then that impossibility itself 
cannot be separated from any promise it may contain. Indeed, our ability 
to decide once and for all between a triumph and a fall would at the same 
time foreclose the promise that any mode of resistance may still harbor. As 
in Derrida’s desire and promise to learn not to have to distinguish between 
24 Paul de Man, “The Resistance to Theory,” in The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986), 3–20, at 19–20.
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promise and terror in a gesture of finality, de Man’s diagnosis of the impossi-
bility of distinguishing a triumph from a fall is not the end of ethico-political 
thought, but rather, in its encounter with the aporia of decision, an opening 
up to and radicalization of such thought.
This inability to distinguish with final certainty between a triumph and a 
fall, between promise and terror, bespeaks certain homelessness, even extra-
territoriality, of thought in which the systematic and reliability of thought 
itself cannot be fully secured. Here, thought is exposed to its homelessness. 
The homelessness evoked in Kracauer’s homeless image is staged in Der-
rida’s discussion of the “defective cornerstone” in de Man’s reading of the 
Hegelian system. Problematizing Heidegger’s concept of Versammlung, or 
gathering, a notion that could be understood as promoting the dangerous il-
lusion of being at home as well as the paranoid nationalism such an illusion 
could inspire, Derrida elaborates upon the notion of a defective cornerstone 
as encrypting a home without a home, the idea of a home that conceals with-
in itself the permanent threat of its opposite. Here, “the very condition of a 
deconstruction may be at work, in the work, within the system to be decon-
structed; it may already be located there, already at work, not at the center but 
in an eccentric center, in a corner whose eccentricity assures the solid con-
centration of the system, participating in the construction of what it at the 
same time threatens to deconstruct.”25 Rather than being administered from 
the outside, as an external intervention, the deconstruction of the system or 
home occurs from within, having already occurred at the moment in which 
its occurrence enters into legibility. Such a defective cornerstone threatens 
the very foundation upon which its house rests, even while remaining a nec-
essary and integral feature of the structure without which there would be no 
house in the first place. The homelessness effected by this defective corner-
stone produces a being at odds with oneself, the experience of an otherness 
in which the dependence of the self on the voices and traces of the always 
already defective — but nevertheless constitutive — other become visible. 
Placing Kracauer and Derrida into syntactical relation through de Man, we 
25 Jacques Derrida, Memoirs: For Paul de Man, revised ed., trans. Cecil Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, Eduardo 
Cadava, and Peggy Kamuf (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 73. For a general discus-
sion of the relation between deconstruction and the very question of “foundations,” see Rodolphe 
Gasché, “Deconstructive Methodology,” in The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflec-
tion (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1986), 121–76, and Nicholas Royle, “Philosophy and 




could conceive of the defective cornerstone as a homeless image and an im-
age of homelessness. The one who dwells in the house experiences himself as 
other or, more precisely, experiences himself as other and as an otherness pre-
cisely when he can no longer reliably differentiate between the cornerstone 
as an architectural necessity for maintaining the structure of the house and 
the cornerstone as the potential precipitant of the house’s collapse.26
To emphasize the sustained and threatening logic of the defective corner-
stone in Derrida’s thinking also is to return it to the homelessness of his own 
experience, an experience that connects this logic to aspects of Kracauer’s 
extraterritoriality within, and beyond, the Germany of his time. Born in Alge-
ria in 1930 as a Francophone Algerian Jew, Derrida’s ancestors had emigrated 
from Spain in the nineteenth century.27 At the time of his move to France at 
age nineteen to continue the studies he had begun in Algeria, a form of iden-
tity imposed itself on him even more forcefully than before, one that was Eu-
ropean and non-European, Jewish and non-Jewish, French and non-French, 
all at the same time.28 Derrida writes of a hybridity that is at odds with itself:
26 It is no accident that the German writer Reinhard Lettau reminds us, in his allegorical tale 
“Schwie rigkeiten beim Häuserbauen,” a story that, like E.T.A. Hoffmann’s romantic tale “Rat 
Krespl,” revolves around the very concept of building a house, that “the difficulties in building a 
house are enormous [die Schwierigkeiten beim Häuserbauen sind gewaltig].” “Schwierigkeiten beim 
Häuser-bauen,” in Schwierigkeiten beim Hiäuserbauen (Munich: Hanser, 1962), 89–95, at 94. By the 
same token, Kafka’s tale “The Burrow” (“Der Bau”) stages a self that obsessively constructs a home 
in the face of an imaginary other who never appears. Franz Kafka, Das Ehepaar und andere Schriften 
aus dem Nachlaß, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 8, ed. Hans-Gerd Koch (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1994), 
165–208.
27 For an autobiographically inflected meditation on his aporetic Jewish heritage, a Jewish herit-
age without a Jewish heritage, see Derrida’s “Circumfession,” a rhetorico-conceptual conflation of 
“confession” and “circumcision” that in turn unfolds in the margins, or circumference, of Geoffrey 
Bennington’s attempt at presenting some major trajectories of Derrida’s life and work. In the bot-
tom margin of this “circumfession” Derrida comments on, modifies, challenges, and elaborates 
what is said “up” on the “official” page. “Circumfession,” trans. Geoffrey Bennington, in Geoffrey 
Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
28 The complex “Jewishness” of Derrida’s thought and experience is insightfully discussed in John D. 
Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington, in: Indiana 
University Press, 1997). Compare further Joseph G. Kronick, “Edmond Jabès and the Question of 
the Jewish Unhappy Consciousness: Reflections on Deconstruction,” in Derrida and the Future of 
Literature (Albany: suny Press, 1999), 69–99. From the perspective of a lifelong friend who shares 
Derrida’s experience of being a French Jew in Algeria, Hélène Cixous investigates their mutual 
belonging and non-belonging in Portrait of Jacques Derrida as a Young Jewish Saint, trans. Beverly Bie 
Brahic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Some of the multiple relays between Derridis 
philosophy and the tradition and politics of “Frenchness” are explored by the essays collected in 
The French Connections of Jacques Derrida, ed. Julian Wolfreys, John Brannigan, and Ruth Robbins 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). The ways in which deconstruction transforms 
the very concepts of tradition, legacy, and inheritance are subtly analyzed in Michael Naas, Tak-
ing on the Tradition: Jacques Derrida and the Legacies of Deconstruction (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003). Finally, it would be necessary to supplement the current discussion with Derrida’s 
recent meditations on traveling and “traveling with” as they are inflected by concepts of identity, 
topographical location, and spacing; see Catherine Malabou and Jacques Derrida, Counterpath: 
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I am European, I am no doubt a European intellectual, and I like to recall 
this, I like to recall this to myself, and why would I deny it? In the name of 
what? But I am not, nor do I feel, European in every part, that is, European 
through and through. By which I mean, by which I wish to say, or must 
say: I do not want to be and must not be European through and through, 
European in every part. Being a part, belonging as “fully a part,” should be 
incompatible with belonging “in every part.” My cultural identity, that in 
the name of which I speak, is not only European, it is not identical to it-
self, and I am not “cultural” through and through, “cultural” in every part.
If, to conclude, I declared that I feel European among other things, 
would this be, in this declaration, to be more or less European? Both, no 
doubt. Let the consequences be drawn from this. It is up to others, in any 
case, and up to me among them, to decide.29
Far from undoing the concept of cultural identity, Derrida brings to the fore 
the ways in which this identity is at odds with itself, is clustered around not 
a core of stable meaning, but a network of differences. Thus, to lay claim to 
a cultural identity such as Europeanness means to invite the ways in which 
the self is plus d’un, more than one: more than itself and no longer simply 
itself. Cultural identity thus becomes visible as a fractured concept in which 
one claims allegiance to this or that culture only among other things, that is, 
in and as a part of many possible and competing identities. If any one aspect 
of the self’s cultural identity is not self-identical, we also could say that the 
specific ways in which that aspect is non-self-identical point to its moment 
of identity: the self becomes readable as the one whose identity is fractured 
and multiple in this or that particular way. Here, even the very notion of be-
ing or having something “cultural” — such as a “cultural” identity — opens 
up to its internal differentiations, for it is only among other things that one 
is or has something “cultural.” Thus, not only does the self merely “possess” 
this or that cultural identity among others — that is, among other things and 
among other others — but even the notion of its readability as something hav-
ing culture or being cultural is only one among many others, in a way that 
does not fetishize the ideology of culture itself, even a culture of multiplicity 
Traveling with Jacques Derrida, trans. David Wills (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), esp. 
ch. 5, “Of Algeria,” 75–92.
29 Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and 
Michael E. Naas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 82–3.
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and difference. We could say that such guardedness with respect to the idea 
of the cultural corresponds to Adorno’s dictum that “the greatest fetish of 
cultural criticism is the concept of culture as such. For no authentic work 
of art and no true philosophy, according to their very meaning, has ever ex-
hausted itself in itself alone, in its being-in-itself [An-sich-Sein]. They have al-
ways stood in relation to the actual life-process of society from which they 
separated themselves [von dem sie sich schieden].”30 To do justice to the ways in 
which the cultural departs from itself and its culture, even when it stands in 
relation to the culture that produced it, means to invite the specters of other-
ness as something constitutive of — rather than merely threatening to — any 
cultural identity.
This perspective is confirmed and elaborated in “A ‘Madness’ Must Watch 
Over Thinking,” in which Derrida is asked by his interlocutor, “Do you mean 
to say that you do not want to have any identity?” To which Derrida replies: 
“On the contrary, I do, like everyone else. But by turning around this impos-
sible thing, and which no doubt I also resist, the ‘I’ constitutes the very form 
of resistance.” “Each time,” he continues, “this identity announces itself, each 
time a belonging circumscribes me, if I may put it this way, someone or some-
thing cries: Look out for the trap, you’re caught. Take off, get free, disengage 
yourself. Your engagement is elsewhere.”31 In the moment in which identity, 
as a form of desire, appears to manifest itself and to tighten its grip on the self, 
there is also a moment that resists that formation of identity. This resistance is 
not simply a refusal to play along, the narcissistic declining of a welcome invi-
tation, but rather signals a commitment to what within identity remains non-
identical, to what eludes identity even in the name of identity — with an eye 
to the incalculable and resistant future of non-self-identical subject positions.
The promise of, and desire for, the incalculable and resistant future is in-
tertwined with the trajectory of Derrida’s “own” experience, an experience of 
otherness that makes him singular and at the same time connects him to so 
many other singularities. The Algerian war, one in a series of conflicts in his 
native region, impressed upon the young Derrida, as we learn in “Unsealing 
(‘The Old Language’),” the “animal fashion” in which one can be displaced 
even within what one considers one’s “most natural habitat.” “Even for a 
30 Theodor W. Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” in Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry We-
ber (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 1981), 17–34, at 23; “Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft,” in Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 10, book 1, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1997), 11–30, at 16.
31 Derrida, “A ‘Madness’ Must Watch Over Thinking,” in Points… Interviews, 339–64, at 340.
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child,” he explains, “who was unable to analyze things, it was clear that it 
would all end in fire and blood. No one could escape that violence and that 
fear.” Derrida “knew from experience that the daggers could be bared at any 
moment, as one left school, in the football stadium, in the midst of the racist 
taunts that spared no one: the Arab, the Jew, the Spaniard, the Maltese, the 
Italian, the Corsican. […] Then, in 1940, the singular experience of the Algerian 
Jews. The persecutions, which were unlike those of Europe, were all the same 
unleashed in the absence of any German occupier.” As Derrida elaborates:
It is an experience that leaves nothing intact, an atmosphere where one 
goes on breathing forever. Jewish children are expelled from school. The 
principal’s office: You are going to go home, your parents will explain. 
Then the Allies landed, it was the period of the so-called two-headed 
government (de Gaulle–Giraud): racial laws maintained for almost 
six months, under a “free” French government. Friends, who no longer 
knew you, insult the Jewish high school with its expelled teachers and 
never whisper protest from their colleagues. I was enrolled there but I 
cut school for a year. […] From that moment, I felt — how to put it?-just 
as out-of-place in a closed Jewish community as I did on the other side 
(we called them “the Catholics”). In France, the suffering subsided. At 
nineteen, I naively thought that anti-Semitism had disappeared, at least 
there where I was living at the time. […] Paradoxical effect, perhaps, of 
this brutalization: a desire for integration in the non-Jewish community, 
a fascinated but painful and suspicious desire, nervously vigilant, an ex-
hausting aptitude to detect signs of racism, in its most discreet configura-
tions or its noisiest disavowals. Symmetrically, sometimes, an impatient 
distance with regard to the Jewish communities, whenever I have the 
impression that they are closing themselves off by posing themselves as 
such. Whence a feeling of non-belonging I have no doubt transposed.32 
Being homeless in one’s own home, being at odds with oneself, or even being 
known as the one who is at odds with himself: these images of homelessness 
and homeless images haunt a philosophical stance or attitude that centers 
on cracks and fissures, on that which, within the overarching system — be it 
a cultural identity, a set of social codes, a geo-topographical space, or a com-
32 Jacques Derrida, “Unsealing (The Old New Language’),” in Points… Interviews, 115–31, at 120–1.
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munity within a community — is extraterritorial. Here, these unpredictable 
shifts and displacements of identity, in which belonging can be felt only in 
terms of particular forms of non-belonging, are transposed onto theoretical 
thought itself. They, too, work to render such thought homeless, even at home.
european headings
It is this displaced and fractured relation to the concept of cultural identity 
that conditions, for all their differences and singularities, both Derrida’s and 
Kracauer’s thinking and experience. Just as Derrida, an Algerian-born Fran-
cophone Jew, is fully European without being fully European, French only 
among so many other things, Kracauer, as a German-born Jew, was German 
only among other things, Jewish only among other things, and in later life, 
like Derrida, perhaps partially American. Writing for a prestigious German 
paper, the Frankfurter Zeitung, Kracauer experienced increasing anti-Semi-
tism from the early 1930s on, a reduction in his salary, and, when his decided-
ly critical tone with regard to the overtly nationalistic films produced by the 
German ufa company continued, the organism of his German newspaper 
expelled him as though he were a foreign body. On February 28, 1933, the day 
after the Reichstag Fire, Kracauer and his wife escaped Germany for France 
and attempted to establish themselves in Paris. At age forty-four, Kracauer, 
whose ear has made him a distinguished stylist of German prose, was forced 
to live, uncomfortably and clumsily, without an ear, as it were, in the French 
language. His increasingly difficult Parisian exile was marked by, among oth-
er things, several internments when French authorities imprisoned Kracau-
er, Benjamin, and so many other people of German descent living in France, 
without regard to political background. After being interned and released 
several times, Kracauer escaped again, this time to the French port of Mar-
seille, where by chance he reunited with his friend Benjamin, who was also 
attempting to flee after the Nazi invasion of France.33 While Benjamin, in the 
33 For a discussion of the friendship between Benjamin and Kracauer, especially as it centers on their 
common experiences as exiles in Marseilles, see Klaus Michael, “Vor dem Café: Walter Benjamin 
and Siegfried Kracauer in Marseille,” in “Aber ein Sturm weht vom Paradise her”: Texte zu Walter 
Benjamin, ed. Michael Opitz and Erdmut Wizisla (Leipzig: Reclam, 1992), 203–21. Elements of their 
complex personal and philosophical friendship become readable in what survives of their corre-
spondence: Walter Benjamin, Briefe an Siegfried Kracauer: Mit vier Briefen von Siegfried Kracauer an 
Walter Benjamin (Marbach: Deutsches Literaturarchiv and Theodor W. Adorno-Archiv, 1987). For a 
reflection on Kracauer’s general theory of friendship, see Gerhard Richter, “Siegfried Kracauer and 
the Folds of Friendship,” German Quarterly 70, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 233–46.
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face of severe difficulties, committed suicide at the Franco-Spanish border, 
Kracauer managed to leave France, traversed Portugal, and reached New York 
City in 1941. At age fifty-two, Kracauer learned yet another language, Eng-
lish — growing yet another ear, as it were — and a few years later published 
his first major book in English, From Caligari to Hitler, with Princeton Uni-
versity Press (1947). The last two decades of Kracauer’s life were spent sus-
pended between Europe and the United States, between languages, and even 
between cultural identities. Unlike his friends and colleagues such as Adorno 
and Horkheimer, Kracauer did not receive a call to return permanently to 
Germany after the war, even though, as Adorno writes in Kracauer’s obituary, 
“he who was armored against ideologies could have done an infinite amount 
of good” in the cold-war world of Germany and Europe.34 But what would it 
have meant for Kracauer to “return” to Europe? To whom or what would such 
a “return” have responded? What would his heading toward “Europe” have 
signified in the face of his own extraterritoriality, his desire for chronological 
anonymity, and the homelessness of his image(s)?
These questions, raised by the homeless image of Kracauer’s extraterrito-
riality, especially their ethical and political dimensions, are cast into sharp re-
lief in Derrida’s elaborations of cultural identity and “Europeanness,” issues 
that form the core of such texts as The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s 
Europe and Monolingualism of the Other, in which he, the Algerian Jew who, 
rather than being almost European, is not quite not European, reflects on the 
politics of having only one language, yet that language not being one’s own.35 
Derrida wishes to conceptualize Europe in a post-essentialist way by rethink-
ing facile programs of identity politics, including those of Eurocentrism as 
well as anti-Eurocentrism, in terms of what they simultaneously presuppose 
and marginalize.36 Based on a radical respect for and openness toward the 
34 Theodor W. Adorno, “Nach Kracauers Tod,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 20, book 1, 195.
35 I borrow the paragraphs on Derrida in this section from an earlier essay of mine in which I address 
the concepts of universalism and Eurocentrism in the work of Slavoj Žižek, Benjamin, and Der-
rida: “Sites of Indeterminacy and the Specters of Eurocentrism,” Culture, Theory and Critique 43, no. 
1 (2002): 51–65. These sentences appear here in revised form.
36 The politics of the arrivant should also be put into conversation with other names for the politi-
cal in Derrida. For attempts to elaborate some of these other names, see, among others, Richard 
Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (London: Routledge, 1996), and Geoffrey Bennington, “Derri-
da and Politics,” in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader, ed. Tom Cohen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 193–212. Derrida’s engagement with Marxian politics in par-
ticular, as it emerges in his Specters of Marx, has occasioned a collection of responses, collected in 
Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx, ed. Michael Sprinker (Lon-
don: Verso, 1999). This volume also includes an illuminating response by Derrida to his political 
respondents, “Marx & Sons,” trans. G. M. Goshgarian, 213–69.
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other, to the one who has as yet no name and who has not yet been subjected 
to a set ideological standard of evaluation—and even the self that is legible 
only in the other — Derrida hopes to cast into relief the spectral contours of 
a European democracy, a still unrealized democratic potential to come. Al-
though this democratic promise draws on the Enlightenment’s universalist 
principles, values of justice, and striving toward a liberal democracy, it also 
breaks with a certain thinking that always already will have defined — and 
thereby, in effect, foreclosed — what such principles in their full complexity 
otherwise might signify. Therefore, Derrida asks, “Is there then a completely 
new ‘today’ of Europe beyond all the exhausted programs of Eurocentrism and 
anti-Eurocentrism, these exhausting yet unforgettable programs? (We cannot 
and must not forget them since they do not forget us.)”37 This thinking nei-
ther follows the established political and intellectual programs of the Euro-
centric tradition nor blindly denounces them. Rather, what is at stake is a 
thinking through of the ways in which what made these programs possible is 
refracted and folded back onto itself in movements of thought that threaten 
to fail at a difficult task. This task is simultaneously to think the liberating 
potential of that tradition and of its violent regression, which are so often 
interlaced. Attending to these concerns is vital because, after all, whether one 
acknowledges it or not, they continue to speak through us.
This double structure of the Eurocentric tradition speaks to the ways in 
which “we today no longer want either Eurocentrism or anti-Eurocentrism. 
[…] Beyond these all too well-known programs, for what ‘cultural identity’ 
must we be responsible? And responsible before whom? Before what mem-
ory? For what promise? And is ‘cultural identity’ a good word for ‘today’?”38 
The crux of Derrida’s reflections on Europe could be condensed in the com-
plex question of whether it is possible and desirable to be faithful to a cer-
tain Eurocentrism without Eurocentrism. That is to ask, what will it have 
meant to have remained loyal to a tradition of thinking by breaking with 
it and to reinscribe oneself in it precisely by breaking with it? And is this 
reinscription, predicated upon a break or radical “ex-scription,” again to be 
subsumed under the programmatic impulse of the tradition itself, or does it 
instead make visible some of the internal breaks and fissures from which this 
tradition always has benefited and under which it always has suffered, the 




tradition upon which it has drawn and whose internal tensions it continues 
to foreclose?
To make possible the thinking through of such questions within the 
concrete borders of today, Derrida’s writing revolves around the political 
question of the other who arrives at one’s intellectual, geographic, or imme-
diately personal border. We could think of this other, with both Derrida and 
Levinas, not simply as an “other,” but as the “wholly other” (tout autre).39 The 
other, by virtue of its counterdistinction from the self, is to a certain degree 
still comprehensible, calculable, and predictable — to the extent that it can 
be negatively assimilated into the available and comforting binary structure 
of self and other. The wholly other, by contrast, cannot be assimilated into 
that binarism. In its radical incomprehensibility, inscribed only in faintly 
legible traces but never encountered as a stable presence, it remains another 
to the very structure of self and other, irreducible to any prescribed system 
of classification. As a triple structure or triple event, this wholly other is an-
other to the self, another to the other, and another to the self-other. Only in 
encountering this wholly other can certain political and ethical questions 
that link our response with our responsibility be posed.
By way of attempting to do justice to this structure of the wholly other, 
and to the responsibilities that it entails, Derrida revisits such an other in 
Aporias: Dying-Awaiting (One Another at) “the Limits of Truth.” This text helps 
us to theorize the possibility of doing justice to the arriving other, the other 
that unexpectedly presents itself to us at our doorstep, at our border, the 
European border for example. Derrida casts this problem in the language of 
the arrivant, a term that signifies “arrival,” “newcomer,” or “arriving.” The ar-
rivant is the arriving other as such-another, however, that
does not cross a threshold separating two identifiable places, the proper 
and the foreign, the proper of the one and the proper of the other, as one 
would say that the citizen of a given identifiable country crosses the bor-
der of another country as a traveler, an emigre or a political exile, a refu-
gee or someone who has been deported, an immigrant worker, a student 
or a researcher, a diplomat or a tourist. Those are all, of course, arrivants, 
39 This notion of the tout autre, inspired in part by Levinas, traverses much of Derrida’s work of the 
last two decades. For a recent discussion of the tout autre, see further J. Hillis Miller, Black Holes 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 157–69.
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but in a country that is already defined and in which the inhabitants 
know or think they are at home.40 
Beyond his or its concrete manifestations, the figure of the arrivant names 
the political and ethical predicaments that emerge in the context of geopo-
litical spaces, Europe for example. The arrivant stands in as a figure for the 
series of displacements that its movement both triggers and describes. As 
Derrida explains,
[t]he absolute arrivant is not even a guest. He surprises the host […] enough 
to call into question, to the point of annihilating or rendering indetermi-
nate, all the distinctive signs of a prior identity, beginning with the very 
border that delineated a legitimate home and assured lineage, names and 
language, nations, families and genealogies. The absolute arrivant does 
not yet have a name or an identity. It is not an invader or an occupier, nor 
is it a colonizer, even if it can also become one. This is why the arrivant 
[is] not someone or something that arrives, a subject, a person, an indi-
vidual, or a living thing, even less one of the migrants. […] It is not even 
a foreigner identified as a member of a foreign, determined community.
Being someone or something before or in excess of stable identity, this ar-
rivant also transforms the site or space that it enters. Something happens dur-
ing its scene of arrival to the site in which this arriving occurs. As Derrida’s 
passage continues:
Since the arrivant does not have any identity yet, its place of arrival is also 
de-identified: one does not yet know or one no longer knows which is 
the country, the place, the nation, the family, the language, and the home 
in general that welcomes the absolute arrivant. This absolute arrivant as 
such is, however, not an intruder, an invader, or a colonizer, because in-
vasion proposes some self-identity for the aggressor and for the victim. 
Nor is the arrivant a legislator or the discoverer of a promised land. As 
disarmed as a newly born child, it no more commands than is command-
ed by the memory of some originary event where the archaic is bound 
40 Jacques Derrida, Aporias: Dying — Awaiting (One Another at) the “Limits of Truth,” trans. Thomas 
Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 34.
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with the final extremity, with the finality par excellence of the telos or the 
eskhaton. It even exceeds the order of any determinable promise. Now the 
border that is ultimately most difficult to delineate, because it is always 
already crossed, lies in the fact that the absolute arrivant makes possible 
everything to which […] it cannot be reduced, starting with the humanity 
of man, which some would be inclined to recognize in all that erases, in 
the arrivant, the characteristic of (cultural, social, or national) belonging 
and even metaphysical determination (ego, person, subject, conscious-
ness, etc.). […] This border will always keep one from discriminating 
among the figures of the arrivant, the dead, or the revenant (the ghost, he, 
she, or that which returns).41
From the perspective of thinking of the geopolitical and theoretical notion of 
Europe and of a future politics that would do justice to the homeless images 
that traverse it, we learn in this account how the movement of the arrivant 
allows for the identification — as a stable subject or identity — of neither 
the arrivant nor the site of arrival, Europe for example. The relation between 
what arrives and what is arrived at always is as much in flux as are the inter-
nal shifts and movements at play within each concept or site. This means 
that one’s relation to who or what arrives always is as much a function of 
one’s hospitality to what is radically other as it is a function of one’s critical 
reflection on one’s own situatedness, prejudices, and evaluation of the claims 
to authority from which the arrival could be judged. Such critical reflection, 
prompted by the arrival of the arrivant, also extends to the power relations 
that are inscribed in any scene of hospitality — that of Europe, for example, 
in which, in order to share or to invite, one must remain the master of one’s 
own space and its boundaries, installing oneself in a superior position in 
relation to the one who, or that which, arrives in the moment of having to 
respond to the event of his or her arrival. The full thinking of the scene of 
the arrivant is a thinking of a multitude of different relations between cer-
tain geopolitical spaces and the hope that might still be found in them. The 
arrivant helps us name what propels us to be open to the other, to invite it, 
to be hospitable to it, while respecting its potential withdrawal from mean-
ing, that is, its irreducible otherness. Neither the languages of discrimination 




adequate any longer to negotiate the transformations unfolding with and as 
the temporary borders between the highly differentiated site of arrival and 
another who is always yet to come — even in the guise of a democracy. That 
the fiction of self-identity and unmediated transparency grows ever more dif-
ficult to maintain in the face of the arrivant ’s transgressiveness also means 
that questions of Eurocentrism and a new or reinvigorated sense of the po-
litical are opened up to their own self-differentiation, to the complexity that 
cannot be thought in isolation from their political urgency.
This opening up — which could be understood as a liberation or a making 
visible of what always already was the case, with a Freudian Nachträglichkeit 
that unfolds on the far side of this or that external intervention or applica-
tion — this opening up also activates what already is excessive or supple-
mental in any French, German, or “European” cultural identity. In this sense, 
it could be claimed that the concept of cultural identity activates its political 
promise when it is transformed from within, rather than abandoned. This 
radical transformation from within remains necessary, not because of any 
desire to implement its individual dogmas, rather because it shares an irre-
ducible elective affinity with concepts that remain undeconstructable, such 
as democracy and even justice itself. Thus, to remain faithful to undecon-
structable concepts is also to break with them; one remains close to them 
by not following them. Just as nothing could be more enlightened than to 
criticize the Enlightenment — that is, remaining faithful to its belief in cri-
tique by radicalizing that critique and turning it against the very structure of 
thought and relations from which it emerged — so too no gesture of cultural 
identity could be more faithful than the gesture that perpetually undoes the 
notion of a cultural identity in a move that, rather than abandoning it, cease-
lessly ushers its internal differences to the fore.
homeless photographs
For Derrida, as for Kracauer, questions that speak to the aporetic nature of 
cultural identity cannot be thought of in isolation from a consideration of 
the technologies of visual representation. Derrida explores these concerns in 
a meditation on televisual images as well as in extensive analyses of painted 
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images and photographs,42 while Kracauer addresses them in his theoretical 
works on film, in his Weimar essay “On Photography,” in Theory of Film, and 
in History. Photography, for Kracauer, in important respects belongs to the 
domain of those homeless images that allow us to consider “modes of being 
which still lack a name.”43
To consider the homeless image that manifests itself in Kracauer’s medi-
tations on photography is to attempt to return to that to which one can never 
properly return because one never can have left it fully behind: extraterri-
toriality. Kracauer himself theorizes the imbrication of extraterritoriality 
and the homeless image of photography when, in History, he locates them 
both within the “image-space” that Benjamin calls a Bildraum. The inability 
of photography to coincide with itself, its particular way of never being able 
fully to capture what it attempts to present, is elaborated in his Weimar essay 
on photography. As a spectral medium, then, photography is the name for a 
particular disjunction that simultaneously inscribes itself in and removes it-
self from history. “Ghosts,” Kracauer writes, “are simultaneously comical and 
terrifying. […] Now the image wanders ghost-like through the present, like 
the lady of a haunted castle. Spooky apparitions occur only in places where a 
horrible deed has been committed. The photograph becomes a ghost.”44 This 
haunted image of the photograph from Kracauer’s Weimar essay reappears 
several decades later, in his discussion of the photograph in Theory of Film 
(1960), as well as in his final work, History. In both instances, it is the ap-
pearance of his grandmother’s image that causes Marcel, the protagonist of 
Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, to encounter the figure of finitude itself. There, 
42 Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, Echographies de la télévision: Entretiens filmés (Paris: Editions 
Galilée, 1996). Compare further, among other texts on the problem of the image, Derrida’s reflec-
tions on Barthes’s study of photography in “The Deaths of Roland Barthes,” trans. Pascale-Anne 
Brault and Michael Naas, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Merleau-Ponty, ed. Hugh Silverman 
(New York: Routledge, 1989), 259–96; his conversation on the photographic image in “Die Photo-
graphic als Kopie, Archiv und Signatur: Im Gespräch mit Hubertus v. Amelunxen und Michael 
Wetzel,” Theorie der Fotografie, vol. 4, 1980–1995, ed. Hubertus v. Amelunxen (Munich: Schirmer/
Mosel, 2000), 280–96; his extended reading of the images by Belgian photographer Marie-Françoise 
Plissart in Right of Inspection, trans. David Willis (New York: Monacelli, 1998); his meditations on 
painted self-portraits in Memoirs of the Blind, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993); and his investigations of drawings and paintings, including 
Valerio Adami’s drawing “Ritratto di Walter Benjamin,” in The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoffrey Ben-
nington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). Finally, a general meditation 
on the relation, in Derrida’s texts, between the image of the artwork and questions of mourning can 
be found in David Farrell Krell, The Purest of Bastards: Works of Mourning, Art, and Affirmation in the 
Thought of Jacques Derrida (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000).
43 Kracauer, History, 4.
44 Siegfried Kracauer, “On Photography,” in The Mass Ornament, 47–63, at 56; “Die Photographie,” in 
Schriften, vol. 5 book 2, 83–98, at 91.
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the image of the grandmother is the homeless image of the one who, in a tem-
poral disjunction, is both dead and going to die. In Theory of Film, Kracauer 
cites the following passage from Proust:
I was in the room, or rather I was not yet in the room since she was not 
aware of my presence of myself […] there was present only the witness, 
the observer with a hat and traveling coat, the stranger who does not be-
long to the house, the photographer who has called to take a photograph 
of places which one will never see again. The process that mechanically 
occurred in my eyes when I caught sight of my grandmother was indeed 
a photograph. We never see the people who are dear to us save in the ani-
mated system, the perpetual motion of our incessant love for them. […] 
How, since into the forehead, the cheeks of my grandmother I had been 
accustomed to read all the most delicate, the most permanent qualities 
of her mind; how, since every casual glance is an act of necromancy, each 
face that we love is a mirror of the past, how could I have failed to over-
look what in her had become dulled and changed. […] I, for whom my 
grandmother was still myself, I who had never seen her save in my own 
soul […] saw, sitting on the sofa, beneath the lamp, red-faced, heavy and 
common, sick, lost in thought, following the lines of a book with eyes 
that seemed hardly sane, a dejected old woman whom I did not know.45
Proust’s Marcel encounters his grandmother as though she were a photo-
graph — as though she had always already been a photograph. This photo-
graph, lodged in the character’s mind, reveals the writing of death, the thana-
tography that is inseparable from the medium of photography. (Like Proust’s 
recollections of the photograph of his grandmother, mobilized in Kracauer’s 
theory of photography, Roland Barthes’s reflections on photography, writ-
ten about a century after Proust, pivot on a mourning of his mother, and her 
absent presence through a photograph that, while never shown in the text, 
nevertheless lies at its core.)46 This recognition of the relation between the 
45 Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, vol. 1, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff (New York: Boni, 
1930), 814–15. Kracauer quotes this passage in Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality, 
introd. Miriam Hansen (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 1997), 14.
46 It will be necessary to read Kracauer’s theory of photography more rigorously in the compara-
tive contexts of the history of such theories, and specifically in relation to Roland Barthes, whose 
theory of photography exhibits many similarities with Kracauer’s. Writing several decades later, 
he does not seem to have been aware of Kracauer’s reflections. For a useful beginning of an in-
vestigation of the relation between Kracauer and Barthes, see Heide Schlupmann, “Stellung zur 
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grandmother and death, the relation in which Proust understands that “my 
grandmother was still myself,” also exposes him to himself as the one who is 
more than one, the one who exists, as a palimpsest, in the multiple and faint-
ly visible traces of the many texts that intersect within him in order to make 
him who he is, even as he never can simply be “himself.” Kracauer takes up 
this trope again in History: “No sooner does Marcel enter his grandmother’s 
room,” he writes there, “than his mind becomes a palimpsest, with the stran-
ger’s observations being superimposed upon the lover’s temporarily effaced 
inscription.” Continuing his spectral meditation in relation to the Proustian 
photograph, Kracauer writes, as if of himself, in a gesture that recalls the 
term “auto-biophotography” from the title of one of Derrida’s conversations:
Sometimes, life itself produces such palimpsests. I am thinking of the 
exile who as an adult person has been forced to leave his country or has 
left it of his own free will. As he settles elsewhere, all those loyalties, ex-
pectations, and aspirations that comprise so large a part of his being are 
automatically cut off from their roots. His life history is disrupted, his 
“natural” self relegated to the background of his mind. To be sure, his in-
evitable efforts to meet the challenges of an alien environment will affect 
his outlook, his whole mental make-up. But since the self he was con-
tinues to smolder beneath the person he is about to become, his identity 
is bound to be in a state of flux; and the odds are that he will never fully 
belong to the community to which he now in a way belongs. (Nor will 
its members readily think of him as one of theirs.) In fact, he has ceased 
to “belong.” Where then does he live? Near the vacuum of extra-territori-
ality, the very no-man’s land which Marcel entered when he first caught 
sight of his grandmother. The exile’s true mode of existence is that of a 
stranger. So he may look at his previous existence with the eyes of one 
“who does not belong to the house.” And he is just as free to step outside 
the culture which was his own, he is sufficiently uncommitted to get in-
side the minds of the foreign people in whose midst he is living. There 
are great historians who owe much of their greatness to the fact that they 
were expatriates. […]
Massenkultur: Barthes’ ‘Bemerkung zur Fotografie’ mit Kracauer gelesen,” in Ein Detektiv des Kinos: 
Studien zu Siegfried Kracauers Filmtheorie (Basel: Stromfeld, 1998), 55–65.
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Fig. 1. Siegfried Kracauer. Photographic print of the surviving shards from the original glass plate 
(1930). Courtesy of the Kracauer Estate, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach am Neckar, Germany.
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It is only in this state of self-effacement, or homelessness, that the 
historian can commune with the material of his concern. […] The most 
promising way of acquiring such knowledge is presumably for him to 
heed Schopenhauer’s advice to the art student. Anybody looking at a pic-
ture, Schopenhauer claims, should behave as if he were in the presence of 
a prince and respectfully wait for what the picture may or may not wish 
to tell him; for were he to talk first he would only be talking to himself. 
Waiting in this sense amounts to a sort of active passivity on the histo-
rian’s part.47
Among so many other things, this passage suggests how the spectrality of the 
photograph intersects with the homeless image that Kracauer evokes in his 
Denkbild “Farewell to the Linden Arcade.” Here, the image of homelessness, 
as a homeless image, constitutes an instantiation of the state of extraterri-
toriality, that is, the multiple displacements of the self that are inextricably 
intertwined with the ways in which that self struggles to make sense of itself 
in relation to what it is not: the other culture, the other cultural identities, 
the other modes of belonging, along with all the other others who already 
are at work in the palimpsest we call the self. This “state of self-effacement, 
or homelessness” not only echoes the trope of the homeless image within 
the space of the photograph, it also shows that the extraterritorial inscrip-
tions of such a homeless image can serve a critical function. Evoking Scho-
penhauer, Kracauer argues that rather than merely finding again and again 
in every image the confirmation of our previously held assumptions, we may 
learn to read by allowing the enigmatic image to speak to us, by allowing it 
to reveal and conceal its multiple secrets in its singular way. It is here, in each 
encounter with a never-before-seen image, that we must allow the visual text 
to reinvent us, assumptions, methods, and all. In this perpetual making and 
undoing, the photograph itself can be read as a homeless image of extrater-
ritoriality.
In order to visualize some of the implications of the relations among 
extraterritoriality, photography, and homelessness, we may turn to a photo-
graphic image of Kracauer himself — a photograph that enacts his fractured 
self as a homeless image (fig. 1).48 Placing this photograph into syntactical 
47 Kracauer, History, 83–4.
48 For a discussion of Kracauer’s image in the context of Benjamin’s theory of photography, see Hu-
bertus von Amelunxen, “Ein Eindruck der Vergängnis. Vorläufige Bemerkungen zu Walter Benja-
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relation with Kracauer’s historical and philosophical concerns, we witness 
Benjamin’s observation that “history [Geschichte] breaks down into images, 
not into stories [Geschichten],” while heeding Kracauer’s methodological ad-
monition that “the vast knowledge we possess should challenge us not to 
indulge in inadequate syntheses but to concentrate on close-ups and from 
them casually to range over the whole, assessing it in the form of aperçus. 
The whole may yield to such light-weight skirmishes more easily than to 
heavy frontal attack.”49 We could say that Kracauer’s emphasis on the close-
up touches both the logic of his Denkbilder and his philosophical engagement 
with the photographic image. His emphasis on the close-up also touches this 
photograph, which he made available, in partial detail, for publication in a 
reference book, the Reichshandbuch der Deutschen Gesellschaft.50
This extraordinary black-and-white photograph from about 1930 — the 
year of Kracauer’s Denkbild “Farewell to the Linden Arcade” and the year in 
which the increasing anti-Semitism of his employer, the Frankfurter Zeitung, 
forced him into an ever more decisive extraterritoriality at home — shows 
him sitting on his desk in half-profile, his right leg crossed over his left, wear-
ing a shabby pinstriped suit, a light-colored shirt, and a bow tie, his melan-
choly gaze directed to the right. The top button of his jacket is illuminated, 
presumably by the photographer’s flash, while the lower button appears 
dark, a play with light that demarcates a peculiar asymmetry along Kracau-
er’s midline. Although we faintly perceive the black fountain pen that his left 
hand holds, his right hand is almost completely obscured by the shadow that 
hovers over the dark surface of his desk, a surface that is punctured only by 
min,” Fotogeschichte 9 (1989): 3–10.
49 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, 
ma: Harvard University Press, 1999), 476; Das Passagen-Werk, vol. 5 of Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf 
Tiedemann (Fankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1982), 596; Kracauer, History, 149.
50 By focusing on the “surface-level” quality of the photograph, we enact with respect to Kracauer’s 
texts the stance that he wishes to apply to the reading of entire historical paradigms. As he writes 
in “The Mass Ornament,” three years before this picture was taken: “The position that an epoch 
occupies in the historical process can be determined more strikingly from an analysis of its incon-
spicuous surface-level expressions than from that epoch’s judgments about itself […] The surface-
level expressions […] by virtue of their unconscious nature, provide unmediated access to the fun-
damental substance of the state of things. Conversely, knowledge of this state of things depends on 
the interpretation of these surface-level expressions. The fundamental substance of an epoch and 
its unheeded impulses illuminate each other reciprocally.” Kracauer, “The Mass Ornament,” in The 
Mass Ornament, 75–86, at 75; in German: “Das Ornament der Masse,” in Schriften 5.2, 57–67, at 57. 
For discussions of Kracauer’s engagement with the surface structure of modern culture, see Miriam 
Hansen, “Mass Culture as Hieroglyphic Writing: Adorno, Derrida, Kracauer,” New German Critique 
56 (Spring–Summer 1992): 43–73, as well as Inka Mülder-Bach, “Der Umschlag der Negativität: Zur 
Verschränkung von Phänomenologie, Geschichtsphilosophie und Filmästhetik in Siegfried Kra-
cauers Metaphorik der Oberfläche,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift 61, no. 2 (1987): 359–73.
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the whiteness of what appears to be a slightly crumpled piece of paper in Kra-
cauer’s right hand. The windows above his head have a hauntingly distant 
quality about them: their white frames, which parallel the white paper on his 
desk, enclose dark panes that neither permit a glimpse of what lies behind 
them nor reflect what stands before them. These are windows that appear to 
belong to a no-man’s-land, the paradoxical visual instantiations, perhaps, of 
the interior of Leibniz’s windowless monad. The dark, framelike space that 
borders the photograph at the bottom and on the right contributes to this 
hauntingly claustrophobic effect.
The spectrality of Kracauer’s photograph is augmented by the material 
fact that it was printed from the cracked glass plate that survived as part of 
his Nachlaß. Like the empirical Kracauer, the surviving image, a homeless im-
age that, following a homeless life, survives the homeless one, is fractured 
and multiple, shattered and dispersed. Missing entire pieces, the fissured 
glass plate corresponds to the ruins and debris left behind by the sweep of 
history. The fault lines in the image effectively present Kracauer as a mari-
onette, tied to, and manipulable by, the “strings” to which he seems to be at-
tached. Significantly, one of these “strings” cuts through his left eye, disfigur-
ing the face of the one whom the photograph commemorates. Here, we recall 
that for Kracauer it “is only in this state of self-effacement, or homelessness, 
that the historian can commune with the material of his concern.” Indeed, 
the photograph was disfigured by history. It works to enact this state of self-
effacement and homelessness, staging its history and the history of the one 
whom it presents as a history of ruins and shards. As a homeless image, the 
photograph unwittingly stages something of Kracauer’s extraterritoriality, 
reminiscent of Benjamin’s allegory of his friend as a philosophical ragpicker 
who lives among the shards — the shards of the homeless image and the 
shards of history.
The transcendental homelessness of this homeless image, finally, also is 
enacted by the triangular void immediately above Kracauer’s head. As if to 
literalize the German word for homelessness, Obdachlosigkeit, or rooflessness, 
a roof-shaped segment is missing at the top of the photograph. Is it an ab-
sent, triangular roof out of which one almost can imagine smoke rising from 
a chimney on the left-hand side? In the ruined image, an image shattered 
by the effects of time, war, displacement, and extraterritoriality, Kracauer 
emerges as the one who possesses no roof, only the thought of a roof, a roof 
that remains absent — absent either as a radical absence or as a distant pres-
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ence that cannot be reached or read but that remains inscribed in his image. 
Its absence makes itself felt by leaving a trace — the contours of a void and 
the outlines of a ruined whole.
In 1927, a few years before this photograph was taken, Kracauer insisted 
that photography “represents what is utterly past, and yet this debris was 
once the present.” As if commenting on the double future of his own image, 
Kracauer spoke to the fact that this photograph had yet to be taken and that 
it would survive after his death, explaining that the photograph’s “ghost-like 
reality is unredeemed” and “consists of elements in space whose configuration 
is so far from necessary that one could just as well imagine a different organi-
zation of these elements. Those things once clung to us like our skin, and this 
is how our property still clings to us today. Nothing of these contains us, and 
the photograph gathers fragments around a nothing.”51 What the ruins of 
this image of photography both contain and disperse is the fragmented na-
ture of what they record in and as history. Like the glass shards of Kracauer’s 
melancholic image and the montage of broken fragments that once seemed 
to relate incontrovertibly to his skin, the photograph records the aleatory 
and contingent quality of any attempt to arrest the presentation of an object 
for good and to secure that presentation in a mimetic model of historical and 
subjective transparency.
homeless language: only one, not ours
For Derrida, the roofless homelessness that Kracauer’s sentences and im-
ages mobilize, cannot be thought in isolation from an aporetic experience 
of language that opens up “the relationship among birth, language, culture, 
nationality, and citizenship.”52 While Kracauer engages this Obdachlosigkeit 
in the figures of multiple extraterritorialities, Derrida’s nonautobiographical 
autobiographical reflections in Monolingualism of the Other, in concert with 
his more general concerns regarding the very possibility of autobiographical 
writing throughout his work,53 consider this aporetic experience as it emerg-
es in the tension that results from having only one language (French) with-
out fully possessing it, from living in one’s own language without being able 
51 Kracauer, “On Photography,” 56 [91–2].
52 Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 13.
53 The most extensive treatment of this general aspect of Derrida’s work is Robert Smith, Derrida and 
Autobiography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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to claim it as one’s own, from speaking, reading, and writing a language that 
is neither native nor foreign, but both at once. Derrida offers the figure of a 
self in language, a self that seeks the homey comforts of speaking a language 
in a “severely idiomatic way, without, however, ever being at home in it.”54 
The self here dwells, if it dwells at all, in a “language that fails, lastingly [à 
demeure], to reach home.”55 Taking as a point of departure his own experience 
of living in the French language as a non-French other, a Francophone Alge-
rian Jew, who, along with other members of his community was stripped of 
French citizenship only to have it reinstated later, and who was subjected 
to colonialist policies — policies that marginalized “indigenous” languages 
such as Arabic and Berber in Algerian schools — Derrida reflects on fantasies 
of linguistic purity (including his own) and the ways in which one’s mul-
tiply fractured relation to one’s language modulates both the experience of 
cultural identity and its loss not simply as a lack, but also as something con-
stitutive. In the belonging and non-belonging that language occasions, in its 
affiliations and exclusions, language raises questions about its own capacity 
to be possessed, in the double meaning of the word: 
But who exactly possesses it? And whom does it possess? Is language in 
possession, ever a possessing or possessed possession? Possessed or pos-
sessing in exclusive possession, like a piece of personal property? What 
of this being-at-home [être-chez-soi] in language toward which we never 
cease returning?56
The openness of the question of linguistic possession also names a perpetual 
deferral of possessing a roof, the Dach of the Obdach.
The Obdachlosigkeit around which language turns cannot be thought 
without considering the distinction between identity and identification. As 
Derrida reminds us, 
an identity is never given, received, or attained; only the interminable 
and indefinitely phantasmatic process of identification endures. What-
ever the story of a return to oneself or to one’s home [chez-soi], into the 
“hut” [“case”] of one’s home (chez is the casa), no matter what an odyssey 





or bildungsroman it might be, in whatever manner one invents the story 
of a construction of the self, the autos, or the ipse, it is always imagined that 
the one who writes should know how to say I.57 
To the extent that identity has no a priori status but, rather, is invented and 
reinvented with every process of identification, the identity that a self pos-
sesses is subject to perpetual revision in the variegated events of identifica-
tion. Indeed, the self that speaks of its cultural or linguistic identity evokes 
a process of identification with a particular modulation that temporarily 
makes it what it is. But because this self can enter legibility only in a series 
of identifications with something or someone, we may conceptualize its be-
ing, not in terms of its identity nor even in terms of its identifications, but 
rather in terms of its identifications-with. This “with-ness” of its identifications 
exposes the self to its dependence on the other, the one with whom or that 
with which it first can enter the process of identifying-with. This identifying-
with — not unlike Heidegger’s Mit-Sein, or being-with, but also not identical 
to it because of its refusal of all communal. Versammlung or a gathering-like 
convocation — tells the self that it emerges, if it emerges at all, only in and 
through another, and that it will always have been affected by that encounter 
in as yet unforeseeable ways. As such, self and other become affirmative wit-
nesses of each other, even of each other’s aleatory nature, through the logic 
that links with-ness and the wit-ness.
This other can be language itself, even if that language it not fully and 
simply itself. What Derrida calls the “monolingualism of the other” is a form 
of experience and cognition that is not limited to the other inasmuch as that 
other is also at odds with itself and even constitutively traverses the self. The 
monolingualism of the other, then, which also is a monolingualism of the 
self, of the self in its relation to the other, marks the fact “that in any case we 
speak only one language — and that we do not own it. We only ever speak 
one language — and, since it returns to the other, it exists asymmetrically, 
always for the other, from the other, kept by the other. Coming from the other, 
remaining with the other, and returning to the other.” In Derrida’s own situ-
ation, “once access was barred to the language and writing of another — in 




it as well, the inscription of this limit could not leave traces.”58 The traces 
of this monolingualism inscribe the movement by which one speaks a lan-
guage, such as French, of which one also is strangely deprived, a language 
that one calls one’s own without owning it. Monolingualism “conditions the 
address to the other, it gives its word, or rather it gives the possibility of giv-
ing its word, it gives the given word in the ordeal of a threatening and threat-
ened promise: monolingualism and tautology, the absolute impossibility of 
metalanguage.”59 With the absolute impossibility of metalanguage — the 
meta of with, the among, and the after — with this impossibility of the meta, 
the monolingual self, who may in fact speak more than one empirical lan-
guage, is deprived of an originary identification with (a) language, an origi-
nary identification that could be called his own origin in language. To the 
monolingual self, there are thus only prostheses of origins, never origins “as 
such” or that are intact. The monolingual possesses an originary self without 
origin. As Derrida suggests:
The monolingual of whom I speak speaks a language of which he is de-
prived. The French language is not his. Because he is therefore deprived of 
all language, and no longer has any other recourse — neither Arabic, nor 
Berber, nor Hebrew, not any languages his ancestors would have spoken-
because this monolingual is in a way aphasic (perhaps he writes because 
he is an aphasic), he is thrown into absolute translation, a translation 
without pole of reference, without an originary language, and without 
a source language [langue de départ]. For him, there are only target lan-
guages [langues d’arrive], if you will, the remarkable experience being, 
however, that these languages just cannot manage to reach themselves 
because they no longer know where they are coming from, what they are 
speaking from and what the sense of their journey is. Languages with-
out an itinerary and, above all, without any superhighway of goodness 
knows what information.60
Derrida continues, taking up the language of arrivals, arriving, and the arriv-






As if there were only arrivals [arrivées], and therefore only events without 
arrival. From these sole “arrivals,” and from these arrivals alone, desire 
springs forth; since desire is borne by the arrival itself, it springs forth 
even before the ipseity of an I–me that would bear it in advance; it springs 
forth, and even sets itself up as a desire to reconstruct, to restore, but it 
is really a desire to invent a first language that would be, rather, a prior-to-
the-first language destined to translate that memory. But to translate the 
memory of what, precisely, did not take place, of what, having been (the) 
forbidden, ought, nevertheless, to have left a trace, a specter, the phan-
tomic body, the phantom-member — palpable, painful, but hardly leg-
ible — of traces, marks, and scars. As if it were a matter of producing the 
truth of what never took place by avowing it.61
Hence, the experience and the event of the monolingual, understood either 
as an other or as a self, or as the traversal of each of these in the other, situ-
ates both the sense of homelessness that accompanies the insight into one’s 
prosthetic — rather than originary — relation to language, native or foreign, 
acquired by birth or by choice, and, at the same time, the desire for an imag-
ined dwelling, not only in an “imagined community” of others, as Benedict 
Anderson suggests, or in a gesture of “dissemiNation” that would mark the 
“liminality” of cultural identity, as Homi Bhabha imagines it, but also for an 
imagined dwelling in language prior to language, a first language before the 
first.62 To read the self as an effect of the prosthetic status of origin — such as 
the original language, one’s native home, one’s cultural community, among 
many other things — is to identify the ways in which it engages in multiple 
acts of identification. These acts articulate an ever-renewed, ever-transformed 
self, a self that “itself” is the event of an arriving without arrival, the prom-
ise of an arrival or absolute translation to come. Here, the homeless self is 
itself a prosthesis. Just like the photograph of Kracauer’s “spooky” lady of the 
haunted castle, and just like the haunted extraterritoriality encoded in the 
homeless image of Kracauer’s own photograph, Derrida’s experience of the 
monolingual, and all that it implies, hardly can be understood without the 
61 Ibid., 61.
62 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983), and Homi K. Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins 
of the Modern Nation,” in The Location of Culture (London: Roudedge, 1994), 139–70. For a book-
length treatment of the question of “origin,” compare further John Pizer, Toward a Theory of Radical 
Origin: Essays on Modern German Thought (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995).
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“spectrality of the phenomenon,” which is to say, “the phantom, the double, 
or the ghost.”63 Phantoms and ghosts — it is these homeless images that both 
Kracauer and Derrida leave behind for us to learn to read.
cultures: transitions
The learning to read that Kracauer and Derrida ask of us is a sort of learning 
that transforms the very notion of cultural identity and the very thinkabil-
ity of belonging, through language, birth, or blood, to this or that cultural 
realm. The call for this kind of learning to read connects these two thinkers 
to a whole constellation of other modern philosophers and writers who have 
meditated on these issues. To recall only those proper names that Derrida 
himself mentions in Monolingualism of the Other: Adorno, Hannah Arendt, 
Paul Celan, Franz Kafka, the Moroccan Abdel-kebir Khatibi, Emmanuel 
Levinas, Franz Rosenzweig, and Gershom Scholem. While Derrida refers to 
Adorno’s 1965 essay “On the Question: ‘What Is German?” only in passing, 
Adorno’s argument is well worth recalling here, not only because of his sig-
nificance as a conceptual link between Kracauer and Derrida, but also be-
cause his “non-identical” thinking convenes with that of Kracauer and Der-
rida in a way that will prove fruitful in our engagement with the issues of 
language and cultural identity that dwell in the homeless images we have 
considered so far.
In “On the Question: ‘What Is German?’” Adorno stages a careful trans-
gression of the essentializing quest for “Germanness” and the ideology of a 
stable German identity. Having transgressed the ideology of a German es-
sence, Adorno writes that it “is in the loyalty to the idea that the current state 
of affairs ought not to be the last — rather than in hopeless attempts to estab-
lish once and for all what is German — that the meaning this concept still 
may claim can be suspected to reside: in the transition to humanity [In der 
Treue zur Idee, daß, wie es ist, nicht das letzte sein solle — nicht in hoffnungslosen 
Versuchen, festzustellen, was das Deutsche nun einmal sei, ist der Sinn zu vermuten, 
den dieser Begriff noch behaupten mag: im Übergang zur Menschheit].”64 Adorno 
wishes to remain faithful to the idea (“Treue zur Idee”) that the last word has 
63 Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 25.
64 Theodor W. Adorno, “On the Question: ‘What Is German?,’” trans. Thomas Y. Levin, New German 




not yet been spoken, that the definitive reading has not been given, that there 
will be an other that is yet to arrive — an other that is an other primarily to 
any ontologizing notion of what is German. By extension, the infinitely me-
diated complexity of the concept of Germanness should not be exhausted 
and closed off because of a delusional chase after its elusive essence in a sin-
gle dominant interpretation. Such a violent positing would foreclose any 
faithfulness to what is to come. Adorno’s transgression here consists in a dou-
ble movement that opens up the concept of Germanness to difference and 
otherness without, however, abandoning the thinkability of that concept 
altogether. That is to say, he violates the concept even while remaining faith-
ful to it. The double movement of this transgression enables him to suggest 
that what is German should not be posited in terms of an essential presence 
or a positive set of verifiable features, but rather should be sought in its fluid 
movement, its transition toward humanity (im Übergang zur Menschheit). 
Adorno does not advocate a transparent, communicative model of substitu-
tion, an exchange of one predetermined program for another; such a model 
would claim, perhaps too easily, to elevate a culture from a blemished Nazi 
past, for instance, to a new, higher, and Nazi-proof humanity. For Adorno, it 
simply would be delusional to assume that one could arrive once and for all 
at a stable concept or state of “humanity,” a program that one easily could 
follow. Here, humanity, like its vital dimensions of ethics, justice, and democ-
racy, always is still to come. In order to remain effective as the promise of a 
future — indeed, as the promise that there will be a future at all — these con-
cepts never can be assumed simply to be present. Instead, Adorno locates the 
prospect of a future, a future Germanness, in the moment of transition itself. 
This new concept — if it is one — would suggest that what properly is Ger-
man is its movement toward something else, rather than the programmed 
arrival at a secure new destination. It is most properly itself when it is on its 
way toward something else. This perpetual transition (Übergang) names the 
political stakes of Adorno’s double reading — it is an Übergang that is still to 
be thought.
Adorno’s Übergang helps us to imagine a subject of culture, even a cultur-
al “self,” whose identity no longer is measured by its allegiance to this or that 
nation-state, originary realm, or cultural space that could endow it with a de-
terminate meaning. Rather, the cultural “self,” to the extent that it becomes 
readable at all, migrates between cultures, the interstices of multiple cultural 
identifications. Übergang thus also names the state of being “between” cul-
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tures in a space that, on the far side of the mechanisms of assimilation that 
encroach upon any act of cultural recognition of otherness within a given 
hegemonic state or culture, first makes the gesture of recognizing cultural 
otherness possible.65 This Übergang leads not to the promised land of cultural 
identity, but to the realm of extraterritoriality itself, where selves can be rec-
ognized as the ones that are gathered and dispersed in language.
Adorno’s Übergang, his undoing of any fixed cultural identity in terms 
of what it is not yet and in terms of what it promises, can be thought of as 
setting the stage for the kind of work that Kracauer’s and Derrida’s texts will 
have asked of us. After all, what Kracauer’s Denkbild of extraterritoriality and 
Derrida’s monolingualism of the other will have asked us to consider, among 
so many other things, is the question of thinking and living in culture, of 
thinking and living culturally, even multiculturally, as a question of a cer-
tain homelessness: homeless images, homeless selves, and even homeless 
cultures. Both Kracauer and Derrida, each in “his” idiom and in “his” experi-
ence of expatriation, an experience that is singular at the same time that it is 
shared by many, invite us to expose cultural identity, even multiculturalism, 
to the plurality that these terms both name and exceed. That is to say, be-
cause of the internal tensions and heterogeneities in both thinkers’ elabora-
tions of the homeless — the tensions and heterogeneities that make it pos-
sible for us to speak of the promise and suffering of homelessness in the first 
place — these elaborations are exposed to their own multiplicities and non-
self-identities. As Werner Hamacher puts it in his discussion of multicultur-
alism, “If the historical and structural a priori of every culture is its multi-
plication, then one multiculturalism cannot be enough, and there needs to 
be many multiculturalisms. There must be more than one, there must be 
more than many, and thus, across cultures, there must be the possibility of 
more than that which today we still call cultures: this is the imperative of 
the ac culturation, alterculturations.” For this, he continues, there “must be 
something other than culture and its mere multiplicity. It is the imperative 
of autonomization. This imperative must count, and must count many, but it 
cannot do so unless it exposes the countable cultures, in and beyond count-
ing, to what cannot be counted.”66
65 This significance of the “between” in acts of cultural recognition is made vivid by Alexander 
García Düttmann, Zwischen den Kulturen: Spannungen im Kampf um Anerkennung (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1997).
66 Werner Hamacher, “One 2 Many Multiculturalisms,” trans. Dana Hollander, in Violence, Identity 
and Self-Determination, ed. Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
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Without this exposure to its own alterities, even multiculturalism can be 
used as a concept that masks certain monocultural ideologies and coloniz-
ing gestures. If we open up Kracauer’s extraterritoriality to its own internal 
extraterritorialities and Derrida’s spectral monolingualism of the other to 
the plurality of monolingualisms that traverse it, there must be many ex-
traterritorialities and many monolingualisms. Just as the autonomy that is 
promised by multuculturalization in order to deserve the politically charged 
promise of autonomy at all “cannot be only one autonomy, there would 
have to be many, innumerably many, and there is only one that would be too 
many, which would be one and only one,” so there would have to be many ex-
traterritorialities and many monolingualisms; in short, there would have to 
be innumerably many homeless images.67 But such a multiple and perpetu-
ally fractures homeless image always is yet to come — is cannot simply be 
assumed to be present, lest it be mistaken for having a proper home, the false 
home that would be present in our stable hermeneutic decoding of that im-
age, its reduction to one meaning and “the one” of meaning. 
The homeless images that Kracauer’s Denkbilder and Derrida’s medita-
tions offer us posit a cultural identity beyond cultural identity, a cultural 
practice in which one no longer is simply oneself and no longer simply one, 
the one who is present. Because the reality of this imagined cultural iden-
tity cannot be reduced to this or that form of presence — its desires, gene-
alogies, contexts, overdeterminations, hidden filiations, promises, commit-
ments, secrets, and debts always are elsewhere, invested differently, and not 
always fully visible — we must look for its homeless images in the future. But 
this future cannot be executed in advance, even by a program that would 
attempt to install a system of reading such homeless images with an eye to 
their futurity and with the best of intentions. Homeless images, if they do 
anything, challenges us to consider the ways in which they, and we in and 
with them, always are still to come, even as an other or as others. Homeless 
images, along with the extraterritorialities and monolingualism’s that they 
perform, are homeless precisely because they still remain to be invented, 
thought, and read, again and again. Read: always already and always as if for 
the very first time. 






guage is no 
longer linked to the 
knowing of things, but 
to men’s freedom.
— Michel Foucault1
In this statement from The Order of 
Things, Michel Foucault speaks of the nine-
teenth-century revolution in linguistics that, 
in effect, rediscovered language and made it the 
object of systematic study in its own right. Language, 
no longer seen as a transparent medium, was granted “its 
own particular density […] and laws of its own.” Yet it is not self-
evident how we are made more free by understanding that words 
are not just a repository of knowledge. The density of language is a 
troublesome postulate. That postulate, according to Foucault, raises difficult 
epistemological problems and presents theorists with a choice:
The critical elevation of language, which was a compensation for its sub-
sidence within the object, implied that it had been brought nearer both to 
an act of knowing, pure of all words, and to the unconscious element in 
our discourse. It had to be either made transparent to the forms of knowl-
edge, or thrust down into the contents of the unconscious.2 
The debate on the status of language has been enormous and subtle, but it 
would seem that these two poles described by Foucault remain constantly 
in effect. Language is, on the one hand, a transparent medium from which 
to deduce a metalanguage and on which to build statistical and mechanical 
models, or language is, on the other hand, a product of the individual psy-
 Originally published as Caryl Emerson, “The Outer Word and Inner Speech: Bakhtin, Vygotsky, 
and the Internalization of Language,” Critical Inquiry 10, no. 2 (1983), 245–64. Reprinted with per-
mission of University of Chicago Press.
1 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1973), 296. 
2 Ibid., 299.
The Outer World and Inner 
Speech: Bakhtin, Vygotsky, 






che and ultimately subject to psychic transformation, to what Foucault calls 
“dim mechanisms, faceless determinations, a whole landscape of shadow.”3 
In the twentieth century, these two poles were reevaluated in the light 
of Ferdinand de Saussure’s celebrated binary oppositions: synchrony/dia-
chrony, syntagmatic/paradigmatic, langue/parole. Language had moved from 
the realm of naming to the realm of relationships — a truly revolutionary 
shift. But as is so often the case with intellectual revolutions, success tended 
to institutionalize and finalize the new terminology. One of the most pro-
ductive (and most quickly canonized) distinctions was that between langue 
and parole, between the social-collective institution of language (the code) 
and the individual act of combination and actualization (the message). Not 
surprisingly, such an unbridged opposition was not congenial to Marxist 
dialecticians, and in the Soviet Union of the 1920s Saussure’s dichotomy 
stimulated vigorous debate. Literary scholars, philosophers of language, and 
developmental psychologists all questioned that opposition in their separate 
disciplines and were concerned to explain the integration of individual with 
society in a more benevolent way. It became a central issue in clinical psy-
chology, especially in the branch dealing with language acquisition. And it 
was a lifelong preoccupation for those members of the Bakhtin circle who 
were especially interested in language: Mikhail Bakhtin, Valentin Vološinov, 
and Pavel Medvedev. These various groups, it should be emphasized, worked 
in and with the terminological frameworks of their time, including an ex-
perimental and open-ended Marxism that stressed process, change, and the 
interaction between organism and environment. Among the most eloquent 
contributions to the debate were two books that appeared under Vološinov’s 
name: Freudianism: A Marxist Critique (1927) and Marxism and the Philosophy 
of Language (1929).4 Each in its own way reassessed the two Saussurian poles 
and attempted a synthesis. The nature of that synthesis, and the light it casts 
on the interplay between language and consciousness, is the focal point of 
this essay.
3 Ibid., 326.
4 See Valentin Nikolaevich Vološinov, Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, ed. in collaboration with Neal 
H. Bruss, trans. I. R. Titunik (New York: Academic Press, 1976). The title has been translated in an 
unnecessarily misleading way; the Russian is simply Frejdizm: kritičeskij očerk (Freudianism: A Criti-
cal Sketch). And see Vološinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and 
Titunik (New York: Seminar Press, 1973). Vološinov’s authorship of these two texts is disputed: 
there is evidence that Mikhail Bakhtin wrote them both, or substantial portions of both. The col-
laboration between the two men was, at any rate, very close. In the text of this article, I refer to 
Bakhtin as the author of both works.
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Members of the Bakhtin circle objected in particular to one fundamental 
aspect of the langue/parole schema, namely, its opposition of the social to the 
individual. Instead of opposition, they spoke of inter-action — and warned 
the while against understanding this interaction in a mechanical and nar-
rowly rational (by which they meant formulaic) way. As Bakhtin defined 
the problem:
The idea of the conventionality, the arbitrariness of language, is a typical one 
for rationalism as a whole, and no less typical is the comparison of language 
to the system of mathematical signs. What interests the mathematically 
minded rationalists is not the relationship of the sign to the actual reality 
it reflects nor to the individual who is its originator, but the relationship of 
sign to sign within a closed system already accepted and authorized. In other 
words, they are interested only in the inner logic of the system of signs itself, 
taken, as in algebra, completely independently of the ideological mean-
ings that give the signs their content.5 
This insensitivity to “ideological meanings,” Bakhtin suggests, is the ultimate 
danger behind the fascination with the arbitrary nature of the sign. The cor-
rective, in his view, is a proper understanding of the concept of ideologija. Its 
English cognate “ideology” is in some respects unfortunate, for our word sug-
gests something inflexible and propagandistic, something politically unfree. 
For Bakhtin and his colleagues, it meant simply an “idea system” determined 
socially, something that means. In this sense of the term, all sign systems 
are ideological, and all ideologies possess semiotic value.6 But in contrast to 
Saussure’s claim that a verbal sign is ultimately a mental construct — that 
the acoustic image and the concept are both contained in an arbitrary closed 
system — the members of the Bakhtin circle posited four social factors that 
make the understanding of speech and writing possible.
First, they assumed that the sign and its effects occur in outer experience. 
“[In the] chain of ideological creativity and understanding […] nowhere is there 
a break in the chain, nowhere does the chain plunge into inner being, nonma-
terial in nature and unembodied in signs.”7 Each ideological product is mean-
ingful not in the soul but in the objectively accessible ideological material.





Second, this outer experience, if it is to register significance, must in some 
way be organized socially. Signs “can arise only on interindividual territory.” 
But this territory “cannot be called ‘natural’ in the direct sense of the word: 
signs do not arise between any two members of the species Homo sapiens. 
It is essential that the two individuals […] compose a group (a social unit); 
only then can the medium of signs take shape between them.”8 A social unit 
is therefore an indispensable aspect of semiotic activity — and for this rea-
son the study of ideologies cannot be grounded in individual psychology. 
Far from positing a Saussurian tension between society and the individual, 
Bakhtin posits an individual who actively creates the society in which his 
discourse occurs. The whole tradition opposing individual to society is mis-
guided: an individual person is simply one biological specimen in a group.9 
Third, the ideologies that are generated by the material reality of lan-
guage must be studied inter-systemically, not as independent and isolated 
phenomena. That is, ideology always exists as a relation between (or among) 
speakers and listeners and, by extension, between or among social groups. 
According to Bakhtin, each social group — each class, profession, generation, 
religion, region — has its own characteristic way of speaking, its own dialect. 
Each dialect reflects and embodies a set of values and a sense of shared experi-
ence. Because no two individuals ever entirely coincide in their experience or 
belong to precisely the same set of social groups, every act of understanding 
involves an act of translation and a negotiation of values. It is essentially a 
phenomenon of interrelation and interaction.10
Fourth and last, Bakhtin profoundly redefined the Word itself and at-
tempted to infuse it with its original Greek sense of logos (“discourse”). For 
8 Ibid., 12.
9 Ibid., 34.
10 For a clear and provocative discussion of this aspect of Bakhtin’s work, see Gary Saul Morson, “The 
Heresiarch of Meta,” Poetics and Theory of Literature 3 (1978): 407–27. In a note written near the end 
of his life, Bakhtin emphasized the necessity of difference in any act of understanding: “Under-
standing cannot be understood as emotional empathy, or as the placing of oneself in another’s 
place (the loss of one’s own place). This is required only for the peripheral aspects of understand-
ing. Understanding cannot be understood as translation from someone else’s language into one’s 
own language” (“Iz zapisei 1970–1971 godov,” Éstetika slovesnogo tvorčestva (Moscow: 1979), 346; 
my translation). Even understanding, itself, is a threshold phenomenon.
 The Tartu school of Soviet semioticians has been very creative with Bakhtinian concepts, which 
it recognizes as complementary to its own work. For an extension of Bakhtin’s insights into the 
micro-dynamics of the psyche, see Iu. M. Lotman, “On the Reduction and Unfolding of Sign Sys-
tems (The Problem of ‘Freudianism and Semiotic Culturology’),” in Semiotics and Structuralism: 
Readings from the Soviet Union, ed. Henryk Baran (White Plains, ny: International Arts and Sciences 
Press, 1976), 301–9. For an extension of Bakhtin’s insights into the macro-dynamics of history, see 
B.A. Uspenskii, “Historia sub Specie Semioticae,” in Semiotics and Structuralism, 64–75.
427
the outer world and inner speech
Bakhtin, words cannot be conceived apart from the voices who speak them; 
thus, every word raises the question of authority. Fully half of Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language is devoted to an investigation of “indirect” and “quasi-
direct” discourse, multileveled speech acts in which more than one voice par-
ticipates. For Bakhtin, words come not out of dictionaries but out of concrete 
dialogic situations. He saw the distinction between dialogic words — that is, 
utterances — and dictionary words as one between theme and meaning:
Theme is the upper, actual limit of linguistic significance; in essence, only 
theme means something definite. Meaning is the lower limit of linguistic 
significance. Meaning, in essence, means nothing; it only possesses poten-
tiality—the possibility of having a meaning within a concrete theme.11 
Words in discourse always recall earlier contexts of usage, otherwise they 
could not mean at all. It follows that every utterance, covertly or overtly, is an 
act of indirect discourse.
These, then, are the amendments the Bakhtin circle would attach to Saus-
sure: the sign is external, organized socially, concretely historical, and, as the 
Word, inseparably linked with voice and authority. These four dialectical al-
terations work a great change in the original distinction between langue and 
parole. Bakhtin deals with this dichotomy (in somewhat expanded form) in 
his discussion of the twin sins of “abstract objectivism” and “individualistic 
subjectivism.”12 Abstract objectivism can be seen as the Cartesian extreme, 
language taken as a code independent of its interpreters. This is an excess to 
which the Neogrammarians were prone, the myth that language makes po-
ets. Individualistic subjectivism, on the other hand, is the Humboldtian ex-
treme, embodied for Bakhtin in the Vosslerites. They are faulted for ground-
ing the message too exclusively in the individual psyche — thus giving rise 
to the myth that poets make language. Bakhtin himself does not deny the 
two poles. But he would synthesize them, and he claims that their opposition 
in real life, at any given moment, is a fiction. In the Bakhtinian model, every 
individual engages in two perpendicular activities. He forms lateral (“hori-
zontal”) relationships with other individuals in specific speech acts, and he 
simultaneously forms internal (“vertical”) relationships between the outer 




world and his own psyche. These double activities are constant, and their in-
teractions in fact constitute the psyche. The psyche is thus not an internal but 
a boundary phenomenon. Or to use Bakhtin’s political metaphor, the psyche 
“enjoys extraterritorial status […] [as] a social entity that penetrates inside the 
organism of the individual person.”13 
This concept of the psyche is indeed radical. The assumption that the psy-
che is, at its base, a “social entity,” a space to be filled with ideological signs, 
sets the Bakhtinian concept of consciousness at odds with much of West-
ern thinking since Freud on the subject. In his remarkable descriptions of 
the transitions from “social intercourse” to “outer speech,” and from “outer 
speech” to “inner speech” and to consciousness, Bakhtin fundamentally re-
thinks both the relation of consciousness to the world around it and the rela-
tion of the self to others. We read that a poet’s style “is engendered from the 
style of his inner speech, which does not lend itself to control, and his inner 
speech is itself the product of his entire social life.”14 And in Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language we read:
Although the reality of the word, as is true of any sign, resides between in-
dividuals, a word, at the same time, is produced by the individual organ-
ism’s own means without recourse to any equipment or any other kind of 
extracorporeal material. This has determined the role of [the] word as the 
semiotic material of inner life — of consciousness (inner speech).15 
When so firmly tied to outer experience, this tripartite equation of inner life 
= inner speech = consciousness is quite audacious. “People do not ‘accept’ 
their native language,” Bakhtin insists, “it is in their native language that 
they first reach awareness.”16 Individuation of the personality is the process 
of a consciousness working over the “ideological themes” that penetrate it 
“and there take on the semblance of individual accents.”17 Indeed, a clear dis-
tinction between inner and outer speech is impossible, because the very act 
of introspection is modeled on external social discourse: it is self-observation, 
13 Ibid., 39.
14 Vološinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art (Concerning Sociological Poetics),” appendix 1, 
in Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, ed. in collaboration with Neal H. Bruss, trans. I. R. Titunik (New 
York: Academic Press, 1976), 114.
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communion with the self, “the understanding of one’s own inner sign.”18 
Thus, the problem of origins in personality is in fact no problem at all, and 
there is likewise no problem of self-expression:
Not only can experience be outwardly expressed through the agency of the sign 
[…] but also, aside from this outward expression (for others), experience ex-
ists even for the person undergoing it only in the material of signs. Outside that 
material there is no experience as such. In this sense any experience is ex-
pressible, i.e., is potential expression. . . .
Thus there is no leap involved between inner experience and its 
expression, no crossing over from one qualitative realm of reality 
to another.19 
Individual consciousness is a socio-ideological fact. If you cannot talk about 
an experience, at least to yourself, you did not have it.
A person’s experiences exist “encoded in his inner speech.”20 Thus the 
word, Bakhtin affirms, “constitutes the foundation, the skeleton of inner life. 
Were it to be deprived of the word, the psyche would shrink to an extreme 
degree.”21 Purely private, speechless, isolated experience — the realm of the 
mystic, the visionary — is essentially impossible as experience. It can only be 
viewed as erratic, as something bordering on the pathological. Experience 
that “lacks a socially grounded and stable audience” cannot “take firm root 
and will not receive differentiated and full-fledged expression.”22 
Bakhtin would say, therefore, that we evolve the mechanisms to express 
that which our environment makes available for us to experience. At any 
given time the fit between self and society may not be perfect, indeed cannot 
be perfect, but the mechanisms are always present to engage self and society 
in dialogue. In such a model of reality, there is no room for  — and perhaps no 
conceptual possibility of — an independent unconscious.
Bakhtin develops this argument in his polemical work Freudianism: A 
Marxist Critique. For Bakhtin, the teachings of Freud represent a debasing of 
that already discredited extreme, individualistic subjectivism. As Western 








opens his “critical sketch”23 on this comment, and it is no accident: Freudian-
ism is analyzed here not as a viable scientific theory but as a social symptom. 
Psychoanalysis saves bourgeois man by taking him out of history, by explain-
ing him to himself not as a concrete social entity but as an “abstract biologi-
cal organism.” According to Bakhtin, Freud would have us everywhere seek 
the answers within; we forget the social crisis and “take refuge in the organic 
warmth of the animal side of life.”24 The “ideological motif of Freudianism” is 
an emphasis on sex and age, common motifs, Bakhtin claims, in eras of crisis 
and decline, when nature (especially “human nature,” in the form of biologi-
cal drives) is seen as all-powerful and history is seen as impotent.25 
It need hardly be pointed out that Bakhtin is very selective in his read-
ing of Freud. Nowhere does he engage Freud’s most provocative works, the 
great sociopsychological essays of the war years and the 1920s. In those 
works Bakhtin would have found a more complex opponent and, at times, 
an uncomfortable ally. But it was precisely the early clinical Freud, and his 
pioneering assumptions and methods of psychoanalysis, that posed a chal-
lenge to the Bakhtinian model for perceiving and assimilating reality. Those 
assumptions and methods had to be confronted. In Bakhtin’s model, phe-
nomena originate in the external material world, as do the means to express 
them. The “unconscious,” that is, the part of ourselves that is outside our 
control and awareness, is best comprehended as merely that portion of the 
conscious not yet articulate — an “unofficial conscious,” if you will, or per-
haps a struggle among various motives and voices within the conscious.26 Ac-
cording to Bakhtin, Freud’s projection of autonomous drives and nonnegoti-
able demands is mere “psychologization of the somatic.”27 It follows that the 
forces of id and ego that emerge so colorfully during psychoanalysis are not 
repressed inner realities in the process of discharge but reflections of overt 
social dynamics, including those between doctor and patient.28 For Bakhtin, 
in short, the unconscious in the Freudian sense is a myth — and it functions 
in society as Roland Barthes has claimed all contemporary myths function: 
“Semiology has taught us that myth has the task of giving an historical inten-
23 Vološinov, Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, 261, n. 2.
24 Ibid., 11.
25 Ibid.
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tion a natural justification, and making contingency appear eternal.”29 This 
evasion of history and the social process is the real sin of the “mythical” un-
conscious. Eliminate time and society, and a structure cannot be modified. It 
can only be satisfied or repressed.
Bakhtin’s model had to account for the phenomena Freud had observed 
but do it differently. An alternative system of explanation would have to 
provide, through experimental work and clinical documentation, specific 
answers to the key psychological question: How precisely does environ-
ment impress a personality, how do outer words become inner speech? One 
remarkable scholar committed to this project was Bakhtin’s contemporary 
Lev Vygotsky — a man comparable to Bakhtin in productivity and interdisci-
plinary brilliance. Vygotsky’s final work, Thought and Language (1934),30 sup-
plemented by his essays of the 1930s, can be read as an important predecessor 
and perhaps even as clinical underpinning to Bakhtin’s philosophy of lan-
guage. Soviet scholars such as Vyacheslav Ivanov have made this connection 
explicitly in discussions of Bakhtin’s contribution to semiotics.31
It must be said at the outset that this interaction between Bakhtin and 
Vygotsky is somewhat hypothetical, although none the less intriguing for 
that. There is no direct evidence that Bakhtin and Vygotsky ever met, and Vy-
gotsky makes no reference to Bakhtin in his work.32 Interest in dialogic rela-
29 Roland Barthes, “Myth Today,” in Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1972), 142.
30 Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky, Thought and Language, ed. and trans. Eugenia Hanfmann and Gertrude 
Vakar (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 1962). A more precise translation of the work’s title, Myšlenie i 
reč, would be “Thinking and Speech”: the thinking is specifically a process and not a product, and 
the language is uttered. An edited selection of Vygotsky’s essays has been published in English, 
with two excellent explanatory essays, as Vygotsky, Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psy-
chological Processes, ed. Michael Cole, et al. (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1978).
31 Vyacheslav Vsevolodovich Ivanov, “The Significance of M.M. Bakhtin’s Ideas on Sign, Utterance, 
and Dialogue for Modern Semiotics (1),” in Semiotics and Structuralism, 310–67. I should point out, 
however, that Ivanov makes very wide claims for Bakhtin’s influence; in certain of his cases, paral-
lel development would be a more reasonable hypothesis.
32 For this information I am grateful to James V. Wertsch of Chicago’s Center for Psychosocial Stud-
ies, who read this manuscript and made a number of very astute and helpful suggestions. It is 
his conviction that Vygotsky’s ideas about dialogue are less influenced by Bakhtin than by the 
formalist linguist Lev Yakubinsky, whose 1923 essay “On Dialogic Speech” Vygotsky does cite (see 
L.P. Iakubinskij [Lev Yakubinsky], “O dialogičeskoi reči,” in Russkaja reč,” ed. L. V. Ščerba [Petrograd: 
1923]). In this essay, Yakubinsky advises those who study “practical language” to investigate first 
the seminal distinction between monologic and dialogic speech (or, better, dialogic processes). 
Dialogue, he claims, is the prior and more natural form, while monologue requires an artificial 
structure. Yakubinsky also argues (as Bakhtin does) that dialogue does not depend solely on 
words: shared context, intonation, visual stimuli are all also powerful carriers of a message. There 
are certainly areas of overlap in the thinking of Bakhtin, Yakubinsky, and Vygotsky on the ques-
tion of dialogic speech. But Yakubinsky’s treatment remains rather naive. For a comprehensive 
discussion of the Vygotsky–Yakubinsky connection, see chapter 4, “The Semiotic Mediation of 
Human Activity,” from Wertsch’s forthcoming study, Cognitive Developmental Theory: A Vygotskian 
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tions and the social context of speech was, of course, rather widespread in the 
1920s; both men doubtless pulled upon and were pulled by many of the same 
social and scholarly currents. Where Bakhtin and Vygotsky intersect is not 
on the plane of their actual texts, that is, not in the reality of a cross-reference, 
but in the ultimate implications of their thought. It is this projected intersec-
tion that I will now discuss.
Vygotsky’s initial inquiry was very similar to that of the Bakhtin circle. 
Could not the unsatisfactory stalemate between individualistic subjectivism 
and abstract objectivism — or, as Vygotsky casts the opposition, between ide-
alist and behaviorist psychology — be resolved with a dynamic synthesis fo-
cusing on the concrete speech act itself? At both those extremes, the loser had 
been time: “Whether inclining toward pure naturalism or extreme idealism, 
all these theories have one trait in common — their antihistorical bias.”33 
Time, Vygotsky argues, had long been misunderstood and misapplied in 
the psychological sciences. The development of the child had once been de-
scribed in terms of botanical models (maturation, “kindergarten”) and then 
in terms of zoological models (the performance of animals under laboratory 
conditions), but in Vygotsky’s view it is precisely what cannot be learned 
from plants and lower animals, namely, the uniquely human assimilation 
and production of language, that psychologists should examine.34 Language 
is man’s greatest tool; and so it should be seen precisely as a tool, that is, as 
a means for communicating with and extracting from the outside world. So 
viewed, language offers special problems to the psychologist. For if language 
is always a means of interaction with the world, it is perilous to study it in 
isolated environments or in traditional controlled experiments. Vygotsky 
replaced those conventional locales of science with much looser “task situa-
tions,” which involved putting subjects in confrontation with real problems 
in a real social setting.35 Vygotsky’s distrust of the classic psychological ex-
periment (what he derisively called the “stimulus-response framework”) 
should in fact recall Bakhtin’s distrust of the classic linguistic model, with 
its ideal speaker and ideal (or nonexistent) listener. Both were suspicious of 
modeling, for both insisted that only the concrete historical event could vali-
date a human communication or lead to an act of learning.
Approach. I thank its author for generously sharing with me a draft of this chapter. [It appears this 
study was never published under above title — Ed.]
33 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 153.
34 Vygotsky, “Tool and Symbol in Child Development,” in Mind in Society, 19–20.
35 Vygotsky, “Problems of Method,” in Mind in Society, 58–69.
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Vygotsky created for himself a powerful clinical tool out of two convic-
tions: that psychological events must be studied in history and that external 
society is the starting point of consciousness. The two are closely allied, for 
whatever we can perceive in outer reality, we can change, or try to change, 
through time. In ingenious experiments, Vygotsky extended (and then modi-
fied or rejected) the language-learning maps offered by Jean Piaget, William 
Stern, and Freud. His primary target was Piaget’s “egocentric thought,” a 
stage Piaget claimed is intermediate between autistic play and directed (that 
is, reality-oriented) thought. Piaget had assumed that a child’s thought was 
originally autistic and became realistic only under social pressure; visible 
here is the direct impress of Freud’s pleasure principle and reality principle. 
Vygotsky was unsympathetic to the idea that an individual is reluctant to 
adjust to its environment, that reality, work, and social intercourse are some-
how not “pleasurable.” In order to test the opposite assumption, Vygotsky 
conducted the experiments described in Thought and Language — and created 
his own scenario for language acquisition.
According to this scenario, the child’s first efforts at perception result in 
an isolation of word meanings — but “meanings” only in the sense of ver-
bal stimuli, functioning in context as signals rather than as proper signs.36 
A child cannot translate much of the speech he hears into his rudimentary 
“signal systems,” because the ability to generalize comes slowly. Until the age 
of two years, language serves the human child much as a thirty-two-“word” 
36 “Signals” and “signal systems” are basic concepts in the Russian school of psychology. The school 
traces its fundamental assumptions and terminology to Ivan Pavlov and, in particular, to two 
physiological laws which were worked out for lower animals and then extended to man. The 
first law provides that all learning is conditional (uslovnyj, usually mistranslated into English as 
“conditioned,” as in the phrase “uslovnyj refleks”). In a human context, this means that learning 
is basically not intuitive but environmental. The second law posits a “second signal system,” a 
derivation and extension of classical conditioning. According to Pavlov, speech introduces a new 
principle into nervous activity: the ability to abstract and generalize signals from the environ-
ment. Whereas animals develop at most a “primary signal system” that links concrete stimuli and 
visual relationships, speech provides man with a second level of links, by which we inhibit direct 
impulses and project ourselves in time and space. Through language, man knows time. We can 
control the strength of stimuli on our senses and thereby modify the rule of force by which all 
organisms are bound. Thus man assumes conscious control over his behavior when the word be-
comes, in Pavlov’s terms, a “signal of signals.” For a helpful discussion, see Alexander R. Luria, The 
Role of Speech in the Regulation of Normal and Abnormal Behavior, ed. J. Tizard (New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1961), 20–42. See also Stephen Toulmin’s summary in his excellent review of Vygotsky’s 
work: “The Mozart of Psychology,” New York Review of Books (Sept. 28, 1978): 51–7. The distinction 
between sign and signal is not, of course, exclusively Pavlovian. Vygotsky also incorporated the 
Husserlian distinction between meaning and objective reference (the latter term Vygotsky rendered 
as “the indicatory function of speech”). Although these categories are similar to Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s symbolic sign and indexical sign, there is no evidence that Vygotsky got them from Peirce. 
I am grateful to James Wertsch for bringing the above to my attention.
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vocabulary serves the chimpanzee throughout its life: words — or, better, vo-
calizations — are purely emotional; they coincide with gestures but exclude 
any simultaneous intellectual activity. The child passes out of this chimpan-
zoid stage when he begins to ask for the names of objects, and at this point 
one of the critical moments in human maturation occurs: “Thought becomes 
verbal and speech [becomes] rational.”37 Vygotsky could not define the pre-
cise mechanism linking overt to inner speech, but he assumed — and this, of 
course, is the crucial point — that this process followed the same course and 
obeyed the same laws as did other operations involving signs. External ex-
periments could be devised to monitor and refine the seepage between levels.
To this end, Vygotsky isolated four stages of “internalization”: the natural 
or pre-intellectual stage, the stage of naive psychology, the stage of egocentric 
speech, and the so-called ingrowth stage. The third stage, egocentric speech, 
was the most conducive to analysis in task situations. Uncomfortable with 
Piaget’s conclusion that this speech is fantasy-talk and generated asocially, 
Vygotsky ran a series of experiments designed to socialize and complicate the 
child’s environment at precisely the age when the child “talked to himself.” 
He demonstrated that a child talks twice as much when presented with ob-
stacles38 and that this externalized “conversation with oneself,” commenting 
on and predicting the results of an action, is in fact the natural dynamic of 
problem solving.39 Furthermore, this talk turned out to be extremely sensi-
tive to social factors. Piaget had observed similar phenomena: that egocentric 
speech occurs only in a social context, that the child assumes he is being un-
derstood by others, and that such speech is not whispered or abbreviated but 
spoken as an utterance, that is, as public speech in a specific environment. 
Vygotsky accepted this data but then devised experiments to detach it from 
Piaget’s conclusions.
When Vygotsky varied the social factors — by isolating the child, placing 
him with deaf-mutes, putting him to play in a room filled with deafening 
music — it was found that egocentric speech dropped drastically, to one-fifth 
its previous rate.40 Vygotsky concluded that egocentric speech was not, as 
37 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 44.
38 Ibid., 16–17.
39 Vygotsky, “Tool and Symbol in Child Development,” 24–6. Vygotsky proceeds to enumerate the 
advantages of the speaking child over the ape in the area of problem solving: the speaking child is 
more independent of his immediate field of vision, more capable of planning, and has greater con-
trol over his actions. Speaking children “acquire the capacity to be both the subjects and objects of 
their own behavior” (Vygotsky, “Tool and Symbol in Child Development,” 26).
40 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 136–7.
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Piaget had suggested, a compromise between primary autism and reluctant 
socialization but rather the direct outgrowth (or, better, ingrowth) of speech 
which had been from the start socially and environmentally oriented. Piaget 
was correct when he observed that private and socialized speech did indeed 
intersect at this stage. Development, however, was proceeding not along the 
lines of Piaget’s scenario but in the opposite direction. The child was not 
externalizing his internal thoughts but internalizing his external verbal in-
teractions. That was why egocentric speech is relatively accessible in three-
year-olds but quite inscrutable in seven-year-olds: the older the child, the 
more thoroughly has his thought become inner speech.41 “Development in 
thinking,” Vygotsky concludes, “is not from the individual to the socialized, 
but from the social to the individual.”42 
Like Bakhtin, Vygotsky offers us a restructuring of the Saussurian di-
chotomy. In Vygotsky’s model of language acquisition, a child’s first speech 
is social; words evoke specific responses and must be reinforced by adults. 
Only gradually does language assume the role of a “second signal system,” 
that is, become for the child an indirect way of affecting his environment. 
When it does, his speech differentiates into two separate though interlock-
ing systems: one continues to adjust to the external world and emerges as 
adult social speech; the other system begins to “internalize” and becomes by 
degrees a personal language, greatly abbreviated and predicative.43 In this in-
ner speech, the sense of a word — a “dynamic, fluid, complex whole” — takes 
predominance over a word’s meaning.44
When internalization begins, egocentric speech drops off. The child be-
comes, as it were, his own best interlocutor. Crucial to this process, however, 
is the presence of a challenging verbal and physical environment. The descrip-
tive “monologue” of which egocentric speech is composed can be internalized 
creatively only if questioned and challenged by outside voices. In this way 
41 Ibid., 134.
42 Ibid., 20.
43 Vygotsky, “Tool and Symbol in Child Development,” 27–28.
44 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 146. Vygotsky further states: “The sense of a word […] is the sum 
of all the psychological events aroused in our consciousness by the word. […] Meaning is only one 
of the zones of sense, the most stable and precise zone. A word acquires its sense from the context 
in which it appears; in different contexts, it changes its sense. Meaning remains stable throughout 
the changes of sense. The dictionary meaning of a word is no more than a stone in the edifice of 
sense, no more than a potentiality that finds diversified realization in speech. (Ibid.) Vygotsky’s 
distinction here between meaning and sense has a nice parallel in Bakhtin’s distinction between 
meaning and theme cited earlier in this essay (see p. 427). Again, I thank James Wertsch, for point-
ing out this parallel.
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alone is intelligence possible, “intelligence” defined not as an “accumulation 
of already mastered skills” but as a “dialogue with one’s own future and an ad-
dress to the external world.” It should come as no surprise that Vygotsky was 
unsympathetic to the standard intelligence test, which measured (in a com-
petitive and isolated context) prior achievement and punished children for 
“cheating.” A true test of intelligence, Vygotsky argued, was one that posited 
problems beyond the capacity of the child to solve and then made help avail-
able. How a child seeks help, how he utilizes his environment, how he asks 
questions of others — all these constitute the child’s “zone of proximal devel-
opment,” where all true learning occurs.45 Intelligence is a social category.46
Speech and behavior interact dynamically in a child’s development. First, 
speech accompanies action, then precedes it, finally displaces it — that is, 
speech assumes the planning function so essential for the higher mental pro-
cesses.47 Just as children outgrow the need to count on their fingers or memo-
rize by means of mnemonic devices, so do they outgrow the need to vocalize 
their activities. This final stage of speech development, the ingrowth stage, 
coincides with the appearance of logical memory, hypothesis-formation, and 
other mature mental processes.
Vygotsky does not, however, claim a one-to-one fit between thought and 
speech. There is speech without thought, as in chimpanzees and infants; there 
is also thought without speech. The two areas overlap in “verbal thought,” 
and this is coincident with language.48 Since we can share only what we ar-
ticulate and communicate, it is this linguistic dimension alone that has his-
torical validity. In this respect, Vygotsky seems somewhat more modest than 
Bakhtin, who suggests more strongly that experience can be given absolute 
expression — inwardly to oneself, outwardly to others — through the word.
For Vygotsky, the Word is a powerful amalgam: part sign, part tool, it 
is the significant humanizing event.49 One makes a self through the words 
45 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 103.
46 See Vygotsky, “Interaction between Learning and Development,” Mind in Society, 84–6. The Ameri-
can educator John Holt seems to have something similar in mind when he writes, with wonder-
ful simplicity: “The true test of intelligence is not how much we know how to do, but how we 
behave when we don’t know what to do” (How Children Fail [New York: Dell Publishing Company, 
1964], 205).
47 Vygotsky, “Tool and Symbol in Child Development,” 27–28.
48 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 47–8.
49 Vygotsky’s distinction between tool and symbol has a parallel in the bifurcating functions of 
speech. Both tool and symbol involve mediated activity, but tools are externally oriented, aids to 
mastering nature, whereas signs are internally oriented, ultimately aids to mastering oneself. See 
his “Internalization of Higher Psychological Functions,” in Mind in Society,55.
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one has learned, fashions one’s own voice and inner speech by a selective 
appropriation of the voices of others. It would obviously be of great interest 
to know how this process of self-fashioning takes place. Here we can turn 
to Bakhtin, to an essay from the 1930s and thus contemporary with Vygot-
sky’s last writings.50 In this essay Bakhtin mentions two ways of assimilating 
the words of others. Each plays its own part in shaping the process of inner 
speech, and each has a ready analogue in the way schoolchildren are asked 
to learn texts. One may “recite by heart” or “retell it in one’s own words.” In 
reciting, the language of others is authoritative: it is distanced, taboo, and 
there can be no play with the framing context. One cannot even entertain 
the possibility of doubting it; so one cannot enter into dialogue with it. To 
change a word in a recitation is to make a mistake. The power of this kind of 
language, however, has its corresponding cost: once discredited, it becomes a 
relic, a dead thing. Retelling in one’s own words, on the other hand, is a more 
flexible and responsive process. It is the only way we can originate anything 
verbally. In retelling, Bakhtin argues, one arrives at “internally persuasive” 
discourse — which, in his view, is as close as anything can come to being to-
tally our own. The struggle within us between these two modes of discourse, 
the authoritative and the internally persuasive, is what we recognize as intel-
lectual and moral growth.
Both Bakhtin and Vygotsky, as we have seen, responded directly or in-
directly to the challenge of Freud. Both attempted to account for their data 
without resorting to postulating an unconscious in the Freudian sense. By 
way of contrast, it is instructive here to recall Jacques Lacan — who, among 
others, has been a beneficiary of Bakhtin’s “semiotic reinterpretation” of 
Freud.51 Lacan’s case is intriguing, for he retains the unconscious while at the 
same time submitting Freudian psychoanalysis to rigorous criticism along 
the lines of Bakhtin. By focusing attention on the dialogic word, he encour-
ages a rereading of Freud in which the social element (the dynamics between 
doctor and patient) is crucial. As Lacan opens his essay “The Empty Word and 
the Full Word”:
50 See Mikhail Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael 
Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 259–422, 
esp. 341–2.
51 See Vyacheslav Vsevolodovich Ivanov, “The Significance of M.M. Bakhtin’s Ideas,” 314.
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Whether it sees itself as an instrument of healing, of formation, or of ex-
ploration in depth, psychoanalysis has only a single intermediary: the 
patient’s Word. […] And every word calls for a reply. 
I shall show that there is no word without a reply, even if it meets no 
more than silence, provided that it has an auditor: this is the heart of its 
function in psychoanalysis.52
The word is conceived as a tool not only of the external world but also of an 
autonomous internal world as well. And what emerges, it would seem, is a 
reinterpretation of the role of dialogue in the painful maturational processes 
of the child. For Vygotsky, the child’s realization of his separateness from so-
ciety is not a crisis; after all, his environment provides both the form and 
the content of his personality. From the start, dialogue reinforces the child’s 
grasp on reality, as evidenced by the predominantly social and extraverted 
nature of his earliest egocentric speech. For Lacan, on the contrary, dialogue 
seems to function as the alienating experience, the stade du miroir phase of 
a child’s development. The unconscious becomes the seat of all those prob-
lems that Bakhtin had externalized: the origin of personality, the possibili-
ties of self-expression. The je–moi opposition in the mirror gives rise to that 
permanent hunger for “a locus where there is constituted the je which speaks 
as well as he who has it speak.”53 And consequently, the Word takes on an 
entirely different coloration: it is no longer merely an ideological sign but 
a potent tool for repressing knowledge of that gap, the face in the mirror, 
the Other. Lacan’s celebrated inversion of Saussure’s algorithm, with the line 
between signifier and signified representing repression, created a powerful 
but ominous new role for language. The child is released from his alienating 
image only through discovering himself as Subject, which occurs with lan-
guage; but this language will inevitably come to him from the Other. Thus 
speech is based on the idea of lack, and dialogue, on the idea of difference.
Here the contrast with the Bakhtin circle is especially fruitful, for dia-
logue between inner and outer speech is central to both approaches. In each 
case, the gap between inner and outer can be a cause of pain: in Lacan it is the 
52 Jacques Lacan, “The Empty Word and the Full Word,” in Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, ed. 
and trans. Anthony Wilden (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 9.
53 Lacan, from “La chose freudienne” (1955), quoted in Anthony Wilden, “Lacan and the Discourse of 
the Other,” in Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 266.
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pain of desire, in Bakhtin, the pain of inarticulateness.54 But Bakhtin defines 
“the strife, the chaos, the adversity of our psychical life” as conflicts of motives 
within the conscious sphere (albeit an expanded conscious sphere) and thus 
retains for the Word an objective role in a historically concrete context.55 He 
does not deny the reality of internal conflicts, but he does socialize them, 
thus exposing their mechanisms to the light of day. If enough individuals 
experience the same gap, it is re-socialized: there develops a political under-
ground, and the potential for revolution.56 
Thus we see that alienation, if it is to survive at all, must be external-
ized — at which point it can become the basis for collective rebellion, or for 
a new dynamic community. One can never, it seems, be existentially alone. 
In fact, the very concept of solitude is a fiction — or, rather, it is a paradox. 
When in 1961 Bakhtin returned to his 1929 study of Dostoevsky (then sched-
uled for republication), he jotted down an eloquent series of thoughts on this 
question of solitude:
No Nirvana is possible for a single consciousness. A single consciousness 
is a contradiction in terms. Consciousness is essentially multiple.
I am conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing my-
self for another, through another, and with the help of another. […]
Separation, dissociation, and enclosure within the self as the main 
reason for the loss of one’s self. Not that which takes place within, but 
that which takes place on the boundary between one’s own and someone 
else’s consciousness, on the threshold. […] Thus does Dostoevsky confront 
all decadent and idealistic (individualistic) culture, the culture of essen-
tial and inescapable solitude. He asserts the impossibility of solitude, the 
illusory nature of solitude. The very being of man (both external and 
internal) is the deepest communion. To be means to communicate. […] To be 
means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself.57
54 On this, see Vološinov, Freudianism, 89: “The wider and deeper the breach between the official and 
the unofficial conscious, the more difficult it becomes for motives of inner speech to turn into 
outward speech.”
55 Vološinov, Freudianism, 75.
56 Ibid., 89–90.
57 Bakhtin, “K pererabotke knigi o Dostoevskom” [Toward a reworking of the Dostoevsky book], in 
Éstetika slovesnogo tvorčestva, 313, 311–12 (my translation). The complete text of Bakhtin’s 1961 
notes for the Dostoevsky book is included as an appendix in my forthcoming translation of 
Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). [This 
book was in fact published in 1993 — Ed.]
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This passage is in part the product of that deep meditation on Christianity 
that occupied Bakhtin all his life.58 But it is also an integral part of his phi-
losophy of language. In a world beset with the existential image of no exit, 
this insistence on community, on true socialism, gives the Bakhtin circle an 
aura of almost old-fashioned coziness in an insecure age.59
In the Russian model, inner speech is thus a benevolent quantity, a 
“unique form of collaboration with oneself.”60 Lacan, as we have seen, also 
depends on the Word to discharge the negative potential of the gap between 
self and society. But as part of the Freudian model, this word is only with 
great difficulty available for “collaboration.” It is potentially neurotic, the 
proof of that permanent gap between objectification and identification. 
It can be mediated only through that structure whose presumed presence 
makes it possible to pose (and solve) the problem at all: the unconscious. In 
Lacan, language is a means of expressing the inexpressible. For Bakhtin and 
Vygotsky, there is, in essence, no inexpressible. In Lacan’s world, therefore, 
the Word is a tool of psychoanalysis. For Bakhtin and Vygotsky, it is a tool 
of pedagogy.
×
The gap between self and society has been, of course, a theme not only of 
modern linguistics but also of the modern study of literary genres. We may 
recall that Georg Lukács defines the epic as a genre embodying the absence of 
such a gap, as the product of “integrated civilisations” where there “is not yet 
any interiority, for there is not yet any exterior, any ‘otherness’ for the soul.”61 
58 In Leningrad of the 1920s, Bakhtin was well known as a cerkovnik, a devout Orthodox Christian; it 
was for his connections with the underground church that he was arrested in 1929. During these 
years he wrote a huge metaphysical work — only portions of which survive — on the meaning 
of Christian “responsibility,” on “the Word become flesh,” and on the implications of the Biblical 
injunction “In the Beginning was the Word.” On this and other points of biography and doctrine, 
I am indebted to Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, who have generously shared draft chapters 
of their forthcoming Mikhail Bakhtin [published in 1986 by Harvard University Press — Ed.]. Until 
that definitive volume appears, see Michael Holquist, “The Politics of Representation,” in Allegory 
and Representation, ed. Stephen J. Greenblatt, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 
163–83.
59 For an American echo of the voices of Bakhtin and Vygotsky, see Stephen Toulmin, “The Inward-
ness of Mental Life,” Critical Inquiry 6 (Autumn 1979): 1–16. Very much in their spirit, Toulmin 
argues that “inner” and “outer” are not on either side of a great divide but that “the moral and 
emotional ambiguities of our inner lives are simply the moral and emotional ambiguities of our 
open lives internalized” (9).
60 Vygotsky, quoted in Ivanov, “The Significance of M.M. Bakhtin’s Ideas” 326.
61 Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, ma: 1971), 29–30.
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Invoking a rather primitive Marxism, Lukács also defines the novel as the 
opposite extreme: for him, the novel is the product of a fragmented world, 
a world in which the interior not only exists but is also maximally at odds 
with the exterior. It would appear that Lukács needed to posit a time when 
there was no gap between self and society, so that he might better describe by 
contrast the world in which, he thought, we now live.
Two decades after Lukács, Bakhtin addressed the issue of epic and novel 
in an essay that borrowed some of Lukács’s terminology but reversed al-
most entirely its ethical charge.62 For Bakhtin, the healthy individual in life 
is the one who can surmount — not deny — the gap, who can break down 
the barriers between inner and outer; likewise, the healthy artistic genre is 
the one that guarantees a non-coincidence between hero and environment. 
The gap so lamented by Lukács is seen, in Bakhtin’s “Epic and Novel,” as the 
beginning of dialogue, of temporal development, and of consciousness. The 
fullest realization of all three is the novel. For Bakhtin, then, the novel-epic 
distinction, though historically instantiated, is really trans-historical, a re-
lationship between different perceived qualities of time — or, as he would say, 
“chronotopes” — whenever in history they might occur. When he describes 
the epic narrative as taking place in an “absolute past” and novel time as truly 
novel, he is really drawing an ontological distinction. He is speaking of tem-
poral types that are always potential: whenever we talk about a world that 
does not know time, we are “epicking.”
And whenever we talk about a world that fully experiences time, we 
are “noveling.” The novel is alienated from epic wholeness. What results 
in Bakhtin’s construct, however, is not loneliness but freedom. Specifically, 
characters in novels experience the freedom to be more than their roles in 
given stories. The epic hero, by contrast, is inseparable from his plot; there is 
only one way his life could be lived.
Neither an epic nor a tragic hero could ever step out in his own character 
during a pause in the plot or during an intermission: he has no face for 
62 Bakhtin, “Epic and Novel: Toward a Methodology for the Study of the Novel” (1941), in The Dia-
logic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Holquist (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1981), 3–40. In this essay, Bakhtin posits three generic characteristics of 
the novel that free it from the strictures of epic: the novel is stylistically multi-languaged (“hetero-
glot”); it uses time in a way maximally open to the future; and it creates a new zone for structuring 
images, a zone maximally close to the present. As a result, novelistic heroes are never exhausted 
by their plots; there is always some other way they might have acted and some other way of un-
derstanding their actions. Epics can prophesy; novels only predict.
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it, no gesture, no language. In this is his strength and his limitation. The 
epic and tragic hero is the hero who, by his very nature, must perish.63 
Novelistic heroes, on the other hand, are like medieval fools on stage: their 
roles are temporary, their masks are not their selves. “These are heroes of 
free improvisation and not heroes of tradition, heroes of a life process that is 
imperishable and forever renewing itself, forever contemporary — these are 
not heroes of an absolute past.”64 A novelistic hero always has a “surplus of 
humanness” that is not embodied in his biography: thus “there always re-
mains in him unrealized potential and unrealized demands. […] There always 
remains a need for the future, and a place for this future must be found. All 
existing clothes are always too tight, and thus comical, on a man.”65 When 
we think away his roles, there is something left: that remainder, that non-
coincidence of self and social categories, that capacity to change into differ-
ent clothes, is freedom.
Novelists rejoice in subjects that are homeless, that is, free to develop. 
Novels also grant freedom for the author to develop, which is to say, freedom 
for the author to play with his own image on the plane of his own work. The 
reader (or, for that matter, the creator) of the Iliad cannot imagine himself 
chatting with Hector on the walls of Troy; epic heroes need neither audience 
nor author. But the writer of novels has an implicated voice. He can enter and 
manipulate, fuse or distribute his voice among characters. Or he can — and 
this requires an extra measure of commitment to freedom — grant autono-
my to his characters; he can create not just objects but full-fledged subjects. 
This was the “Copernican revolution” that Bakhtin had, in 1929, attributed 
to Dostoevsky. In Dostoevsky’s novels, the author is no longer the creator 
around whom characters are forced to revolve but is, so to speak, himself but 
a planet among planets. By the end of his life, Bakhtin had come to see this 
freedom as characteristic of all true novels. Or to put the point another way, 
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These, then, are the ways an awareness of the gap between inner and outer 
might function in both life and literature: as an index of individual con-
sciousness, as a measure of our escape from fixed plots and roles, as a prereq-
uisite for discourse itself. What now remains is for us to return to Foucault’s 
statement that language, de-privileged, is an instrument of man’s freedom. 
In light of this discussion, we can understand this freedom two ways, both 
valid and both linked to the persistent dichotomy between langue and parole, 
between the code and the message.
One way of understanding this freedom can be found in a passage from 
The Order of Things which argues that literature as such could emerge only 
when language was deprived of privilege and thus made self-conscious.66 
This being so, the purpose of literature could be seen as the preserving, and 
perhaps even the widening, of this self-consciousness. Through the artistic 
word we learn who we are. And that knowledge could be harnessed to utili-
tarian purposes, including, for example, the purpose Freud in “The Relation 
of the Poet to Day-Dreaming” attributes to literature. In that essay, Freud dis-
cusses poetry as a sort of fantasy-play for adults and suggests that our appe-
tite for art has at its base the desire to discharge guilt for such indulgence in 
play: “The true enjoyment of literature proceeds from the release of tensions 
in our minds.”67 Literature thus serves as a psychic safety valve, much as, in 
the Aristotelian view, catharsis serves as a social safety valve. In his role as 
psychoanalyst, Lacan would probably agree with Freud. If the acoustic im-
age is defined as the repressor of the concept, then human neuroses can be 
released through, and only through, their identification in the Word. Words 
have a purpose and a function: they are a code, they can pin down. Definition 
implies release, and therefore freedom.
In contrast, we might consider Freud’s essay as Vygotsky treats it in “Art 
and Psychoanalysis,” a chapter from his early work The Psychology of Art. In 
opposing what he considers a reduction of art, Vygotsky argues that Freud 
left largely unexplained the effects of the artwork on the audience. Moreover, 
Vygotsky contends, “such an interpretation of art reduces its social role; art 
begins to appear as an antidote whose task it is to save mankind from vice, 
but which has no positive tasks or purposes for man’s psyche.”68 Vygotsky be-
66 Foucault, The Order of Things, 299–300.
67 Sigmund Freud, “The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming,” trans. I. F. Grant Duff, On Creativity 
and the Unconscious: Papers on the Psychology of Art, Literature, Love, Religion, comp. Benjamin Nelson 
(New York: Harper, 1958), 54.
68 Lev Vygotsky, The Psychology of Art (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 1971), 79.
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gan his career as a teacher of literature. The affinities among language, litera-
ture, and psychology were never far from his mind, and in studying all three 
he raised the same question: How might man be kept from closing in on his 
self? One answer he gives is that we learn, through the word, who we are not, 
who we might yet become. It is precisely this positive task — not identifica-
tion but liberation — that is taken up by Foucault and by such philosophers 
of language as Paul de Man. In the modern era, Foucault writes in The Order 
of Things,
the name ceases to be the reward of language; it becomes instead its enig-
matic raw material.
This proper being of language is what the nineteenth century was to 
call the Word (le Verbe), as opposed to the Classical “verb”, whose function 
is to pin language, discreetly but continuously, to the being of representa-
tion. And the discourse that contains this being and frees it for its own 
sake is literature.69 
The same sentiments are echoed by de Man:
Here, […] consciousness does not result from the absence of something, 
but consists of the presence of a nothingness. Poetic language names this 
void with ever-renewed understanding and […] it never tires of naming it 
again. This persistent naming is what we call literature.70
The eternal and inevitable inadequacy of all names permits new meanings 
to happen and new messages to be created. This permission — or intermis-
sion — is Bakhtin’s novelistic gap, which not even the author can (nor should 
wish to) bridge. And it is the lack, the absence at the center, that keeps the 
outer word and our inner speech in permanent dialogue, out of that danger 
Bakhtin saw of collapse into single consciousness, which would be non-exist-
ence. Inside that gap, it is always worthwhile to try naming it again.
69 Foucault, The Order of Things, 118, 119.
70 Paul de Man, “Criticism and Crisis,” in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 18.







like”), has unpleasant 
overtones. It describes ob-
jects to which the observer no 
longer has a vital relationship and 
which are in the process of dying. They 
owe their preservation more to historical 
respect, than to the needs of the present. Museum 
and mausoleum are connected by more than phonetic 
association. Museums are like family sepulchers of works 
of art. They testify to the neutralization of culture. Art treasures 
are hoarded in them, and their market value leaves no room for 
pleasure of looking at them. Nevertheless, that pleasure is dependent on 
the existence of museums. Anyone who does not have his own collection 
(and the great private collections are becoming rare) can, for the most part, 
become familiar with painting and sculpture only in museums. When dis-
content with museums is strong enough to provoke the attempt to exhibit 
paintings in their original surroundings or in ones similar, in baroque or 
rococo castles, for instance, the result is even more distressing than when 
the works are wrenched from their original surroundings, and then brought 
together. Sensibility wrecks even more havoc with art than does the hodge-
podge of collections. With music, the situation is analogous. The programs of 
large concert societies, generally retrospective in orientation, have continu-
ally more in common with museums, while Mozart performed by candle-
light is degraded to a costume piece. In efforts to retrieve music from remote-
ness of the performance and to put it to immediate context of life there is 
not only something ineffectual but  also a tinge of industriously regressive 
spite. When some well-intentioned persons advised Mahler to darken the 
hall during the concert for the sake of the mood, the composer rightly replied 
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worthless. Such problems reveal something about the fatal situation of what 
is called “the cultural tradition.” Once tradition is no longer animated by a 
comprehensive substantial force, but has to be conjured up by means of cita-
tions, because “It’s important to have tradition,” then whatever happens to be 
left of it is dissolved into a means to an end. An exhibition of applied art only 
makes a mockery of what it pretends to conserve. Anyone who thinks that 
art can be reproduced in its original form through an act of will is trapped in 
hopeless romanticism. Modernizing the past does it much violence and lit-
tle good. But, to renounce radically the possibility of experiencing the tradi-
tion would be to capitulate to barbarism out of devotion to culture. That the 
world is out of joint is shown everywhere, in the fact that however a problem 
is solved, the solution is false.
One cannot be content, however, with the general recognition of a nega-
tive situation. An intellectual dispute, like the one on museums, must be 
fought out with specific arguments. Here two extraordinary documents are 
available, for the two authentic French poets of the last generation have ex-
pressed themselves on the question of the museum. Their positions are dia-
metrically opposed, but the statements are not directed polemically against 
each other, nor in fact does either betray any acquaintance of the other. In 
contribution to a volume of essays dedicated to Proust, Valéry emphasized 
that he was not very familiar with Proust’s novels. Valery’s remarks on mu-
seums are entitled “Le problème des musées” and appear in the volume of 
essays, Pièces sur l’art. The passage from Proust occurs in the third volume of 
A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs.
Valéry’s appeal is obviously directed against the confusing over abun-
dance of the Louvre. He is not, he writes overly fond of museums. The more 
marvelous the treasures which are preserved in them, the more do all delight 
disappear. The word Valéry uses, “délices,” is one of those which are utterly 
untranslatable. “Delicacies” sounds too journalistic, “joys,” too heavy and 
Wagnerian. “Delights” is perhaps closest to what is intended, but, none of 
these words express the faint reminiscence of feudal pleasure that has been 
associated with l’art pour l’art since Villiers de l’Isle Adam. The only echo of 
it in German is the “deliziös” (“delicious”) of the Rosenkavalier. In any case, in 
the Louvre, the seignorial Valéry feels himself constrained from the first by 
authoritarian gesture that takes away his cane and by the “No Smoking” sign. 
Cold confusion, he says reigns among the sculptures, a tumult of frozen crea-
tures, each of which demands non-existence of the others, disorder strangely 
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organized. Standing among the pictures offered for contemplation, Valéry 
mockingly observes that one is seized by a sacred awe: conversation is louder 
than in the church, softer than in real life. One does not know why one has 
come — in search of culture or enjoyment, in fulfillment of an obligation, in 
obedience to a convention. Fatigue and barbarism converge. Neither a hedon-
istic nor a rationalistic civilization could have constructed a house of such 
disparities. Dead visions are entombed there.
The ear, Valéry argues, which is further removed from music than the eye 
is from painting, can therefore harbour illusions, is better off — no one can 
ask it to listen to ten orchestras at once. Furthermore, the mind is certainly 
not capable of performing all possible operations simultaneously. Only the 
mobile eye is forced to apprehend in the same moment a portrait and a sea-
scape, a kitchen and a triumphal march, or, worst of all, styles of paintings 
completely incompatible with one another. The more beautiful a picture 
is, the more it is distinct from all others: it becomes a rare object, unique. 
This picture, one sometimes says, kills the ones around it. If this is forgotten, 
Valéry warns that the heritage of art will be destroyed. Just as man loses his 
abilities through excess of technical aids, so an excess of riches can impover-
ish him.
Valéry’s argumentation bears the stamp of cultural conservatism. He 
certainly did not concern himself with the critique of political economy. It 
is therefore all the more astounding that the aesthetic nerves which regis-
ter false wealth should react so precisely to the fact of over-accumulation. 
When he speaks of accumulation of excessive and therefore unusable capi-
tal, Valéry uses metaphorically an expression literally valid for the economy. 
Whether artists produce or rich people die, whatever happens is good for the 
museums. Like casinos, they cannot lose, and that is their curse.
For people become hopelessly lost in the galleries, isolated in the midst 
of so much art. The only other possible reaction to this situation is the one 
which Valéry sees as the general, ominous result of any and all progress in 
domination of material — increasing superficiality. Art becomes a matter of 
education and information: Venus becomes a document. Education defeats 
art. Nietzsche argues along very similar lines in his Untimely Meditation, “On 
the Use and Abuse of History for Life.” The shock of the museum brings Valé-
ry to historical-philosophical insight into the perishing of art works: there he 
says, we put the art of the past to death.
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Even afterwards, in the street, Valéry cannot free himself from the mag-
nificent chaos of the museum (a metaphor, one could say, for the anarchi-
cal production of commodities in fully developed bourgeois society), and 
he searches for the basis of his malaise. Painting and sculptures, the demon 
of knowledge tells him, are like abandoned children. “Their mother is dead, 
their mother, architecture. While she lived, she gave them their place, their 
definition. The freedom to wander was forbidden them. They had their place, 
their clearly defined lighting, their materials. Proper relations prevailed be-
tween them. While she was alive, they knew what they wanted. Farewell, the 
thought says to me, I will go no further.” With this romantic gesture, Valéry’s 
reflection ceases. By breaking it off, he avoids the otherwise inevitable con-
clusion of the radical cultural conservative: the renunciation of culture out 
of loyalty to it.
Proust’s view of the museum is woven most skillfully into the fabric of 
the Recherche du temps perdu. Only there can its meaning can be interpreted. 
Proust’s reflections, which represent a return to the techniques of the pre-
Flaubertian novel, are never mere observations on the material represented. 
They are bound up with it through subterranean associations and hence fall 
like the narrative itself, within the great aesthetic continuum of his inner 
dialogue. In speaking of his trip to the sea resort Balbec, Proust remarks on 
the caesura which voyages make in the course of life, by “leading us from one 
name to another name.” The caesuras are particularly manifested in railway 
stations, “these utterly peculiar places [...] which, so to speak, are not a part 
of the town and yet contain the essence of its personality as clearly as they 
bear its name on their signs.” Like everything surveyed by Proust’s memory, 
which seems to drain the intention out of its objects, the stations have be-
come historical archetypes and, as the archetypes of departure, tragic ones. 
Of the glass dome of the Gare St.-Lazare he writes: “Over a sprawling city it 
stretched its wide, wasted heaven full of ominous dramas. Certain skies of 
Mantegna or Veronese are as modern, almost Parisian — under such a vault-
ing sky only terrible and solemn things can happen, the departure of a train 
or the raising of the cross.”
The associative transition to the museum is left implicit in the novel: it 
is the picture of that station painted by Claude Monet, whom Proust loved 
passionately, which now hangs in the collection of the Jeu de Paume. Briefly, 
Proust compares the station to a museum. Both stand outside the framework 
of conventional pragmatic activity, and, one might add, both are bearers of 
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a death symbolism. In case of the station, it is the ancient symbolism of the 
voyage: in that of the museum, the symbolism associated with the work of 
art — “l’univers nouveau est périssable,” the new and fragile cosmos the art-
ist has created. Like Valéry, Proust returns again and again to the mortality of 
artifacts. What seems eternal, he says at another point, contains within itself 
the impulse of its own destruction. The decisive lines on the museum are 
contained in Proust’s physiognomy of the station. 
But in all areas our age is obsessed with the desire to bring things before 
our eyes in their natural surroundings and thus to suppress what is essen-
tial, the mental event that raised them out of those surroundings. Today, 
one “shows” a picture amidst furniture, small art objects, and curtains 
“of the epoch,” in a trivial decorative display produced by the hitherto 
ignorant lady of the house after having spent her days in archives and 
libraries. But the masterpiece observed during dinner no longer produces 
in us an exhilarating happiness that can be had only in a museum, where 
the rooms, in their sober abstinence from all decorative detail, symbol-
izes the inner spaces into which the artist withdraws to create the work.
It is possible to compare Proust’s thesis with Valéry’s because they share the 
presupposition that works of art should be enjoyed. Valéry speaks of “délic-
es,” Proust of “joie enivrante,” exhilarating joy. Nothing is more characteristic 
than the presupposition of the distance which not merely is present between 
the present generation and the previous one, but also between the German 
and the French attitudes towards art. As early as the writing of A l’ombre des 
jeunes filles en fleurs, the expression Kunstgenuß (“aesthetic pleasure”) must 
have sounded as touchingly philistine in German as a Wilhelm Busch 
rhyme. This aesthetic pleasure, furthermore, in which Valéry and Proust 
have as much faith as in a revered mother, has always been a questionable 
matter. For anyone who is close to the works of art, they are no more objects 
of delight than is his own breathing. Rather, he lives among them like a mod-
ern inhabitant of a medieval town who replies with a peremptory “yes, yes,” 
when a visitor remarks on the beauty of the buildings, but who knows every 
corner and portal. But it is only when the distance necessary for enjoyment 
to be possible is established between the observer and works of art that the 
question of their continuing vitality can arise. It would probably never occur 
to anyone who was at home with art and not a mere visitor. But since they 
452
extraterritorial objects
both continually reflect upon their own work as well as produce it, Valéry 
and Proust are certain of the pleasure which their works provide those on the 
outside. They agree even to the point of recognizing something of the mor-
tal enmity which exists among works and which accompanies the pleasure 
of competition. Far from recoiling before it, however, Proust affirms this en-
mity, as though he were as German as Charlus affects to be. For him, competi-
tion among works is the test of truth. Schools, he writes at one point in Sodom 
and Gomorrah, devour each other like microorganisms and ensures through 
their struggle the survival of life. This dialectical attitude, which transcends 
fixation on the individual as such, brings Proust into conflict with Valéry, 
the artiste. It makes his perverse tolerance of museums possible, whereas for 
Valéry, the duration of the individual work is the crucial problem.
The criterion of duration is the here and now, the present moment. For 
Valéry, art is lost when it has relinquished its place in the immediacy of life, 
in its functional context: for him, the ultimate question is that of the possible 
use of the work of art. The craftsman in him fashions poems with the preci-
sion of contour which embodies attention to the surroundings, has become 
infinitely sensitive to the place of the work of art, including its intellectual 
setting, as though the painter’s feelings for perspective were intensified in 
him to a feeling for the perspective of reality, in which it becomes possible 
for the work to have depth. His artistic standpoint is that of immediacy, but 
is driven to the most audacious consequences. He follows the principle of art 
for art’s sake to the verge of its negation. He makes the pure work of art the 
object of absolute, unwavering contemplation, but he scrutinizes it so long, 
and so intensely that he comes to see that the object of such pure contempla-
tion must wither and degenerate to commercialized decoration, robbed of 
the dignity in which both its raison d’être and Valéry’s consist. The pure work 
is threatened by reification and neutralization. This is the recognition that 
overwhelms him in the museum. He discovers that the only pure works, the 
only works that can sustain serious observation, are the impure ones, which 
do not exhaust themselves in that observation but point beyond, towards a 
social context. And since, with the incorruptibility of the great rationalist, 
Valéry must recognize that this stage of art is irrevocably past, there is noth-
ing left for the anti-rationalist and Bergonian in him but to mourn for works, 
as they turn into relics.
Proust, the novelist, virtually begins where Valéry, the poet, stopped 
— with the afterlife of works of art. For Proust’s primary relationship to art 
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is the precise opposite of that of the expert and producer. He if first of all 
an admiring consumer, an amateur, inclined to that effusive and for artists 
highly suspect awe before works that characterizes only those separated 
from them as though by an abyss. One could almost say that his genius con-
sisted not least of all in assuming this attitude (which is also that of the man 
who conducts himself as a spectator even in life) so completely and accu-
rately that it became a new type of productivity, and the power of inner and 
outer contemplation, thus intensified, turned into recollection, involuntary 
memory. The amateur is incomparably more comfortable in the museum 
than is the expert. Valéry feels himself at home in the studio: Proust strolls 
through an exhibition. There is something exterritorial about his relation to 
art, and many of his false judgments, as in questions of music, displays traces 
of dilettante to the end (what, for instance, has the conciliatory kitsch of his 
friend, Reynaldo Hahn, to do with Proust’s novel, where each sentence puts 
an established attitude out of business with remorseless gentleness). But he 
moulded this weakness into an instrument of strength, as only Kafka could. 
However naïve his enthusiastic judgments of individual works of art, espe-
cially those of the Italian Renaissance, may sound, in comparison to Valéry’s, 
he was far less naïve in his relation to art as such. To speak of naïveté in an art-
ist like Valéry, in whom the process of artistic production is so indissolubly 
merged with reflection upon the process, may sound like a provocation. But 
he was in fact naïve in having no doubts about the category of the work of 
art as such. He took it for granted, and the force of his thought, his historical-
philosophical energy, increased as a result. The category becomes the crite-
rion in terms of which Valéry can see changes in the internal structure of 
works of art and in the way they are experienced. Proust, however, is entirely 
free of unconditional fetishism of the artist who makes things himself. For 
him works of art are from the outset something more than their specific aes-
thetic qualities. They are a part of the life of the person who observes them: 
they become an element of his consciousness. He thus perceives a level in 
them very different from that of the formal laws of the work. It is a level set 
free only by the historical development of the work, a level which has as its 
premise death of the living intention of work. Proust’s naïveté is a second 
naïveté. At every stage of consciousness a new and broader immediacy arises. 
Whereas, Valéry’s conservative belief in culture as a pure thing in itself af-
fords incisive criticism of a culture which tends by its very historical nature 
to destroy everything self-subsistent, Proust’s most characteristic mode of 
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perception, his extraordinary sensitivity to changes in the modes of experi-
ence, has as its paradoxical result the ability to perceive history as a land-
scape. He adores museums as though they were God’s true creations, which 
in Proust’s metaphysics is never complete but always occurring anew in each 
concrete experience, each original artistic intuition. In his marveling eye he 
has preserved something out of his childhood: Valéry, by contrast, speaks of 
art like an adult. If Valéry understands something of the power of history 
over the production and apperception of art, Proust knows that even within 
the works of art themselves history rules like a process of disintegration. “Ce 
qu’on appelle la postérité, c’est la postérité de l’œuvre” might well be trans-
lated as, “What is called posterity is the afterlife of the work.” In the artifact’s 
capacity for disintegration Proust sees its similarity to natural beauty. He rec-
ognizes the physiognomy of decomposing things as that of their second life. 
Because nothing has substance for him but what has already been mediated 
by memory, his love dwells on the second life, the one which is already over, 
rather than on the first. For Proust’s aestheticism the question of aesthetic 
quality is of secondary concern. In a famous passage he glorified inferior 
music for the sake of the listener’s memories, which are preserved with far 
more fidelity and force in an old popular song than in self-sufficiency of a 
work by Beethoven. The saturnine gaze of memory penetrates the veil of 
culture. Once they are no longer isolated as domains of the objective mind, 
but are drawn into the stream of subjectivity, distinctions between the levels 
of culture lose their pathetic quality that Valéry’s heresies constantly accord 
them. Valéry takes offense at the chaotic aspect of the museum, because it 
distorts the works’ expressive realization: for Proust this chaos assumes trag-
ic character. For him it is only the death of the work of art in the museum 
which brings it to life. When severed from the living order in which it func-
tioned, according to him, its true spontaneity is released—it’s uniqueness, 
its “name,” that which makes the great works of culture more than culture. 
Proust’s attitude preserves, in adventurously sophisticated form, the saying 
from Ottilie’s journal in Goethe’s Elective Affinities: “Everything perfect of its 
kind must go beyond its kind,” a highly un-classical thought, which does art 
the honor of relativizing it.
Yet anyone who is not satisfied with intellectual history alone must face 
the question: Who is right, the critic of the museum or its defender? For Valé-
ry the museum is a place of barbarism. His conviction of sanctity of culture 
(which he shares with Mallarmé) underlies this judgment. Since this religion 
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of spleen provokes so much opposition, including objections with a simplis-
tic social orientation, it is important to affirm its moment of truth. Only what 
exists for its own sake, without regard to those to whom it is supposed to 
please, can fulfill its human end. Few things have contributed so greatly to 
dehumanization as has the universal human belief that products of the mind 
are justified, only in so far as they exist for men-the belief itself bears wit-
ness to the dominance of manipulative rationality. Valéry was able to show 
the objective character, the immanent coherence of the work in contrast to 
the contingency of the subject with such incomparable authority, because 
he gained his insight through subjective experience of the discipline of the 
artist’s work. In this he was unquestionably superior to Proust: incorruptible, 
he had greater resistance. In contrast, the primacy that Proust assigns to the 
flux of experience and his refusal to tolerate anything fixed and determinate 
have a sinister aspect — conformity, the ready adjustment to changing situ-
ations which he shares with Bergson. Proust’s work contains passages on art 
which approach in unbridled subjectivism, the philistine attitude that turns 
the work into a battery of projective tests. In contrast, Valéry occasionally 
complains — and hardly without irony — that there are no tests which can 
determine the quality of a poem. Proust says in the second volume of Le temps 
retrouvé, that the work is a kind of optical instrument offered to the reader, in 
order that he makes self-discoveries perhaps not otherwise possible. Proust’s 
arguments in favor of museums also have as their point of reference not the 
thing itself, but the observing subject. It is not coincidental that it is some-
thing subjective, the abrupt act of production in which the work becomes 
something different from reality, that Proust considers to be preserved in the 
work’s afterlife in the museum. For him, the moment of production is reflect-
ed in the same isolation of the work that Valéry considers its stigma. Proust, 
in his unfettered subjectivism, is untrue to objectifications of the spirit, but it 
is only this subjectivism that enables him to break through the immanence 
of culture.
In the litigation implicitly pending between them, neither Proust nor 
Valéry is right, nor could a middle-of-the-road reconciliation be arranged. 
The conflict between them points up in the most penetrating way a con-
flict in the matter itself, and each takes the part of one moment in the truth 
which lies in the unfolding of contradiction. The fetishism of the object and 
the subject’s infatuation with itself finds their correctives in each other. Each 
position passes over into the other. Valéry becomes aware of the intrinsic be-
456
extraterritorial objects
ing of the work through unremitting self-reflection, and, inversely, Proust’s 
subjectivism looks to art for the ideal, the salvation of the living. In opposi-
tion to culture and through culture, he represents negativity, criticism, the 
spontaneous act that is not content with mere existence. Thus he does justice 
to the works of art, which can be called art only by virtue of the fact that they 
embody the quintessence of this spontaneity. Proust holds on to the culture 
for the sake of objective happiness, whereas, Valéry’s loyalty to the objective 
demands of the work forces him to give up culture for lost. Just as they both 
represent contradictory moments of truth, so both, the two most knowledge-
able men to have written about art in recent times, have their limits, without 
which, in fact, their knowledge would not have been possible. Quite obvi-
ously Valéry agrees with his teacher, Mallarmé in finding, as he wrote in his 
essay “The Triumph of Manet,” that existence and things are here only to be 
devoured by art, that the world exists to produce a beautiful book and finds 
its fulfillment in an absolute poem. He also saw clearly the escape to which 
poésie pure aspired. “Nothing leads so surely to complete barbarism,” another 
of his essays begins, “as complete absorption in what is purely spiritual.” And 
his own attitude, the elevation of art to idolatry, did in fact contribute to the 
process of reification and dilapidation, which, according to Valéry’s accusa-
tion, art undergoes in museums. For it is only in the museum, where paint-
ings are offered for contemplation as ends in themselves, that they become 
as absolute as Valéry desired, and he shrinks back in terror from realization 
of his dream. Proust knows the cure for this. In a sense works of art return 
home when they become elements of the observer’s subjective stream of con-
sciousness. Thus, they renounce their cultic prerogative and are freed of the 
usurpatory aspect which characterized them in heroic aesthetics of Impres-
sionism. But, by the same token Proust overestimates the act of freedom in 
art, as would an amateur. Often, almost in the manner of a psychiatrist, he 
understands the work all too much as a reproduction of the internal life of 
the person who had the good fortune and the misfortune to produce it or 
enjoy it. He fails to take full account of the fact that even in the very moment 
of its conception the work confronts its author and its audience as some-
thing objective, something which makes demands in terms of its own inner 
structure and its own logic. Like artists’ lives, their works appear “free” only 
when seen from the outside. The work is neither a reflection of the soul, nor 
embodiment of a Platonic Idea. It is not pure being, but rather a “force field” 
between the subject and the object. The objective necessity of which Valéry 
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speaks is realized only through an act of subjective spontaneity, which Proust 
makes the sole repository of all meaning and happiness.
It is not merely because protestations of culture against barbarism go un-
heard that Valéry’s campaign against museums has a quixotic aspect — hope-
less protests are nevertheless necessary. But Valéry is a bit too ingenuous in 
his suspicion that museums alone are responsible for what is done to paint-
ings. Even if they hung in their old places in the castles of the aristocrats 
(with whom Proust is in any case more concerned than is Valéry), they would 
be museum pieces without museums. What eats away at the life of the art 
work is also its own life. If Valéry’s coquettish allegory compares paintings 
and sculptures to children who have lost their mothers, one must remember 
that in myth the heroes, who represent emancipation of the humans from 
fate, always lost to their mothers. Works of art can fully embody the promesse 
du Bonheur, only when they have been uprooted from their native soil and 
have set out along the path to their own destruction. Proust recognized this. 
The procedure which today relegates every work of art to the museum, even 
Picasso’s most recent sculpture, is irreversible. It is not solely reprehensible, 
however, for it presages a situation in which art, having completed its es-
trangement from human ends, returns, in Novalis’s words, to life. One senses 
something of this in Proust’s novel, where physiognomies of paintings and 
people glide into one another almost without a break and memory traces of 
experiences fuse with those of musical passages. In one of the most explicit 
passages of the work, the description of falling asleep on the first page of Du 
côté de chez Swann, the narrator says, “It seemed to me that I was the thing the 
book was about: a church, a quartet, the rivalry between Francis the First and 
Charles the Fifth.” This is the reconciliation of that split which Valéry so ir-
reconcilably laments. The chaos of cultural goods fades into bliss of the child, 
whose body feels itself at once with the nimbus of distance.
The museums will not be shut, nor would it even be desirable to shut 
them. The natural-history collections of the spirit have actually transformed 
works of art into hieroglyphics of history, and brought them a new content, 
while the old one shriveled up. No conception of pure art, borrowed from the 
past and yet inadequate to it, can be offered to offset this fact. No one knew 
this better than Valéry, who broke off his reflections because of it. Yet, mu-
seums certainly emphatically demanded something of the observer, just as 
every work of art does. For the flaneur, in whose shadow Proust walked, is also 
a thing of the past, and it is no longer possible to stroll through museums, 
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letting oneself be delighted here and there. The only relation to art that can 
be sanctioned in reality that stands under the constant threat of catastrophe 
is one that treats the works of art with the same deadly seriousness that char-
acterizes the world today. The evil Valéry diagnoses can be avoided only by 
the one who leaves his naïveté outside, along with his cane and his umbrella, 
who knows exactly what he wants, picks out two or three paintings, and 
concentrates on them as fixedly, as if they really were idols. Some museums 
are helpful in this respect. In addition to light and air they have adopted the 
principle of selection that Valéry declared to be guiding one of his schools 
and that he missed in museums. In the Jeu de Paume, where the Gare St.-Lazare 






about space and time 
in the entire history of 
philosophy occurred in the 
Leibniz–Clarke correspondence 
of 1715–1716.1 The English clergyman 
Samuel Clarke, acting as a surrogate for his 
friend Isaac Newton, made the case for space 
and time as absolute, empty containers in which 
objects reside and events unfold. The great German phi-
losopher and polymath Leibniz countered that it is mean-
ingless to ask whether the universe could have been created ten 
minutes earlier than it was, or forty meters further to the west than it 
was; there is no external spatial or temporal measuring stick that would 
allow us to claim that everything has been moved as a whole. Instead, space 
and time for Leibniz emerge from the relations between entities, thus paving 
the way for Einstein’s breakthrough nearly two centuries later.
It seems to me that the views of both Leibniz and Clarke are wrong, even 
if I feel much closer to Leibniz. Space cannot be relational, for the simple 
reason that it is both relational and non-relational. If space is where things 
meet, it is also where they stand at a distance from each other. At this mo-
ment we are obviously in relation with Cairo and Tokyo by standing at a 
certain measurable distance from them, yet we are also not in relation with 
them insofar as they currently exceed our grasp. It takes work to travel to 
Egypt or Japan, and even once we arrive we will not have exhausted their 
many secrets. Insofar as relation means contact, space is the zone of both con-
tact and non-contact. If objects engage in spatial relations, then at the same 
time they also withdraw from these relations into a private inner life that 
might be described as subspatial rather than outside space in the manner of 
God. With time it is different: here a relational approach is more successful, 
 This text was first presented at an Exterritory Project Symposium, May 8, 2012, Jaffa, Israel.







though it must be a different sort of relational approach than Leibniz had in 
mind. To explain both of these claims, it is first necessary to give a brief ac-
count of object-oriented philosophy.
1. two kinds of objects
For Edmund Husserl, phenomenology was a way to root philosophy in un-
shakeable immediate evidence. The natural sciences may have greater social 
prestige in our time than philosophy, but the sciences give us mediated theo-
ries rather than direct evidence of their subject matter. For example, physics 
demonstrates that a mailbox like all physical things is made up of quarks and 
electrons, or perhaps of tiny vibrating ten-dimensional strings. Yet none of 
us have ever seen such minuscule particles. However solid the evidence for 
their existence may be, for Husserl such evidence must ultimately be ground-
ed in phenomenological experience, the only source of direct insight we 
have. Instead of reducing the mailbox downward to the unseen corpuscles 
of which it is built, we can instead describe our experience of the mailbox in 
intimate detail, finding ever-subtler perceptual layers and increasingly shad-
owy dimensions in our experience of it. Philosophy suspends or “brackets” 
all consideration of a real material world, and becomes instead a painstaking 
description of the phenomenal. The price Husserl pays for this maneuver is 
a deeply idealist conception of philosophy, in which nothing exists except as 
the actual or potential target of some observing consciousness. Even if the 
mind is always already outside itself, pointing at objects, these objects are 
still just phenomena in consciousness, not real autonomous entities that 
lead an independent life outside of being recognized or perceived by us.
But Husserl is not a typical idealist. When reading Husserl (just as when 
reading Maurice Merleau-Ponty), he so often feels like a realist. Husserl feels 
like he is discussing the autonomous existence of mailboxes, blackbirds, 
and battles of centaurs, even though for phenomenology these objects exist 
only as correlates of our consciousness. The reason for this is that despite 
being an idealist, Husserl is almost certainly the first object-oriented idealist 
in the history of philosophy. His teacher Franz Brentano paved the way for 
phenomenology by reviving the medieval concept of “intentionality.”2 The 
2 Franz Brentano, Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint, trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and L. 
McALister (London: Routledge, 1995).
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difference between mental acts and physical events, says Brentano, is that 
mental acts always aim at some object. To hear is to hear something; to wish 
is to wish for something; to judge is to judge about something; to hate is to 
hate something or someone. This is sometimes misinterpreted to mean that 
consciousness always points at some object in the outside world, and that has 
led in later years to misunderstandings about the meaning of the term “in-
tentionality.” Yet Brentano is quite clear that intentionality means immanent 
objectivity. Conscious acts are aimed at objects inside, not outside, the mind. 
This is already obvious if we consider that it is possible to perceive halluci-
nations, wish for non-existent things, make judgments about the powers of 
non-existent monsters, or fall in love with charlatans and frauds.
Brentano’s philosophical psychology was focused on what is immanent 
in the mind. But that left open the question of how this immanent sphere re-
lated to any outside world. A clean and candid solution to this problem was 
attempted by Brentano’s exceptional Polish student Kazimierz Twardowski, 
who doubled up the world into an object outside the mind and a content inside 
the mind.3 Also among Brentano’s students at the time was the older but green-
er ex-mathematician Edmund Husserl. Husserl never liked Twardowski’s ap-
proach, since it seemed to make our knowledge a mere phenomenal knowl-
edge of content, unable to grasp the object itself. In Husserl’s famous example, 
the Berlin of which I speak is the same Berlin that exists in the real world; 
there are not two Berlins. Yet what is often overlooked is that Husserl did not 
simply eliminate Twardowski’s distinction between object and content. In-
stead, he preserved both terms while collapsing them into the phenomenal 
realm of consciousness. Phenomenology does not consider the phenomenal 
world to be made up solely of content. Instead, experience shows a constant 
tension between object and content within the phenomenal universe. This is 
surely Husserl’s greatest philosophical insight, and we can explain what it 
means by contrasting it with what empiricism says about objects.
David Hume famously claimed that there is no such thing as unified “ob-
jects” in experience. What we call a grapefruit, for instance, is really just a 
“bundle of qualities.” We experience such qualities as spherical, soft, spongy, 
pulpy, sour, yellow or pink, and internally sectioned. Our only immediate ex-
perience is of these discrete qualities. From seeing these qualities go together 
3 Kasimir Twardowski, On the Content and Object of Presentations: A Psychological Investigation, trans. R. 
Grossmann (Dordrecht: Springer, 1977).
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regularly, we form the habit of thinking that there are things called grapefruit 
in the world, when in fact we only have evidence of qualities. This empiricist 
dogma is often subtly adopted even by those who are not otherwise followers 
of Hume. We still find traces of it in Brentano and Twardowski, especially the 
latter when he describes experience as made up of “content,” which really 
means the same thing as “qualities.” Husserl’s most remarkable gesture was 
to treat the whole intentional object as prior to its parts. What we experi-
ence is not a “bundle of qualities,” but simply a grapefruit, and the grapefruit 
dominates those qualities as if they were its servants or satellites or mindless 
drones. The grapefruit can be rotated in my hand, showing different qualities 
at different moments, yet I never cease to think of it as the same grapefruit. I 
can view the fruit from behind, from a greater or lesser distance, first in full 
sunlight and later in shadow. In all these cases the grapefruit shows different 
aspects, and is therefore a different “bundle of qualities,” yet it does not cease 
to be the same grapefruit. In fact, this is the very meaning of what Husserl 
calls “eidetic reduction.” By varying our perceptions of an object, either ex-
perientially or more often through imagination, we strip away the inessential 
qualities and arrive at those absolutely necessary qualities that the grapefruit 
cannot lose without ceasing to be this very grapefruit that it is. The fruit is 
not a bundle of qualities, but a nucleus that can support many variations in 
qualities — many Abschattungen or “adumbrations,” as Husserl puts it. 
And yet, the essential and inessential qualities of the grapefruit turn out 
to be of two vastly different kinds. First, there are the phenomenal qualities 
of the grapefruit: the exact pinkish or yellow hue of its interior; the precise 
sponginess of the spherical fruit as I squeeze it in my hand; the soft deadness 
of sound as I snap it repeatedly with a fingernail; the wise and somber appear-
ance of the fruit as it sits in the bowl of a still life painter. Since all of these 
qualities belong to the immanent phenomenal realm, we might call them 
intentional qualities. But for various reasons, I prefer to call them sensual 
qualities. These sensual qualities are the accidental chaff that shifts atop the 
surface of any object, whirling like a kaleidoscope without changing the un-
derlying object. Husserl speaks for example of “my friend Hans,” who can be 
encountered in just about any physical posture and suit of clothing without 
changing the identity of Hans himself.4 These are sensual qualities. The sen-




sual object is not “hidden” behind them, since we always have direct contact 
with Hans or a grapefruit simply through the fact of acknowledging their 
presence. Instead, these sensual qualities are encrusted on the surface of the 
sensual object like feathers and rhinestones on a carnival samba dancer, who 
always remains the same dancer despite the wildest gyrations.
But the truly pivotal qualities of a sensual object are not like this. Hus-
serl admits that they cannot be perceived through the senses at all, but only 
through an intellectual or categorial act. It is not as if we perceived one mil-
lion qualities on a level playing field and then chose three or four of them as 
the most important. Instead, all of the sensual qualities of a sensual object 
turn out to be inessential. The essential or eidetic qualities of an object are 
buried at a sub-sensual level, graspable only by the intellect. Oddly enough, 
this entails that the sensual object does not just have sensual qualities, but 
also has real qualities as well. This turns out to be rather paradoxical once we 
have taken a look at Heidegger, as we are now about to do.
Heidegger is famous for asking the question of the meaning of being, 
which is nowhere near as obscure as it sounds. His own innovations are 
aimed against the idealism of Husserl’s view that reality is based in phenom-
enal presence to the conscious mind. Beginning in his first lecture course at 
the age of twenty-nine, Heidegger explains that for the most part, our way 
of dealing with things is not explicitly conscious of them.5 My minimal con-
scious activity in any given moment is rooted in a gigantic empire of items 
taken for granted: the oxygen I breathe, the ground that is currently free of 
earthquakes, the heart and lungs and kidneys that keep me alive, the Eng-
lish grammar I have now mastered and no longer struggle with — all of these 
things tend to vanish unnoticed into the background as long as they are func-
tioning efficiently. This, of course, is the famous tool-analysis, first published 
in 1927 in Being and Time.6 The hammer and the bus route tend to remain 
invisible unless they malfunction. This is not just true of widely recognized 
hand tools such as screwdrivers, wrenches, and axes. Instead, all objects are 
caught up in a reversal between silent functionality and explicit visibility.
This is generally taken to mean that for Heidegger all conscious theory 
is grounded in unconscious praxis. But this interpretation is superficial, 
since there is a deeper sense in which theory and praxis are the same. In Hei-
5 Martin Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, trans. T. Sadler (London: Continuum, 2008).




degger’s account, what happens when we hold a hammer and stare at it is 
that we have oversimplified the hammer. That is to say, we have reduced it 
to a tiny selection of its vast qualitative reality; the hammer has been turned 
into a caricature, a distortion, or at least a translation. But notice that exactly 
the same thing happens when we simply use a hammer rather than staring 
at it. To touch the hammer unconsciously does not exhaust its reality any 
more than staring at it does. The hand is just as finite as the eye. Dogs and 
mosquitoes notice fleeting nuances of smell in the hammer that I myself will 
never detect. In other words, the supposedly mighty theory/praxis distinc-
tion isn’t much of a distinction at all, at least not when it comes to ontology. 
Both conscious and unconscious human activity are equally guilty of fail-
ing to exhaust the reality of whatever they confront. The reality of objects is 
something deeper than either theoretical or practical human contact.
But this can be pushed one step further to demonstrate that inanimate 
objects caricature, translate, and distort each other as well. The inability to 
touch the full depths of any given thing is not just some poignant feature of 
human finitude. Instead, objects fail to grasp each other just as much as we 
fail to grasp them. Fire burns a cotton ball without ever having made contact 
with the color or smell of this cotton, stupidly limited as it is to the cotton’s 
flammable features. Once we realize this, the philosophy of the human sub-
ject is in deeper peril than ever before. But since this theme is a digression 
from the topic of space and time, it can be left for another occasion.
Heidegger dislikes like the term “object,” which he uses negatively for 
things reduced to appearances in human consciousness. Nor does he always 
think that the world is made up of a plurality of things, since he generally 
treats the world of tool-beings as a global relational system in which each 
thing gains reality from its reference to other things, and thus all things turn 
into a gigantic relational whole. But we don’t need to follow him in either of 
these claims. The fact that individual entities can break for Heidegger means 
that they must have some private surplus deeper than the system of equip-
ment. And there is no reason not to call them “objects” simply because Hei-
degger happens not to like that word; it has a long and admirable tradition, 
and was central to early phenomenology.
In Husserl’s case we spoke of sensual objects. These are always directly 
before us rather than hidden or withdrawn; they are simply encrusted with 
superfluous information that must be stripped away to reach the truly es-
sential features of the thing. If I perceive a mailbox, the sensual mailbox is di-
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rectly there in front of me as soon as I acknowledge it, not “hidden” behind all 
the confusing details on its surface. But there is also the real mailbox, deeper 
than any access to it, and the sensual mailbox is merely a translation of it. 
This real object is withdrawn from relation, deeper than any contact that 
animate or inanimate objects might have with it. And since real objects are a 
surplus beyond any relation they might have with other entities, it remains 
a mystery how they can make contact at all. Causation and influence more 
generally can only be indirect, never direct, and this is why I have called for 
a theory of “vicarious causation.”7 But once again, this theme is peripheral to 
the main topic of the lecture and can be left to another occasion.
Earlier, we saw that Husserl’s sensual objects were in tension with two dif-
ferent kinds of qualities: the sensual, accidental qualities that shift and swirl 
from one moment to the next without affecting the object to which they be-
long, and the real qualities that the object can never lose without falling out 
of existence. The same dual set of qualities can be found in Heidegger’s real 
objects. Consider any entity insofar as it is exists outside its relations, purely 
in its own right. Hammers, volcanoes, cargo ships, and birds cannot simply 
generate their individual qualities for the first time as soon as they come into 
contact with something else. The reason our encounters with each of these 
things is so different is because they all have their own qualities from the 
start. If each of them did not have its own qualities, then they would all be 
completely indistinguishable; all would be featureless perceptual lumps. For 
this reason, real objects must have real qualities. But at the same time, real ob-
jects can also announce their presence through sensual qualities, as happens 
for instance in the case of Heidegger’s broken tool. The hammer that breaks 
is never directly before us. What we have instead are a specific shape, a grainy 
wooden texture, a partially damaged steel head — all of them sensual quali-
ties in tension with an absent real hammer-object.
We now come to the goal of all these discussions of Husserl and Hei-
degger. Namely, there are two kinds of objects: not just autonomous things 
outside consciousness, but also durable units that sustain many changes 
inside consciousness. Stated more simply, there are real objects and sensual 
objects. There are also two kinds of qualities: the sensual qualities that we 
experience directly, and the real qualities that can never be sensed, but only 
hinted at by some of intellectual, categorical act that (in my view if not Hus-
7 Graham Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” Collapse 2 (2007), 171–205.
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serl’s) can never make these real qualities directly accessible to the mind. 
These considerations lead us to see that there is a fourfold structure of real 
objects, real qualities, sensual objects, and sensual qualities. And though four 
terms can usually be paired up in six different ways, if we consider only those 
cases in which objects are in tension with their qualities, then we also have 
just four possible pairings to consider here: real objects with real or sensual 
qualities, and sensual objects with real or sensual qualities. The reason this is 
relevant to us here is because these four tensions can be redescribed as time, 
space, essence, and eidos, as can be clarified easily enough. When we speak 
of a real thing in relation to its real qualities, the traditional name for this is 
essence, and there is no reason not to preserve this term (though it is has long 
been under assault for reasons that do not concern us here). And as for eidos, 
this is the term Husserl used for the relation a sensual object has with its real 
qualities, accessible only to the intellect.
That leaves us with sensual qualities and the relations they have to the 
two kinds of objects. And I hold that these relations are the metaphysical 
root of space and time. What leads us, for instance, to feel the passing flow 
of time? Whatever the neurological reason might be, the phenomenological 
reason is a sense of change within stability. The world does not seem to be 
reinvented anew at each instant. Instead, candles flicker and trees sway in 
the wind; dogs walk and trains rush past. If objects were really just bundles of 
qualities that changed completely in each instant, there would be no conti-
nuity from one moment to the next. But the sense that time is passing is con-
nected with the relative durability of units that support shifting perceptual 
configurations — the flame that remains the same flame for us amidst all its 
contortions in the wind; the dog that remains the same dog no matter the 
angle or distance from which we view him. This is time. Time is not an in-
dependent cosmic force driving things through some sort of flux or “becom-
ing” irreducible to individual states. Instead, time is more like a distracting 
noise emitted by individual states which serves to mask the fact that quite 
often nothing is really happening. If the tension between real objects and 
their real qualities is called essence, that between sensual objects and their 
sensual qualities is the purely inessential, or the accidental. Time, in the sense 
of our experience of the flow of time, is thus the kingdom of the inessential, 
the site where nothing has happened yet. Turn an apple in your hand and 
toss it into the air; view it from five meters rather than three; polish the ap-
ple a bit more. It hardly matters. An object is not a bundle of qualities, and 
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therefore an object is not affected by any of the trivial fluctuations on the 
surface of that bundle.
But what about space? We said earlier that, contra Leibniz, space is not 
the site of relation, but of both relation and non-relation. Real objects cannot 
relate directly, since they withdraw behind all possibility of direct contact. 
But indirect content is inevitable, since objects do evidently affect each other. 
Sensual qualities are the ambassadors or emissaries of real objects that never 
meet in person. Consider once again our experience of a broken hammer. Its 
various damaged qualities lie directly before us, subject to our inspection. Yet 
the hammer itself is not here. It is, or was, something over and above these 
qualities — a formerly operative unit deeper than all its qualities. The ham-
mer is not present in consciousness but belongs to a different place, even 
though it still makes contact with us through the medium of its sensual 
qualities. If space is the tension between distance and nearness, then there is 
no better exemplar of this than an object that withdraws from direct contact 
even while leaving its qualities behind to confront us directly. In terms of 
object-oriented philosophy, space and time are the two tensions concerned 
with sensual qualities, just as essence and eidos pertain to real qualities. Let’s 
see if this can tell us anything about the subtemporal and subspatial charac-
ter of objects. 
2. space and time
Treating space and time as different dimensions of reality seems to run coun-
ter to twentieth-century physics. Four-dimensional space-time was implicit 
in Einstein’s special relativity and openly proclamied by Hermann Minkows-
ki in 1907, and has enjoyed an illustrious career in physics ever since.8 But 
we cannot tether philosophical speculation to the state of the sciences at any 
given moment; science must be an inspiration for philosophy rather than a 
straitjacket. Consider the views of Lee Smolin, who in The Life of the Cosmos 
laments the days when philosophers actually challenged the sciences, and in 
The Trouble with Physics shares his hunch that space and time might need to 
be de-coupled again for further progress in physics to occur. Philosophy must 
be free to speculate about space and time on the basis of its own internal con-
8 Hermann Minkowski, “Space and Time,” in The Principle of Relativity, ed. Albert Einstein et al. (Mi-
neola: Dover, 1952), 73–91.
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cerns. Who is to say what the physics of a half-century from now will look 
like, and whether it will continue to function so independently of metaphys-
ics as it has for the past fifty years.
From mapping the two kinds of objects and two kinds of qualities, it 
turned out that they yield the four tensions of time, space, essence, and ei-
dos. What time and space have in common is their link with sensual rather 
than real qualities. And what is most characteristic of sensual qualities is their 
purely accidental nature. For Husserl, since the mailbox or the blackbird is not 
a bundle of qualities, these sensual objects do not need any particular con-
figuration of qualities in order to be what they are. We can watch the black-
bird fly from any number of angles and distances and under any imaginable 
lighting conditions (twilight, sunrise, under strobe lights or illumined with 
lasers) and we look straight through these variations at the blackbird as an 
underlying unit of our experience. And for Heidegger, since real objects such 
as hammers are deeper than any of their sensual manifestations, the hammer 
cannot be identified either with the specific details of its shattering, its pre-
cise obtrusive heaviness, the exact arbitrary color of its handle, or other such 
features. The hammer announces itself through breaking and calling atten-
tion to various qualities that announce it, but the hammer is never built out 
of these visible qualities. Instead, it withdraws into subterranean shadows 
that no gaze can even partially penetrate. It is quite different with real quali-
ties, such as the essence of a concealed hammer or the eidos of an apple or 
pear experienced by consciousness. In both cases these qualities are essential 
to the objects in question, and hence there is no room for maneuver. Change 
the real qualities of a real or sensual object and you have quite simply de-
stroyed that object and turned it into something else. But space and time are 
concerned only with the inessential, and paradoxically, this gives them a tre-
mendous degree of power. Insofar as the sensual qualities of a real or sensual 
object shift wildly within a wide range of variation, these sensual qualities 
are the sole emissaries of change in the world.
It is a deeply classical principle, in the good sense of classical, that noth-
ing can change its essence but everything can change its accidents. Insofar 
as we want to discover how change occurs in the world, or what prevents 
the world from becoming a static garden of unmoving statues, we need to 
look at the sensual or the inessential. A related principle has been familiar in 
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sociology since the early 1970s — the so-called “strength of weak ties.”9 From 
our family and closest associates we are often rewarded with loyalty, emo-
tional support, the safekeeping of secrets, and supportive ears for complaints 
of mistreatment. Yet there is also something static and repetitive about such 
relations, which in a sense are already all that they can ever be. Rewarding 
though such relationships are, in some respects they are resistant to change. 
It is different with casual acquaintanceships, which may lack much in terms 
of trust, loyalty, and intimacy, but which provide numerous avenues into 
possible new opportunities or perhaps entirely new worlds. It is such a good 
analogy that we might even borrow the phrase “the strength of weak ties” 
to describe the weak ties that any object has with its sensual qualities as op-
posed to the strong and intimate bond of loyalty it enjoys with its real ones. 
Indeed, weakness may always be the genuine agent of change in the world. 
Somewhere, Levinas describes violence as the attempt to control what is 
strong in someone through what is weak in them. But this turns out to be 
true of causal links in general, not just the ones we call violent.
Although space and time both have connections with sensual qualities, 
there is a basic asymmetry between them. Qualities never exist in a vacuum, 
but are always the servants or lackeys of some object. Merleau-Ponty is per-
haps even stronger than Husserl at showing that a quality such as green is 
not an isolated, objective wavelength of light, but that the exact same wave-
length of green appears differently depending on whether it is the green of 
grass, ink, a shirt, or the fluorescent lights on a mosque.10 In each of these 
cases, the character of the object infects the quality itself. Sensual qualities 
always belong to objects, but the objects to which they belong are sensual 
objects, not real ones. There is no bundle of qualities, but a primordial bond 
between sensual objects and their sensual qualities. Initially, we encounter 
them as belonging together. Our instinctive, commonsense approach to sen-
sual objects is to view them lazily as bundles of qualities. I turn an object in 
my hand, and after seeing it from all sides I am quietly satisfied that I have 
exhausted the thing by experiencing the sum total of its qualities.
But now and then, we do experience a separation or fission between the 
sensual object and its qualities. In these cases we suddenly grasp that the sen-
sual object is not a bundle of sensual qualities, but an autonomous source 
9 Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (May 
1973), 1360–80.
10 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith (London: Routledge, 2002).
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capable of generating new qualities under different conditions. This often 
occurs with delightfully variable objects such as kaleidoscopes and holo-
grams, or with electronic toys that utter different random phrases whenever 
a button is pushed. But in a non-technological context we know such cases 
through simple, natural experiences such as watching the light fade over 
rural landscapes, observing the changing colors of the Taj Mahal every few 
minutes at dawn, or following the shifting adventures of a fictional charac-
ter. A good general name for all of these phenomena would be simulation. 
Although this word is increasingly associated with computer models, the 
phenomenon is much more general. We have a simulation whenever we 
isolate a basic underlying principle in any given situation and try to gen-
erate the results of this principle in counterfactual situations. What might 
Baudelaire have written if he were a San Francisco beat poet instead of a post-
Romantic Frenchman? How would German philosophy have differed if, in-
stead of eliminating Kant’s thing-in-itself as the German idealists did, it had 
eliminated Kant’s fixation on the human–world pair and extended the phe-
nomenal–noumenal split to inanimate nature? How might World War III in 
Europe have played out in 1985? (I once read such a study, commissioned by 
nato.) What if we reversed the nationalities of Henri Bergson and William 
James — how would this have affected their philosophies? What if I had ac-
cepted job Z rather than job X? Or on a humbler level: how would this pear 
look if I viewed it from the other side of the kitchen? We have simulation 
anytime we break the usual bond between a sensual object and its customary 
range of qualities, so that the object is grasped as an underlying unit capable 
of moving into different contexts and yielding different results about which 
one can speculate. Sensual objects and sensual qualities are united when 
they arrive on the scene, and it is our job to split them apart. In doing so, we 
come to see that the sensual object is subtemporal, not to be identified with 
the shifting on its surface that gives a sense of dynamic temporal flow, since 
we have seen that these shifts are irrelevant to the sensual object.
One implication of calling objects subtemporal is that we must embrace 
what in the philosophy of time is sometimes called “presentism.” The élan 
vital so beloved by Bergson, the primordial “becoming” of Deleuze and Guat-
tari, looks from our new standpoint like sheer qualitative noise. Most becom-
ing leads nowhere; most flux is a surface effect without exit. Sensual objects 
are relatively durable units that change or perish infrequently. The river of 
Heraclitus is still there, but there are stones in the river, and those stones are 
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not altered or destroyed automatically every time a bit of water passes. The 
becoming of the stones is a very special case that requires work, not a preor-
dained entitlement for everything that exists. Becoming must be earned. But 
if sensual objects are subtemporal, we cannot even call them subspatial, since 
they have nothing to do with space at all. Insofar as objects are sensual, we 
are in direct contact with all of them. Even distant towers, forests, and moun-
tains are in immediate contact with them insofar as we recognize them. As 
John Locke already knew, distance is inferred rather than seen; babies must 
learn that they cannot grab everything within eyesight, and cannot touch the 
moon with their hands simply because they touch it with their eyes.
The situation between real objects and sensual qualities is completely dif-
ferent. Here, there is no pre-existent bond between the two. If we notice the 
qualities of a hammer, we link these qualities with a sensual object directly 
before us. Normally, we do not link them with some withdrawn, subterrane-
an hammer-thing hiding in the dusk of the world. True, there is always a link 
insofar as some real object must generate the sensual qualities of a broken 
hammer. But the real object with which we link those qualities need not be 
the same one that generates the qualities. For example, if I suddenly find the 
hammer too heavy, this might not be the result of the hammer itself, but of 
a strange degenerative disease by which I am gradually weakened. Or I may 
be unusually ignorant of tools, so that I blame the broken hammer for what 
is actually the effect of a broken mallet. Or I may be delusional, and curse 
the broken hammer when what I actually hold in my hand is a plastic toy. If 
these examples seem outlandish and contrived in the context of hammers, 
there are more credible examples — mistaken inferences in scientific work, 
false conspiracy theories that miss the true conspiracy, or shoddy historical 
work that weighs cause and effect incorrectly.
The point of these examples is simply to note that the link between sen-
sual qualities and real objects does not just flow from the objects to the quali-
ties (as when Kant says that there must be noumena to generate the phenom-
ena). It also flows in reverse, from qualities to objects. When the hammer 
breaks, to use Heidegger’s most famous example, there is a transfer of quali-
ties to a new and unseen object. Previously we saw the sensual qualities of 
the hammer in a bond or union with the sensual object hammer. But now 
those qualities are reassigned to an object entirely outside our grasp. The 
malfunction of the hammer does not make the hammer present, but calls 
our attention to its absence. The real hammer is not made up of the obtrusive 
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qualities that announce its breakdown, but lies at a layer much deeper than 
those qualities or any other qualities. The broken hammer does not give us 
any more knowledge of hammers than a reliably functional hammer does, 
but at least it strips hammer-qualities away from a sensual object and assigns 
them to an absent real one.
There is something unsettling about this experience, something lacking 
in the playful and addictive expectancy of simulation. It is unnerving to be 
alerted to an object that cannot be pinned down to any qualities at all, but 
merely shatters all accessible qualities. This is not a matter of simulation like 
the previous case. In simulation we have a fairly good tacit grasp of what 
the sensual object is, and simply apply it to numerous additional counterfac-
tual cases. In the new case just described, of real objects lying behind sensual 
qualities, we barely have a grasp of the object at all. We can do nothing more 
than allude to the object, and for this reason I have often spoken of the related 
noun allure. There is allure whenever we sense a real object in impossible fu-
sion with sensual qualities. Only here do we get a sense of space, because only 
here is there any distance; this space need not be physical, but encompasses 
every form of distance.
The showcase example of allure would be artworks, which cannot in any 
sense be paraphrased. A prose summary of visual art or literature cannot re-
place the work itself unless that work is of the most negligible quality, or 
unless such replacement is meant as a conceptual artwork in its own right. 
An especially beautiful landscape or jewel gives the sense of a disembodied 
force even deeper than the already startling qualities it displays. In cases of 
extreme courage, we encounter a force of character deeper than the venal 
calculations normally required by the relations between people and things. 
In cases of disappointment, the same thing happens for the opposite reason: 
a feeble underlying thing or human character now seems to have generated 
deceptive accidental qualities of which it was never truly worthy. If space 
is the interplay of distance and nearness, then real objects are subspatial, be-
cause they never approach us in nearness, but withdraw beyond any attempt 
to grasp them directly via qualities. As for time, we cannot even call real ob-
jects subtemporal, because they are not immersed in the stream of time at 
all, but erupt into the flow of time as if from another world — not a Platonic 
otherworld of eternal, perfect things, but a secular otherworld of fragile, de-
structible, and imperfect but beautiful things.
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One frequent critique of recent civilization is that it turns everything 
into a simulation, so that the reality principle is thereby lost. Baudrillard is 
condemned for turning the Gulf War and 9/11 from cases of genuine human 
suffering into hypnotic media events. Police and even insurance companies 
are criticized for predicting future behavior or future liability on the basis 
of statistical models. Pre-emptive war causes outrage, since it responds not 
to actual events, but to possible scenarios of aggression by the enemy that 
must be cut off in advance. Videogames are blamed for the inability of two 
full generations to distinguish illusion from reality. In terms of our fourfold 
model, simulation can be viewed as a de-temporalization, since it no longer 
lets sensual objects run their course in the normal flow of shifting qualities, 
but turns them into an extra-temporal source of variation that can be mas-
tered in immaterial form. By contrast, allure cannot be viewed as a kind of 
de-spatialization, since it is the only experience that produces space at all: 
without allure there is no space, but only withdrawn objects cut off from one 
another, just as in the occasionalist theologies of past centuries. If the era of 
simulation is accused of stripping reality from the contemporary world, al-
lure cannot possibly be accused of this, since it is the source of an unparal-
leled heightening of reality. The destruction of time would be countered not by 
a reconstruction of time, but by a production of space. Instead of the Heideg-
gerian cliché of citing Hölderlin’s “where the danger is, there too lies the sav-
ing power,” we would claim instead that simulation is the danger and allure 
is the saving power, and that the two have nothing to do with each other ex-
cept for their common link in sensual qualities. Andy Warhol’s age of simula-
tion would give way to an era of allure, and the extraterritorial would serve 
as the reality principle — objects not localizable in any given place because 
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